Hitler's Biggest Mistake?

World War II German Military
#121

well, this austrian bloke did a lot of mistakes. beside the holocaust as the biggest crime imaginable and the responsibility for millions of dead from all over the globe, he invited the rest of the world to make war in germany and to devestate this country. but this is maybe a true but quite general answer.

there were many mistakes in detail. even it was a clear mistake to start a war, he did it much too early. he was told not to start a war against russia before 1945 (!) or better not before 1950, because the industry and army would not be ready before this time.

and:

  • he did not give much to valuable decisions of some generals and ingored important hints all through the war
  • he wasted hundred thousands of german soldiers on the battlefield due to idiotic orders, like in stalingrad f. e.
  • he did not force enough a rocket programme for anti aircraft purposes, he was more inrerested in V-waffen as terror devices
  • he underestimated some of his enemies first, but I guess he really knew that germany could never win a war against the mightiest countries plus the rest of the world

maybe the biggest mistake: he did not die as a child like his brothers …

jens

jens

#122

Hitlers biggest mistake… Hummm, Failing to understand that the US was at war with Germany after the incident with the ‘Rhine’ off the Florida coast.
Not understanding Donitzs’ requests (repeated) for proper use of Luftwaffe assets in support of the U-waffe. Not heeding Donitz in the request for 300 operational boats before undertaking hostilities. Listening to Erich Reader, and throwing away assets of the DKM in silly raider missions. Failure to listen to the Japanese counsel in developing the German fleet air arm. Signing the understanding with the Japanese Ambasador further commiting to mutual defense of Japan (to the detriment of Germanys best interest). Not understanding that with every tonne of goods lost, England was less able to support Churchill’s war. England was on the skids, with less than three weeks to go before throwing in their towel and giving up! He may have had some good ideas with his KdF wagen, and Autobahn, Kindergeld, and such, but as a war leader, he should have left it to the professionals.

#123

I voted for attacking Russia because of all the choices listed I think that one had the biggest impact.

#124

Flammpanzer
there were many mistakes in detail. even it was a clear mistake to start a war, he did it much too early. he was told not to start a war against russia before 1945 (!) or better not before 1950, because the industry and army would not be ready before this time.

Good thing he started early. Any later and he might have been first to develope nukes.

#125

i dont know, werent there rumours about soviet union ready to crush hitler in 1941?

#126

i did not hear any rumors about that. i heard hitler almost crushing the Soviet Union in 1941. I think you got it mixed up.

#127

no, i mean isnt there a rumour that involves stalin ready to attack europe? Hitler might do europe a favour to stop this invasion? i dont know, i read that in some other forum, so it is most likely not credible.

#128

FW, for rumors contact your local gipsy fortune teller. :wink:

#129

I can’t find anything on Stalin’s plan to attack Germany. Was there any?

Is there anything even remotely scholarly?

#130

Hitler’s, and the Axis’s, biggest overall mistake was the failure to identify, agree upon, and relentlessly pursue a common Axis aim, which is the exact opposite of the Allied position, regardless of the disputes and suspicions which may have plagued the Allies. This allowed each of the three major Axis powers to go off on exercises of their own without regard to the overall Axis position, and frequently in a way highly damaging to it and other members.

While attacking the USSR may have been Hitler’s biggest military mistake, it was made far worse by his betrayal of Japan in doing so, which altered Japan’s grand strategy in a way fatal to Hitler’s chances of achieving his grand strategy aim with the USSR.

In 1941 there were vigorous debates in Japanese strategy formulation circles about whether to attack northwards into Russia or southwards into SE Asia etc.

One of the significant factors for opponents of the northwards attack was Hitler’s betrayal of one of the major and supposedly agreed common aims of the Axis powers contained in the 1936-37 Anti-Comintern Pact http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tri1.htm http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tri2.htm http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tri3.htm
The intent of that pact was to contain the USSR and prevent the spread of communism. While not explicitly saying so, it saw the USSR as the enemy of all three signatories.

When Germany signed the Non-Aggression Treaty with the USSR http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nazsov/nonagres.htm in August 1939, without Germany forewarning Japan or seeking its agreement and while Japan was fighting a major campaign against the USSR at Nomonhan, the treaty was perceived by many in Japan as a betrayal of Japan by Germany.

When the position was reversed after Germany attacked the USSR in mid-1941, and bearing in mind that Article 3 of the Tri-Partite Pact http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/triparti.htm required the other parties to come to a signatory’s aid only if attacked by another nation, there was strong opposition in some quarters in Japan to aid Germany by attacking Russia. The reluctance was reinforced by the fact that Hitler attacked the USSR while the non-aggression treaty between them was in force, which increased Japanese distrust of him. Other factors, unrelated to Hitler’s actions, were that Japan assessed the risk of a Soviet attack against it as low and saw no point in antagonizing a sleeping dog, and resource and other issues dictated that a southward advance served Japan’s interests much better.

Had Hitler not been so treacherous towards Japan as an ally, and towards the USSR under the non-aggression treaty, he might well have been able to capitalise on the strong support for an attack into the USSR by Japan in 1941, so that Japan’s forces would have been devoted entirely to such an attack when the USSR was at its most vulnerable.

This would have meant that there was no southwards advance by Japan and no Pearl Harbor etc, at least not for another two to three years, if ever. America probably would not have come into the war against all, or any, Axis powers if Japan did not attack it. Hitler might well have won in Europe and the western USSR, with the USSR being carved up between Germany and Japan.

In the end, so far as attacking the USSR was concerned, Hitler’s first and biggest mistake was being as treacherous towards his allies and treaty partners as he was towards his acknowledged enemies. But for that, his military strategies might have succeeded.

#131

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4497 See links here. Weeks is an academic and authority on the USSR.

#132

no no no the war in the ussr was and stays no mistake because Hitler was stupid because he didn’t want to listen to hes generals and that was his mistake but declaring the war on ussr was no mistake!!!
operation seelowe that was his mistake it was a very simple and it was a good plan because he had 100.000 men at his disposal.
But because the morphia addicted fat ass could Herman goring couldn’t controle the air.
because he kept all the planes for him self.
(for airshows.)
in conclusion Hitler could have won the war and kick t the ass from Stalin back to the and of Russia.

#133

I would vote but the main and defining mistake that Hitler made was to to to the aid of Italy time and time again. Valuable time and resources were lost because of Italy’s blunders. And that’s a fact.

#134

I chose not taking Britain out early. After Dunkirk basically Britain was the only thing standing in the way of the axis’ domination of europe. His bombings during the battle of britain didn’t break through so basically he couldn’t take britain down anymore

#135

Iam pretty sure his biggest blunder was breaking the non-agg. pact. The USSR had too many men, some of them were not even armed, but the numbers of the “Ivans”… wow.

The Germans never had a chance at Stalingrad, it was a defender’s dream, every little pile of rubble became a spot for troops to find cover. Then, of course, the Russians finding all the Camps… it just gave them more of a reason to fight.

Attack in U.S.S.R, the reason, in my opinion with Germany was crushed.

#136

I don’t think failing to take the United Kingdom out early in the war was a mistake. It was impossible. After taking out countless RAF airfields and radar stations, and huge bombing campaigns on London and Coventry, Hermann Goering’s Luftwaffe was decisively defeated by the Royal Air Force. I do think one of the mistakes during the mini-war was The Blitz. Hitler allowed himself to be played by Churchill. After the Luftwaffe was making headway in damaging the RAF severely, it looked like a cross-channel invasion of the English Channel was possible. Even Churchill considered this a strong possibility. I know some don’t like to think so cynically, but it’s clear what the British did. Churchill launched massive air raids on Berlin that had little military significance, but claimed thousands of German civilian casualties. He did this purposely to goad Hitler into switching his Luftwaffe strength off the RAF and on to bombing mainland England out of anger, which gave the RAF time to regroup. And it’s not as if Germany could have taken on the British any sooner. They needed to clear out weaker obstacles first; namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent(in terms of weakness), France.

#137

I wouldn’t say the French “ran away”. Both France and Hitler knew that the French defeat was inevitable. All they would have gained from resisting would be more dead French soldiers and civilians, and a Paris that would have looked like Dresden. Besides, Vichy France wasn’t actually a bad deal, and especially not for those who wanted at least a formal declaration of neutrality.

The United States wasn’t all too neutral before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. and the UK were both selling weapons and making loans to China, in order to allow it to defeat Germany’s ally in the Pacific, Japan. Also, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands, had all placed oil embargoes on Japan. The U.S. and Canada were also working on the Lend-Lease program, in order to give the United Kingdom the tools it needed to wait Hitler out. The Roosevelt administration followed a policy of military neutrality, but not economic neutrality.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might have been a mistake in the long run, but they really didn’t have much of a choice. They either needed to ramp up the offensive for the natural resources or cease their conquests. Even if they didn’t attack the United States directly, they still would have launched attacks on Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, etc. This would have undoubtedly brought the U.S. into the war anyway, only without the weakening blow Japan had delivered it at Pearl Harbor. If Japan planned to continue the war effort in the Pacific, it would have been a grave mistake not to weaken the U.S. first.

Invading the Soviet Union wasn’t neccessarily a mistake, but stalling his attack on Moscow was. Also, he should have closed the theater of operations. He was now dealing with keeping Britain at bay in North Africa and a huge offensive in the USSR. And now without being supplied by the Soviets, there was a serious drain in resources.

#138

i.e. the you wish to say sir the defeat of France was predetermined in 1939?
The France which had a army equal to the Germans ( at least in quantity) was ready capitulate?
Well you right IMO the France resistanse was not as hard as the for instance Yugoslavian. But does it mean the most of franches don’t saw in the nazy the mortal enemy?Or shortly speaking - most of franches was not strongly against nazy ideas?

The United States wasn’t all too neutral before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. and the UK were both selling weapons and making loans to China, in order to allow it to defeat Germany’s ally in the Pacific, Japan. Also, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands, had all placed oil embargoes on Japan. The U.S. and Canada were also working on the Lend-Lease program, in order to give the United Kingdom the tools it needed to wait Hitler out. The Roosevelt administration followed a policy of military neutrality, but not economic neutrality.

Yes sure the US til the Perl Harbor wasn’t pure neutral, but it still was far from declaration of war. I think you heared about american “isolationism” - the some of americans prefered the trade instead the war :wink:
As he resault the americans companies continie to sell the oil the Japane untill the Perl Harbor. So the position of USA was dual - from the one hand to get support its ally Britain, fromthe other hand - to make the money on getting support for the Japane invasion.
The course of Roosevelt administration was to keet the neutralitet just becoce at that moment the USA ruling elite yet was not determined what had the begger profit - to sell with the Axis or to join the allies in war. It seems it was too difficult chouse for them :wink:
At least till the Perl Harbor.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor might have been a mistake in the long run, but they really didn’t have much of a choice. They either needed to ramp up the offensive for the natural resources or cease their conquests. Even if they didn’t attack the United States directly, they still would have launched attacks on Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, etc. This would have undoubtedly brought the U.S. into the war anyway, only without the weakening blow Japan had delivered it at Pearl Harbor. If Japan planned to continue the war effort in the Pacific, it would have been a grave mistake not to weaken the U.S. first.

Indeed the Japane had the choise.
There were two possible way - "northern direction to attack the USSR in the 1941 when the Germans was near the Moscow, and “southern direction” to attack the rich by resources European colonies in Asia.
Both “ways” had its own supporters among the Japane hight command.
The Nother way was lobbied by the Kwantung army command in Manchguria and among the infantry command in Tokio. The south way was supported by the Naval and AF command.
The reason why the Japanes prefered the “south direction” is still exactrly unknown.
One of the groop of historians thinks it was the resault of Japane falling during the attack to the USSR in the Halking-Holl lake in 1939. After this failure the Japanese were more not inclined to underestimate the Red Army.
If they desided firstlky to finish the USSR i.e. attack the Soviet far East in summer of 1941 the fate of USSR was determined. The siberian division which were taken from the East when the soviet hight command has take the adequate information about absent the plamns to invide the USSR in the East.
Those siberian division saved the Moscow in the 1941 ( and the fate of whole Eastern fromnt). If it would not the the USSR could be defeated already in the end of 1941, and Axis could be very close to the victory in this war.
But to the happines ( for us;)) the Japanes involved the USA in the war.

Cheers.

#139

The southward advance was more attractive because it required smaller forces than would be involved in a northern advance and (I’m subject to correction on this as I don’t know what developed resources were available in eastern Siberia, which was the limit of Japan’s interest) better resources: notably oil in Burma and the NEI; tin and rubber in Malaya; and sundry other resources in the occupied territories.

Another influence was that the Japanese had persuaded themselves that it was their destiny to liberate the Asian peoples from their colonial masters, notably Britian and the US who also happened to be the two nations causing the greatest resentment in Japan by their economic sanctions over China. The same sentiments didn’t apply to Russia.

Japan’s overall strategy was based on holding the colonies long enough for the Western powers to accept Japan’s conquests, which they were more likely to accept in time than Russia would accept the loss of eastern Siberia.

On balance, a southward advance seemed more likely to succeed and give Japan what it wanted than attacking Russia.

#140

You are perfectly right (as always ) mst Rising Sun*:wink:
The main goal for the Japanes was the resources of Asia. The giant resources of Syberia was simply unknowen at that time.
The final Japanes aim was the Asia no doubt but the concequences of attack is not obvoiuse. According the simple strategic logic they could win this was if they acted together with Gernany as aliies. But thanks for the god us the did not.
The Hitler was in fury when had learned the Japanes will not attack the USSR in the Far East. As the resault the 8 fresh division from Syberia saved the Moscow in the winter of 1941.
The simple logic of war could forced the Japane to help the Germany to finish the USSR firstly and AFTER than to began the capturing of the Asia.
The realasing the enourmous the Germans armies in the East (if the USSR was beaten) let the Germnany to begin the offencive to the Near East through the Caucaus and Iran and finally to take the Britain for the throat. This was a best moment to attack the Asia for the Japanes( probably in the spring-summer of 1942).
The collapse of USSR could get the Japane the enourmouses territories of Eastern Syberia. Besides the Soviet supporting of Chins had come to the end in this case. And as the resault the Chinas resistence could be succesfully supressed.

Cheers