Japanese Military Strength

World War II Japanese Military
#41

That’s probably best, I have no intention of starting a flamefest or pissing contest over these issues.

True. Both sides regarded Coral Sea as decisively in their favor at the time. However, it’s clear in hindsight that the Japanese really lost. Not only were they forced to abandon their operation to capture Port Moresby, but they permanently lost a useful CVL, and lost the services of their two best CV’s, scheduled to be in the Midway operation. Had the Shokaku and Zuikaku actually been at Midway, it’s doubtful the USN could have overcome the quantitative disadvantage they posed.

Excuse me, but I didn’t say “we won all the battles”. I said we won three out of the four in 1942. We won the first three and lost the last one. However, even in losing we always inflicted heavier casualties in planes and aircrew than we received, which I think is the most telling fact of all.

Actually, it’s you who is mistaken. The term “Long Lance” was bestowed by Samuel Eliot Morison in his monumental “History of United States Naval Operations in World War II”. In context, it specifically referred to the Japanese Type 93 torpedo. This was a 24 inch oxygen-fueled torpedo designed to be launched from cruisers and destroyers; no other torpedo platforms used this weapon during WW II.

The standard submarine torpedo was the Type 92 (a version of a German-designed torpedo), and later the Type 95 which was purely a Japanese designed, 21 inch torpedo, used only in submarines.

The standard Japanese aerial torpedo was the Type 91, a 17.7 inch torpedo, originally designed in 1931. It used a kerosene-air wet-heater type of propulsion unit and was rather short-ranged (2,200 yards), but was considered fast for it’s day. The Japanese upgraded their torpedoes with minor improvements over the years, as did most navies. Incidentally, the US Mk 13 aerial torpedo (the one used at Midway) was also upgraded and eventually became the best aerial torpedo of WW II, achieving an enviable 50% hit probability by the end of the war; it remained in service with the USN for a considerable period post war.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTJAP_WWII.htm

Actually, the same torpedo and aircraft had performed magnificently less than a month before in the attack on the Shoho at Coral Sea. The Shoho was overwhelmed by a reported seven torpedo strikes (some sources claim as many as 13 torpedo hits), and went down in minutes.

Well, Frank, as well as quite a few other historians, does not hold with the conventional wisdom that all Japanese were “expert Jungle fighters”. In fact, it now seems to be recognized that very few IJA units received any kind of special jungle training. Certainly not those on Guadalcanal, as they seemed to have a propensity for getting lost in the jungle at the drop of a hat. Much of this may be attributive to their senior officers, who seemed to have no idea of the difficulty of jungle navigation.

Selective quotes to build my case??

Come on, I provided three quotations about three different events, involving three different Japanese units, and all on Guadalcanal, which I believe was the focus of this part of our discussion. Moreover, I used the same source which you had previously cited! At least give me credit for supporting my assertion with relevant data.

Again your assertions are pretty vague; the only episode where any Marines were “handed their asses.” or “wiped out to a man” on Guadalcanal was the Goettge Patrol. There were, on the other hand, numerous times when the Japanese were ambushed and suffered extremely heavy losses at the hands of the Marines, such as the Shibuya detachment from Ichiki’s command. Ichiki, himself, and his 900 men met the same fate shortly later, when they were so foolish as to attack the Marine lines. This supposedly elite assault unit were defeated in hand-to-hand fighting with Marines, losing about 800 of their number, while the Marines lost forty-four dead and seventy-one wounded.

Well, what ground battles did the Americans lose in the South Pacific? They began engaging the Japanese at Guadalcanal, where were they deficient in fighting the Japanese? I’d say it was the Japanese who needed to learn to fight the American forces. Apparently, they never did, because I can’t think of a single ground battle the Japanese won against American ground forces after Corregidor.

No, that is not what Frank says, or implies, at all.

“Guadalcanal”, Page152;

“For nine months, Allied [As opposed to American] units had sometimes bolted to the rear abandoning duty and dignity when confronted by shrieking Japanese infantry like Ichiki’s veterans. Pollock’s Marines were grass-green, but resolute…Stories of courageous and desperate struggles by individual Marines abounded, but one episode involving the three-man crew of a machine gun…entered American folklore. The gunner, Private John Rivers,… slammed hundreds of rounds into the on-rushing phalanx until a bullet struck him in the face and killed him…Corporal Lee Diamond then fired the gun until wounded in the arm. His place was taken by Private Albert A. Schmid, who fired until an exploding grenade flung him from the gun…and blinded him, but he crawled back to his post and fought on with a pistol.”

Page 157;

“If Japanese strategists hoped this willingness to die virtually to the last man would cause westerners to blanch at the brutal implications of such battle ethics, the actions of the Marines…would have given them food for thought. If the Japanese wanted to fight to the death with no quarter asked or given, the Marines were ready to oblige them fully.”

Oh, come on, That’s too easy. The Japanese took over areas that were lightly defended by poorly trained, equipped, and led troops, or areas not defended at all, such as Borneo. They expanded into millions of square miles of territory that, for the most part was worthless and thus undefended. The territories of Sumatra, Java, and Malaya were the only real prizes. Even Singapore was worthless because the naval base there had no ships, and the airfields few if any planes that weren’t obsolete.

Ask yourself when did the Japanese first encounter large numbers of American troops with adequate air power and naval support? Then ask yourself if they won any territory after that point in time. If you’re honest you’ll have to admit the answer is no.

Certainly not in the way in which the Japanese hoped. It didn’t cause the Americans to be awed at a people who were so willing to die for a principle; it caused the Americans to become angry at the Japanese because they were so intransigent about admitting defeat. I’ve spoken to men who went through that campaign; the dominant feeling was, “How can people be so stupid as to throw their lives away after the war is so obviously lost?” There was no respect for the kamikaze pilots, only disgust.

#42

Well, Alzheimer’s notwithstanding, I was reasonably close.

A better informed than me short article here, based on sources that both Nick and Wizard have quoted.

Aircraft Pilots

Aircraft proved a decisive weapon during the Pacific War. However, no weapon can be better than the men who use it. The Japanese had a clear edge in pilot skill when war broke out, but the Pacific War was characterized by a steady improvement in Allied aircraft pilot skills and a steady degradation in Japanese pilot skill.
Japanese pilots

The Japanese Navy began the war with superbly trained pilots. None of the Japanese pilots involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor had logged less than 600 hours of flying time, and many flight leaders had over 1500 hours’ experience. Flying the excellent Zero, these pilots were able to sweep opposing aircraft out of the skies of the southwest Pacific in the early months of the war.

Japanese naval pilot training emphasized quality over quantity. Selection criteria were so strict that no more than 100 pilot candidates were accepted in some years. The training course took more than two years and was brutally demanding. Emphasis was placed on aerial maneuvers appropriate for dogfights, such as the characteristic hineri-komi or “turning-in” maneuver that many Allied pilots described as a “falling-leaf” maneuver. Navy fighter pilots were trained to work in the three-plane shotai, and this training continued after assignment to operational units, so that the pilots in a shotai developed a sixth sense for each other’s reactions. This helped compensate for the very poor radio equipment in most Japanese aircraft. (The radios were apparently spoiled by unshielded ignition systems.)

Japanese Army pilot training was somewhat less demanding than that of the Navy. The complete training course took two years and pilots graduated with 300 hours’ flying time. Basic flight training was conducted in the Ki-17 “Cedar” biplane trainer and continued in the Ki-9 “Spruce” medium trainer. Final operational training took place in the Ki-55 “Ida”. Pilots were then assigned to a flying training unit for six months, followed by assignment to a fighter squadron, where they received a final three months’ training before entering combat. The Japanese Army started the war with inferior aircraft such as the Nate and took heavy casualties over Burma and China even in the early days of the war. However, the Army shared the Navy’s emphasis on dogfighting and had similar personnel policies.

The majority of Japanese pilots were noncommissioned officers. This was in marked contrast with the U.S. Army and Navy, where most pilots were commissioned. Japanese noncommissioned officers drawn from fleet service were trained by the Pilot Trainee System (Sōjū Renshūsei, or Sōren), while young men aged 15 to 17 drawn directly from civilian life were trained by the Flight Reserve Enlisted Trainee System (Hikō Yoka Renshūsei, or Yokaren). Only a small number of college students were recruited into the Student Aviation Reserve (Kōkū Yobi Gakusei) to become reserve ensigns, although this program expanded rapidly after war broke out, training over 10,000 pilots in 1943. A dark side of the Japanese system was the great social gulf between officers and enlisted men. Even such superb noncommissioned pilots as Sakai Saburo, Japan’s second leading ace to survive the war, were frequently mistreated by their officers. Corporal punishment was an integral part of training.

Because Japanese culture discouraged emphasis on the individual, Japanese aces were not given the same attention as Allied aces. However, especially productive pilots would be rewarded with a promotion, which amounted to a nice pay raise for the enlisted pilots. Officer pilots ran the risk of being promoted out of command of flying units.

There was no system of regular rotation of pilots. Japanese pilots usually flew until they died or were crippled. Sakai survived the war because he was half-blinded over Guadalcanal: He mistook a flight of Avengers for a flight of Wildcats and approached incautiously from the rear, making himself an easy target for the Avengers’ rear gunners. Wounded in the head, he somehow made it back to Rabaul, but lost his sight in one eye, was sent back to Japan, and did not again participate in combat missions until the last, desperate days of the war.

The Japanese system was suitable for a nation that hoped to win quick, limited wars. When the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, they held nothing back. There was no reserve of skilled pilots to speak of. Indeed, Peattie (2001) has pointed out that, when war broke out, 11 Air Fleet had been drawn on so heavily for cadre for the new Shokakus that its rosters already included significant numbers of incompletely trained pilots. As attrition set in, particularly during the Guadalcanal campaign, the training system proved entirely inadequate to replace losses. Though Japanese pilots continued to show superb combat skill through the end of 1942, by mid-1943 Allied pilots began to notice a sharp decline in their opponent’s flying skills. By 1944, Japan’s supply of skilled pilots was so limited that many flight instructors were reassigned from training units to Ozawa’s Mobile Force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in an all-or-nothing effort to stop the American counteroffensive. The outcome was the slaughter of the Japanese pilots in what the Americans dubbed “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”

When war broke out, the average Japanese Navy pilot had 700 hours’ flying time while Army pilots averaged 500 hours’ flying time. This had dropped to 275 hours in the Navy and 130 in the Army by 1 January 1945, reflecting a precipitous decline in the level of training of replacement pilots. By late 1944, a new Japanese Navy pilot graduated with just 40 hours flying time, while his American opponent had at least 525 hours flying time. Relative losses in combat were correspondingly disproportionate. The Japanese Army was likewise forced to reduce pilot training to 60 or 70 hours’ flight time by 1945, while the U.S. Army held firmly to its requirement of at least 200 hours’ flight time to the end of the war.
American pilots

During the 1920s, the U.S. Navy trained its pilots almost as thoroughly as the Japanese Navy. Pilot candidates had to be college graduates who met strict physical standards. All received commissions. Flight training took two years and emphasis was placed on deflection shooting and cooperative tactics. However, in the years just before the war, the Navy shifted its emphasis towards producing larger numbers of good pilots rather than small numbers of superb pilots. The flight time requirement dropped to just 305 hours. As a result, when war broke out, 75% of U.S. Navy carrier pilots had fewer flight hours than the least qualified Japanese Navy carrier pilot.

However, the Americans were able to vastly expand their training program, in part because they had a much larger pool of qualified pilot candidates to draw on. It was estimated that 500,000 men in the U.S. had the necessary aptitude to become pilots, although arbitrary eligibility requirements cut this figure to a total of 193,400 pilots trained during the war. These included 35,000 U.S. Army fighter pilots. By contrast, the Japanese graduated just 46,000 pilots. The Americans also had a policy of rotating experienced pilots out of combat units into training units before combat fatigue made them careless. There were experiments with training noncommissioned pilots, but eventually the experiment was abandoned and most of the pilots involved received their commissions.

#43

…

With seizable numbers of reserve pilots and a large training program, and with the new Essex carriers not due to start joining the fleet until late 1943, the American Navy actually increased its training requirements. The pilots who manned the new carriers all had a minimum of two year’s training and 500 hours’ flight time.

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army gave its fighter pilots solid aviation training, but almost none in gunnery. Pilots arriving at Wheeler Field had 200 to 300 hours flight time, but some had never fired a weapon. Because the Army required large numbers of pilots for the European theater, it never attempted as thorough of training as the Navy. Quantity had to be emphasized over quality throughout the war, and an Army Air Force pilot won his wings in just 9 months with about 200 hours’ flight time. Basic training typically began with in the Stearman PT-17, a biplane trainer, and continued in the Vultee BT-13/15 monoplane trainer. Advanced training took place in the legendary T-6 Texan and was followed by assignment to an operational unit. However, in December 1942 the Army Air Force organized Fighter Replacement Training Units (FRTUs) where new fighter pilots polished their skills for two months. In some cases, training was much better: P-38 pilots were selected on the basis of highly competitive mock dogfights after 350 hour’s flight time. In other respects, Army policies resembled those of the Navy.
Tactics

Prior to the Second World War, air combat was centered on the dogfight, in which fighter aircraft attempted to outmaneuver each other and get on their opponent’s tail to deliver a fatal burst of fire. Most Japanese fighters of the Second World War were optimized for dogfighting, and they were probably the most maneuverable monoplanes ever built. The Allied pilot who attempted to out turn his Japanese opponent in a dogfight rarely survived.

However, American air tacticians, such as Claire Chennault, came to the conclusion that hit and run tactics had superseded dogfighting. Allied pilots looked for opportunities to hit the enemy by surprise and from above, and if they failed to destroy their target, they simply kept going. If they were themselves surprised, they would head for the deck and perform a sharp turn to try to shake their pursuers. Maneuverability became the least important performance category for most American fighter aircraft designers, who chose to optimize speed, protection, and firepower instead.

In addition, Jimmy Thatch pioneered cooperative tactics such as the scissors or Thatch Weave. A pair of Allied fighters would fly a few hundred yards apart and keep an eye on each other’s tails. If one of the fighters was jumped by an enemy fighter, his wingman would immediately turn sharply towards him, which warned him that he was under attack. He would then turn sharply towards his wingman, forcing his pursuer to either break off or be vulnerable to attack by his wingman. These tactics were so effective that a saying began to go around: A lone Wildcat against a lone Zero was outnumbered ten to one, but two Wildcats against ten Zeros outnumbered their opponents ten to one.

The effects of the uneven battle of attrition became evident as early as mid-1943. On 25 April 1943, a group of just four Corsairs defending Henderson Field engaged a group of 16 “Bettys” and 20 “Zeros” and shot down five aircraft at the cost of two of their own. On 5 June 1943 a sweep by 81 “Zeros” opposed by 110 Allied fighters over the Russell Islands cost the Japanese 25 aircraft versus seven for the Allies. A sweep on 12 June had a similar outcome. Such lopsided outcomes would have been unthinkable a year earlier.
Aces

The Allies gave much more publicity to aces (pilots who destroyed five or more enemy aircraft) than the Japanese did. An ace was almost certain to be decorated for his accomplishment, and particularly outstanding performance could win an American pilot the Medal of Honor. On the other hand, the brass saw no need to promote an ace unless he also displayed superb leadership qualities. Many aces, such as Jimmy Thatch and Joe Foss, had such qualities and would achieve high rank. Others did not.
Top Imperial Japanese Navy Aces
1 Nishizawa Hiroyoshi 87+ kills KIA 1944 as a passenger on a transport aircraft
2 Iwamoto Tetsuzo ~80 kills Survived the war
3 Sugita Soichi ~70 kills KIA 1945
4 Sakai Saburo 64 kills Survived the war
5 Okumura Takeo 54 kills KIA 1943
6 Ota Toshio 34 kills KIA 1942
7 Sugino Kazuo 32 kills Survived the war
8 Ishii Shizuo 29 kills KIA 1943
9 Muto Kaneyoshi 28 kills KIA 1945
10 Sasai Jun-ichi 27 kills KIA 1942
Top Allied Aces of the Pacific War
1 Richard I. Bong Army 40 kills Killed 1945 in a flying accident
2 Thomas McGuire, Jr. Army 38 kills KIA 1945 by ace Sugita Soichi
3 David McCambell Navy 34 kills Survived the war
4 Gregory Boyington Marine 28 kills
6 kills with AVG 1941-42 POW from 1943
5 Charles W. MacDonald Army 27 kills Survived the war
6 Joseph J. Foss Marine 26 kills Survived the war
7 Robert M. Hanson Marine 25 kills Survived the war
8 Cecil E. Harris Navy 24 kills Survived the war
9 Eugene A. Valencia Navy 23 kills Survived the war
10 Gerald R. Johnson Army 22 kills Survived the war
11 Neil E. Kearby Army 22 kills KIA 1944 over Wewak
12 Jay T. Robbins Army 22 kills Survived the war

As these tables show, the top Japanese aces claimed many more kills than their American counterparts. There are a couple of explanations for this. Many of the Japanese aces were credited with a large number of kills over China against inferior pilots and aircraft. American claims required confirmation from gun cameras or a second pilot, and postwar analyses of Japanese loss records tend to support their claims. Japanese claims were not nearly so well verified and may be badly exaggerated.

References

Bergerud (2000)

Dunnigan and Nofi (1998)
Frank (1999)

Hastings (2007)
Molesworth (2008)

Morison (1950)
Peattie (2001)

Prange (1981)

Tillman (2005)

#44

That’s a post hoc, propter hoc argument that proves nothing.

It could equally well be applied to the Australians on Kokoda or at Milne Bay or Gona, Buna, Sanananda.

Although at Buna the Japanese encountered large numbers of Americans (32nd Div) with adequate air support and, as Nick pointed out earlier, the Americans stalled and then pretty much gave up until Eichelberger arrived.

I think that on a proper analysis of the 1942 Pacific war it will be seen that the sea and air wars individually and certainly together contributed at least as much, probably rather more, to Allied successes on land and overall than did American or any other troops on land, with or without naval and air support (e.g. Coral Sea and Midway being naval and air battles with no land troops).

#45

So you really think that there is only a coincidental correlation between the fact that the Japanese were brought to a screeching halt when they first met American troops with adequate air power and naval support in the Southwest Pacific? If that is the case, what do you think was the real reason the Japanese took no more territory?

And should be. The Australians fought very well in the New Guinea campaign. BTW, there was An American Engineer Regiment involved in the Milne Bay battle, along with the Australians. And air power in the New Guinea campaign was decidedly of an Allied nature, involving Australian and New Zealand personnel, not just Americans.

I didn’t claim that the American forces always decisively defeated the Japanese, only that they (the Japanese) were unable to take any more territory.

I think the contributions of sea, air, and land forces in the Pacific war are inseparable, and that it is impossible to determine which was more important in any given campaign. It’s like saying the heart is more important to the human body than the lungs or the brain. Unlike the ETO, most objectives in the PTO involved building or capturing air strips which would then support further operations by sea and land forces, therefore it might arguably be said that air power was the arbiter of most offensive and defensive operations, but successful campaigns required the participation of all three arms.

#46

In part, the points I made about air and naval battles on the sea, but there is no ‘real’ or single reason.

Among the many reasons is a significant contribution by Japan because it over-extended itself under the impetus of the victory disease and encountered the American, and Australian, troops on land at that point, which limited its ability to conduct the sustained campaigns in Papua and Guadalcanal at the same time.

The impact of those campaigns on Japan was primarily due to their sustained length which drew in more resources than Japan originally contemplated committing, and which bled Japan in troops and logistically,

There was another significant contribution by Japan in its logistics policies, which were deficient for jungle warfare in the South East Pacific by issuing troops with an initial ration and then expecting them to live off the land to a fair extent. They got away with it in Malaya, the Philippines and the NEI where sufficient rations could be obtained as they were more heavily populated and more developed countries. This problem is reflected in the starvation which beset Japanese troops in Papua and Guadalcanal after the early phase of those campaigns. Perhaps no better illustrated than by the food supply dumps which the Australians fouled on the Kokoda retreat and which the Japanese fell upon greedily in their retreat, thus rendering themselves too ill to fight or, in some cases, to continue the retreat.

There was a range of other Allied advantages relative to Japanese disadvantages, such as the proximity to Papua and Guadalcanal of Australia as a troop staging and supply base against Japan’s bases and Allied access to sulfa drugs which kept Allied troops in the field while Japanese troops were succumbing to illness for want of a similar medicine.

Also the basic flaw in Japan’s war plan of lacking the merchant shipping to sustain its conquests and the troops in distant occupied territories, compounded by the requirement to live off the land. In Papua New Guinea and surrounding areas as early as 1943 and very much by 1944 some supposed combat and many other units spent most of their time tending vegetable gardens for subsistence rations.

It is too simplistic to attribute Japan’s advance stalling purely to meeting American troops with adequate air and naval support. There were multiple factors involved beyond American success on the land battlefields on Guadalcanal and in Papua, some of which I have outlined.

The fact that Japan didn’t take any territory in the South Pacific after 1942 isn’t terribly significant by itself as there wasn’t much more to take. The only strategic value in succeeding in Operation FS would have been to try to strangle the sea routes between America and Australia, but that was probably beyond Japanese capacity to any great degree by early 1943 even if Japan had succeeded in the Solomons.

#47

Now I think we are dealing with what might be termed a circular argument. The primary reason the Japanese campaigns in the South Pacific were of a sustained length was because the Japanese had finally encountered troops, ships, and air forces, which were equal to, and in some aspects, superior to, their own forces. What you are really saying is that the Japanese found that they could no longer achieve their objectives in a matter of days or weeks, as they had been accustomed to in earlier conquests. And the reason for that was superior American and Australian fighting techniques. Not in every detail of course, but where it counted, and in the overall results.

As a side note, I remember reading in one of Willmott’s books that, for every six ounces of material and equipment the Japanese supplied to their troops in the Pacific, the US supplied two tons to their forces in the Pacific. The point being made; that a considerable amount of Japanese supply still lies on the bottom of the Pacific.

I would be interested in any sources which you might have to the effect that it was either IJA or IJN strategic or tactical planning policy to dump their men into a theater and ignore their sustenance requirements. I know it occasionally happened that IJA field commanders ordered attacks without sufficient rations, such as at Kohlima and on the Kokoda trail, but this was more often the result of making unrealistic assumptions about their ability to quickly achieve their objectives against well equipped, well, led, and well motivated troops, than a deliberate policy of requiring their forces to “live off the land”. I have seen a translation of a Japanese logistical planning manual which sets forth daily nutritional requirements for soldiers engaged in combat in various climates and terrains. While the Japanese certainly did not lavishly supply their troops, neither did they expect them to live off the land for any significant period of time.

I would argue, specifically in New Guinea and the Solomons campaigns, that it was the ability of the Americans and Australians to force the Japanese into situations where it was physically impossible for them to fight through supplies, not only of food, but of small arms ammo, ordnance, spare parts, fuel, medical materials and equipment, and every other kind of basic human necessity. Thus it wasn’t a Japanese failure of logistical planning or policy, that defeated them, but a failure to cope with the fighting abilities of the Australian and American forces.

I will grant that the Japanese often underestimated their logistical needs, but I feel this was due more to an underestimation of the ability of American and Australian forces to interdict their supply routes, than any perceived advantage the Japanese might have in living off the land.

This was an improvisation prompted by the Allied strategy of by-passing some very large garrisons whenever possible; it was not originally foreseen that entire garrisons would be required to produce their own crops. I remember reading about a Japanese submarine early in 1944, making a supply run which consisted largely of agricultural hand tools, seeds, and fishing gear, which was sorely needed by one such garrison.

Considering that the Japanese, in the Spring of 1942, appeared to be bent on taking every significant island in the Pacific, I would consider the Allies preventing such an event to be highly significant.

The Sea routes between the US and Australia could not be cut off solely by the acquisition of territory, as anyone with a large scale map could perceive.
Even if every single island in the Pacific were occupied and equipped with an airfield and planes, the US could still make shipments to Australia via the South Atlantic and, of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, much as Britain was making shipments from the Middle East via that route. It would have added approximately 3,000 miles, but would still be quite feasible.

In any case, I hope you’ll forgive me if I continue to believe that it was no coincidence that the Japanese were first forced to a standstill and then put in reverse, at the very moment they first came into contact with the Australians and Americans in New Guinea, at Midway, and in the Solomons.

#48

Not on Kokoda. The Japanese advanced steadily and effectively to within sight of Port Moresby. While the Australian retreat certainly impeded Japanese progress it was still a constant retreat in the face of successive Japanese victories. The Japanese were beaten as much by supply deficiences as their LOC lengthened and the Australian LOC shortened and by being sicker than the Australians.

I’m not saying that at all, because it’s not the case. The Kokoda-Gona etc campaign was about the same length and Guadalcanal campaign about a month shorter than the six month long Philippines campaign, where Japanese soldiers also encountered severe food shortages in the advance phase after Manila because they couldn’t supply their front line units properly.

Not during the Japanese advance on Kokoda. While there were some valiant defences, the Australians had no effective counter to Japanese infiltration techniques, in small unit engagements or even against an Australian brigade at Brigade Hill (aka Mission Ridge).
The Australian victory was significantly assisted by sulpha (=sulfa in US) drugs which the Japanese lacked. The Australian Official History notes that without sulpha drugs dysentery could easily have reduced the Australians to impotence on Kokoda: Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 5 – Medical - Volume I – Clinical Problems of War, p. 3 http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/35/chapters/01.pdf It was noted that development of Australian production of sulphaguanidine “played a vital role in saving Australia from Japanese invasion …Had the drug not been available, the course of the New Guinea campaign might have been unfavourable to our cause.” L.R Humphreys, Trikojus: A scientist for our times, Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, 2004, p. 44 The Japanese were treating their troops with a useless mixture of creosote, charcoal and tannic acid (ibid., p.43)
The Allies were also ably assisted by deficiencies in Japanese rations which rendered their troops avoidably ill with beri-beri, which did not afflict Allied soldiers (unless they were POWs of the Japanese) to the extent that U.S. Army intelligence concluded that of the approximately 37,000 Japanese soldiers deployed on Guadalcanal, more than one-half of those who had been on the island over 3 months had beri-beri. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3912/is_200604/ai_n16350305/?tag=content;col1

Even if that estimate is accurate, and I don’t know where the Japanese figures would come from, it is not just food.

It is difficult to compare ration weights as the Japanese relied heavily on rice which when dry weighs considerably less than when cooked and as the Japanese also relied on dried foods, where the Allies relied much more on tinned food which weighs considerably more.

I didn’t say their sustenance was ignored but that their initial rations could be expected to be supplemented by ‘living off the land’, meaning getting what they could locally. This is consistent with the following reference to rations including local supplies.

Field. (a) Rations and forage supplies in the field may be both “imported” or “local”. The former was manufactured and purchased by base supply depots operated by the Intendance Bureau in Japan. The latter are obtained by purchase, requisition, or confiscation. The field ration in the Japanese Army is fixed by regulation as consisting of the following:

  1. Standard, or normal field ration (total, about 4 1/8 pounds), consisting largely of rice and barley, fresh meat and fish, fresh vegetables, and various condiments and flavorings.
  1. Special field ration (total, 3 pounds), consisting largely of rice; dried, canned, or pickled items. This ration is the one most likely issued in combat.
  1. Reserve (emergency) ration. Class A (total, 2 1/2 pounds) consisting of rice, canned meat, and salt. Class B (total, 1 3/4 pounds) consisting of rice or hardtack, canned meat, and salt.
  1. Iron rations, weighing about one-half pound for one meal, include special Japanese biscuits and extracts that have been successfully tried out in various climates.
  1. Nutritious rations, consisting of extra amounts of all kinds of food are allowed to men who need them.
  1. Substitute items according to a regular system.
  1. Supplementary articles, to be issued as available, consisting of cigarettes, either sake or sweets.

War Department Technical Manual TM-E 30-480, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 1 October 1944 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944) p.178 http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJA/HB/HB-8.html#I

As every soldier knows, what is prescribed in army manuals and what actually reaches the front line soldier are often very different things, in all armies.

During the Japanese advance on Kokoda there were adequate food supplies at the Japanese beachhead but the further the Japanese advanced the more they had to rely on getting local supplies, primarily by raiding the natives’ relatively meagre gardens which were soon exhausted.

So far as Papua was concerned one of the main reasons the Japanese were forced back to their beachhead was that the American resistance in Guadalcanal made the Japanese military leadership decide that they couldn’t maintain the fight on both fronts so they ordered Gen Hori to withdraw to his Gona beachhead until Guadalcanal was decided. He had the misfortune to have to do this while his troops were sick and starving and pressed by fresh Australian troops who had been brought up in the time gained by the fighting retreat on Kokoda, as well as encountering problems he hadn’t faced in his advance and notably the surprise of Australian artillery being brought up where it was thought impossible.

While the Japanese ended up starving at their beachhead, they nonetheless gave a good account of themselves in well prepared defensive positions which caused the Australians and Americans considerable problems in trying to defeat them.

If the Japanese had concentrated all their forces on Papua instead of splitting them with Guadalcanal they would almost certainly have won on Kokoda and most probably in Papua as a whole. As for concentrating all their forces on Guadalcanal, that might well still have ended up with a Japanese defeat as the substantial Allied naval forces came into play in support of their troops where they were irrelevant on Kokoda plus air support was virtually non-existent on Kokoda while it was significant on Guadalcanal.

I still attribute the Japanese failure as much to the over-extension, attributable to over-ambition, by the Japanese as any fighting or other qualities the Allies might have had. I’m not disputing that the land campaigns were decisive in the way they turned out, but for the reasons I’ve outlined there was more to it that just better fighting qualities of Allied troops. And I don’t accept that the Allied troops were inherently better than the Japanese.

#49

Then the IJA and IJN must have had only small scale maps, because they thought differently.

The strategic purpose of Operation FS was to strengthen a blockade of the sea routes from America to Australia to isolate Australia and force it to surrender.

Imperial Headquarters decided on an operational plan on 18 May[1942]. The main points of this plan are as follows:[23]

No. 1 Operational objective

  1. The objective of operations by the 17th Army is to invade key locations in the New Caledonia, Fijian islands, and Samoan islands areas. In addition to strengthening the blockade of the communication route between the United States and Australia, Port Moresby will be invaded, thus bringing the Coral Sea under control and smashing enemy plans for a counter-offensive in that region.

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/AJRP/AJRP2.nsf/017f5db0d9c8cf61ca256d9500143041/a0d182cb29d68514ca257057001c73ff?OpenDocument#con2.1

The Fiji-Samoa (FS) Operation was subsequently considered (operation to blockade Australia–US supply lines). Related to this operation was the determination to construct an airfield on Guadalcanal.
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/Web-Printer/818086D3F9E5BA08CA256AC3001EBCF0?OpenDocument

The offensive operations against Port Moresby in this plan were to be conducted by sea. The operations commenced as planned with the departure of the invasion force from Rabaul on 4 May. From 7-8 May, the first ever carrier-based air battle over sea took place. Losses on the Japanese side in the Battle of the Coral Sea amounted to one light carrier, with heavy damage to regular carriers, and the loss of numerous aircraft and crew. The Port Moresby invasion was stopped forcing the postponement of the operation until July. In June, the Navy suffered a defeat at the Battle of Midway resulting in a heavy loss for the Japanese. This defeat of the Japanese Navy was, among other things, a heavy setback for the short-term decisive engagement strategy of YAMAMOTO. Even so, the concept of a blockade of supply between the US and the Allied base of counter-attack in Australia was still foremost in the minds of the Naval General Staff. It had been stalled by the FS operation, but not as yet cancelled.
Ditto

It would have been feasible but it probably wouldn’t have happened. Retaining Australia wasn’t high on the list of American, or British, priorities.

I recall seeing somewhere that an alternative route down the west coast of South America and then across to Australia was considered by America but dismissed as putting too high a demand on oil and because it increased ships’ transit time unacceptably, thereby depriving America of the use of those ships elsewhere. For example, the extra 3,000 miles you give is roughly the same distance as from the US to Britain across the Atlantic, so given a choice between the highest priority of ‘Germany First’ and the much lower priority of retaining Australia it’s obvious where the ships should be used.

#50

This, of course, ignores one thing; that the Japanese never were able to achieve their objective on the Kokoda Trail. They may have been in sight of their objective, but they were stopped short of it. And there is another matter regarding supplies; the Japanese were able to amass sufficient supplies at their end of the Kokoda trail head. But the Japanese staff planners had assumed that the Kokoda trail was a road capable of supporting motorized vehicle traffic; it was, in fact, little more than a foot path, and almost everything that moved over it was carried by human or animal traffic.

There was one big difference between the Philippines and Guadalcanal/New Guinea. The Japanese did achieve their objectives in the Philippines. They never did in New Guinea and the Solomons. The Japanese supply problems in the Philippines were temporary in nature and limited to a few front-line situations; they were never general in nature as they were at Guadalcanal for instance, and they were mostly caused by poor staff planning, not a real shortage of food supplies.

Again, the diseases the Japanese suffered in New Guinea and the Solomons were often the consequence of logistical shortages caused by superior American and Allied tactics and destruction of logistical resources. The Japanese knew about Beri Beri because it had been endemic in their military forces for years, even, perhaps especially, in peace time. The IJN had stopped issuing polished rice to their crew because it was found that contributed to Beri Beri; polished rice was considered a luxury in the IJN.

The same place Allied logistical figures came from. The Japanese operated shipping agencies controlling logistical shipping; there was one for the Navy, one for the Army, and one for civilian shipping. These agencies kept records of everything that was shipped, just like the US Quartermaster Corps. And of course, it was not just food, I thought I made that clear in my last post.

Yes, and there is another complicating factor especially with rations. Because the Japanese protective packaging was much less sophisticated than Allied packaging, the wastage of Japanese rations was much higher, thus a lot of the food which did reach the combat zones could not be preserved, and ended up inedible. The US also experienced wastage of certain items, but on a much smaller scale than the Japanese.

That appears to be similar to the “fresh rations” of both meat and vegetables that appeared in ration issues to American troops from time to time. For example, there were about 300 head of cattle which had belonged to the Lever Brothers plantation at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. These cattle were slaughtered by Marine cooks as needed to supplement the rations of various Marine units. This wasn’t unusual and certainly didn’t imply that the marines were “living off the land”. For example, the Australian Army during WW II, maintained Field Butchery Platoons whose job it was to butcher cattle for distribution to the field kitchens. One of these platoons was the 2/3rd. Australian Field Butchery platoon which operated the Manbulloo Abbattoir near Katherine in the NT during the early part of the war, to supply fresh meat to various Allied forces defending the NT.

That goes without saying. It may be even more true of the Navy.

Yes, see my post about the erroneous Japanese assumptions about the Kokoda Trail itself.

That supports what I’ve been saying about the superior tactics and fighting qualities of Austr5alian and American troops.

No doubt, and in fact, the Japanese were the ones who lost the campaign.

Another way of saying they got outfought. Even though the Japanese expended substantial naval assets in fighting the Allies in the Solomons and in sustaining their garrisons on New Guinea, they still lost. Had they managed to secure Papua, they would have been outflanked by the American drive up the Solomons chain toward Rabaul; the Japanese had to take both Papua and The Solomons; one region was strategically useless without the other being secured.

The Japanese had been “overly ambitious” for decades, it was not something new in the South Pacific. And I agree that that many factors converged to thwart Japanese plans, but in my opinion without the superior tactics, doctrine and fighting qualities of the Australian and American forces, those factor would have been no more consequential than they were in the NEI, Borneo, or Malaya.

#51

Did they? If so, I haven’t read about it. Perhaps they did, but if so they were wrong. It would be impossible to “blockade Australia” by capturing the islands of the the Southeast Pacific. there are thousands of miles of empty ocean between the US and New Zealand, even if one does not want to use the South Atlantic Indian Ocean route. The Japanese might have been able to make supply of Australia more time consuming and costly, but they could never cut it off completely. And certainly not by constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. Whoever wrote that just wasn’t thinking.

I wouldn’t bet on it not happening. The US listed the maintenance of the Hawaii-Australia communication route just under the defense of the “Strategic Triangle (Alaska, Hawaii, Panama Canal)”. The defense of the Strategic Triangle was a higher priority than the Europe First policy since it was considered vital to the Defense of North America itself. Therefore, the security of sea communications with Australia was at least on par with the Europe First policy.

Besides that, Roosevelt had a personal interest in retaining Australia as a viable US base for an offensive campaign in the Pacific. Roosevelt needed Australia as a base to keep MacArthur out of the US. He didn’t want Mac messing in US domestic politics and Australia was conveniently distant from the US to accomplish that.

#52

It remains the case that Operation FS and its aim of cutting off Australia from the US was the purpose of Japanese operations from New Guinea eastwards. See, for example, Henry Frei’s book “Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia”

Oddly enough, as the Japanese advanced in pursuit of Operation FS Admiral King saw the importance of holding the islands you dismiss as unimportant, so that America could maintiain communication with Australia. He must have been just as mistaken as the Japanese about the importance of those islands to preserve communication with Australia.

Operation FS (the Occupation of Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia)

The next best option was to cut the entire Australian continent off from US supplies by occupying Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. This was known as Operation FS.[35] It was a timely change of options and had it been acted on speedily, it might have forestalled US moves into those positions. At the time that Navy General Staff, Combined Fleet and the army were discussing Operation FS, a memorandum from Fleet Admiral E.J. King warned President Roosevelt on 5 March 1942 about these three strategic locations:

After our primary concern to hold Hawaii and Midway, our next care in the Pacific is to preserve Australasia. It requires that its communications be maintained via Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. We have now - or will soon have - “strong points” at Samoa, Suva (Fiji) and New Caledonia. …- When the “strong points” are made reasonably secure, we shall be able to cover Australia and drive back the Japanese in the same fashion of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China Sea.[36]

The Japanese Navy General Staff’s redirection from an amphibious landing on Australia of enormous proportions to an operation that involved the occupation of three smaller islands was nevertheless daunting. It would still extend greatly Japan’s original plans in the South-west Pacific Theatre. It would certainly not allow for a withdrawal of the army’s South Seas Detachment back to Palau as reserves.

It is really this huge extension of original operations in the Pacific - from mopping up and occupying a few islands in the Pacific, to a new plan that encompassed the entire isolation of a continent - that eventually had the greatest impact on the extension of war into New Guinea on a large scale. With Operation FS in the making, greater contingencies were necessary. In fact, the simmering war of attrition in the Bismarck Islands and the New Guinean littoral made Imperial Headquarters think of creating a new army, the 17th Army, and a new fleet, the 8th Fleet.
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/pages/NT00002FAA

The islands you dismiss as unimportant also happened to be crucial in the ferry route for aircraft from the US to Australia.

United States aircraft and supplies would be rushed to Australia by way of the newly opened South Pacific ferry route whose island bases–Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton Island, Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia–formed steppingstones all the way from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Australia.
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Papua/USA-P-Papua-1.html p.2

US Military historians didn’t see the plan as incapable of success.

Instead of approving an operation against the Australian mainland, the Japanese agreed to seize Port Moresby as planned and then, with the parallel occupation of the southern Solomons, “to isolate Australia” by seizing Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia.

The plan said nothing about invading Australia; it did not have to. If everything went well and all objectives were taken, there would be time enough to begin planning for the invasion of the Australian mainland. Meanwhile, it would be possible to squeeze Australia and render it harmless without invasion and at much less cost.

It was clear from the circumstances that the Japanese had not given up the idea of invading Australia. They had merely laid it aside in favor of measures that, if successful, would make invasion–in the event they found it necessary later on–a comparatively easy matter. The immediate object was to isolate Australia, and the plan for doing so was ready to go into effect. Japanese naval aviation was now within 170 air miles of Port Moresby, close fighter distance. The 4th Fleet was spreading rapidly through the northern Solomons, with the southern Solomons next. The final step, after Port Moresby was taken, would be to seize New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, thereby severing the line of communications between the United States and Australia.
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Papua/USA-P-Papua-1.html p.12

#53

The Japanese still managed to destroy a US carrier–and further delay the US recovery and extended their run a bit. But I think I already mention that the Coral Sea “halted” the Japanese advance and represented and almost “high-water-mark” in their “first six-months” mentality…

Actually, it’s you who is mistaken. The term “Long Lance” was bestowed by Samuel Eliot Morison in his monumental “History of United States Naval Operations in World War II”. In context, it specifically referred to the Japanese Type 93 torpedo…

The Type 95 was directly based on the Type 93. And yes, the Type 91 was a separate development, my bad. However, I would also like to point out this further undermines your “blanket statement” mentality regarding supposed universal US Naval superiority over the Japanese, as the US Navy could never have conducted a Pearl Harbor type operation–as they believe the harbor was impervious to torpedo attack, even though the IJN had perfected the use of wooden aerodynamic stabilizers as early as 1936.

Actually, the same torpedo and aircraft had performed magnificently less than a month before in the attack on the Shoho at Coral Sea. The Shoho was overwhelmed by a reported seven torpedo strikes (some sources claim as many as 13 torpedo hits), and went down in minutes.

And the Japanese sank two carriers with theirs. What does that prove? Painfully obsolete British Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers also in no small part helped doom the Bismark. Would you want to fly that in combat in the PTO? But against a target properly defensed by air and AAA assets, they were hopeless and not worth using as they were ‘supplicating the deity’ with the sacrifice of our pilots. The Type-91 was still a far better weapon and far more innovative than anything the USN possessed until after mid-War…

Well, Frank, as well as quite a few other historians, does not hold with the conventional wisdom that all Japanese were “expert Jungle fighters”. In fact, it now seems to be recognized that very few IJA units received any kind of special jungle training. Certainly not those on Guadalcanal, as they seemed to have a propensity for getting lost in the jungle at the drop of a hat. Much of this may be attributive to their senior officers, who seemed to have no idea of the difficulty of jungle navigation.

They received in-theater jungle training, and were better suited to a jungle warfare mentality overall and I’ve heard quite a bit of testimony that the Japanese were often inherently better psychologically suited for fighting in enclosed spaces that negated much US firepower and mobility, though not their organic firepower advantages. They “got lost” in one major instance of a desperate, worthless night attack ordered by a distant, indifferent higher headquarters. Not at all much different then some of the blunders committed by US ground forces in this theater and others…

He also goes on to relate that the Japanese were intractable, even in certain defeat and did not give up easily despite suffering deprivations in the final securing operations in early 1943, where the US Army also had their own ‘blunders’ or sorts that were accurately, if symbolically through fiction, depicted in The Thin Red Line…

I would also urge you to reread Frank’s bitter assessment of some of the US Navy’s TO&E and its commanders around the Savo Island debacle, and other naval engagements where the Japanese came off better initially…

Selective quotes to build my case??

Yes. You also simply ignore, or claim irrelevant, instances which disprove your gratuitous assertions and blanket statements, which is a disservice to overall history. I don’t believe it should be about a nationalist chest thumping…

Come on, I provided three quotations about three different events, involving three different Japanese units, and all on Guadalcanal, which I believe was the focus of this part of our discussion. Moreover, I used the same source which you had previously cited! At least give me credit for supporting my assertion with relevant data.

You provide anecdotes, then try to render anyone else’s as somehow meaningless or irrelevant. Hardly the stuff of analysis, and more the stuff of partisan case building…

Again your assertions are pretty vague; the only episode where any Marines were “handed their asses.” or “wiped out to a man” on Guadalcanal was the Goettge Patrol. There were, on the other hand, numerous times when the Japanese were ambushed and suffered extremely heavy losses at the hands of the Marines, such as the Shibuya detachment from Ichiki’s command. Ichiki, himself, and his 900 men met the same fate shortly later, when they were so foolish as to attack the Marine lines. This supposedly elite assault unit were defeated in hand-to-hand fighting with Marines, losing about 800 of their number, while the Marines lost forty-four dead and seventy-one wounded.

Right, but the Marines were holding a static line (or position) and conducting largely defensive operations, which gave them the classic advantage of the defender once they were properly supported with the weapons an industrialized nation could give them.

The Japanese were overall poorly supported, and already beginning to suffer malnutrition–and ultimately–starvation. They also fought onto a point that no Western military ever would on the 'Canal…

Well, what ground battles did the Americans lose in the South Pacific? They began engaging the Japanese at Guadalcanal, where were they deficient in fighting the Japanese? I’d say it was the Japanese who needed to learn to fight the American forces. Apparently, they never did, because I can’t think of a single ground battle the Japanese won against American ground forces after Corregidor.

They didn’t have to “win” an offensive battle after Bataan, because they had reached the high-water mark of their offensive operations and pretty much achieved their (somewhat aimless) goals. The Japanese also won numerous tactical, small unit engagements in New Guinea and pretty much pissed the 32nd ID until probably one of the War’s most underrated Generals turned them around. You could also state that the US won no major actions until 1943, when victory on Guadalcanal was secured…

No, that is not what Frank says, or implies, at all.

“Guadalcanal”, Page152;

“For nine months, Allied [As opposed to American] units had sometimes bolted to the rear abandoning duty and dignity when confronted by shrieking Japanese infantry like Ichiki’s veterans…”

“If Japanese strategists hoped this willingness to die virtually to the last man would cause westerners to blanch at the brutal implications of such battle ethics, the actions of the Marines…would have given them food for thought…”

Again, anecdotal (if true) generalizations. But the “Allies vs. the Americans” comment is just silly. The marines were well trained and specifically hardened to meet what was known to be a fierce foe. They were properly conditioned as opposed to the pre-War troops often told racist shit notions such as that the “Jap’s” were “squint-eyed” and therefore could not aim their rifles, or fly planes well. That doesn’t mean that Americans are innately superior (or inferior). They were also backed up by a massive superiority in firepower and logistics, which really comes down to industrial output.

Americans are just as capable of shitting-their-pants and running when facing shock troops and a technically superior foes as anyone else had been. Kasserine Pass, the Hurtgen Forest, and initial shocks in the Battle of the Bulge proved that! US service members were also capable of gallantly fighting to almost the bitter end, and having their lives pissed away in ridiculous attacks ordered by a distant, tactically ignorant, and inflexible command…

…

Certainly not in the way in which the Japanese hoped. It didn’t cause the Americans to be awed at a people who were so willing to die for a principle; it caused the Americans to become angry at the Japanese because they were so intransigent about admitting defeat.

But when Americans conduct fruitless, suicidal attacks, it’s all honor and glory. The Alamo, Wake Island (the “Alamo of the Pacific”)–in which the US public was either mistakenly or intentionally made to believe the marine garrison died fighting to the last man–or the strategic bombing campaign in which US and British crews suffered horrifying casualties for often fruitless results are all examples where Western lives were expended either unwisely, or where heroism and sacrifice tied to “the last man, to the last bullet, to the bayonet” notions. The only difference was that Allied flyers had a chance of making their set number of missions, even if many accepted their death or dismemberment as more than likely…

I’ve spoken to men who went through that campaign; the dominant feeling was, “How can people be so stupid as to throw their lives away after the war is so obviously lost?” There was no respect for the kamikaze pilots, only disgust.

Of course. But I’ve talked to and have seen interviews with men that were somewhat shattered and haunted by images of their dismembered friends laying on the deck flooded with blood. Had those Kamikaze pilots hit US troop ships, the horror would have come home quickly, and I’d also remind you the battle would have gone on well into 1946 without the US nukes. The US Army troops in the ETO were already on the verge of severe morale problems and outright protest over the prospect of being sent to the Pacific…

#54

I am getting a headache reading this thread. I don’t know who to believe. You guys have so many facts and yet different perspectives on the topic.
Thanks for making it interesting for us lay people who eagerly read away:)

#55

If you read Bill Bradley’s Flyboys, he goes into a bit of depth about the often callousness and indifferent disregard by the Japanese command of their troops basic needs, and how this ultimately contributed to the horrific, vile atrocities inflicted on the Chinese people. Entire villages were often seized largely for their rice and other foodstuffs, which caused famine. Though, to be fair the IJA troops often murdered much of the young male population and fucked the female one to death, reducing the number of mouths to feed. But also reducing the agrarian populace thus insuring hardship for both occupier and occupied alike in the process…

#56

Perhaps, but then so did the USN. And, effectively the USN put three carriers out of action at a very crucial time, May through July, the period during which the Battle of Midway was fought. Overall, the loss of the Japanese carriers and the inability to achieve their objective made the Coral Sea a defeat for the Japanese.

The wooden “stabilizers” for the Type 91 torpedoes, which the Japanese used at Pearl Harbor were not developed until the summer of 1941, and then only in sufficient quantity to conduct a single attack at Pearl Harbor. if you will look at the picture of the Mk 13 aerial torpedo being loaded on an Avenger, on the same site, you will see the American version of the wooden stabilizer, developed shortly after Midway, to allow the Mk 13 to be used in shallow waters. According to one source I have read, the wooden stabilizer for the American torpedo was rushed to the American carrier forces and was in use before the end of 1942.

And the US sank one. So what? The Japanese actually managed to sink only one carrier, the Lexington, solely with aircraft torpedoes. The Hornet absorbed 12 torpedo hits before sinking, but only two were Japanese aerial torpedoes and they did not fatally damage her; six were US Mk 15’s fired in an attempt to scuttle Hornet when the US fleet had to retire, and four were Japanese Type 93’s fired by two Japanese destroyers. In addition the Hornet suffered five bomb hits, at least one kamikaze crash and over 400 5" shell hits. Ton for ton, that was more explosive than it took to dispatch the Yamato.

And Japanese warships were not properly defended by AAA at any time in the war. At Midway, during the height of the battle on June 4, there were only two confirmed kills of USN aircraft by AAA. The Mk 13 was not “hopeless” as it did sink an IJN carrier and sank and damaged other warships and transports in 1942. And Japanese torpedoes, with the exception of the Type 93 were not “far more innovative” than the US. The Mk 13 was quite an advanced design, admittedly with bugs that needed to be worked out. Not saying the performance of the Mk 13 was better than the Japanese, but it was no where near as bad as you have intimated.

Again sources? Are you sure your not referring to the Japanese defensive phase later in the war when they made extensive use of caves and bunkers?

On the contrary. I’ve already cited at least two instances of the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal getting lost. I will now list those instances;

  1. August 8 - Captain Monzen’s scratch force failed to find the Marines in the Jungle and aborted a night attack on on them. (Frank, Guadalcanal, Page 70.)

  2. September 12-13, Edson’s Ridge, a brigade sized attack under General Kawaguchi goes awry because the various Japanese elements get lost in the jungle and fail to coordinate their attacks.(Frank, Guadalcanal, Page 231)

  3. October 20-27, The Japanese 17th Army (whose staff is on Guadalcanal) plans an attack with a reinforced Division, that has to be postponed five times because the various Japanese elements are out of position or lost in the jungle. When all is finally ready and the order to attack is given, two of the three Japanese regiments lose their way in the jungle and attack at widely scattered times and places, frittering away their offensive power, and allowing the Marines to shift their reserves to meet Japanese threats. (Frank, Guadalcanal, Pages 341-356)

The fact is that according to Frank, these well-trained “jungle fighting experts” seldom seemed capable of navigating their way through the jungle and usually botched their attacks because they were lost in the jungle. I can’t recall a single instance of them being where they thought they were except when they were on or near the beach. Frank’s assessment of the failure of the Japanese October offensive, is that the Marines had two factors in their favor; “massed artillery fire, and the Jungle.” (Frank, page 366)

This seems strangely at variance with your contention that the Japanese were “well trained jungle fighters”.

Of course, but remember, that the Japanese were “intractable” in the face of “certain defeat”. So what? They still got outfought and faced “certain defeat” because their fighting ability was less than that of the Marines. The individual Japanese soldiers were usually courageous, but collectively or individually, they were seldom a match for the Marines.

And if you want to accept the citation of works of fiction, then I can prove practically anything about the Pacific war.

It should be obvious to you by now that I have read Frank very closely, including his accounts of the naval war in the Solomons. Despite losing several of the naval skirmishes in the Solomons, the USN was obviously much better at keeping their forces on Guadalcanal well supplied and this was the deciding factor in the campaign. Even when the Japanese enjoyed apparent victory as at Savo Island, they still failed to achieve their objective whic was the destruction of the transports.

I don’t make gratuitous assertions; every assertion I make is backed up by either original source documents or statements by recognized authoritative sources. and It is not about chest thumping. The facts are the facts, you just haven’t been able to disprove them and that is what you find so frustrating.

Continued…

#57

Continued…

Actually, it is superior analysis. Nothing you have posted has altered or disproven anything I have posted.

Yes, it is true that Marines on Guadalcanal were holding a static defensive position. And it is true that the IJA wasn’t equipped with the artillery and other supporting equipment you would expect of an Army engaged in modern warfare. So what? The Japanese thought they could compensate by attacking at night and with “great martial spirit”; they were wrong, the Japanese fighting spirit wasn’t as consequential as they thought. In the October offensive, the Japanese, if their army was as well trained as they thought, should have been able to mass a 9:1 advantage at the point of attack; they couldn’t.

The Japanese miscalculated and were outfought by the Marines.

Again true. So what? This was caused by poor Japanese staff work, and superior USN strategy in effectively interdicting Japanese reinforcement and resupply efforts.

Interesting statement. I guess you are contending that it really didn’t matter if the Japanese failed at Coral Sea, Midway, Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal, Milne Bay, and Buna? They were just expending the resources at those battles for the hell of it? And are you saying they achieved their goals? Because by any objective measure, the didn’t.

Don’t deny it. Now tell me what good it did them. MacArthur’s forces won many small unit engagements in the Philippines, but it didn’t save the Philippines or deny t6he Japanese their final victory there in the spring of 1942. It isn’t about small unit engagements, it’s about achieving your strategic objectives, that’s what wins wars.

You could state that but you’d be wrong. Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal were all decided in 1942. The Japanese IGHQ decided to pull out of Guadalcanal in December, 1942, because the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal had been decisively defeated inn their last offensive, and their was no hope of further reinforcment and resupply because the USN had won the the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal.

Yeah, sure. I keep forgetting the Japanese troops were eight feet tall, could fly like eagles, could live in the jungle on a single grain of rice each day, and could move like ghosts. Again these are the anecdotes you want to believe.

Here’s a fact which isn’t an anecdote. The Japanese failed to win a single major ground battle on Guadalcanal in 1942. Now you can call up all the excuses you want, and they don’t change that fact one iota. I don’t care if the Japanese weren’t supported, were starving, or whatever, or that the Americans were better equipped, better supplied, had more artillery or whatever. Get it

We aren’t talking about the ETO; we are discussing the PTO. if you want to discuss the ETO, start a new thread. The fact is the American troops on Guadalcanal didn’t run. They faced the Japanese troops in battle and beat them on almost every occasion. You haven’t posted anything that disproves that and until you do I will continue to assert the fact. Moreover, the USN despite some defeats, also decisively beat the IJN, and proved it by keeping the US ground troops adequately supplied. In the air the USN and Marine pilots consistently defeated the Best of the Japanese pilots. If you want you want me to believe otherwise, post some facts and figures, not just vague statements of opinion.

Yes! Thank God for the Nukes. My father was one of those who had fought the war from Day One and was afraid that his luck would run out if he had to fight another campaign in the Pacific. But what does that have to do with the American victories in 1942, which stopped the Japanese cold in their tracks?

The fact is the kamikazes didn’t have the effect the Japanese had hoped for. It backfired and instead of respecting the Japanese for their determination, the Americans despised them for their unavailing stubbornness. It was an ironic reverse of the early days of the war, when Americans and others surrendered when the fight became hopeless; the Japanese despised them for surrendering, and ignored the fact that they had survived to fight another day.

#58

Admiral King was anxious to fortify the islands between Hawaii and Australia long before the Japanese began their advance into the Southeast Pacific. And there were two reasons for this; the first was he wanted to be able to easily move air elements around the area to make it more difficult for the Japanese to operate there. The second was that he wanted secure bases from which he could mount offensives in the Pacific despite the “Europe First” Policy, which he never fully agreed with.

I did not dismiss any islands as “unimportant”; I said they were not necessary to maintain the sea route to Australia, that’s a big difference. The air ferry route from Hawaii to Australia relied on these islands and that, in itself, was important, but only so far as long range aircraft were concerned. Neither a significant amount of supply or reinforcement depended on these islands.

Even if the Japanese had seized Fiji and Samoa, this would not have allowed them to cut, or even significantly hinder, the transport of supplies and reinforcements to Australia. The Great Circle route between the Port of Los Angeles to the Port of Auckland is 5,666 nm.(for shipments from San Francisco, approximately 290 nm’s are added by steaming south to the Los Angeles area) At the GRC’s closest approach to either Samoa or the Fijis, (at Suva in the Fiji’s), it is 743 nm’s distant.

The Japanese had only two types of aircraft, the H6K (Mavis) and the H8K (Emily), which could operate with a bomb load of any kind over that kind of distance, find a convoy, and possibly make an attack. This would be at the extreme edge of their combat radius. Furthermore, there were only about 17 H8K’s and 140 H6K’s in the Japanese inventory in 1942, and these represented the entire long range air search assets of the Japanese Navy. They would hardly have been any kind of deterrence to the USN convoys at that range, and using them in such a role would have seriously crippled the Long range search efforts of the entire IJN.

So no, the Japanese capture of Fiji and/or Samoa would not have cut, or seriously hindered, the sea communications between the US and Australia.

#59

I don’t have to read Bradley’s “Flyboys” to learn about Japanese treatment of native populations during WW II. My wife is Chinese, and while she wasn’t born until 1950, her parents and older siblings lived through the Japanese occupation of Borneo; they told me of their experiences with Japanese “requisitioning” of food and other items. Much of it was just plain old looting. My mother-in-law told me that during the four years of Japanese occupation, she would grow two crops; a small one in plain sight, and a larger one further back in the jungle. The Japanese always confiscated about 75% of the smaller crop, but never found the larger crop.

My wife’s eldest brother, then about 17, was conscripted as a laborer for the Japanese; they never saw him again.

#60

It is also acknowledged that it would have been considered an overall victory for the Japanese had Midway not been a decisive victory for the US Navy…

And the US sank one. So what?..

None of this really has anything to do with what I said…

And Japanese warships were not properly defended by AAA at any time in the war. At Midway, during the height of the battle on June 4, there were only two confirmed kills of USN aircraft by AAA. The Mk 13 was not “hopeless” as it did sink an IJN carrier and sank and damaged other warships and transports in 1942. And Japanese torpedoes, with the exception of the Type 93 were not “far more innovative” than the US. The Mk 13 was quite an advanced design, admittedly with bugs that needed to be worked out. Not saying the performance of the Mk 13 was better than the Japanese, but it was no where near as bad as you have intimated.

Actually, I was referring to the aircraft they flew as “hopeless” while suffering nearly 100% losses. And the Mk13 was subject to several improvements and a change in launch tactics IIRC. It was generally acknowledged that the Devastator was a “flying coffin” type aircraft at the time. And VT-6/8 made a home movie that was essentially a “goodbye”.

The Japanese at Guadalcanal? Sources please?

Firstly, where is your source regarding the training of the average Japanese soldier or Naval Landing Force infantrymen in 1941-42? You’re the one making the assertion that only the Japanese in the Malayan Campaign received any sort of specific jungle training…

Secondly, sources abound that the Japanese were generally considered better fighters in harsh mountainous and jungle terrain INITIALLY. IIRC the US Marines on Guadalcanal also received jungle fighting training, and were also trained to a high standard before being dispatched. That in no way implies that US, Aussie, and British troops also undergoing jungle fighting training could not equal or better them…

From:http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/pages/NT00002F06

The speed, ferocity and effectiveness of the IJA and the mountainous operational environment in New Guinea came as a powerful shock to the militia battalions that initially comprised New Guinea Force. Australian military authorities learned several important lessons during the opening rounds of the fighting in New Guinea. The futility of sending insufficiently trained, badly equipped and poorly led militia units into action against the IJA under jungle conditions quickly became clear as troops of 39th and 53rd Battalions fell back in disorder under heavy Japanese pressure. It was also evident that operational conditions in the jungle-covered Owen Stanley Mountains were far worse than in Malaya in terms of the rugged terrain, harsh climatic conditions and the endemic diseases that cut swathes through the ranks. Moreover, the almost total absence of land communications forced recourse to native carrier transport and aircraft to maintain forward units. A combination of these factors meant that the relevance of the lessons of Malaya were quickly called into question and possessed only limited value. Finally, following the commitment of reinforcements from the 7th Australian Division, even troops of the AIF needed specialised instruction and a period of acclimatisation and psychological adjustment to the almost completely alien, apparently hostile and bewildering environment in which they operated before being committed to battle.[24]

Again sources? Are you sure your not referring to the Japanese defensive phase later in the war when they made extensive use of caves and bunkers?

Well, Captain Obvious, it’s hard to fight in a jungle when one doesn’t exist on a volcanic atoll or island chain. The Japanese adapted their tactics to maximize their strengths and to compensate for their weakness in equipment…

On the contrary. I’ve already cited at least two instances of the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal getting lost. I will now list those instances;
…

You’ve narrowly pointed out one circumstances to draw a blanket statements conclusions. That’s like saying that the entire US Army and Marine Corp were incompetent at command and control because the commander at Wake Island surrendered prematurely as he thought the Japanese had taken most of the island based on planted battle ensigns (flying over dead Japanese NLF infantry)…

Just because the Japanese “got lost” in these instances in desperate attacks does not mean the Japanese soldier did not receive better jungle fighting than his adversaries initially…

The fact is that according to Frank, these well-trained “jungle fighting experts” seldom seemed capable of navigating their way through the jungle and usually botched their attacks because they were lost in the jungle…

I don’t think Frank makes any such overweening assertion, as real historians generally don’t. I think he was implying that well trained US ground troops could match the Japanese and the faulty notion some had that the “boys of democracy” had some in inherent disadvantage against the boys toughened by autocracy. It was about training and equipment–in all theaters…

Of course, but remember, that the Japanese were “intractable” in the face of “certain defeat”. So what? They still got outfought and faced “certain defeat” because their fighting ability was less than that of the Marines. The individual Japanese soldiers were usually courageous, but collectively or individually, they were seldom a match for the Marines.

I never really said anything different, other than the fact that the marines usually enjoyed a massive advantage in firepower. Secondly, the USMC was a very different organization in August of 1942 than it was in December 1942 after garrisons suffered successive defeats by IJA and IJN forces enjoying numerical and material advantages…

Points which continue to sail over your head…I’ve never said the Japanese were inherently superior to the marines or US soldiers. That’s a strawman argument you keep recirculating. I said the Japanese initially had some advantages in prewar readiness and planning, and it took time for the US to make good…

And if you want to accept the citation of works of fiction, then I can prove practically anything about the Pacific war.

You mean like your contention that US Navy pilots were inherently superior and had more hours of training than US pilots did in December of 1941?

I think you’re selectively arguing bogus and chest thumping blather…

It should be obvious to you by now that I have read Frank very closely, including his accounts of the naval war in the Solomons.

You’ve certainly read him selectively…

Despite losing several of the naval skirmishes in the Solomons, the USN was obviously much better at keeping their forces on Guadalcanal well supplied and this was the deciding factor in the campaign. Even when the Japanese enjoyed apparent victory as at Savo Island, they still failed to achieve their objective whic was the destruction of the transports.

Right. Because the Japanese had a large Pacific Empire and had violated the classic military treatise of overextending their supply lines while launching simultaneous operations. They neither had the merchant fleet nor the ability to make good their losses in a multitude of areas, but that has a lot to do with the inherent advantages in US shipbuilding, geographical proximity, and education. This is true on any facet of the War whether it was the Eastern Front or the US liberation of France. The Japanese would blow their wad and become static at some point that the United States, having a smaller space to defend, adeptly exploited this. That has no bearing on my argument whatsoever…

I don’t make gratuitous assertions; every assertion…The facts are the facts, you just haven’t been able to disprove them and that is what you find so frustrating.

Continued…

You cite make selective facts as a wider proof without acknowledging that it was not (for instance) solely US skill which defeated the Japanese, but their massive advantage in industrial base and output, which afforded them inherent firepower and mobility advantages–amounting to chest-thumping…