Indian soldiers during WW2

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#61

Basically Nehru was a pragmatic politician, which at the time was a great counterfoil for the idealistic Gandhi. Nehru knew how to sway with the populist sentiments, and acted accordingly during this whole period (not just on the issue of the INA but in a lot of matters).

However, he was also pragmatic enough to know that British opinion had also changed, and that the Labour government was ready to accecede to Indian independence demands - so he could go out on a limb (which he probably wouldn’t have done to the same degree during the war).

What was important was Indian public opinion - Bose was still considered a national hero (though most of activities during the war were not known to the public), and the INA were seen as a force who had actually tried to actively do something for Indian freedom. The Quit India Movement had failed big-time, and the leaders had lost some credibility because of their absence from the public arena. India needed heroes, and the INA fit the bill for them - and the fact that the British were seen to hate them so much was seen as vindication of the INA members.

#62

Agreed.

If we ignore the military aspects during the war, it was really, in unintentionally, a war of liberation from European colonialism in Asia, to a fair extent in the Middle East, and to a similar but slower extent in Africa.

WWII had more lasting significance outside Europe for ending the colonial era and forcing European powers to re-evaluate a whole range of things, from economic exploitation to human rights, than it did for stopping Japan’s expansion.

The paradox is that Japan purported to be embarking on a war to liberate Asia from European colonialis when in reality it just wanted to replace European colonialism with Japanese colonialism, yet in the process it ensured that Asia would free itself from all forms of foreign imperialism, from Partition in India to expelling the French from Vietnam and the Dutch from Indonesia and so on (Although fortunately not the Australians from Australia. :D)

Though India had declared war on Germany, that decision was not made by the Indian government (which at that time had been going through a 20 year period of Indianisation) but by the Viceroy, without consultation of the Indian parliamentarians who had minority positions in local and national governments.

Can you expand on that?

I didn’t realise that India was able to act independently of the British at that point.

The main factor, though, that played badly for the British and Indians in Malaya, and later Burma, was that from 1939 to 1941, the Indian Army was so badly organised, and the administrators so relaxed about the possibility of a future war with Japan, that they only implemented minimal increases in recruitment and training facilities.

Was it the case that British officers from the Indian Army, and Indian officers, NCO’s and troops, were taken to fight the Germans in North Africa etc before the threat from Japan was fully apparent in the second half of 1941, so that the training cadre in India was badly denuded and unable to train troops as well as before? Leading to ill-trained troops in Malaya?

Although I have to say, the Dogras at Kota Bahru on the initial invasion put up a bloody good fight which they could never win because of British failures (going back to Churchill) in air support, while the failure at Jitra was due more to a range of problems emanating from staff levels than the troops on the ground who ended up in bad positions because of it. The level of inexperience of Indian troops might be gauged from the Punjabis at Jitra reportedly never having seen a tank before (seeing one for the first time when it‘s firing at you in battle is bound to be quite demoralising), while later in the campaign Indian troops reportedly fled from unseen advancing Japanese tanks which in fact were the tireless wheels of the bicycles of the advancing Japanese whose tyre tubes exploded in the heat, so they tore the tyres off and rode on the steel rims. That’s probably also partly in the nature of an army in a retreat that is nearly a rout. A lot of those problems go back to poor leadership by British officers in the Indian Army, many of whom were arrogant zombies of the worst colonial type who dismissed the Japanese as bespectacled pygmies incapable of facing European troops successfully.

#63

Hence the Brits being on a hiding to nothing if they tried to prosecute all the INA members after the Red Fort trials had become a sharp focus for anti-British and Indian independence sentiments.

I think one of the factors that changed between Clive and WWII was that what we now call India was originally carved up between various principalities etc, but by WWII a sense of national identity was emerging.

Again paradoxically, that in turn was an inevitable but unintended consequence of Britain’s ubiquitous presence on the sub-continent, so that in dividing and conquering the discrete principalities etc and replacing them with a uniform British administration that crossed all previous boundaries, Britain actually succeeded in providing a focus for united opposition to it across the sub-continent. This widespread level of opposition was far greater than anything Britain could handle, unlike earlier episodes in the Jewel in the Crown where the troops could be sent in to a local hot spot to put down trouble.

The INA, as one expression of united opposition to Britain and comprising a range of diverse ethnic Indian groups, also symbolised a national identity.

Or am I going too far with these inferences?

#64

An excellent book on the effects of the war in the immediate post-war period in Asia is “Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire” by Bayly & Harper, which is the sequel to their “Forgotten Armies”. It does an excellent job of describing the fortunes and misfortunes of many nationalist movements, many of whom had initially supported the Japanese. Well worth a read.

Can you expand on that?

As stated earlier, India had been going through a period of Indianisation, and though it didnot have Dominion status like Canada, Australia or New Zealand (who declared war independently), many Indians believed that this process had lead to a position where they would be consultedon such issues. The political relationship was that the Viceroy was the representative of the King, and could act semi-independently from Whitehall for internal matters. Things were negotiated rather than poicy being completely handed down from Whitehall. However, the declaration was made without discussion. For a bit more info, have a read of:

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-47058/India#486428.hook

I didn’t realise that India was able to act independently of the British at that point.

Was it the case that British officers from the Indian Army, and Indian officers, NCO’s and troops, were taken to fight the Germans in North Africa etc before the threat from Japan was fully apparent in the second half of 1941, so that the training cadre in India was badly denuded and unable to train troops as well as before? Leading to ill-trained troops in Malaya?

This was partially the reason - the long-standing professional army had been sent off to fight in Africa. Part of this was due to the fact that by 1941, Australia was (obviously) starting to worry about Japanese threats so close to home. However, a core remained behind in India and should have been used to better train new recruits but complacancy and incompetance on the part of higher command (and the lack of resources) meant that the pace was very slow

Although I have to say, the Dogras at Kota Bahru on the initial invasion put up a bloody good fight which they could never win because of British failures (going back to Churchill) in air support, while the failure at Jitra was due more to a range of problems emanating from staff levels than the troops on the ground who ended up in bad positions because of it. The level of inexperience of Indian troops might be gauged from the Punjabis at Jitra reportedly never having seen a tank before (seeing one for the first time when it‘s firing at you in battle is bound to be quite demoralising), while later in the campaign Indian troops reportedly fled from unseen advancing Japanese tanks which in fact were the tireless wheels of the bicycles of the advancing Japanese whose tyre tubes exploded in the heat, so they tore the tyres off and rode on the steel rims. That’s probably also partly in the nature of an army in a retreat that is nearly a rout. A lot of those problems go back to poor leadership by British officers in the Indian Army, many of whom were arrogant zombies of the worst colonial type who dismissed the Japanese as bespectacled pygmies incapable of facing European troops successfully.

Considering the position that the army (with all troops - British, Indian & Australian) was put into, with continual political interference from Churchill, military mismanagement, and most importantly, the lack of training, equipment and supplies, they did remarkably well. The issue of what the troops then did only comes about after they surrendered.

#65

Yes, and a point I meant to make earlier but overlooked for some reason (the beer, probably :D) was that the same options weren’t available to all captured troops.

The Japanese wanted to get the Indian troops on side to enhance Japan’s position as the leader of Asian liberation, among other things.

So far as troops of European nations and Australia went, it was more selective and primarily for propaganda rather than military purposes (like Charles Cousens http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A130571b.htm) , and compounded by the contempt Japan had for Europeans.

It’s interesting to contrast the Japanese attitude to Indian POW’s who switched sides and were treated by Japan as honourable soldiers with the contempt Japan showed for European soldiers who offended Japan’s code of ‘no surrender’ and were therefore worthless animals to be worked to death and slaughtered on a whim. Just like the Indians who didn’t go over to Japan.

The supposedly rigid Japanese with their bastardised code of Bushido were just as full of bullshit as everyone else when it came to subordinating their inflexible noble principles of honour to the political expediency of suborning Indian troops to help Japan’s intentions towards conquering India.

#66

Yes, but the Japanese didn’t see the Indians as soldiers who had surrendered of their oown volition but rather slaves of the European imperialists, who had been conned into fighting against their Asian brethern. So the “Bushido” code of surrender being dishonourable didn’t apply - which is probably why they treated those Indians who didn’t change sides even worse (seeing them as unrepentant lackeys of the Europeans).

Looking at from the Japanese point of view (merely hypothesising - not agreeing), those Indians who didn’t join the INA were the traitors. But that was at the political level - as has been shown, japanese military leaders weren’t so certain that the INA would remain loyal - they knew that renegades (though I think we agree to disagree as to whether they were traitors, I would certainly accept that they were renegades), once they had acted once in such a manner, may then act again in the same way because all allegiances, except to their own cause, have been broken.

#67

I’m not sure that they did too well, at all. That’s not a criticism of the troops, of any nation, but of their commanders, senior officers, and field officers. Maybe even subalterns, in some cases.

Notwithstanding the critical failure to supply Malaya with adequate aircraft which was the fault of Churchill and Whitehall, there was some appalling mismanagement by all the commanders, but perhaps least of all by poor old General Percival in one way, although as commander he bears ultimate responsibility for the disaster.

Here’s some of my views on it

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4781&highlight=malaya

As for the magnificent Australian command, Gen bloody Bennett never went forward in the peace phase, let alone when the shooting started. Never a coward, but very poor as a divisional commander despite some outstanding performances in WWI at battalion and brigade level.

Ran back to Australia rather than stay with his troops, because he believed he had great knowledge of Japanese tactics, so he said. He could have sent a captain or major back with that knowledge.

Maybe he just wanted to get back to make sure that he rather than Gen Blamey got the top job. Blamey got it, despite having fled the rout Churchill caused in Greece by not providing air support (familiar theme?) in a small aeroplane and giving one of the few seats to his surviving son, who was of no military significance and much lower rank than the few other officers on the plane.

Senior military commanders share one feature with the politicians who get us into wars: ambition which ensures self-preservation at the expense of others.

#68

What I meant, and you probably agree with me, is that the troops on the ground did their jobs well, under the circumstances. In fact there were no major panics or routs (though it often did look like that because of the incompetent handling of the troops, and the contnual orders to fall back). Soldiers fought, and died, bravely, when they were given the opportunity to do so.

As to Bennet, I only know the little that I have read, and from what I have read, his egomania was a great obstacle to him being a good leader. But then again, his “escape” back to Australia with the contempt that it really did deserve, and he received no-more important command positions.

I am ambivalent about Percival - he wasn’t the best commander to have on the spot, but then again, his position was made untenable by the interference from Whitehall, and he wasn’t of a strong enough character to counter the constant bickering between the commanders of the three military arms (who all seemed to have their own ideas about the best courses of action - the adage of too many cooks really does seem appropriate).

In many ways, Malaya and Singapore was lost from the moment the Allies failed to counter the threat of the Japanese invasion of Thailand.

#69

An original and insightful point, but it makes sense. I don’t know if that’s how the Japanese thought.

But that was at the political level - as has been shown, japanese military leaders weren’t so certain that the INA would remain loyal - they knew that renegades (though I think we agree to disagree as to whether they were traitors, I would certainly accept that they were renegades), once they had acted once in such a manner, may then act again in the same way because all allegiances, except to their own cause, have been broken.

That’s pretty much what led to the collapse of the First INA, but if Japan had been smart enough to recognise that the desire of Mohan Singh and his men to fight the British was genuine they wouldn’t have lost some Indians who preferred to go back to POW status. The problem there was with Japanese deviousness and suspicion (assuming that the INA would be as crooked as the Japs) rather than INA conduct.

It’s always the problem that nobody trusts someone who has abused the trust placed in them, whether a soldier who has betrayed his oath or a primary school kid who has snitched on another kid for whatever.

The fact that many Indians willingly chose POW status, although perhaps without full understanding of what it would mean for them (nobody knew what was coming, Indian or other POW’s), suggests that their loyalty was to India rather than to Japan and its aims or to Britain and its aims. That’s hardly rocket science.

I’ll accept renegade as a convenient term for people whose actions we might interpret in different ways, rather than labour the point I’ve already made repeatedly.

I don’t have any problem in understanding the actions of Indians who went over to the Japanese, although I’m sure that there was a variety of reasons in each man’s mind, not least self-preservation. I wouldn’t be above it in the right circumstances. Well, actually, any circumstances, as I’m a congenital coward. :smiley:

Perhaps the first practical problem is that at the Farrer Park address there remains confusion about what the British officer, ? Hunt (sorry, working off my failing memory here - some might think it‘s a name that rhymes with Hunt but starting with an earlier consonant in the alphabet, about three from the beginning), said.

Some Indians understood him to say something to the effect that ‘You are now part of the Japanese Army’ while others understood him to say only that they were prisoners of the Japanese. It may have got lost in the translation. The Indians had been separated from the British and many felt abandoned. So, that was fertile ground for the blandishments of the Japanese and First INA speakers who followed.

#70

Agreed.

In fact there were no major panics or routs (though it often did look like that because of the incompetent handling of the troops, and the contnual orders to fall back). Soldiers fought, and died, bravely, when they were given the opportunity to do so.

Lower levels of command rarely met the expectations placed upon them by distant commanders. The lower levels often did rather better than the resources and directions given to them by distant commanders deserved.

As to Bennet, I only know the little that I have read, and from what I have read, his egomania was a great obstacle to him being a good leader. But then again, his “escape” back to Australia with the contempt that it really did deserve, and he received no-more important command positions.

Like so many things, it’s more complex than that. Read his biographies and the contemporary views of his peers and there’s an equivocal view. Then there’s a picture (which bloody Google can’t find) of his 8th Div troops who’d been in captivity for close to four years, hanging a “We want Bennnet” (not entirely an unambiguous statement :D) off the rails of their ship.

I am ambivalent about Percival - he wasn’t the best commander to have on the spot, but then again, his position was made untenable by the interference from Whitehall, and he wasn’t of a strong enough character to counter the constant bickering between the commanders of the three military arms (who all seemed to have their own ideas about the best courses of action - the adage of too many cooks really does seem appropriate).

In many ways, Malaya and Singapore was lost from the moment the Allies failed to counter the threat of the Japanese invasion of Thailand.

Everybody of any importance in Malaya knew what had to be done to resist the Japanese.

They were just prevented from doing it for a range of reasons that had nothing to do with the troops, and commanders, on the ground in late 1941 early 1942.

Even if Percival had been Patton (a shithouse general in his own right in some respects, but one who got some things done), the result probably wouldn’t have been any different

#71

It is indeed uncertain what Hunt (yep it was Hunt :wink: ) said that day, and what is interesting is that he was the only European officer to speak to the Indian soldiers that day, as all the others had been seperated and marched off to Changi.

Fay makes some interesting points about the period immediatelly after the surrender, and I shall scan the 4 or 5 pages a little later for you to read (have to pop out now so will scan this evening).

Interesting debate so far - hope to continue it when I get back.

#72

A pity.

Some of the troops might have thought he was the other thing. :smiley:

#73

Amrit,
Squadron Leader Mahinder Singh Pujji DFC looks like an interesting character. I must look into his exploits sometime. As you may or may not know, I specialise in WW2 aviation art; perhaps his experiences could make for an interesting, future artwork.

#74

Looking back on this thread, I think I owe Rising Sun an apology for getting ‘shirty’ a while back on this thread. I have sent him a PM accepting I was out of line and hope he accepts my apologies.

Regards,