Tooze gives an example of Speer going to some factory notorious for their particularly abhorrent use of slave labor and that he must have witnessed the deaths and maltreatment of many Jews. Some of those in his entourage were said to have become ill and to have been bothered by seeing all this. Speer made nary a mention of it and seems to have not been bothered at all…
Perhaps Speer was too frightened to mention the slave labour bit. This was certainly an excuse used by Wernher (“Cluster”) von Braun. He claimed to have been horrified by the conditions endured by slave labourers engaged on excavating a cave out of solid rock to serve as an underground V-2 factory. Von Braun claimed to have protested to an SS guard, who told him in none-too-polite terms to mind his own business if he knew what was good for him. The great rocket man claimed that he was so frightened by this exchange that he went off and never mentioned such a matter again. There is a certain implausibility about this story (1) because while Von B’s SS rank may have been “honorary”, he was still in all possibility the highest-ranking SS officer in the vicinity, and would have had little reason to tolerate abuse from a guard and (2) there is the question of how Von B expected his rocket factory tunnel to be excavated unless the slaves were driven so hard that humping granite slabs up the “Stairs of Death” at Mauthausen might have seemed preferable. Postwar statements by people like von Braun are valuable as sources of history, but they always have to be read having regard to the almost universal desire of such individuals for self-exculpation. When it came to self-exculpation, Speer was up there with the all-time masters … Best regards, JR.
Hi Nickdfresh, please don’t go to lots of trouble! I was looking for a general impression, and thought as a book on economics as applied by the Nazis, that sub-topict might have been a strong enough theme that you could respond to off the top of your head. I was trying to get a sense of the book, and whether or not I wanted to read it for myself. I’ve read a few excerpts of a few consecutive pages from the book. Those limited samples weren’t personally especially exciting in terms of subject matter: what I came across was dealing mostly with unemployment rates and the like – not just the statistics, certainly, and Tooze did a good job of providing interesting historical context. but…the topic itself was of limited appeal. While I appreciate their value to history, and use numbers and stats in work, I’m not always delighted with the prospect of reading more of them in my leisure time. Maybe I’ve just got an aversion to the topic of “economics.” Yet enough has been said about the book here that I’m curious. You’ve read the book, you know it’s subject matter: given what I’ve said here, would you guess this book would be something enjoyable, or a chore, for someone of my interests to read? To be honest, I’ll probably get it on my list to read anyway: I just need to know what frame of mind I should be in when I start. 
I won’t hold you responsible for any poor guesses, but would appreciate your thoughts on that level. And thanks for humoring my questions so far, and any “thumbing” done!
Personally I found it very easy to read - it’s pretty much on a level with a typical mass-market history book when it comes to readability, rather than an economics textbook. Maybe a little harder because there is more hard fact and less sensationalism, but it’s certainly pretty easy and enjoyable to read.
There is another possible interpretation of Speer’s and von Braun’s and others’ conduct and personally favourable recollections, which is the other side of Hannah Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’. They were so used to the exploitation of slave labour and general denial of human rights to certain peoples as part of the Nazis’ contempt for lesser peoples that they didn’t really notice it.
That view may sound as implausible as their exculpations, but it reminds me that in the late 1960s the father of a mate of mine had an Indian business contact to their home for dinner. The question of poverty in India came up and, my mate being young and committed to principle, took the position that much needed to be done to help the poor in India. The Indian business contact, a wealthy man, maintained the position that there were no poor in India. It was only some time later that my mate realised that the wealthy Indian was not stupidly denying the existence of poor in India, but that they just weren’t on his radar as people because they were of castes which were of no significance to him and not ‘people’.
I can see the same thing happening in Nazi Germany under constant bombardment of Nazi propaganda extolling the virtues of ubermensch and the worthlessness of untermensch.
It’s not hard to understand when one sees how in current free societies in the West there are certain groups or races which are perceived as a threat or otherwise possessed of negative characteristics, such as Muslims or illegal immigrants, against which the dominant society, without the influence of government propaganda or longstanding caste systems such as exist in India and Japan, will readily tolerate negative treatment.
When demonisation and worthlessness of certain groups becomes an article of faith, as it did in Nazi Germany, why would the likes of von Braun and Speer see slave labour as anything but an expression of the superiority of Nazism and Germans and confirmation of the worthlessness of the slaves who were subjugated to the demands of the master race?
Personally I found it very easy to read - it’s pretty much on a level with a typical mass-market history book when it comes to readability, rather than an economics textbook. Maybe a little harder because there is more hard fact and less sensationalism, but it’s certainly pretty easy and enjoyable to read.
Thanks. I wasn’t thinking of it so much as a textbook as something that might involve endless discussions of labor force, the price of coal, the impact of forced labor, and the like. Topics that are rather dry in and of themselves, from my point of view – some may eat that up, but for me, I take it only in small doses.
The economic content is there, but it is woven into the narrative nicely and doesn’t feel like it dominates.
The economic content is there, but it is woven into the narrative nicely and doesn’t feel like it dominates.
Thanks pdf!
Speer attended meetings and conferences/rallys where forced labour was mentioned and planned - he always seems to have conviniently left before that part of the discussion despite being the leading figure at many of them.
He also tended to leave out the fact that Jews and other forced laborers were summarily executed in his presence, and that he had a very close working relationship with Heinrich Himmler, in his memoirs…
Hitler’s biggest mistake may have been entering the Tripartite Pact with Japan.
This aligned Germany with Japan against the Allies.
Without the Pact:
(a) the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might have been seen in large parts of America which lacked the desire to get into the European war as purely a Japanese / American war, which would have been more likely in the absence of
(b) Hitler’s consequent declaration of war on America.
This interpretation depends upon one’s views about the likelihood of America getting involved in the European war anyway, which was certainly what some politicians and others favoured, against the impression that the majority of Americans supported an isolationist policy so far as the European war was concerned but generally would have supported enthusiastically a response to Pearl Harbor.
Had the Americans confined their response to Pearl Harbor to defeating Japan, the Pacific War, which never occupied more than about 15% of American effort in WWII, would have been a quicker and more decisive defeat of Japan, even without the atomic bombs.
Meanwhile Britain, its Commonwealth, and the USSR would have been contending with Germany and Italy without the American industrial, materiel, shipping and military support actually provided, which at the very least would have prolonged that conflict and at worst might have seen an Axis victory.
It’s debatable whether America could have conducted a sole war against Japan in 1942 as it needed bases in Australia to resist the Japanese advance and the British in Burma to keep Japanese forces there and to supply air bases for the critical supply flights from Burma to China to help the Chinese keep Japanese forces there. The Australian bases probably would have been provided by Australia as the political climate after Britain failed, and lacked the capacity, to honour its various guarantees to Australia saw Australia look to America for defence of Australia. Whether Britain would have allowed America access to India and Burma for the supply line to China if America was conducting a war against only Japan but expecting Britain to assist that war while Britain was fighting Germany and Italy is unknowable, not least because it was still in Britain’s interests to allow that supply line to aid Britain’s war against Japan.
As an aside, the preamble to the Tripartite Pact, signed on 27 September 1940, is a magnificent piece of doublespeak:
The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.
Furthermore, it is the desire of the three governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.
I believe that Hitler was in no way obligated to claim war on the United States under the Tripartite Pact, as the treaty only obligated assistance to defend an ally, not to be a cobelligerent in it’s sneak attacks…
But the memoirs from other major Nazi players still exist, even though Speer always found a way to avert the attacks by claiming that he was not an anti-Semite, as if that admission was sole proof of his ignorance.
When Speer published, “Inside the Third Reich,” the impression I first received was one of a civil servant who knows the truth but does not question the ethics of his actions or those of his subordinates because those ethical questions are unimportant in comparison to much larger, more important questions, like armaments production and architecture. When Sereny extensively interviewed Speer in the 1970s, she was under the impression that the political aspects of his work never elicited any strong emotions from him; he felt nothing for the Jews and non-Germans who slaved in his armaments factories. His cold demeanor allowed one to believe that he was not a zealous Nazi or an Anti-Semite, and so he encouraged this belief, even if his actions suggested otherwise. Sereny believes Speer wasn’t an ardent Nazi; however, I didn’t reach this conclusion. Listen to Speer’s careful, forced recollections in “Inside the Third Reich,” and compare them to his uninhibited words to Sereny.
(RS*) Had the Americans confined their response to Pearl Harbor to defeating Japan …. Meanwhile Britain, its Commonwealth, and the USSR would have been contending with Germany and Italy without the American industrial, materiel, shipping and military support actually provided….
The problem with your argument is that America’s response pre-dated Pearl Harbor. FDR had already staked out a position as the “arsenal of democracy.” Britain was buying US matériel at very early on. The cost of the war led to its inability to continue to do so in late 1940, leading FDR in turn to initiate Lend-lease in March 1941. Likewise, US Lend-Lease to the USSR predates Pearl Harbor (October, 1941). US for-cash sales of matériel to the USSR seem to go back to at least that June. American industry, materiel, and shipping were thus in full play, and I doubt these would have been impacted at all by a US-only-Japan war – as you pointed out, the actual war with Japan only ate up 15% of the USA’s effort, leaving a lot of potential energy just laying around waiting to be used in the public rage after 12/7/41. In terms of things military, the absence of US fighting forces against Germany is much trickier to assess, but personally I don’t think things would have stayed US-Japan only for very long, especially given the pre-Pearl penchant of U-boats to sink US merchant shipping, the pre-existing US escort of UK convoys, etc.
(RS*) This interpretation depends upon one’s views about the likelihood of America getting involved in the European war anyway….
Whether Britain would have allowed America access to India and Burma for the supply line to China if America was conducting a war against only Japan but expecting Britain to assist that war while Britain was fighting Germany and Italy is unknowable….
Well, since both Churchill and FDR were clearly leaning in that direction of US involvement in Europe long before Pearl Harbor, I’d say that once the shooting with Japan started, the USA would wind up at war with Germany. And I can’t help but think Churchill would have done anything that he saw as bringing the US even one step closer to that goal – especially if it wasn’t costing him anything. So I seriously doubt there’d be UK objections to US access to Commonwealth bases, etc. I also believe access to bases was part of the pre-Pearl Lend-Lease agreements – though I can’t recall if there were any geographical restrictions or other caveats to that.
(RS*) [A US-Japan war] would have been a quicker and more decisive defeat of Japan….
Which would also have freed up Commonwealth forces committed to Asia for service in Europe….
(RS*) Without the Pact… would have been more likely in the absence of (b) Hitler’s consequent declaration of war on America.
(Nickdfresh ) I believe that Hitler was in no way obligated to claim war on the United States under the Tripartite Pact, as the treaty only obligated assistance to defend an ally, not to be a cobelligerent in it’s sneak attacks…
Nickdfresh’s recollection matches my own, and more importantly, Hitler’s beliefs. If I recall correctly, Hitler’s rationale for declaring war on the US was based not on any obligation under the Pact, but on his own brand of military analysis. He knew he would have to fight the US sooner or later, and ultimately viewed Japanese Naval power as too valuable not to have on his side. So he decided to strike while the iron while hot. His own naval weaknesses may have been on his mind, with the earlier losses of assets such as the Bismarck, together with the limited utility of the rest of his surface fleet. Since the supremacy of the aircraft carrier was not yet evident, he may also have attributed too much importance to the loss of US battleships and naval prowess. Whatever the quality of his reasoning, it could well have led him to declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor even if the Tripartite Pact had not been in place. After all, the man certainly did not suffer from a lack of hubris.
But there are also other considerations to consider. As I understand it, one of the pre-war effects of the Pact was to drive the Western powers closer together politically and militarily. How do you measure that? At least one source I read claimed that there was a lot of pre-war dancing between the Axis members on whether their acts of unity hurt or helped them, given the Allies’ responses, so it may have more importance than evident at first glance; I don’t know. On the other hand, the Pact had propaganda value, and served as a trunk onto which other alliances (Hungary, Romania, Croatia, etc.) were grafted. While some might argue about it, I would say Germany needed some of those alliances, even if just for raw manpower and economic trade. Without the Pact, what would have taken its place, and with what consequences for Germany?
Then there’s Japan. If Germany wasn’t getting closer to the Japanese, was it getting more distant? Things can get real speculative real quick, but…. In WWI, Japan had fought on the Allied side, and indulged in the grabbing of various Central Power assets in the Pacific. Without being a Germany Ally, it could have become a “loose cannon” so far as Hitler was concerned. The Germans were major suppliers of matériel and training to the Kuomintang government, and only stopped that support after the Pact. Germany had been using China as a source of various raw materials and trade, and so had an investment there to protect if there was no compensating Pact. There were also (minor) German and Italian Naval forces in the Pacific. Then there were various Vichy holdings in Asia, desired by Japan. If Japan hadn’t been an ally and grabbed them, instead of Germany smothering a French response, what might Hitler have done in response to Vichy pleas? As Japan pushes further into China and perhaps kills German observers and trainers? If Japan interferes with Axis ships on the seas? I doubt major bloodletting would have occurred, but perhaps an added diversion of Germany’s limited resources: China would have wanted more of everything it could get. Vichy’s Asian colonies – echoing Hungary, Romania, and others – might have cried out for matériel to strengthen its position – even without shedding blood, that would be a practice that consumed resources Germany didn’t have.
I don’t think Germany not signing the Pact would have improved Germany’s chances for victory much, and might have actually hurt – but certainly the war might have looked very different in its execution.
Agreed.
However, the Tripartite Pact was in part aimed at the US to discourage it from getting involved in the various existing and anticipated expansionist military adventures of the Axis powers, which is reflected in Article 3 “Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.”
It also aims to repair the damage done by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact a little over a year earlier which took Japan by surprise when it was fighting the Soviets at Nomonhan and deprived Japan of support by Germany, which had not yet embarked on WWII.
By September 1940 it suited Germany to align itself with the Japan it had abandoned to the Soviets a year or so earlier, primarily to dilute Allied forces facing Germany in late 1940 and prospectively, and long before the war really started to heat up in 1941-42. At the time of the Tripartite Pact, Japan was far from being committed to southward expansion and Pearl Harbor wasn’t even remotely in contemplation, but it suited Japan to align itself with Germany to dilute the potential Allied forces it could face.
It’s not something I’ve researched closely, but on what I know there doesn’t seem to be a primary source setting out Hitler’s reasons for declaring war on America. I suspect it might have been more to do with demonstrating unity of purpose with Japan which was a potential ‘second front’ attacker of the Soviets as Hitler’s war against the USSR began to stall rather than an independent desire to get into a war with America.
Don’t dispute any of that, but the question in my mind is whether the American people and Congress would have been willing to support FDR in getting into a war with Germany if they perceived the Japanese attack as, as it really was, an independent action by Japan in pursuit of its own interests unrelated to anything being pursued by Germany and Italy in pursuit of their own interests as, as you mentioned in another thread, Axis powers each operating independently of the other without any overall plan in concert, unlike the Allies from 1942 onwards.
FDR was certainly spoiling for war with Germany, but I doubt that this was the majority opinion among the American people and Congress.
Don’t know if that was bound to happen. As it was, Hitler handed FDR and a belligerent Congress the opportunity to declare war on Germany by declaring war on America shortly after Pearl. Had Hitler not done this, would Congress have been persuaded to declare war on Germany? If so, I suspect that the chances would have been vastly improved by Germany aligning itself with Japan through the Tripartite Pact as, otherwise, there was no connection between Japan’s attack on America and Germany’s war.
Undoubtedly.
British Commonwealth in WWII comprises various parts of the planet with various degrees of independence. Dominions such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia were not subject to British direction. Britain could not direct Australia to give access to the forces of any other nation. Indeed, Churchill got quite shitty when our Prime Minister looked to America for support after Britain was defeated in Malaya and Churchill refused to honour Britain’s long standing guarantees for Australian security from Japanese attack and, worse, tried to commit our troops returning from the Middle East to Burma where they surely would have been lost. The consequence would have been Japanese victory in Papua New Guinea before America had built up useful forces in Australia. The SWPA war would have been very different. Thank Christ that Britain did not have the power to control our forces or access to bases in our land.
Australia wasn’t part of any pre-Pearl Lend Lease Agreement. We didn’t need to be. We finished the war with the equivalent of Lend Lease credits due to support of various kinds given to American forces in the SWPA. Similarly, among various things Australia did, in his imperial Edwardian eyes, to piss Churchill off was to profit from sending various foodstuffs to Britain throughout the war. Oddly enough, he never complained about the various weapons we sent to Britain early in the war in a flush of imperial loyalty, thus depriving ourselves of the ability to defend ourselves from the Japanese when Churchill refused to honour British commitments to our defence, not least because he couldn’t as the Japanese had defeated Britain early in 1942 and Britain had its hands full fighting Germany elsewhere.
The only Commonwealth, as distinct from exclusively British, land forces committed to Asia and steadily fighting the Japanese in the crucial period 1942-3 were Australian. Apart from the US effort in Guadalcanal in 1942-early 1943, they bore the brunt of the land fighting to 1944 in New Guinea, with considerable US support, while MacArthur marshalled his American forces for the assault on the Philippines. Had those Commonwealth forces been sent to Europe, Australia could have been lost in 1942 before America’s green land forces could be built into a fighting force as effective as the battle hardened Australian divisions returned from the Middle East to confront the Japanese advance.
I don’t know. As mentioned earlier, I haven’t made a close study of it, but I don’t know if there is any primary source which clearly states Hitler’s reasons for declaring war on the US.
The war in Europe had been going for over a year when the Tripartite Pact was signed on 27 September 1940.
Other pacts could have been made.
See above post regarding comments on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Japan and Germany were getting closer under the Tripartite Pact, which was the opposite of the position a year or so earlier under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Those assets were not grabbed by Japan but were mandated to it by the League of Nations following WWI.
FDR was certainly spoiling for war with Germany, but I doubt that this was the majority opinion among the American people and Congress.
And I’d agree with you. But once we were over the cliff with Japan, I think it would have been relatively easy to exploit/twist/manufacture an event or three that would change that. It might take a few tries, but I think FDR and Churchill would have gotten there. JMHO.
British Commonwealth in WWII comprises various parts of the planet with various degrees of independence. … Britain could not direct Australia to give access…
Yes, I know. Mea culpa: I think, after reading your original post, I blended in my mind your comments about India and Burma with the bases.
The only Commonwealth, as distinct from exclusively British, land forces committed to Asia and steadily fighting the Japanese in the crucial period 1942-3 were Australian.
I’m not sure we’re understanding each other? What I was initially trying to point out was that in your original post, you had noted that a US-vs-only-Japan war might have been might shorter, as historically, the US only applied 15% of its effort in that direction. Your subsequent analysis on the impact of the PACT/non-Pact didn’t include that once Japan was (quickly?) defeated, British/Commonwealth forces in the PTO would be available in Europe (including returning Japanese POWs). How quickly Japan fell - I doubt it would have been a quick collapse – would impact the numbers of troops/formations of course. But isn’t your quote above missing forces in India, Malaysia, etc. that fought the Japanese? And wouldn’t Commonwealth forces, freed from concern about Japan, be lending greater support to the European struggle? The rest of the paragraph I took your quote from seemed to be suggesting Pacific Commonwealth nations wouldn’t have kept forces to defend themselves against Japan, or that they had sent all they had to the UK, neither of which I was suggesting.
The war in Europe had been going for over a year when the Tripartite Pact was signed on 27 September 1940.
Quite right. I had just been posting in the other thread about Pearl Harbor and had a US-centric frame of mind. And I was also including in my comments the time period and diplomacy that culminated in the Pact…
I’m running out of time (have to go to work). Yes, of course other Pacts could have been made, but with what consequences? Who with? Beyond the historical partners, such agreements might have brought in other states that might have become an albatross in one manner or another around Hitler’s neck. Or are you suggesting Hitler would no longer be in the market for allies? Turkey, Spain, Iran…all have various pluses and minuses that would have had consequences. or, alternatively, failure to find a “major” ally with the perceived military stature of Japan would also have had geo-political consequences.
I think we’re both suffering from the same problem, being confusing the ‘what if’ situation with what really happened.
Ditto.
I’ve confused ‘what if’ with what really happened by several degrees of separation between the two, and am now utterly confused. As I’ve confused myself, I’m not surprised I’ve confused you. Sorry.
At the risk of confusing both of us further, on the Commonwealth forces in Asia point, I don’t think they could have been released from Malaya southwards as Japan’s strategy required conquering Malaya and advancing to the NEI, although the fatal extension into Papua New Guinea was only a provisional target in the initial war plan while the ‘even more fatal’ (I know it’s not grammatical, but I think you’ll get my point) ‘victory disease’ inspired expansion to Guadalcanal and related activities in Papua New Guinea etc ensured that the Australian Commonwealth forces could not be released to Europe.
The Burma / India situation was quite independent of the situation in the SWPA involving Australian forces and involved only British and British/ Indian forces. However, the Japanese advance into Burma still required those British forces to face the Japanese, so they couldn’t have been released to Europe.
I think I misunderstood your earlier point about freeing up those forces as relating to the early stages of the war I’ve mentioned above, rather than what I now think was your intention that as the Americans would have defeated Japan, say, a year or two earlier this would have released British and Commonwealth forces to serve in Europe from or before, say, D Day.
If so, I’m not sure it would have made much difference to the end result in Europe, although it might have made D Day and its immediate aftermath more successful for the Allies if they had several divisions of troops battle hardened by the Japanese rather than some of the green soldiers who actually landed.
I think I misunderstood your earlier point about freeing up those forces as relating to the early stages of the war I’ve mentioned above, rather than what I now think was your intention that as the Americans would have defeated Japan, say, a year or two earlier this would have released British and Commonwealth forces to serve in Europe from or before, say, D Day.
If so, I’m not sure it would have made much difference to the end result in Europe, although it might have made D Day and its immediate aftermath more successful for the Allies if they had several divisions of troops battle hardened by the Japanese rather than some of the green soldiers who actually landed.
Yes, that was my point. I’m not sure if the war in the ETO would have happened quite the way it did without US participation (your premise) or if the US got involved at some unknown later date (my premise) as a result of Hitler not signing the Pact and/or not declaring war on the US. But once Japan was removed from the game, the UK/Allied forces would have more manpower in the ETO than was historically the case.
At the risk of further muddying the water, or ratcheting up the confusion, or whatever metaphor you prefer: your last paragraph seems to be suggesting the war would have ended pretty much the same way: If Hitler had not signed the Pact/declared war on the US, D-Day would still have happened, the end would come without much difference, whether the added troops from the PTO augmented or “replaced” US forces. In other words, you’re saying Hitler would still loose?
If that’s the case, I am not at all clear on why you’re saying signing the Pact was Hitler’s biggest mistake? It would seem a stronger argument could be made, for instance, that if he’d stayed out of the USSR, he might have won or at least avoided total defeat. Or are we so busy tripping over ourselves we should just drop this whole line? :0
I am confused. Were these episodes mentioned in Adam Tooze’s book or Albert Speer’s 1970 autobiography? A month after his death in 1981, MacMillian Publishing, Inc, published Infiltration, Speer’s analysis on Heinrich Himmler’s SS Industrial Empire. I don’t know whether Speer claimed to have had a strong working relationship with Himmler in Infiltration, but he seemed to have an incriminating knowledge of Himmler’s war crimes, and his book seems to indicate that he was aware of at least some of Himmler’s machinations or approved of them.