Italian tanks and AFVs.

Hello everyone, the P26/40 is a step forward for Italian, but it has the same problem as its predecessors, that dir as steel in which it is built is of poor quality, more production is ridiculous in number. In terms of combat capability, the problem is that it met very little car in its class, so its assessment is difficult. Note though that the Germans will still occur until 1945, suggesting some military value to them. For more information I suggest you look at this.

http://www.italie1935-45.com/RE/photoscopes/chars/p26-40.html

Sincerly Fred:D:D:D

The P40 seems to have been liked by some German units while not well thought of by others (mainly due to its unreliable engine). It was generally regarded as a useful vehicle but in the too little too late mould.

It was the tank the Italians wanted in 1941 and needed in 1942 but got in 1943 by which time it was being superseded. The proposed P43 would have been a much better proposition but Italian design and manufacturing was unfortunately very limited in its capabilities.

Typical of the Germans as vehicles broke down and become un-repairable they turrets were used as static defence points along with Panther turrets.

The germans used the P40’s in northern Italy & Yugoslavia, but some allied tank crews sais it could beat the Grants and shermans M4A1, but for the luck of the allies it was finished only in 1943

The P40 was the first time the Italians actually had a tank with a gun comparable to the main allied tank of the time (the Sherman). Its armour was not much better than its predecessors though.

Yeah, I think the Semoventes were the best (if not the only) Italian trumps of the war, if their air-force does not count!

The Germans considered the P40 as a sort of less powerful and efficient Panzer IV.

The germans used the P40’s in northern Italy & Yugoslavia, but some allied tank crews sais it could beat the Grants and shermans M4A1, but for the luck of the allies it was finished only in 1943

It was roughly equal to the Sherman, stat-wise, but was made with poorer-quality steel, nowhere near as reliable and never produced in numbers for a variety of reasons. Development took way too long; if the Italians could have fielded this tank in NA in early 1942, it could have made quite a difference in the war there.

Without a doubt, the Semovente were the best AFV the Italians did use in the field. If they had upgunned them to the 75/46 or the 105 faster, they could have had a significant impact on the war in NA. As it ended, it seemed the Italians only managed to manufacture adequate AFV in 1943, and for the most part they were still behind other nations with these designs. Still, they were worlds better than the 47mm armed M 13/40-14/41-15/42 tanks.

Sorry Byron, but you’re wrong, the Italians had lost the war is beginning, let me explain, Mussolini launched a country are far too early in the war, when he declared war on France, are armed is far be ready, regardless of the regiment are fully staffed with whether in weapons or soldiers, it just has to see the reaction of the general commanding the Alpini who says simply Mussolini they are by no ready and it will be repeated on each theater unfortunately in Greece for example, or it will be rolled by troops better equipped and better managed, in North Africa where they send the Folgore in abject poverty and But that will do wonders. This is not the troops and officers and NCOs to blame but a central command unable to have a realistic view of events. What then of the industrial production of weapons whose capabilities are more than reduced, the fact that they would have had the Semovente they produce more consistent with a weapon does not mean because of the low yield industrial capabilities, many pictures show Italian factories with facilities date back to early 20s with no modernization,how do you know that in such conditions they can rapidly produce improved ue for a particular material, that they is simply not possible.
friendships Fred

You’re right dear Fred. Apart the big lack of industrial output, the Italian war was just a bet over the idea that “Germany has already won, just some months and a bit of blood and we’ll seat among the winners”. The Comando Supremo, apart the fact the the armed forces would still needed at least 3 years of preparation to be quite ready for a great conflict (like agreed in the Steel pact) guaranteed 6 months of authonomy for such a conflict. If the war was lasted less, that would be perfect, but after that time, nothing could be assured.
In fact what strategical planes were prepared for the war? None. “Now we enter into the war, then we’ll see what to do”. To delay the invasion of Malta after june 1940 was a mistake consequenting a big general mistake based on these mistaken basis. The war against Greece was another worse mistake in the mistake. After the German military intervention in Romania, Mussolini wanted its own success in the Blakans. Mussolini, Ciano and general Visconti Prasca prepared a useless campaign without the mininum good sense, political and military. Few and insufficent troops, without moral motivation, in the worst season for an attack, should attack an enemy clearly stronger, fierce and motived in defending the homeland, and alerted by months of useless menaces if the fate was to attack and not just warning from some political attitudes. Apart the political disaster by Ciano and Mussolini, Visconti Prasca should be shooted for inaptness and airiness.
Still in 1941 the economy was not a war-economy: the Duce, the first year and more want to limit the fatigues of the population, under the usual idea the war should last no long.
Even in september - october, the veterans in Albania were dismobilited, for the same reason: Mussolini, would a peace-time attitude in the homefront. A few weeks later those men were recalled with the confusion - many already at home - and the moral conseguences easily guessable.
Troops that would served in Africa, were wasted in Greece, without useful motivation and in the worst possibile military conduction. Discretid covered the Italian armed forces, that fought well, as usual, in their duty, for the ineptitude of the political and military leaders. Being not finished after december 1940, the war was already lost for Italy, as the Comando Supremo had already meant 6 months before. After that time Italy was towed by Germany, and this was not in the intentions. To send the CSIR and the ARMIR in Russia, was another military mistake, even if the political reasons of the move were understandable. Especially considering that the Germans wasted the Alpini Corp in the steppe’s plains and not in the Caucaso mountains, for wich it was allotted.
So, apart the army not ready, apart the completely insufficient industrial output, the Italian war was a big mistake from the start, with other and worse big mistakes in the tecnical conduction…
So, considering all this, as the famous historician of the US navy Morison wrote, it’s not surprising that Italy lost the war, it’s surprising that was able to resist three years!

By the way Fred, you that speak a bit of Italian, read here. Do you know the story of Suor Elena Aiello?

Cosenza, 23 aprile 1940

Al Capo del Governo
Benito Mussolini

Duce,
vengo a Voi in nome di Dio per dirvi ciò che il Signore mi ha rivelato e che vuole da voi. Io non volevo scrivere, ma ieri, 22, il Signore mi è apparso di nuovo imponendomi di farvi sapere quanto segue:

“Il mondo è in rovina per i molti peccati e particolarmente per i peccati d’impurità che sono arrivati al colmo dinanzi alla Giustizia del mio Padre Celeste. Perciò tu dovrai soffrire ed essere vittima espiatrice per il mondo e particolarmente per l’Italia, dove è la sede del mio Vicario. Il mio Regno è regno di pace, il mondo invece è tutto in guerra.
I Governatori dei popoli sono agitati per acquistare nuovi territori. Poveri ciechi!.. Non sanno che dove non c’è Dio non vi può essere alcuna vera conquista! Nel loro cuore non vi è che malvagità e non fanno che oltraggiarmi, deridermi, disprezzarmi! Sono demoni di discordia, sovvertitori dei popoli e cercano di travolgere nel terribile flagello anche l’Italia, dove sta Dio in mezzo a tante anime e la sede del mio Vicario, Pastor Angelicus.
La Francia, tanto cara al mio cuore, per i suoi molti peccati, presto cadrà in rovina e sarà travolta e devastata come Gerusalemme ingrata.
All’Italia, perché sede del mio Vicario, Ho mandato Benito Mussolini, per salvarla dall’abisso verso il quale si era avviata, altrimenti sarebbe arrivata in condizioni peggiori della Russia. In tanti pericoli l’ho sempre salvato; adesso deve mantenere l’Italia fuori dalla guerra, perché l’Italia è civile ed è la sede del mio Vicario in terra.
Se farà questo avrà favori straordinari e farò inchinare ogni altra Nazione al suo cospetto. Egli invece ha deciso di dichiarare la guerra, ma sappia che se non la impedirà, sarà punito dalla mia Giustizia!”

Tutto questo mi ha detto il Signore. Non crediate, o Duce, che io mi occupi di politica. Io sono una povera Suora dedicata all’educazione di Piccole abbandonate e prego tanto per la vostra salvezza e per la salvezza della nostra Patria.

Con sincera stima
dev.ma
Suor Elena Aiello

(la lettera fu consegnata alla sorella del Duce, Donna Edvige, il 6 maggio 1940, ed ella la consegnò a Mussolini qualche giorno dopo).

Ma ecco un’altra lettera di Suor Elena Aiello, questa volta direttamente a Donna Edvige, nella quale ella accenna al contenuto della lettera di cui sopra:

Montalto Uffugo (CS), 15 maggio 1943

Gent.ma Donna Edvige,
questo mio lungo silenzio vi avrà fatto forse pensare che io mi sia dimenticata di voi, mentre invece io vi ricordo tutti i giorni, nelle mie povere preghiere, seguendo sempre le dolorose vicende della nostra bella Italia.
Noi ci troviamo fuori Cosenza, a causa dei bombardamenti. La barbarie nemica ha sfogato il suo odio, sganciando bombe sulla città di Cosenza, causando devastazione, dolore e morte fra la popolazione civile.
Io mi trovavo a letto con le sofferenze: tre bombe sono cadute vicino al nostro Istituto, ma il Signore ci ha salvato nella sua infinita bontà e misericordia. Per tenere lontane le bambine dal pericolo di nuove incursioni, ci siamo rifugiati a Montalto Uffugo, mio paese natio, dove ci troviamo certamente a disagio, ma tutto offriamo al Signore per la salvezza dell’Italia.
La ragione di questo mio scritto è per rivolgermi nuovamente a voi, come nel mese di maggio del 1940, quando venni a Roma presentata dalla Baronessa Ruggi, per consegnarvi in iscritto le rivelazioni avute dal Signore riguardo al Duce. Ricordate quando il 6 maggio del 1940 dicevano che il Duce aveva deciso di fare la guerra, mentre il Signore gli faceva sapere nella mia lettera che doveva salvare l’Italia dalla guerra altrimenti sarebbe stato punito dalla Sua divina Giustizia? “In tanti pericoli” diceva Gesù “l’ho sempre salvato: anche lui, adesso, deve salvare l’Italia dal flagello della guerra, perché vi è la sede del mio Vicario. Se farà questo gli darò favori straordinari e farò inchinare ogni altra Nazione al suo cospetto; invece lui ha deciso di fare la guerra, ma sappia che se non la impedisce, sarà punito dalla mia Giustizia”.
Ah!.. se il Duce avesse dato ascolto alle parole di Gesù, l’Italia non si sarebbe trovata ora in così triste condizione!..
Io penso che il cuore del Duce sarà molto rattristato nel vedere l’Italia, da un giardino fiorito, trasformato in un campo deserto, seminato di dolore e di morte. Ma perché continuare questa guerra terribilmente crudele, se Gesù ha detto che per nessuno vi sarà vittoria? Perciò, cara Donna Edvige, dite al Duce, a nome mio, che questo è l’ultimo avviso che il Signore gli manda. Potrà ancora salvarsi mettendo tutto nelle mani del Santo Padre. “Se non farà questo” diceva il Signore “Presto scenderà su di lui la Giustizia Divina. Anche gli altri Governatori che non ascolteranno gli avvisi e le direttive del mio Vicario(1) saranno raggiunti e puniti dalla mia Giustizia”.Vi ricordate il 7 luglio dell’anno scorso quando mi chiedevate che cosa ne sarebbe stato del Duce ed io vi risposi che se non si fosse mantenuto unito al Papa sarebbe finito peggio di Napoleone?! Ora vi ripeto le stesse parole: Se il Duce non salverà l’Italia rimettendosi a quanto dirà e farà il Santo Padre, presto cadrà; anche Bruno dal cielo chiede al padre la salvezza dell’Italia e di lui stesso.
Il Signore dice spesso che l’Italia sarà salva per il Papa, vittima espiatrice di questo flagello, perciò non vi sarà altra via per la vera pace e per la salvezza dei popoli, fuori di quella che traccerà il Santo Padre.
Cara Donna Edvige, riflettete bene come tutto ciò che ha detto il Signore si sia perfettamente avverato.
Chi è che ha causato tanta rovina all’Italia? Non è stato forse il Duce per non avere ascoltato le parole di nostro Signore Gesù Cristo?
Ora potrà ancora rimediare facendo quanto vuole il Signore.
Io non mancherò di pregare.
Suor Elena Aiello

Read here too:

http://ilcovo.mastertopforum.net/mussolini-uomo-della-pace-vt1308.html

Fred and DVX,

I never claimed that the Italians could have won the war–or even won in NA. I only stated that the better weaponry they were just beginning to field in 1943 (at the end) could have had a powerful effect in NA if it had been produced sooner. To say that would have completely turned the tide of the entire war, or even the conflict in NA, is a stretch. However, it would have had a pretty good chance of prolonging the conflict and may have changed the overall timeline of the war in 1943.

I am aware of the reasons why these AFV were not produced in 1941 or 1942.

Hello Byron, it was not a criticism but rather a focus to understand why this has occurred. Indeed you are right about the Semovente is in fact probably the best tank produced by Italian industry of the time. As for the P26/40 I think it could be of great service as well, because the documents proved that the Germans liked the machine. As for fighting, it is true that a char type Semovente represents a significant potential deal with Shermans and other allies, it is easy to hide in the landscapes of northern Italy as well as his German counterpart, the Sturmgeschütz was in Normandy and the evolution of his caliber 105mm cannon to make it formidable and your thinking is right, especially when you see how it passed the landing of Anzio, the effect in this type of tank engaged in strength could have sacred pose problems for Americans.
Friendships Fred:D:D:D

Even if you would say that, it hadn’t been a shame. :smiley:

Yes of course. But unfortunatly, strategically speaking, Italy had already lost the war at the end of 1940, when the political basis of the Italian war-bet had already fallen, and badly too. After that time, Italy was just towed by Germany for the “strategical economics” of war. When Italy entered into the war, all the Italian leadership knew that weaponry, organization, moral and industrial output were very far from being ready for a world war. Only in 1943 the army would had STARTED to be quite ready for such a war.
In fact Italy started to produce better and modern weapons in 1943 (artillery, tanks and aircrafts), when the war was lost.
The delay of the Italian industrial and heavy production, could not be resolved soon. In fact like the P26, many other weapons that were projected already in 1940-41 started to be produced in 1943. For example, other weapons, that would be effective in 1940, in 1943 were belated… The radical change in the Italian infantry division, passed from three regiments to two, decided in late '30s, should had needed many years of reorganization, but the war surprised the core of the army in this full structural change.
Everything was based on the idea that the war was already finished and won, something should be done soon to seat at the table of peace, before it would be too late and Germany too powerful. No strategical planes were prepared for industry and military, and no war-time economy was organized before the late of 1941. So the Italian industry, already belated, lost at least another year of temporization.
All this can explain the delay in the development of the P26 like in many other projects. But as the same Comando Supremo stated in 1940, the armed forces would started to be ready not before 1943 and if the war would had lasted more than six months nothing could be assured after that time. After that time Italy had virtually already lost.

Does anyone know if these weapons were ever made for export, and if so, who got them?

Generally speaking, Italian aircrafts had much more export success than other kind of Italian weapons. In fact, the Italian tanks were quite belated. Anyway many CV tanks were acquired by Hungary and Spain, Nationalist China, Austria, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iraq (one was re-found and “captured” by US forces a few years ago) and other South American countries, when this tank, or better its formula, was considered still effective in many armies of the time.

Strange beast I saw earlier today

Cingoletta L.40 (1).jpg

Nice finding leccy. It’s an armored transport for infantry based on the L6/40 light tank platform. It was just a prototype. The British AFV impressed the Italian army, and in this case the influence of the Bren carrier is evident. Another prototype built by Fiat was a perfect copy of the Bren carrier, like the blindo Lince that was largely inspired by the Dingo. Anyway the only “copy” really built was the Lince. The Italian AV for infantry, except these and other experiments, were the armored trucks Autoprotetto S37, the Fiat 665 blindato, and the Dovunque protetto.

I got a couple more pics but the site kept crashing for me when I tried to set them up. Will try again later with some info for them.

Seems they were impressed with the T16 and Windsor Carriers in particular.

Dalmatian MVAC or BAC (Milizie Volontarie AntiComuniste, Bande AntiComuniste) usually fighiting along with the Italian army, over a an AS37

autoprotetto S37.jpg

Is that a local improvised vehicle or a factory built, I only know the AS37 as the Saharina and never seen a picture of one armoured.