These were episodes mentioned in Tooze’s book. I’ll look some of it up tomorrow…
Hello
Yes? Anything to add?
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In my view, Hitler made 3 critical mistakes in '40 and '41 which cost Germany the war. Before I go further I should state that I’ve been fascinated by the “what if” questions of WW2 since I was a teenager (25 years ago) one of my hobbies since that time has been to conduct simulated war games to explore various alternative histories of the war. To accomplish this, I have used the most advanced commercially available computer software as well as “simple” board games like “Advanced Third Reich.” Using these methods, I’ve simulated/modeled many different scenarios (a dozen different simulations per scenario in some cases) using the most reliable and accurate historical information available. By using these methods, and through extensive reading and research, I’ve come to believe that Hitler made 3 critical mistakes that played a decisive role in Germany losing the war.
Mistake 1: Failing to recognize the importance of conquering England. Following the fall of France, Hitler wanted to make peace with England. He respected the English, and his attitude toward England was, basically, “you can have your colonies and your Empire–I don’t want them–all I ask is that you allow me to establish a German-led continental European Empire.” When the English government made it clear that it didn’t want peace, Hitler seriously considered invading the UK, but even then, he never really felt motivated to go through with the endeavor. Hitler also recognized that an invasion of England would be very difficult to pull-off militarily–that it would probably fail–and he wasn’t willing to take such a huge political military risk. Therefore, he cancelled Operation Sea Lion–the invasion of England–and began turning his full attention toward the USSR.
Had Hitler recognized the strategic importance of of conquering England; had he been willing to accept the necessary political/military risks involved in launching an invasion; had he been determined to lay the necessary groundwork to make such an invasion successful–destroying the B.E.F. at Dunkirk–insisting that the Luftwaffe focus on eliminating the RAF’s airbases in the UK–assembling all the necessary ships/barges necessary for the attack–then there is a fair to good chance that Germany would have been able to successfully invade and conquer England. Accomplishing this–along with a full mobilization of the German war economy–would have gone a very, very long way toward winning the war for Germany.
Mistake 2: Failing to conquer the Mediterranean. By September/October 1940, Hitler had decided that he (and Germany) were unable/unwilling to successfully invade England. Around that time, some of Germany’s brightest military men began advocating that Germany should drive south in order to turn the Mediterranean into an 'axis lake." One of the first steps in this proposed plan would have been to seize the British stronghold on the island of Malta, which would then have made it possible to establish a strong supply line to a German force operating in North Africa. (Rommel’s Afrika Corps) After this was accomplished, the Germans would have focused on capturing both Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Had Hitler chosen to pursue this course, there is every reason to believe that the Germans would have been spectacularly successful. Most probably, Gibraltar, Suez, and most/all of the Mediterranean basin would have been under Axis control by the end of '41–mid-42 at the latest. Afterwards, the Germans would have plunged into the Middle East to capture that region’s vast oil fields which were critical to the German war economy. If Hitler had pursued this Mediterranean option–and the Germans had captured Gibraltar and the Suez Canal–there is a very high probability that Germany would have been forced to make peace and withdraw from the war. (Churchill himself admitted this after the war) With Britain out of the war, it seems quite unlikely that the U.S. would have entered the war against Germany. (this raises the issue of Hitler’s 4th biggest mistake: Declaring war on the U.S. in December '41.) Hitler then would have been largely free to focus his attention on defeating the USSR–probably by launching Operation Barbarossa in '43. (to be continued)
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Mistake 3: Hitler's decision to attack and capture Kiev instead of Moscow in 1941. Following the fall of Smolensk, in August, found himself facing a critical decision: Should he launch an offensive towards Moscow, which most of his generals were hoping he would do? Or should he launch an offensive toward Kiev, in an effort to capture the Ukraine and destroy the Soviet armies (consisting of more than 1 million men) who were impeding the advance of his southern armies? Hitler chose to attack Kiev, and the Germans went on to win a spectacular tactical victory; but by failing to capture Moscow, Hitler had lost his chance--possibly--to win a decisive strategic victory. The capture of Moscow might have knocked the Soviet Union out of the war which, in turn, would have lead to a German victory in WW2. (Of course, the Germans later launched an attack on Moscow, in the Fall of '41, but weren't quite strong enough to capture the city)
Had Hitler made the decision in August to drive on Moscow instead of Kiev, there is every reason to believe that the Germans would have succeeded in surrounding and (at least partially) occupying the city in October. It's reasonable to assume that it might have then taken the Germans another 4 to 8 weeks to establish control over the city and crush all major resistance. If true, then the Germans would have been largely, or completely in control of Moscow by the time fierce winter weather fully descended on the area in December. Undoubtedly, the Soviets would have made desperate efforts to keep/drive the Germans out of Moscow. First, by using their Ukrainian armies (and other forces) to attack and drive north into the long German right (southern) flank that would have become increasingly exposed and vulnerable as the Germans drip over toward Moscow. Second, Stalin's recently arrived Siberian troops would have undoubtedly made efforts to recapture the city from the east during the period Dec '41--April '42. Could the Germans have fought off these attacks and held onto Moscow? My own battle simulations--using both "sophisticated" software and "simple" board games--indicate that the Germans almost certainly would have halted the Russian attacks against their exposed right flank south-west of Moscow. My simulations also indicate that their is a fair-to-good chance that the Germans would have held off the attacks by the (mostly) Siberian divisions attempting to recapture the city from the east. If true, then in real life the Soviet leadership and people would have been forced to accept the devastating loss of Moscow--at least for the time being. Whether the loss of Moscow would have knocked the USSR out of the war is unclear, but the loss would certainly have been greatly damaging to the Soviet cause. By failing to capture Moscow in '41, Hitler squandered away his only real chance to defeat the Russians and his last chance to win WW2.Computer simulations are inherently limited both by the nature of software and the biases of the programmer and the user. What exactly does “the most advanced commercially available computer software” for war games mean? I did a search and got…Flight Simulator. Your board games are even more limited, of course, and results may have more to do with your opponent(s) than historical analogy.
Are we to interpret your scenarios as stand-alone situations? In other words, that doing any one of them would (or realistically might) win? Yet I fear your games severely underrate obstacles. What of the difficulty that Germany, a nation with relatively little maritime experience, faced in invading England? For example their planners called for landings at high tide: vessels would beach themselves, allowing infantry off but then wait for the tide to go out so AFVs could just “drive off.” Unsupported infantry against the Home Guard, RAF against sitting-duck boats and AFVs – an interesting mix. Did the Germans wait in your scenario until more (and more appropriate) ships were available for an amphibious invasion? A rebuilding of the Luftwaffe after failing to win the Battle of Britain, or delaying until it builds a fleet of strategic bombers? Shipping to support logistics? What is the Soviet Union doing – if I recall my school day lectures, Stalin’s theory was to let Germany and Western European powers tear each other apart, and then he would go in and pick up the pieces. Stalin actually learned something from the debacle with Finland, and was restructuring and strengthening the Red Army. So every day Germany delays a move east allows him to build more surprises like the T-34, which the Germans found so unpleasant. How does your software deal with things like politics – for instance, in your Mediterranean scenario, how does Germany conquer Gibraltar without Spanish support? What time or other resources does it cost? With no German build-up in the east, does Germany help Italy after it attacks Greece, or does it let Hitler’s political mentor go down in defeat (and with what repercussions)? What is the rationale for assuming better German performance in their summer clothing in a captured Moscow is somehow better than their historical performance against Siberian troops? How does your software account for the instability of Hitler, the “Allies’ Secret Weapon”?
Your ideas may have some merit (IIRC, they’ve been discussed here before), but unnamed commercially available war game simulations are hardly a sound basis for supporting your conclusions. These ideas may in fact have been steps that improved Hitler’s chances – or just given him and his cronies improved (or at least different) chances to screw things up. JMHO.
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Hi Ardee, Thanks for your reply. You’re right–computer/board game simulations ARE very limited (unless, perhaps, you’re using the Pentagon’s computers/software) Simulations can never fully account for the vast multitude of military/political variables, the “fog of war”, etc.
You brought up an excellent point regarding possible Soviet intentions. If Stalin was indeed planning to launch a major attack on Germany/Europe (perhaps between July-September 1941), as some historians now believe/suspect, then this obviously alters the whole calculus regarding Hitler. If Stalin was planning to attack Germany–and Hitler knew it–this would explain why Hitler seemed to be in such a rush to attack the Soviet Union, why he didn’t feel like he could “waste time” by driving Germany into the Mediterranean, etc. I want to avoid the whole “was Stalin planning to attack Germany first” debate, but this obviously needs to be considered when evaluating Hitler’s pre-Barbarossa conduct. Personally, though, I have some doubts regarding the “Hitler knew” theory: Some of Hitler’s words and actions seem to indicate that he was never expecting a Soviet attack. Three examples: 1) Soon after Barbarossa was launched, Hitler said, “If I had known how many tanks they (the Russians) had, I never would have ordered the invasion.” (This statement–and similar ones–would seem to indicate that Hitler didn’t choose to attack the USSR because he thought that country was powerful and planning to attack Germany, but because he thought that country was weak and vulnerable) 2) Hitler remarked on at least two occasions–pre-Barbarossa-- how lucky Germany was that the Bolshevist Revolution had occurred when it did because Russia was now in a far weaker state than it had been during the czarist era. 3) If Hitler was expecting Stalin to attack, why didn’t he order the German economy to be fully mobilized and put on a war footing? Why didn’t he require German women to join the workforce? Why didn’t he order the defensive deployment of Sarin nerve gas to be used against a possible Soviet invasion?
(Continued)
Regarding the Mediterranean: I know that Rommel and other German officers believed that a full-blown German drive into the Mediterranean in '40-'41 would have cleared the British out of that theatre of operations in short order. At least two members of the British High Command–and Churchill–seemed to believe the same thing. An objective analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean at that time–strategic supply lines, shipping capacity, force dispositions, etc.–would seem to vindicate and justify this belief. (Rommel’s dizzying success in North Africa–with practically no support and only a tiny trickle of supplies–would seem to vindicate and justify this belief even further) The loss of Suez, or Gibraltar, or both, would have been devastating for Britain–and Churchill knew it. The Germans had a plan in place–an amphibious assault–to capture Gibraltar without Spanish support. I’ve read several books in which this plan is mentioned or alluded to, but I don’t know much about the plan itself. It does iseem like any plan designed to capture Gibraltar without Spanish support would have been very problematical.
Regarding Moscow: Seizing Moscow would have offered the Germans huge advantages; but whether they could have managed to hold onto the city for any length of time obviously remains an open question. Among other issues, the Russian rail system east of Moscow was quite sparse, and I do believe that transporting, supplying, and staging a large-scale counter-attack to re-capture the city would have been a major challenge for the Soviets. However, I do believe that they could–and perhaps would–have pulled it off. .
If Stalin was indeed planning to launch a major attack on Germany/Europe (perhaps between July-September 1941), as some historians now believe/suspect, then this obviously alters the whole calculus regarding Hitler.
I know of no serious historian who gives any credence to the idea expressed above. The “theory” seems built entirely on will-o-the-wisp evidence, and is contradicted by the demonstrated weakness of force, lack of supplies, and other military preparations/buildup that would be happening if an invasion were imminent. My own comment was speaking of Stalin’s long-term thinking.
Your comments on the Mediterranean scenario miss several points: Hitler had no vested interest in North Africa, and was involved chiefly to prop up Italy. Politically he want his “living room” to the east. The actual fighting in Africa was of a seesaw nature, so I’m not sure “dizzying success” is the correct expression to use. Germany’s codes were being read, and if Hitler had gone in that direction, the UK would know it and have had time to take at least some counter actions. Even assuming total Nazi success, it will have cost them time (probably at least a year) and strength for their war with the Soviets, while the Soviets continued to gather strength.
Regarding Moscow, I am not sure what huge advantages the Germans would gain, unless Stalin managed to get himself captured there. Stalin’s scorched earth policy leaves it unclear what would have remained in the city; the Germans would not have been any better able to use captured assets like the rail hubs in any case (wrong gauge). The chief advantage to the actual ground soldier in the city would probably have been shelter, both from the cold and from attack. Rather than German advantage, it would be a case of Soviet disadvantage in terms of rails, logistics, loss of face/morale etc. If the Soviets had been able to bring up their forces, they would probably hit the flanks rather the city itself, negating the German Shelter advantage, and Stalingrad would have come earlier and farther north. Well, that may be a little bit of an exaggeration, as there was no large-scale Allied bombing to draw off the Luftwaffe’s air support in 41, etc., but since even you seem to question the German’s ability to hold the city for long, that does raise the question of how not capturing the city is a major mistake?
You raise a lot of interesting points. During the past decade I’ve read several
If its taken you this amount in posts, to figure out Hitler’s biggest mistake, then your not the brightest star in the sky, we had a saying, as kids, “sticks and stones may break my bones but name will never hurt me” yes I’m treating you as a child. :lol::lol::lol:.
And as for you saying, it took me two hours to reply to your video, well I can only say this, I’m not a sad old git like you, that as nothing better, or more important things to do, in writing a load of tripe.
In me saying all this though, I have become like you:shock:.
Chunky
You raise a lot of interesting points. During the past decade I’ve read several long articles on the internet describing the detailed (and often bitter) arguments going on between proponents and opponents of the “Stalin was planning to invade Germany” thesis. (The whole debate apparently began in earnest when, in the early '90’s, a Russian man–a former Soviet military intelligence officer–wrote a book advocating the thesis) If I remember correctly, the articles mentioned at least 6 or 7 Russian historians by name–and 4 or 5 Western historians by name–who supported the thesis. I also seem to remember that at least several of these historians were described as being “prominent.” Some of the evidence presented by proponents of this thesis included: Detailed maps of Germany and Poland which were supposedly found on Russian soldiers who were captured during Barbarossa; the turncoat Russian General Vlasov’s statements to the Germans–while being questioned–that he knew for a fact that Stalin had been planning to invade Germany/Poland in September '41; a secret speech given by Stalin to officers in the Kremlin in May ‘41 in which he indicated, essentially, that the USSR needed to begin using it’s militarily to aggressively export the Communist revolution, etc. Of course, opponents of the thesis offered up equally valid sounding refutations and counter-arguments, etc.
I believe that Hitler would have had 4 valid reasons for invading/occupying the Mediterranean: 1) To prop up Mussolini. 2) To force the British to withdraw from the war and make peace 3) To induce Franco to join the Axis. 4) To establish a springboard for invading the Middle East and seizing that region’ soil. (and perhaps, at some point in the future, seizing resources in Central Africa)
Regarding Moscow: Some of the advantages that would have accrued to the Germans by capturing that city include: 1) Depriving the Soviets of their most central–and far most important–rail hub in European Russia. (without Moscow, the Soviets would have found it quite cumbersome and difficult to move large bodies of soldiers around the Eastern Front, particularly on the north to south axis) 2) Depriving the Soviets of 15-20 percent of their military industrial base. 3) dealing a blow to the morale of the Soviet leadership and people. 4) Providing shelter to at least some of the soldiers in Army Group Center, and perhaps a great deal of confiscated Russian warm winter clothing as well. 5) Providing the Germans with a more centralized and organized supply depot and command and control center; as well as providing soldiers and doctors with access to “real” hospitals. 6) Giving many German soldiers an additional motivation to fight in order to protect their new, comfortable “home.” (A lot better than being stuck in some tiny village west of Moscow, probably laying in the snow half-frozen to death waiting to be rolled over by a Russian tank) 7) Perhaps inducing the somewhat reluctant Finns to become more aggressive in their efforts to help the Germans reduce Leningrad. 8) Providing the Germans with at least a chance–perhaps only a tiny chance–to force the Soviet Union out of the war.
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I think the Germans were hoping to arrive in Moscow so quickly that the Soviet leadership wouldn't have had any time to adopt much of a "scorched earth" policy, or to evacuate or remove much (except themselves)--this includes, perhaps, a fair number of train locomotives and cars. As they arrived in Moscow, I think the Germans would have been hoping for something similar to what they experienced when they occupied Orel: There, as the German tanks rolled in, streetcars were still running, civilians were shopping and going about their business, some pedestrians mistook the German tanks for Russian tanks, etc.
I believe that if the Germans could have held onto Moscow for a certain length of time--perhaps a year or more--than it might have forced the Soviet Army to exhaust itself attempting to recapture the city (As well as the rest of the Moscow front--Orel, Bryansk, etc.) Moscow also would have offered the Germans a good springboard for launching a major attack in '42 aimed down toward the Crimea and Sea of Azov.During the past decade I’ve read several long articles on the internet… If I remember correctly, the articles mentioned at least 6 or 7 Russian historians by name–and 4 or 5 Western historians by name–who supported the thesis. I also seem to remember that at least several of these historians were described as being “prominent.”
jgb, if you are gaining your information from the Internet, you may wish to be a little more critical of what you read. As you have probably noticed, even the most ridiculous ideas can find ardent disciples in its ill-lit and anonymous folds. The evidence you cited, at least as you presented it, means nothing. Maps? If having maps of enemy territory, even in forward border areas, were an indication of impending invasion, every nation on Earth has been threatening invasion since the invention of cartography. Given the goings-on in the west and the growing conflict of the times, it is even less surprising. And whether it is for purposes of disinformation, telling the captors what they want to hear, a desire to buy favor, the desire to avoid some of the more tender interrogation techniques the Germans sometimes employed, or any of dozens of the reasons, it think it unwise to give any weight to what a captive says without physical evidence to back the words up. German propagandists may even have made the story up, with a turncoat all too happy to go along. A “secret” speech? Really? Since it is so secret and/or unofficial, how can any transcript be relied upon? You are offering only the exact will-o-the-wisp “evidence” I spoke of. Compare that to the absence of tangible evidence required for an invasion and there’s only one logical conclusion to draw. As I said, I know of no serious historian who gives the notion of a Soviet invasion of Germany in 1941 credence. Of course I don’t know every serious historian. Yet you did not provide any names. You say others claim some historians were “prominent,” but one must wonder how qualified those others were to make such claims. There are some, for instance, who think David Irving is “prominent” – but no reputable historian would take his theories seriously. Nor, I think, would any one here. If that’s a topic you want to discuss without any better evidence than what you provided, I suggest you try another thread or another forum. JMHO.
I believe that Hitler would have had 4 valid reasons for invading/occupying the Mediterranean: 1) To prop up Mussolini. 2) To force the British to withdraw from the war and make peace 3) To induce Franco to join the Axis. 4) To establish a springboard for invading the Middle East and seizing that region’ soil. (and perhaps, at some point in the future, seizing resources in Central Africa)
Your first reason I already alluded too. Your second reason has some validity, for indeed that is supposedly one of the reasons Hitler decided to launch a major invasion – of the USSR. If Britain did not surrender after the fall of France, what exactly would be required to make island England surrender? Loss of Egypt and the Suez would certainly hurt, but there’s no guarantee they’d bend knee if North Africa was taken, so why fight a good Aryan nation when all those sub-humans are waiting to get slaughtered in their rotten house of cards just to the east? That’s what I meant by my “living room” comment. Bring Franco into Axis? His country was war-weary, ill prepared, and uninterested. HE was uninterested, and too busy bragging about having the tallest building in Europe while the rest of the continent burned. Why suggest Franco would change his mind? I also fear your fourth idea is rather flawed and that you are seeing things from a current-day perspective. Oil was discovered in Persia (think Iran) in 1908, but it wasn’t discovered in Saudi Arabia until 1938, just before the war. Perhaps they had even discovered how large the oil fields were by 1941, perhaps not – to find out, I’d have to go research a topic I’m not terribly interested in. But I am pretty confident such recently-discovered oil was not yet significantly developed, and Germany’s ability to develop all the required infrastructure to profit from it in a timely fashion seems highly questionable to me. So far as being a launch pad for Central Africa, well, I have trouble envisioning Nazi logistics across the Sahara or down the Red Sea and eastern coast of Africa at anytime near 1941. And what resources were in central Africa that wouldn’t be much more accessible in the east, where Hitler wanted to go anyway?
Regarding Moscow: Some of the advantages that would have accrued to the Germans by capturing that city include…
You may (or not) consider it a question of semantics, but most of the things you describe are not advantages gained by the Germans, they are disadvantages given to the Soviets. A subtle distinction you may agree with or not, as you choose, but the point is that most of those things wouldn’t actually strengthen the Germans, though they might weaken the Soviets. The loss of industry is perhaps the most notable and strongest of your points, perhaps because I don’t know enough to argue about it. I won’t repeat the points I made earlier concerning railroads and the value of defensive terrain in a city encircled and cut off from supplies. But you do seem rather “optimistic” about the conditions in a German-captured Moscow. To hope the Finns would increase their war effort is likewise without any obvious basis in fact: the Finns had excellent reasons for stopping where they did, and precious little reason to go further.
I think the Germans were hoping… As they arrived in Moscow, I think the Germans would have been hoping for…
If Nazi hopes and wishes had any practical impact on the battlefield, we’d all be speaking German now. Moscow was the Soviet capital, and I seriously doubt resources would not have been used to the utmost in its defense. Everything you say in your post suggests you think the Germans would have had a cake walk into the city. I suggest that’s a tad unlikely, and will leave it at that.
Hi Ardee, you know, I wasn’t trying to espouse the theory about Stalin. Quite honestly, I’m not even remotely interested in the issue. And you’re right, a lot of things on the internet are hogwash. I’m currently engaged in a fascinating conversation about Alexander Hamilton on another fiorum, so I’ve got to go. I apologize if I said anything to offend or upset you. Take care.