Japanese Military Strength

World War II Japanese Military
#21

Actually, I believe the Japanese were stopped by superior quality naval forces in the May/June 1942, time frame. These were the naval battles of Coral Sea and Midway, of which I was speaking. And by “quality” I mean in the widest possible sense of the word. The IJN was certainly no pushover during this period, but the USN proved slightly better, not in every area, mind you, but in the areas that happened to count. American naval pilots were slightly better trained, (but much less experienced) than Japanese naval pilots particularly in the areas of carrier doctrine, scouting, team tactics, aerial gunnery, and fleet air defense. American naval officers were better at planning, fleet tactics, engineering, and intelligence The IJN was no doubt far more skilled in small unit night fighting, and torpedo tactics, but as it eventuated, these areas did not assume a great deal of importance until later in the year.

In the Guadalcanal campaign, beginning in August, the Japanese faced troops with superior equipment, superior tactics, and superior supporting arms, for the first time since August, 1939, when the Soviets bested them at Nomahan. In later years, when the Japanese were on the defensive in the Pacific, they developed better defensive tactics, but never really figured out how to defeat an amphibious assault or stop a ground campaign; all they could realistically hope for was to inflict heavy casualties on their attackers

No, we’ll never know what the ultimate ground battle would have been like, thanks to the atomic bombs. I suspect, however, that the Japanese would have lost after inflicting heavy casualties. I doubt very seriously that it would have been enough to win them any concessions at the negotiating table.

When I mentioned the Japanese soldier as being fanatically courageous, I was thinking of the average grunt in the field; his officers, going all the way up to the staff honchos, were the ones I was thinking of as amateurs. None of the senior officers, after the first six months seemed to have a clue as to what modern warfare was all about. Their standard solution to every problem seemed to be to exhort every one to “try harder”.

#22

The Japanese actually made their decision to “go South” in July, 1940, with the adoption of the “The Principles to Cope with Changing World Situation” as national policy. At the same they accepted the possibility (actually near inevitability) of war with the US and Britain, and began measures to mobilize industry, the Navy, and the civilian population and to stockpile strategic materials. The Japanese were aware that the international conditions would probably never again be as favorable to them as at that moment. Japan was also aware of the USN’s expansion program; a program which would, in a matter of less than three years, make it virtually impossible to complete their plans. It was this American naval expansion program that drove the Japanese schedule for their plans of conquest of the SRA. They calculated that the USN’s new ships would start coming off the ways no later than mid-1943, therefore it was necessary for the Japanese to fight and resolve any war with the US before that time frame.

So the prerequisites for their policy were;

  1. A stabilization of relations with Soviet Russia.

  2. A military alliance with Germany and Italy.

  3. Early resolution of the Chinese war.

  4. Acquisition of bases in Indochina from which to strike at British and Dutch defenses in the SRA.

In practical terms, the IJN began preparing immediately for war with the US and Britain. The Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy was signed in September, 1940, and a Neutrality Treaty was signed with the Soviet Union in April, 1941.

See; http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/146/index.html

#23

But the Siberian option was still actively considered and remained a possibility after that. It became a stronger possibility after Germany attacked the USSR in mid-1941.

It wasn’t until the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 that a final decision was made to go south, and then only after arguments were put in favour of the Siberian option.

Summary here http://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichibei/popup/pop_10.html and policy here http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/IR-410702.html.

Policy paragraph 2 still leaves the Siberian option open for the future.

“The Imperial Government will continue its effort to effect a settlement of the China Incident and seek to establish a solid basis for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve an advance into the Southern Regions and, depending on future developments, a settlement of the Soviet Question as well.”

The Kwantung Army was being beefed during 1941, which was consistent with a possible assault on Siberia.

A contemporary US assessment considered that the Kwantung Army could well attack in Siberia independently of Tokyo’s policy, which would be consistent with the Kwantung Army’s previous conduct. See paragraph 6 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411021amie.html

#24

Yeah, as I recall, the Imperial Army was chomping at the bit to get at the Soviets in conjunction with the coming German offensive, and it was the Navy strongly arguing in favor of the option of the “Go South” war-plan…

I’ll have more later…

#25

I think the July 2, 1941, Conference was reiterating a decision which had already been made in 1940. Preparations for the the move to the South had been underway since early September, 1940. I note the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” (GEACPS) was announced at this conference as cover for Japaneses intentions. Certainly, this was not something that flashed into full conception on the same day the Move South decision was made. In effect, the Japanese were well along in their plans to seize the SRA and were simply affirming their intention.

However, I agree that the "Move North " option was still being debated especially by the IJA because of the German attack on the Soviet Union. Things were happening fast in that particular time period and the Japanese did not want to prematurely foreclose any options that might suddenly become more appealing

Yes, because the IJA had never completely given up on the possibility of an attack on the Soviets, even after, maybe particularly after, they had signed the neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union.

I agree, it was probably viewed as possibility by the US planners. The Japanese, on their part, also saw a distinct possibility of a joint US-Soviet air and submarine campaign aimed at Japanese interests, and operating out of Soviet bases in Siberia. It should also be noted that the B-17’s sent to the Philippines could not possibly effectively bomb Japan without the cooperation of the Soviet Union in providing bases in Siberia. No country involved in this area could afford to ignore the confusing array of possible conflicts and alliances that might arise in this region, but that doesn’t mean Japan, or any other country, held concrete plans for either a military confrontation, or cooperation, with the Soviets.

#26

I don’t know exactly where you ever divined that American carrier pilots were “better trained” than they Japanese foes. Everything I’ve ever read or heard on the subject indicates a very clear, concise, and very palpable Japanese superiority early in the War. While the American pilots were also certainly no pushovers, they clearly were inferior to the IJN aviators at first. What benefit was their training if the Japanese had vastly more experience anyways? It wasn’t really until after Midway that the American Navy began to field experienced, superior pilots simply because the US pilot training system could not only make good its losses, but could expand the pilot base even in the face of much greater losses than they were sustaining as the Japanese qualified pilot numbers withered…

And I would also contend the the notion that American offers “were better at planning?” Planning what? A series of haphazard tactical defeats around Iron Bottom Sound? Yes, indeed the Japanese were vastly superior at night fighting in 1942, because they had a damn fine navy with very highly trained, elite personnel. The difference was American mass production and shipbuilding that could make good losses whereas the Japanese had most of the fleet they would ever have at the beginning of the War, and they certainly were cognizant of this fact. USN training and leadership caught up, and even surpassed the Japanese, but not by June of 1942…

Incidentally, there is something that is missing from this conversation. The massive advantage the USN enjoyed in their bevy of intelligence as the codes had been broken, and they largely knew the Japanese plan (to attack “AN,” aka Midway) as it unfolded. Now, of course this does not in anyway detract from the glorious victory the US Navy won at Midway; because it was won by: courage, seamanship, superior use of reconnaissance assets, and the dedication of the aircrews. But let’s face it, man. The breaking of the Japanese codes was a huge trump card! American naval aviators were in many respects flying inferior machines and launching shitty torpedoes and could not match the early Japanese expert skill in a combined air fleet attack until probably 1943. They were brave and aggressive, but not as skilled for a while…

In the Guadalcanal campaign, beginning in August, the Japanese faced troops with superior equipment, superior tactics, and superior supporting arms, for the first time since August, 1939, when the Soviets bested them at Nomahan.

I only partially agree. Superior equipment, supporting arms: yes. Superior tactics? Not so much. The Japanese were expert jungle fighters and were certainly a match for the marines and soldiers (ARNG) on Guadalcanal. When using proper infiltration tactics, the Japs were deadly and could be quite difficult to stop. It should be noted that when the main epic, pivotal battle took place around Henderson Field, the Japanese units had marched for days through the Jungle on little food or water, and became disoriented in the nighttime attack (as any formation would) in their desperate attempt to eject the marines, which is why they were decimated. But we can also argue that US forces benefited from much better shipping and resupply while the IJA was slowly starved–and even then–the emaciated soldiers of the Emperor still offered tough going for the final clearing of Guadalcanal…

In later years, when the Japanese were on the defensive in the Pacific, they developed better defensive tactics, but never really figured out how to defeat an amphibious assault or stop a ground campaign; all they could realistically hope for was to inflict heavy casualties on their attackers

Well of course! The US had naval and air superiority, and vastly greater firepower. How could they defeat an amphibious assault when even the Heer and SS couldn’t at Anzio–even when the Germans enjoyed parody in the air and armored superiority on the ground? The only sensible thing to do for Japanese garrisons was to offer difficult, intractable resistance in order to bleed the US forces white. Okinawa for instance was a classic example of avoiding US firepower and mobile superiority using deception and terrain…

No, we’ll never know what the ultimate ground battle would have been like, thanks to the atomic bombs. I suspect, however, that the Japanese would have lost after inflicting heavy casualties. I doubt very seriously that it would have been enough to win them any concessions at the negotiating table.

Perhaps. The Japanese would have broken at some point. Probably when US Pershing and Sherman tanks were rolling up the Tokyo Plain with no way for the IJA to stop them…

When I mentioned the Japanese soldier as being fanatically courageous, I was thinking of the average grunt in the field; his officers, going all the way up to the staff honchos, were the ones I was thinking of as amateurs. None of the senior officers, after the first six months seemed to have a clue as to what modern warfare was all about. Their standard solution to every problem seemed to be to exhort every one to “try harder”.

Some were and some weren’t. But I believe as the War went on, the more realistic and competent Japanese commanders where allowed to rise to the top. Kuribayashi was a prime example of this and was thought highly of by his marine counterparts, who actively searched for his body on Iwo in order to bury it was honors…

#27

I didn’t divine it, I did some careful questioning of American naval pilots who participated in the early battles in the South Pacific, one of whom happened to be my father (he flew SBD’s until early 1943). And I carefully read a number of books by historians who actually did some scholarship before writing their books. Only the greenest of USN pilots were generally inferior to Japanese naval pilots. American naval pilots were far better trained in aerial gunnery, for example, assiduously practicing deflection shooting, of which the Japanese pilots usually had only a rudimentary training. American pilots also had, for the most part, better overwater navigation skills, and were much better trained in team tactics, something the Japanese never spent much time on. Some Japanese had picked up elements of these skills on their own, not as a result of training courses, but this was haphazard, and not uniform within the ranks of Japanese pilots. Most of the Japanese didn’t have “vastly more experience”; a few had a few hundred hours in combat over China, but most had very little such experience. Some American pilots had well over thousand hours in type. My father, for example, had been in the US navy for over two years and had 960 hours in dive bombers, much of it in the SBD.

If you think that’s all the USN experienced during 1942, then you are dead wrong.

American carrier officers were not only better at carrier doctrine, but surface warfare officers were better at screening major units, ASW, and fleet air defense. The US planning that went into Coral Sea and Midway was clearly far better than the bungling approach of the IJN. As an example, the Japanese deployed a major portion of their navy at Midway with the intention of annihilating the American Pacific Fleet, yet their planning was so poor they were able to bring their firepower to bear on only a single American ship. They wouldn’t even have been able to sink that ship, if it hadn’t been for the fortuitous intervention of a Japanese submarine. Yeah, they were real good at planning.

I’ve already acknowledged that the Japanese were better at night fighting, particularly with small units. But the skirmishes that took place in the Solomons during the latter half of 1942 were not strategically significant. Take Savo Island, for example, a clear Japanese victory, but it didn’t stop, or even delay the landing on Guadalcanal and the Japanese failed to even attack the real target, the American transports. Good planning again.

Yes, intelligence was another skill in which the Americans clearly outclassed the Japanese, and if you had read my last post, you’d know I mentioned it. Well, the American aircraft may have been marginally inferior to Japanese naval aircraft, but you sure couldn’t tell it by the relative losses in battle. You’ll find it difficult to name a carrier battle in which the American aircraft losses were greater than the Japanese losses in 1942. Aerial torpedoes? Yep, definitely inferior to Japanese torpedoes in 1942, so what? Of the four carrier battles in 1942, the edge definitely went to the USN; the Japanese lost 4 CV’s and 2CVL’s to 3 CV’s lost on the American side. Given the relative productive capacities of the US and Japan, that’s not exactly a comforting ratio for the Japanese.

The Japanese were expert jungle fighters on Guadalcanal? A match for the Marines and soldiers? Where do you get that?

You’re probably thinking of the Japanese troops who were specially trained in jungle warfare on Formosa and Hainan, and who defeated the poorly trained, shabbily equipped, and ineptly led British, Australian, and Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore. Not the Japanese troops encountered on Guadalcanal, who tended to get lost in the jungle on that island.

The Marines and soldiers on Guadalcanal defeated the Japanese in every major ground battle on Guadalcanal, and in every case inflicted far more casualties than they suffered. Not once did the Japanese on Guadalcanal break an American defensive line, nor did their infiltration tactics ever produce any significant results. The Japanese on Guadalcanal fought like hopeless amateurs, the annihilation of the Ichiki Detachment being a case in point.

In reality, several of the Japanese main units involved in the major ground battles around Henderson Field got lost in the jungle and either got into the battle late, or never arrived at all. The Japanese troops were decimated (actually much worse than that) because the Japanese plans were unrealistic, unimaginative, and very poorly coordinated. The disparity in logistics was a symptom of superior American planning. But even though it was far superior to the haphazard Japanese effort, the American logistics could have been much better organized; the Japanese would have never had any chance at all if that had been the case.

I think you mean “parity”; “parody” is a form of satire.

It’s a given that defenders will almost always face air superiority and enemy control of the sea, since those two things are considered mandatory pre-requisites for successful assault landings. However, the Allies twice defeated Japanese amphibious assaults, three times if you count the “Battle of the Points” on Luzon, and in every case, the Japanese enjoyed control of the sea and air.

And still it didn’t work; the American Marines and soldiers on Okinawa ended up hunting down and killing the Japanese defenders like so many burrowing rabbits.

Maybe so, but he was one of the very few who seemed to understand they couldn’t win, and resolved to simply take with him as many of the enemy as he could.

#28

My regards and respect to your father for his service. But asking a pilot who the best pilots were is a bit like asking an NFL veteran what the best team was. It’s not exactly the stuff of scholarship as they might be a bit biased. I never said US pilots were amateurs and they quickly adapted to to compensate for their pre-War weaknesses in tactics and equipment and to exploit Japanese ones. But that’s not to say the Japanese did have tactical victories and inflict real losses when the opportunity afforded them…

And I carefully read a number of books by historians who actually did some scholarship before writing their books.

Like whom? What specific comparison is made?

Only the greenest of USN pilots were generally inferior to Japanese naval pilots. American naval pilots were far better trained in aerial gunnery, for example, assiduously practicing deflection shooting, of which the Japanese pilots usually had only a rudimentary training.
American pilots also had, for the most part, better overwater navigation skills, and were much better trained in team tactics, something the Japanese never spent much time on. Some Japanese had picked up elements of these skills on their own, not as a result of training courses, but this was haphazard, and not uniform within the ranks of Japanese pilots. Most of the Japanese didn’t have “vastly more experience”; a few had a few hundred hours in combat over China, but most had very little such experience. Some American pilots had well over thousand hours in type. My father, for example, had been in the US navy for over two years and had 960 hours in dive bombers, much of it in the SBD.

More than a “few” Japanese pilots had significant combat time over China, and even the ones who didn’t benefited greatly from that experience and leadership gleaned by their commanders, and IIRC, the average Japanese pilot (up until Midway and a few other skirmishes began to kill off the elite veteran corp) had more hours of training than did the average USN/MC or USAAC pilot. Far more I recall reading. Your father, the tip of the spear, was the exception more than the rule.

The Japanese weren’t “good at team tactics?” That’s quite a revelation as I was under the impression that a combined Japanese fleet air arm strike (early in the War) could be quite well coordinated and devastating within the operating limits of their machines. Also, possibly America’s greatest naval victory was partially enabled by US Naval Aviators and their commanders own lack of planning and coordination. You might recall a certain torpedo strike which led to the near total annihilation of two squadrons of Devestators at Midway.

If you think that’s all the USN experienced during 1942, then you are dead

I don’t, nor did I ever imply as such. What I’m saying is that just because the USN overall was competent and able to overcome its initial weaknesses at points doesn’t mean the Japanese sucked. Nor does it mean that the US Navy was flawless and didn’t have it’s share of awful commanders and peacetime “deadwood” at the senior level needing removal…

American carrier officers were not only better at carrier doctrine, but surface warfare officers were better at screening major units, ASW, and fleet air defense. The US planning that went into Coral Sea and Midway was clearly far better than the bungling approach of the IJN.

As evidenced by what? The US Navy was fighting for its life and very carefully picking its battles. And while the US Navy certainly shared in the pioneering of carrier battle, their was still an element of the “battleship-happy” that were “an island of faith in a sea of doubt” as Gabel once said of the US Tank Destroyer Doctrine. I’m not really sure how one can prove or disprove your statements as one would be hard pressed to to find concrete examples of direct comparisons. The Imperial Japanese Navy was one of the finest in the world, within certain constraints (material being the biggest and the impossible task of matching US shipbuilding and industrial might being the biggest). I never said they were “better” than the US Navy overall, but is some areas they clearly were superior–initially. Their “bungling” approach as compared to what? There are several examples of certain USN officers “bungling” things as well. But I am curious to know what actual evidence you base the above specifics on? As I recall, the Battle of the Coral Sea was no walk over, and the US Navy also suffered significant losses in battle and failed to achieve a decisive victory without the “trump card” that was Rochefort’s codebreaking team would give them at Midway. Knowing and telegraphing your enemy’s exact moves is one hell of a bit of “planning”…

As an example, the Japanese deployed a major portion of their navy at Midway with the intention of annihilating the American Pacific Fleet, yet their planning was so poor they were able to bring their firepower to bear on only a single American ship. They wouldn’t even have been able to sink that ship, if it hadn’t been for the fortuitous intervention of a Japanese submarine. Yeah, they were real good at planning.

The Japanese plan was hastily implemented, true. That didn’t make their overall planning any more poor than some the anachronistic American planning at points in the War. The Japanese “poor planning” was only able to be exploited because the codebreakers had determined exactly WHERE AND WHEN the Japanese attack was going to take place enabling the USN to exploit this by laying an ambush. A huge advantage that goes a long way in exploiting the enemy’s mistakes? No? Incidentally, “fortuitous” is a word that points both ways as the US Navy was also very lucky at points in the battle and they finally had things go their way, as in the example above where a suicidal torpedo attack cleared the upper air cover enabling a decisive, brilliantly executed divebombing attack on a carrier that was refitting its planes with ordnance and fuel. That’s not a bit fortuitous? The Americans were also a bit lucky. But of course US aviators were also good and certainly created their own luck to an extent, and I’ve never said anything other.

Incidentally, the Japanese were able to pretty much decimate air cover at Midway–with virtually no losses. And had Nimitz not known their plan, they may well have taken it and the War made even bloodier and more prolonged…

I’ve already acknowledged that the Japanese were better at night fighting, particularly with small units. But the skirmishes that took place in the Solomons during the latter half of 1942 were not strategically significant. Take Savo Island, for example, a clear Japanese victory, but it didn’t stop, or even delay the landing on Guadalcanal and the Japanese failed to even attack the real target, the American transports. Good planning again.

The Japanese were also quite clearly better at command and control in tactical circumstances and I recall several scathing reports of failures resulting in losses in men and material to the USN that were unnecessary. Savo Island did not stop the marine landings because they had already taken place as it was largely a strategic surprise and shock to the IJN and Army and the GIs took Henderson Field with almost no resistance. And of course, they didn’t get to the transports as they destroyed numerous cruisers and other ships, which did in fact delay and prolong the agony of the marines and soldiers on Guadalcanal denying them precious naval gunfire support, also leaving them precariously vulnerable to their opposition’s for sometime afterword. You can also pick apart anything as far as failures in planning, but I believe that is also called “hindsight.”

Yes, intelligence was another skill in which the Americans clearly outclassed the Japanese, and if you had read my last post, you’d know I mentioned it.

Not at Pearl Harbor, nor for the first few months they didn’t. But yes, after the initial blunders, the Americans clearly did and certainly some of there procedures for seeking out the enemy were clearly superior to the IJN’s. But failing to mention the fact that the US Navy (Fletcher and Nimitz) knew the gist of the Japanese plan and target, and were effectively able to ambush them as a result–then ascribing the following actions as merely the result of qualitative superiority of the US Navy seems a tad disingenuous to me. A bit of a glaring omission really…

Well, the American aircraft may have been marginally inferior to Japanese naval aircraft, but you sure couldn’t tell it by the relative losses in battle.

Of course not. US pilots were good and adaptable, compensating for their disadvantages while taking advantage of the enemy’s idiotic “samurai” macho ethos of getting their pilots killed in unarmored tinderboxes. Though ones that were fantastically maneuverable…

But those samurai pilots were still great overall (up until many were sent down to Davy Jones Locker at Midway, in their burning carriers)…

Cont’d

#29

You’ll find it difficult to name a carrier battle in which the American aircraft losses were greater than the Japanese losses in 1942.

You’ll also find that American losses in 1941 were much greater than the Japanese! So what? That does not prove nor disprove individual competence and skill in certain facets. There weren’t really that many carrier battles, certainly in the first half as the Americans spent it biding their time and judiciously avoiding major engagements and the Japanese seeking the “one-more-push” to finish what they had started at Pearl. Midway was the tipping point, which assured “parity” and even quantitative superiority of the USN as the Japanese could never make good their losses in trained men and machines. This allowed the American Navy to become more aggressive and to go onto the offensive, finally. Their vastly superior training programs could produce a standard of sailor in the USN expansion the Japanese simply couldn’t match, especially after their losses.

Aerial torpedoes? Yep, definitely inferior to Japanese torpedoes in 1942, so what?

Aerial, sub, and ship torpedoes. The Long Lance was the bane to the Allies for much of 1942, and helped kill 1000s of Allied sailors in Iron Bottom Sound and severally hindered the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, I also think the courageous aviators of VT6 and VT8 might also think differently, as they were butchered in a suicidal attack with pointless weaponry. A valiant charge and good men wasted firing duds. Sickening!!

Of the four carrier battles in 1942, the edge definitely went to the USN; the Japanese lost 4 CV’s and 2CVL’s to 3 CV’s lost on the American side. Given the relative productive capacities of the US and Japan, that’s not exactly a comforting ratio for the Japanese.

Right, largely based on the turning point at Midway. And that is exactly my point. But the American Navy’s most decisive advantage was the broken code which telegraphed most of the Japanese plans to an extent. And any battle of attrition would clearly turn to America’s favor. Yamamoto delivered exactly what he promised, “six months” of chaos and worry for the US. After that, all bets were off and an American victory in the absence of a hugely decisive “coup de main operation” the Japanese never really were able to achieve meant they were just prolonging the inevitable after June of 1942…

The Japanese were expert jungle fighters on Guadalcanal? A match for the Marines and soldiers? Where do you get that?

Um, a seminal work on Guadalcanal by Richard Frank (among just about every testimony I’ve ever read on the subject). It’s not in my personal library, but he goes on about the (futile) fighting prowess of the Japanese soldier, as they tended not to give up even when starving…

You’re probably thinking of the Japanese troops who were specially trained in jungle warfare on Formosa and Hainan, and who defeated the poorly trained, shabbily equipped, and ineptly led British, Australian, and Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore. Not the Japanese troops encountered on Guadalcanal, who tended to get lost in the jungle on that island.

The Japanese ethos in itself was one that suited the jungle and I believe many, if not most had some form of basic instruction. And the Americans certainly didn’t do any better in the Jungle. They simply took the airfield (the best part of the island, granted :slight_smile: ) and hunkered down defensively while many of their probes and small operations inland were rebuffed, and sometimes wiped out to almost a man…

The Marines and soldiers on Guadalcanal defeated the Japanese in every major ground battle on Guadalcanal, and in every case inflicted far more casualties than they suffered.

Not once did the Japanese on Guadalcanal break an American defensive line, nor did their infiltration tactics ever produce any significant results. The Japanese on Guadalcanal fought like hopeless amateurs, the annihilation of the Ichiki Detachment being a case in point.

Yes, but, there weren’t that many “major ground battles” on Guadalcanal. They certainly inflicted more casualties, but that is irrelevant to the overall point that the Japanese soldier was a fierce one capable of sometimes great feats, and sometimes pointlessly getting himself killed under poor leadership. However, I might also point out that a starving Japanese force was outnumbered and cut off after a time, and held out in spite of horrifying deprivations. And I think merely painting them as hopeless amateurs (which I agree they were when balanced with the view that they were fanatically tough, skilled in certain ways, and were no fucking pushovers!!) also only tells part of the story and is a bit of a disservice not only to their history, but to the ones of the US marines, sailors, and soldiers that fought them there. They didn’t defeat the Japanese easily nor was anything a walkover and they also suffered deprivations.

I might also point out that there were several smaller unit actions in which various Marine and Army units were annihilated by the Japanese–which would also indicate some poor leadership and “amateurish” TO&E on the part of the USMC and Army. They were largely fighting a defensive battle against an under supplied enemy largely ignored and abandoned by their high command. Yet they still held up final victory for months. I also believe the US Army also made some critical, amateurish blunders in the final push that cost needless casualties…

In reality, several of the Japanese main units involved in the major ground battles around Henderson Field got lost in the jungle and either got into the battle late, or never arrived at all. The Japanese troops were decimated (actually much worse than that) because the Japanese plans were unrealistic, unimaginative, and very poorly coordinated. The disparity in logistics was a symptom of superior American planning. But even though it was far superior to the haphazard Japanese effort, the American logistics could have been much better organized; the Japanese would have never had any chance at all if that had been the case.

Correct. But IIRC the Japanese on the ground on Guadalcanal were saddled with unrealistic expectations and orders from idiots chairs sitting in hundreds, even thousands, of miles away who were willing to fight to the last of the men on the the island. The garrison was not properly supported in any way and was ill-advisedly considered expendable. Any major action constrained by time is going to be frustrated by a large night movement through the jungle. But again, albeit on a much smaller scale, the US military also pissed away the lives of marines and soldiers into ill-advised operations on the islands. The disparity in logistics was a fact that the Japanese would have to live with as they expanded their empire quickly without the shipping necessary to sustain operations overall, not just on the Canal.

I might also add that other US military formations also pissed themselves in the New Guinea such as a certain National Guard division (the 32d ID?) that virtually quit and took the excellent leadership of Gen. Eichelberger to turn them back into an effective formation…

I think you mean “parity”; “parody” is a form of satire.

I think I was tired and a bit drunk…

It’s a given that defenders will almost always face air superiority and enemy control of the sea, since those two things are considered mandatory pre-requisites for successful assault landings. However, the Allies twice defeated Japanese amphibious assaults, three times if you count the “Battle of the Points” on Luzon, and in every case, the Japanese enjoyed control of the sea and air.

The Allies also suffered a string of ignominious defeats inflicted by the Japanese, and took four years to roll back their empire the IJ military won within a few months, even weeks really. This despite having numerical, industrial, and maritime superiority…

And still it didn’t work; the American Marines and soldiers on Okinawa ended up hunting down and killing the Japanese defenders like so many burrowing rabbits.

It gave the US pause, and caused a projection of frightful (if possibly exaggerated - we’ll never know) casualties for Operation Downfall. The blood bath that took over 100,000 Japanese lives (an expendable sum to them) forced the Americans to kill those “rabbits” at the decimation of some of the Marine and Army line units at casualty rates that might have been unacceptable to an already war-weary US public had they continued to the other Home Islands. The Battle served its purpose in delaying the inevitable and giving planners a pause about Downfall–specifically the first phase of the operation which could have been horrific if we believe the tales of suicide strikes on American and British troopships and the like (which I think might be a tad overboard)…

Maybe so, but he was one of the very few who seemed to understand they couldn’t win, and resolved to simply take with him as many of the enemy as he could.

Correct, which fit into the wider goal of “saving face”–and the Emperor–and some of regime, via negotiations…

#30

Who would better know the real facts? Some sportswriter who never played the game? And who is to say that ingrained bias isn’t present in every commentator? The facts are the USN pilots won the battles and inflicted greater losses than they suffered in 1942. To me, and I think, to any objective observer, that is what counts. It’s not imaginary or subject to rationalization by someone who has preconceived notions about the situiation. That is the very definition of “better”.

Like John Lundstrom (The First Team) and Eric Bergerud (Fire In The Sky). Both make specific comparisons as to pilot training, aerial teamwork and tactics, as well as myriad other subjects. Perhaps you could cite the historians who support your position?

First of all, I am speaking only of USN pilots and have never mentioned American Army pilots who routinely received far less training than naval pilots, so let’s stick to discussing naval pilots only, Ok? Specifically what proportion of Japanese naval pilots in the Pacific had combat experience in China? And who says so? And just how many hours of real training did the Japanese pilots receive compared to US pilots, and again, who says so?

A coordinated naval strike is one thing, and I grant you the Japanese were fairly good at that. However, even when achieving well coordinated attacks on ground or ship targets, Japanese pilots often fell victim to American pilots flying inferior planes, but employing better team tactics in aerial combat. Examples of this would be the American use of the “Finger Four” formation, and the “Thach Weave”. According to Bergerud, the Japanese were never able to, or perhaps never inclined, to employ team tactics in aerial combat. My father is credited with three Japanese planes shot down while flying the SBD; one was an A6M, which he downed while employing the Thach weave in conjunction with another SBD.

Yes, torpedo aircraft on both sides suffered heavily for little results, but this had little to do with executive planning and coordination and more to do with the nature of carrier warfare. Of all the aerial torpedo attacks launched at Midway only three torpedoes actually struck a target; one American and two Japanese. Of the torpedo planes launched against the Yorktown, half were shot down by American CAP before reaching their launch point. The opther half managed just two torpedo hits. In the case of the American torpedo attacks, poor torpedo performance, and obsolete torpedo planes were far more instrumental in the failure that any other factor.

I never claimed the Japanese “sucked”; are you implying that I did?

Nor I have I ever said or implied that the USN was flawless, where did that idea come from?

And yes, the USN still had senior commanders who needed removal. Fortunately neither Nimitz nor King were shy about doing that once they became convinced of a lack of competence or aggressiveness. I’m not sure the same could be said of the Japanese; Nagumo for instance continued to serve as Commander of the Japanese carrier striking force after Pearl Harbor and until he completely botched the battle of Midway.

As evidenced by the USN winning most of the important carrier battles of 1942. The USN was NOT carefully “picking it’s battles” until after August, 1942, for the simple reason the IJN still held the initiative until it’s defeat at the battle of Midway and the USN had to respond when the IJN moved. Despite the fact that many senior commanders still believed in the “Big Guns” of the battleship, this was much less a factor in the USN than the IJN. As far back as July, 1940, the USN had opted for the carrier as the most important capital ship, by ordering 14 new Essex-class (and only six new battleships) and affording those carriers absolute top priority in construction materials, labor and yard space. As a result, the Navy’s battleships did not become available until 1944, but the Essex-class carriers were built in an average of 18 months, the first one being commissioned on 31 December, 1942.

Something I’ve never disputed. My position is that the USN was slightly better overall than the IJN, as demonstrated by it’s performance in the second half of 1942.

Compared to the winning approach of the USN in the really important battles in 1942.

Well, I’ve been citing authorities to support my conclusions, but the ultimate authority is the fact that by the end of 1942, the USN, from an initial position of disadvantage, unreadiness and inferior aircraft, fought the IJN to a standstill, and inflicted severe and crippling attrition on the IJN, which prevented it from ever recovering the initiative

No battle in the Pacific in 1942 was a “walkover” and no one, least of all me, has so indicated. I don’t know why you keep implying that I have stated these obviously incorrect things as a fact. Is it that you find countering the assertions that I have made so difficult?

As for codebreaking and general intelligence, you keep citing it as a factor in the USN victories as though it was a gift from the gods; it wasn’t. The superior intelligence enjoyed by USN commanders was the result of years of intensive effort and study to learn the secrets of the IJN. As such, it was part of the USN’s general superiority over the IJN and evidence that the USN was the better of the two services, especially in the area of planning. USN intelligence didn’t just happen as a matter of good fortune it was planned and executed by senior naval commanders as a necessary component of Command and Control.

Continued…

#31

No. The Japanese plan for Midway, was seriously flawed whether it was compromised by poor communications security, or not. The American ability to learn the Japanese plans was simply another area wherein the USN proved superior to the IJN. The IJN could have equaled the USN in intelligence had it applied the same amount of effort to intelligence matters; it did not and throughout the war discounted the value of intelligence in planning operations, another failure of the Japanese to understand modern warfare.

Actually, this was less fortuitous in nature than a result of astute planning by the Americans. It’s a matter of record that Captain Miles Browning on Spruances’ air staff, calculated the moment of maximum vulnerability for the Japanese carriers (when the Midway strike was returning to be refueled and rearmed), and advised Spruance to launch his planes in time to arrive over the Japanese carriers at that moment.

Not true. The Japanese suffered losses over Midway according to Tully and Parshall in "Shattered Sword", page 204;

“The total casualties to the Midway strike force was eleven aircraft lost, with another fourteen heavily damaged, and twenty-nine more shot up to some degree. Fully half the aircraft involved had been hit. Counting missing aircraft and those rendered out of commission, the mission had lost 23 percent of it’s strength in about thirty minutes of combat. Twenty aviators were dead or missing, and several more had been wounded. The kanko crews on board CarDiv 2 must have been stunned. Between the American fighters and the flak, their formations had been decimated. Four had been shot down, four more damaged so badly they had to ditch, and another nine put out of commission after they made it back. Every other Kanko in CarDiv 2 had been damaged to some extent. In the ready rooms, the talk was grim. If this sort of defensive fire (and casualty rate) was going to be the norm when flying against the Americans, the carrier attack squadrons would be totally annihilated in the course of a couple more strikes. This did not bode well for coming operations.”

Do you have specific instances where the Japanese demonstrated superior command and control? I really can’t recall any where the Japanese significantly out performed the USN in this area.

Well, of course, history is, by definition, based entirely on “hindsight”. Or do you have some other way of perceiving history?

Yes, the landings had already commenced by the time the Savo island action was fought, but the Japanese had a golden opportunity to stop it cold by destroying the transports, which, after the defeat of the Allied cruisers were entirely open to destruction in detail. The action was a Japanese victory, but only a partial one; after all the mission wasn’t to sink a few Allied cruisers (which, BTW, were under the command of a RAN officer), but to stop the landing on Guadalcanal by destroying the transports. The Japanese failed to do this and in this respect the Allies achieved their objective, while the Japanese failed in theirs.

Nor did the defeat at Savo delay anything; the unloading re-commenced the next morning, and the Marines continued with their scheduled tasks. I do not remember any instances where the Marines called for “precious NGS” and were denied. In fact, there was no need for NGS for several days. In any case, had the Marines required NGS, Turner still had undamaged one CA, three CL’s and six destroyers available.

One failure, as embarrassing as it was, does not mean the Japanese were inferior to the US in intelligence gathering and analysis.

I did mention intelligence as an American strength. And there is nothing disingenuous about it. It was not “luck” and was not a God-given gift, but the result of years of intensive effort and study in the pre-war years. You seem to think that American intelligence capability should somehow not count in the balance of strengths and weaknesses between the IJN and USN; I disagree. It was as much to the credit of the American Navy as pilot skill, planning or command and control abilities.

Something I never denied. But, in fact, the consistent ratio of higher Japanese aircraft losses and overall defeats, in the carrier battles of 1942 (and I’m not counting Japanese debacles like the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) points to serious deficiencies amongst either Japanese aircraft, pilots, air doctrine, planning, aerial combat tactics, or some combination thereof. Suffice it to say, the USN stopped the Japanese Navy cold after six months and in the first carrier to carrier battles in history, and began pushing them into eventual total defeat. To me that argues that the USN , for whatever reasons, was superior to the IJN in 1942.

#32

IIRC the IJN pre-war pilot training program was two years or maybe a bit longer. I don’t recall seeing flying hours for that course but my recollection is that it involved intensive training in air combat, inlcuding an emphasis on team tactics contrary to comments that the Japanese didn’t employ them.

I seem to recall that all Pearl Harbor IJN pilots had at least 500 hours and many had a lot more than that.

One of the reasons the IJN was less able to counter USN increases in carrier pilots from 1942 onwards was that the IJN persisted with its long course, where the USN adapted to wartime conditions and shortened its course.

The IJN also persisted with its highly selective recruitment, which limited numbers and, in conjunction with the long course, kept replacements below losses, where the USN focused on training as many pilots as possible and replacements exceeded losses.

My recollection is also that the training problem for the IJN was compounded during the war by fuel scarcity with limited flying time compared with the USN, so that IJN pilots trained during the war had less air time than pre-war trainees.

I can’t recall a specific source. Just what I recall from general reading.

#33

The discussion on IJN v USN so far has focused primarily on carrier encounters and Coral Sea, Solomons, and Midway.

The Java Sea and related battles indicate that even outnumbered and outgunned non-carrier IJN forces could be more than a match for the USN and other Allied navies.

The invasion of Bali was carried out by a relatively small advance force of Japanese warships covering a pair of transports. The transports successfully disgorged their troops in Sanur Roads, but were attacked during the day by Allied airpower. One of the transports was severely damaged. The Japanese withdrew the majority of their force to the north, detailing one pair of destroyers (Michishio and Arashio) to escort the cripple, and another pair (Oshio and Asashio) to bring up the rear with the undamaged Maru. Just as this latter pair was getting underway, the first of two Allied squadrons charged with breaking up the landings appeared. Composed of a Dutch and Australian light cruiser and three destroyers, it heavily outgunned the Japanese force. However, the Japanese bravely gave battle, first driving off the light cruisers through the channel northward, and then turning to attack the Allied destroyers. A successful torpedo attack resulted in the sinking of one of the Allied destroyers, which then shortly drew off to the south.

Shortly afterwards, however, the second Allied squadron of four U.S. destroyers and a Dutch light cruiser came up the Strait from the south as well. Oshio and Asashio again returned to defend the damaged transport against a second superior enemy force. In short order they had attacked the U.S. destroyers so fiercely as to force them to withdraw through the Strait to the north, leaving only the Dutch light cruiser Tromp to be dealt with. This they quickly did, hitting the cruiser eleven times in the superstructure in rapid succession. She, too, fled.

The final act was played out as some of the Allied warships retreating northward ran into Michishio and Arashio. A sharp fight developed, in which Michishio was heavily damaged. However, the Allied ships continued on their way without giving a serious fight.

The final result of this rather confusing action was that two superior Allied squadrons had been manhandled almost singlehandedly by a lone pair of audacious Japanese destroyers. It was a most embarrassing performance by the Allies, who were admittedly heavily fatigued, but who possessed more than enough firepower to deal handily with their Japanese adversaries. This was the first of the impressive night-fighting performances the Japanese Navy would turn in throughout the war.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/battles/Java_Campaign

#34

LOL! Well if you want to pick one battle where one side didn’t even know there was a war going on, yes, I guess I have to admit that the Americans lost more aircraft in that one battle.

But in the four carrier battles in 1942, the Americans won three of them and in every one suffered fewer aircraft losses than the Japanese. Overall, the Americans also lost fewer CV’s and CVL’s. I think that is a pretty good indicator that either American aircraft, pilots, aerial combat tactics, or some combination thereof were superior to their Japanese counterparts.

We are discussing aerial torpedoes here, so let’s stick to that subject, Ok? The Long Lance was a destroyer/Cruiser torpedo and was not a factor at Pearl Harbor or Midway. And yes I agree that the US aerial torpedo was a dud, however, at Midway it was not primarily the cause of the slaughter of the US torpedo squadrons; most torpedo planes were shot down before they could even launch their weapons. It was the obsolescent nature of the aircraft themselves that was the problem. Without armor, self-sealing tanks, deficient in speed, and defensive armament, they would have been shot down no matter what kind of torpedo they were carrying. The Japanese torpedo planes that managed to get into action, with their superior torpedoes, did not fare much better than their US counterparts, losing half their number before getting into range to launch.

Whether or not the USN’s intelligence capabilities were the “most decisive advantage” is debatable. But, in any event, just knowing what the enemy intends to do is not much of an advantage unless you can position superior forces and defeat his intentions. It took skill, courage, and superior fighting ability to defeat the Japanese naval forces even after their plans were known.

Interesting that you should cite Richard Frank’s work, as I have it here on my desk as I write. I can find no reference to “expert Jungle fighters”, or a “match for the Marines”. If anything, Frank gives the very opposite impression. Page 70; “But Captain Monzen rallied a body of stalwarts and led them southeast to seek battle in the dark. They became lost in the jungle and returned before making contact with the Marines.”

Page 231-32,

“When the three battalions, numbering 2,506 men, went forward they lost their sense of direction, almost entirely missed the ridge, and instead drifted into the low, waterlogged swath of jungle between the ridge and the Lunga…he [General Kawaguchi] reported that ‘because of the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and completely beyond control. In my whole life I have never felt so helpless’”

Page 346,

“Early on October 23, Japanese soldiers dropped their packs and each unit began to slice it’s own trail north toward the American perimeter. Scouts radiated out, but many failed to return, and those who did could only gasp that there was jungle in every direction.”

These are “expert jungle fighters”??

Well, at the very least a lot of Japanese met their demise in the Jungle.

The bottom line was that American tactics were superior and they won the battle. That’s the only thing that counts in war.

You keep posting allegations that the Americans made plenty of mistakes too, as if that changes the basic equation that the Americans and Australians beat the Japanese soundly in the South Pacific; it doesn’t. The Allies were clearly superior in military expertise to Japanese forces in the Pacific.

You are comparing apples and oranges; The Japanese were advancing in to what amounted to a military vacuum with the twin advantages of surprise and the initiative. And it took only three years to roll back the Japanese despite their having had a year in most cases to consolidate their defensive positions. Had the circumstances been reversed, the Japanese would never have been able to accomplish what the Allies did.

Oh, I believe Japanese could have inflicted the casualties they hoped for. I’m equally convinced it would have been to no avail; the Allies would have simply rolled Japan under and buried it in a communal grave.

It reminds me of the kamekazi campaign; the Japanese hoped to overawe the Americans and impress them with the determination and loyalty of the Japanese people. But it backfired. The Americans were not impressed, but came to despise the Japanese for their stupidity and willingness to die for no good reason.

But it failed. The Japanese still ended up surrendering unconditionally with their hopes of negotiations unfullfilled

#35

Well, the reason the discussion has focused on the carrier battle is because my original statement was to the effect that the USN stopped the IJN cold in these battles, about six months into the war. I have never claimed the USN was able to stop the initial advances of the Japanese in South East Asia.

However, I would feel constrained to point out that the Japanese were seldom outnumbered and outgunned, and were almost always operating under conditions of at least Japanese air superiority, if not air supremacy.

In the specific example that you posted, the forces involved were hardly dominated by the USN, the largest US ship being a WW I-era destroyer. All of the ships were under ABDA command, and were under the tactical command of a Dutch naval officer. These vessels were remnants of the US Asiatic fleet which had been fleeing south ever since MacArthur managed to get his air force wiped out at the beginning of the war.

In fact, the first Allied Naval victory of the war was won by four American destroyers (Paul Jones, Pope, Parrot, and John D. Ford), at Balikpapan on the night of 23/24 January, 1942.

#36

I think you need to pick your period and campaign for that.

So far as the Australians were concerned, the level of their ‘military expertise’ against the advancing Japanese and in recognition that the Japanese would try to advance overland to Port Moresby was, in the first half of 1942, to:

  1. Send at the beginning of 1942 a battalion which included about 100 men who had yet to see a rifle, and many of the rest not much better. This was one of the two battalions which would face the Japanese on the critical Kokoda campaign.
  2. Use both those battalions primarily as fortification labourers and stevedores from the time they arrived at Port Moresby at the start of 1942 until the time they went into action against experienced Japanese troops in mid-1942.
  3. Fail to supply those battalions adequately by air or with air evacuation of wounded.
  4. Fail to provide air fields necessary for 3 due to poor planning and poor airfield selection.
  5. Send Blamey, MacArthur’s 2iC, to Morseby in a panic by MacArthur at risk of losing his SWPA command which infected Blamey, always a military politician of similar vein but vastly inferior to MacArthur, to sack the best commander he had, Rowell. http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=526
  6. Have Blamey exhorting his commanders on the Kokoda Track to do various things which were impossible, as Blamey would have known if he had bothered to view the ground himself. Which is the same for MacArthur, several thousand miles south in Brisbane and shitting himself that the Australians could lose the command of the greatest general America ever had.
  7. While the Australians fought a valiant and reasonably effective fighting retreat on Kokoda, when Gen Hori and his exhausted troops were almost in sight of Moresby it was Japanese command which ordered him to retreat for reasons more to do with the US situation in Guadalcanal than anything local to the Kokoda campaign.
#37

But what if the US hadn’t broken the code or the Japanese had changed it? How “superior” would US planning have been? And yes, having superior codebreaking and SIGINT along with IMINT is part of being better overall. But you were segmenting things and implying as if the US Navy was vastly superior to the Japanese in 1942 as far as combat, when in fact the Japanese may have had initially superior fire control, damage control, etc…

Actually, this was less fortuitous in nature than a result of astute planning by the Americans. It’s a matter of record that Captain Miles Browning on Spruances’ air staff, calculated the moment of maximum vulnerability for the Japanese carriers (when the Midway strike was returning to be refueled and rearmed), and advised Spruance to launch his planes in time to arrive over the Japanese carriers at that moment.

Right, all allotted by the fact that the US had clearly identified that Jap target. I should fuck well hope they could figure out a basic precept of warfare, and “ambushing” the IJN aviators. This was no more brilliant or laudable than the Japanese attacking on Sunday morning.

Incidentally, the hero behind all of this, Rochefort, was detested by many of the “genius” spit-and-polish admirals in the USN. But I’m not sure why you’re arguing on this point, we’re not that far apart. But the Americans also got “lucky” and the Japanese luck and mojo were running out. Granted, the USN was also good enough to create and take advantage of their own luck. I think I’ve acknowledged this several times…

Not true. The Japanese suffered losses over Midway according to Tully and Parshall in "Shattered Sword", page 204;

"The total casualties to the Midway strike force was eleven aircraft lost, with another fourteen heavily damaged, and twenty-nine more shot up to some degree…
…"

Yes, but they also destroyed nearly every US aircraft on Midway and according to Wiki, only two remained flyable. I think Wiki (citing the same work) says roughly seven were downed in air to air and the rest by “intense” AAA with 16 US fighters shot down, albeit mostly very obsolete Brewster Buffalo (Coffins)…

Do you have specific instances where the Japanese demonstrated superior command and control? I really can’t recall any where the Japanese significantly out performed the USN in this area.

Really? Have you forgotten Savo Island already? Or are you going to imply that that somehow doesn’t count or didn’t matter? Because, you seem to be rather selective at points. :slight_smile:

Well, of course, history is, by definition, based entirely on “hindsight”. Or do you have some other way of perceiving history?

Yes. The that explains what happened with greater detail than just linear “cause-and-effect.” For instance, I’m not interested in simply denouncing the French as “surrender monkeys” or calling Gen. Gamelin and idiot–I’m more interested in the intrinsic reasons for the Fall of France and how it was allowed to happen…

Yes, the landings had already commenced by the time the Savo island action was fought, but the Japanese had a golden opportunity to stop it cold by destroying the transports…

Because the US and Australian navies were generous enough to donate several heavy cruisers to the locker of Davy Jones in One Iron Bottom Sound. :frowning:

Nice job of spinning and making excuses though. You seem to do that a lot and have a very partisan, overly nationalistic view of history–which is fine. I’m pretty sure that if the reverse had been true, you’d be crowing about what a huge victory The Battle of Savo Island was and pointing out to us all that the glorious US Navy managed to eat the Japs lunch at night (even if a few transports got away)…

Nor did the defeat at Savo delay anything…

No? It afforded the marine and army garrison several months of hell and allowed the Japanese to wage a losing campaign in what otherwise could have been a swift coup de main victory that could have shortened the War…

One failure, as embarrassing as it was, does not mean the Japanese were inferior to the US in intelligence gathering and analysis.

I did mention intelligence as an American strength. And there is nothing disingenuous about it. It was not “luck” and was not a God-given gift, but the result of years of intensive effort and study in the pre-war years. You seem to think that American intelligence capability should somehow not count in the balance of strengths and weaknesses between the IJN and USN; I disagree. It was as much to the credit of the American Navy as pilot skill, planning or command and control abilities.

I never said US intell had anything to do with “luck.” What I said was they were lucky at points. And I think you mean that the one defeat did not mean the Japanese WEREN’T inferior? Again, I think I’ve made myself clear that I agree with you in certain aspects. However, as far as overall strategic intelligence, it would be hard to argue that the US wasn’t severally ignorant of Japan in many respects, even at the end of the War…you seem to be actually missing my wider point though, as I never argued that SIGINT wasn’t a testimony to the Naval, and overall US, intelligentsia. Pearl Harbor notwithstanding. But my point is that you can’t sit here and carp about the brilliant, almost infallible US Navy and be overly critical of Japanese commanders without considering that the individual US commanders had a significant advantage in the broken code. I think many commanders in the US Navy or any other service might tell you the same thing, you’re not considering everything and omitting much. Not very helpful in AAR. Nagumo may have been a stogy, static personality; but he was competent. He had a massive disadvantage in that his enemy knew full well his intentions. Had the US not, how “superior” would US aviation and naval skills really have been apparent? The codes allowed the US admirals to play poker with a marked deck, and it’s hard to say what genius they were at poker after they won the pot. I’m saying they could afford to make errors and the Japanese had to be perfect. I am not saying the US was dumb to play with a marked deck though. Nor am I saying that Nimitz wasn’t one hell of a poker player… :D…

Something I never denied. But, in fact, the consistent ratio of higher Japanese aircraft losses and overall defeats, in the carrier battles of 1942 points to serious deficiencies amongst either Japanese aircraft, pilots, air doctrine, planning, aerial combat tactics, or some combination thereof…

No, it doesn’t. What it shows was the Japanese suffered an appalling loss of aviators, deck crews, and equipment in a seminal battle which was a tipping point (Midway). It tells me that the US had a vastly superior industrial base and resources to train new pilots and replace and improve their machines. The Japanese didn’t–and even if Wildcat pilots suffered about the same number of deaths as the Zero and Oscar pilots–inherent superiority of skill sets or Thach Weaves were great, but new pilots and machines were coming in 1943 irregardless. Lots of new pilots whereas the Japanese couldn’t even really make good their losses. There were few air battles where US naval aviators scored significant advantages in kills in air to air combat prior to them “getting up to speed” by the middle of 1942 in a straight up fight and I recall things mostly being roughly equal at best…

In fact, even after, according to Franks Guadalcanal, combat losses on both sides in the Cactus Air Force and the Japanese flying from Rabul were roughly even with perhaps a slight advantage in numbers to the CAF. But of course, the Japanese IJN and IJA flyers were flying long endurance and had a clear disadvantage…

Suffice it to say, the USN stopped the Japanese Navy cold after six months and in the first carrier to carrier battles in history, and began pushing them into eventual total defeat. To me that argues that the USN , for whatever reasons, was superior to the IJN in 1942.

To me, it points to a nationalist’s bantering of favorite service is better than yours. :slight_smile: To me, it’s irrelevant and a disingenuous and useless over generalization that fails to tell the story nor adequately explains what happened. Because it doesn’t really tell us “why” the US Navy came out on top and discounts an “all things being equal” process and that the Japanese clearly were dominant in the first half of 1942 as Yamamoto predicted. And that they could not maintain “parity” with the US as even with equal losses, or even if they inflicted slightly greater ones; they could never replace as the US managed to expand. That has nothing to do with the skills or competence of commanders, pilots, etc…

#38

YES! A sportswriter pouring over pages of declassified documents and who was NOT emotionally involved in how great his team and career was…

Like John Lundstrom (The First Team) and Eric Bergerud (Fire In The Sky). Both make specific comparisons as to pilot training, aerial teamwork and tactics, as well as myriad other subjects. Perhaps you could cite the historians who support your position?

Thank you, I’ll see if I can find them but I am going through a slight “Eastern Front phase” now.

I named one of my sources in Franks’ Guadalcanal. And many of my sources are long forgotten as I read a lot of this a decade or more ago in the high school and college library until I realized that chasing girls was more fun & rewarding–if less fulfilling…

For instance, I cannot remember the dry work I read on the Japanese Army that referred to the soldier’s paradox of the “dangerous amateur” and the skilled, dedicated warrior using a “Third Force” (the first two being men and equipment [where the Western armies stopped] and the third being the “spirit warrior” ideal via the perverse, “bastardized” version of Bushido shoveled by the high command onto its peasant soldiers. This was expanded on in Bradley’s Flyboys).

First of all, I am speaking only of USN pilots and have never mentioned American Army pilots who routinely received far less training than naval pilots, so let’s stick to discussing naval pilots only, Ok?

Why limit ourselves? In any case, the USAAC/F shot down far more Japanese aircraft than the USN ever did!

A coordinated naval strike is one thing, and I grant you the Japanese were fairly good at that. However, even when achieving well coordinated attacks on ground or ship targets, Japanese pilots often fell victim to American pilots flying inferior planes, but employing better team tactics in aerial combat. Examples of this would be the American use of the “Finger Four” formation, and the “Thach Weave”. According to Bergerud, the Japanese were never able to, or perhaps never inclined, to employ team tactics in aerial combat. My father is credited with three Japanese planes shot down while flying the SBD; one was an A6M, which he downed while employing the Thach weave in conjunction with another SBD.

Certainly the lack of teamwork was a weakness of the IJN aviation. The finger four was a German invention, and although the Wildcat was not as maneuverable, it was far more rugged and Japanese fighters could be deathtraps without self-sealing tanks. However, the US pilots were generally only holding their own until they got better and more numerous while the experienced, better Jap pilots were hunted down over time and the newbs were cannon fodder…

Yes, torpedo aircraft on both sides suffered heavily for little results, but this had little to do with executive planning and coordination and more to do with the nature of carrier warfare. Of all the aerial torpedo attacks launched at Midway only three torpedoes actually struck a target; one American and two Japanese…

I believe it was stated that more like six US torpedoes may have hit their marks (we’ll never know for sure as the men are dead and the ships were sunk shortly thereafter). I also might add that shitty torpedoes like the Mk13 and obsolete aircraft are hardly the mark of a “superior” service? And perhaps showed deficiencies in US Naval planning? Eh? :slight_smile:

I never claimed the Japanese “sucked”; are you implying that I did?

I wasn’t quoting you, but you certainly come across as dismissive of whatever fails to build your prosecutorial like, sophist argument and dismiss as irrelevant what doesn’t quite fit…

And yes, the USN still had senior commanders who needed removal. Fortunately neither Nimitz nor King were shy about doing that once they became convinced of a lack of competence or aggressiveness. I’m not sure the same could be said of the Japanese; Nagumo for instance continued to serve as Commander of the Japanese carrier striking force after Pearl Harbor and until he completely botched the battle of Midway.

Yes, well. King was hardly competent or aggressive regarding the U-boats blowing the shit out of our merchant fleet in the “happy days” of 1942. And Nimitz or King may well have botched any battle where their mail was read! Even Enigma and Anglo-forewarning didn’t prevent King from fucking up! Overall, I do think King was an organizational genius though…

And Pearl went about as well as it feasibly could for the Japanese, its deficiencies could not all be put on Nagumo…

As evidenced by the USN winning most of the important carrier battles of 1942. The USN was NOT carefully “picking it’s battles” until after August, 1942

I don’t recall providing an exact date, sensibly, as they were greatly weakened by Pearl Harbor. They did hold back until they had a clear intelligence telegraph of Japanese plans, or only to parry a Japanese thrust at Australia…

…Despite the fact that many senior commanders still believed in the “Big Guns” of the battleship, this was much less a factor in the USN than the IJN. As far back as July, 1940, the USN had opted for the carrier as the most important capital ship, by ordering 14 new Essex-class (and only six new battleships) and affording those carriers absolute top priority in construction materials, labor and yard space. As a result, the Navy’s battleships did not become available until 1944, but the Essex-class carriers were built in an average of 18 months, the first one being commissioned on 31 December, 1942.

But yet the USN failed to grasp the Japanese threat of a carrier born strike despite the British demonstration using even obsolete torpedo planes. And it was the Japanese that conducted the carrier-born strike at PH…

Something I’ve never disputed. My position is that the USN was slightly better overall than the IJN, as demonstrated by it’s performance in the second half of 1942.

Compared to the winning approach of the USN in the really important battles in 1942.

Which were largely won with the aid if knowing the exact Japanese intentions. without that key advantage, how superior can we really claim the US Navy was in terms of aviation, command, damage control, etc.? And by your own logic, the Japanese WERE better for the first six or seven months of the War, as they were winning. My point is that neither the US nor IJ Navies were fixed, static organizations, and furthermore they were very different organizations at the beginning and the end of 1942…

Well, I’ve been citing authorities to support my conclusions,

Congratulations. So have I…

…but the ultimate authority is the fact that by the end of 1942, the USN, from an initial position of disadvantage, unreadiness and inferior aircraft, fought the IJN to a standstill, and inflicted severe and crippling attrition on the IJN, which prevented it from ever recovering the initiative

So the Japanese were “better” in the beginning of 1942? :slight_smile:

It was very nice of the US Navy (and Army) to graciously give the Japanese a nice head-start and hand them most of the Pacific. :slight_smile:

No battle in the Pacific in 1942 was a “walkover”…

But when you callously dismiss the IJA as just “dangerous amateurs,” (a phrase I introduced to the conversation I might add) you sort of imply selectively that the US military was vastly superior. Something which took time to actually achieve…

As for codebreaking and general intelligence, you keep citing it as a factor in the USN victories as though it was a gift from the gods…

Continued…

We’ve been over this. What I said is that it’s hard to call Spruance a genius naval commander and Nagumo a fool when they were playing a game like the New England Patriots were a few years back in “spygate.” (intercepting the radio transmitted play-calling of opposing offenses and defenses for those of us not a fan of American football) Direct comparisons are difficult, just like I believe Montgomery had a significant advantage over the Desert Fox with Enigma, and this idea was put forth by one of his own British staff officers in a documentary interview in which he implied that he didn’t like Monty all that much and that he was overrated even if Monty had introduced many reforms critical to the British victories and the British Army recovered from early defeats to sweep the desert of the Afrika Korp. That doesn’t mean I’m removing that facet from the game, just that it’s not a fair direct comparison. Just like Adm. Kimmel cannot be solely be blamed for the losses at Pearl Harbor–no matter how he was scapegoated by both military and civilian authorities…

#39

I recall reading as much and this is pretty much the “conventional wisdom” here, despite boasting the the contrary…

#40

I grow weary of this and I’m beginning to think of the girls walking into my college library as I was reading page after page of fifty year old events… :frowning: So, just a few points as I think I’ve clarified mine and this is devolving into a pedestrian “flamefest”… Irregardless Wizard, I think you’re a solid, knowledgeable poster.

But, we’ll agree to disagree as:

The Coral Sea was far from an unambiguous victory. But I think my point that the singular, one-sided victory at Midway caused a systemic breakdown in Japan’s naval war effort making a true comparison impossible and making saying “we won all the carrier battles” ad hominem…

We are discussing aerial torpedoes here, so let’s stick to that subject, Ok? The Long Lance was a destroyer/Cruiser torpedo and was not a factor at Pearl Harbor or Midway.

Um, lol wut? I think you’re sorely mistaken…

And yes I agree that the US aerial torpedo was a dud, however, at Midway it was not primarily the cause of the slaughter of the US torpedo squadrons; most torpedo planes were shot down before they could even launch their weapons…

My point was that even that slaughter was made futile by the duds that were the Mk13s, and their sacrifice might have been even more poignant had one of as many as six torpedo strikes on the carriers had actually detonated. And as stated, shitty torpedoes carried by obsolete planes flying unsupported by fighter cover hardly makes some of your claims of inherent US naval aviation superiority seem valid in the context of June 4th, 1942. (my birthday actually, not in 1942 though :slight_smile: --June 4th is truly a magnificent day!)

…

Interesting that you should cite Richard Frank’s work, as I have it here on my desk as I write. I can find no reference to “expert Jungle fighters”,

Well, as I recall it was like 700 or 900 pages (often fraught with extraneous, but interesting details). In any case, I wasn’t “quoting” him. I was pretty much stating the conventional wisdom held by almost everyone–except you of course. :slight_smile:

or a “match for the Marines”. If anything, Frank gives the very opposite impression. Page 70; “But Captain Monzen rallied a body of stalwarts and led them southeast to seek battle in the dark. They became lost in the jungle and returned before making contact with the Marines.”

Page 231-32,

“When the three battalions, numbering 2,506 men, went forward they lost their sense of direction, almost entirely missed the ridge, and instead drifted into the low, waterlogged swath of jungle between the ridge and the Lunga…he [General Kawaguchi] reported that ‘because of the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and completely beyond control. In my whole life I have never felt so helpless’”

Page 346,

“Early on October 23, Japanese soldiers dropped their packs and each unit began to slice it’s own trail north toward the American perimeter. Scouts radiated out, but many failed to return, and those who did could only gasp that there was jungle in every direction.”

These are “expert jungle fighters”??

Well, I think I pretty much referred to the botched attack on Henderson Field, so congratulations on preaching to the choir. But thanks to testifying to my memory, which I’ll have to rely for now despite years of alcohol rot. :slight_smile: And on finding selective quotes to “build your case.”

I think he also testifies to the courage of the Japanese soldier and clearly mentions several instances where US marines or soldiers had their asses handed to them in straight up small unit engagements. and some US units were wiped out almost to the man in ill advised movements?

You could also make the contention (a false one I think) that the US ground pounders were far too reliant of their superior firepower over the Japanese and tended to fall apart in small unit actions where they didn’t have direct support. Marine Raiders notwithstanding…

The bottom line was that American tactics were superior and they won the battle. That’s the only thing that counts in war.

They were superior only after they learned how to fight the Japanese forces properly and to conduct proper defense in depth and from proper mutually supporting positions on the tactical level. They also had a clear superiority in industry giving them huge advantages over the IJA in firepower and mobility, something I’ve said here dozens of times–and the reason why the IJA was heavily dependent on the “spirit-warrior” ethos…

If you’ve read Franks closely, he also pretty clearly indicates that many in the West thought the Japanese be something of ‘fanatical savages’ virtually undefeatable on the ground by the soft boys raised under a democracy, a sentiment echoed in Atkin’s An Army at Dawn as an overall fear in going against the Axis powers. And that US morale was questionable and shaky prior to the initiation of ground operations and the taking of Henderson Field, where shocked Japanese soldiers and ground crews simply ran–as they often went into shock during unpleasant surprises despite their ferocious reputation. August Storm is a great example of this…

You keep posting allegations that the Americans made plenty of mistakes too, as if that changes the basic equation that the Americans and Australians beat the Japanese soundly in the South Pacific; it doesn’t. The Allies were clearly superior in military expertise to Japanese forces in the Pacific.

Then they took over most of the Pacific rim how?

Another overgeneralization with no context… :rolleyes:

You are comparing apples and oranges;

Quite contraire my friend, not I.

The Japanese were advancing in to what amounted to a military vacuum with the twin advantages of surprise and the initiative. And it took only three years to roll back the Japanese despite their having had a year in most cases to consolidate their defensive positions. Had the circumstances been reversed, the Japanese would never have been able to accomplish what the Allies did.

So it took three years to rollback what the Japanese took in three months? Bataan and Corrigador were hardly “military vacuums.”

Oh, I believe Japanese could have inflicted the casualties they hoped for. I’m equally convinced it would have been to no avail; the Allies would have simply rolled Japan under and buried it in a communal grave.

An interesting seperate discussion. I believe the US and Commonwealth would have suffered huge casualties initially in the first phase (Olympic?). But the Japanese didn’t deal well with open, mobile combined arms battle as evidenced in Manchuria, and may have collapsed according to, or depending on, the terrain and their ammunition shortages…

It reminds me of the kamekazi campaign; the Japanese hoped to overawe the Americans and impress them with the determination and loyalty of the Japanese people. But it backfired. The Americans were not impressed, but came to despise the Japanese for their stupidity and willingness to die for no good reason…

I agree that it backfired, but I think you’re wrong if think Americans were not impressed! And a single plane killing hundreds or thousands in an Allied troop ship would have been a good trade-off. But the Japanese decimated what was left of their air forces with little gain overall. And it’s hard to predict what the American people would have thought of coffins with flags rolling into their graveyards in small towns if the US began suffering true Eastern Front-numbers of casualties. “If”…