Japanese Military Strength

World War II Japanese Military
#61

Opinions are like arseholes, everyone has one…

Yes, it is true that Marines on Guadalcanal were holding a static defensive position. And it is true that the IJA wasn’t equipped with the artillery and other supporting equipment you would expect of an Army engaged in modern warfare. So what? The Japanese thought they could compensate by attacking at night and with “great martial spirit”; they were wrong, the Japanese fighting spirit wasn’t as consequential as they thought. In the October offensive, the Japanese, if their army was as well trained as they thought, should have been able to mass a 9:1 advantage at the point of attack; they couldn’t.

The Japanese miscalculated and were outfought by the Marines.

I don’t disagree with most of this, but I believe Japanese tactical doctrine did not rely on night attacks (or banzai charges), but emphasized flanking, infiltration, and wheeling maneuvers, which did prove initially effective against unprepared and shocked Western adversaries. The Japanese also really didn’t have proper reconnaissance as the attack was launched ad hoc out of desperation. It was again a Japanese HHQ that was inflexible and ordered a hasty attack, ill-advised attack. The Marines (and National Guardsmen) did fight heroically and expertly, I’ve never contended anything else. Once they were properly trained and supported, they were certainly the capable of victory…

Again true. So what? This was caused by poor Japanese staff work, and superior USN strategy in effectively interdicting Japanese reinforcement and resupply efforts.

The offensive in Guadalcanal simply did to the Japanese what they had previously done to the Allies–launched a surprise attack effectively–isolating the garrison. Not unlike the Japanese had done in the Philippines, frustrating much US prewar planning…

Interesting statement. I guess you are contending that it really didn’t matter if the Japanese failed at Coral Sea, Midway, Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal, Milne Bay, and Buna?..

Not as interesting as your statement, as I never implied any thing of the sort…

Don’t deny it. Now tell me what good it did them. MacArthur’s forces won many small unit engagements in the Philippines, but it didn’t save the Philippines or deny t6he Japanese their final victory there in the spring of 1942. It isn’t about small unit engagements, it’s about achieving your strategic objectives, that’s what wins wars.

What “good it did for them” in the outcome of the War has little bearing in what I’m saying. But nice job at qualifying things, which is sophism at its finest…

You could state that but you’d be wrong. Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal were all decided in 1942.

Not in the first half of 1942, where the US began to enjoy several decisive advantages that many in Japan knew they could never match. I recall reading something of a Japanese engineer fresh out of school claiming that victory was imminent right after Pearl Harbor to his veteran design colleagues, and they laughed at him asking him if he knew how much steel the US was capable of producing in a single year --and how much Japan could produce…

The Japanese IGHQ decided to pull out of Guadalcanal in December, 1942, because the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal had been decisively defeated inn their last offensive, and their was no hope of further reinforcment and resupply because the USN had won the the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal.

It was too late…

Yeah, sure. I keep forgetting the Japanese troops were eight feet tall…

Wow. Another strawman argument that has absolutely nothing to do with what I said as I was commenting on the overall Allied deficiencies in training and preparations against the Japanese…

Here’s a fact which isn’t an anecdote. The Japanese failed to win a single major ground battle on Guadalcanal in 1942…

They won “small unit engagements,” and did hold up the US advance at points, which sort of makes your comments regarding the Philippines as a bit silly and again an example of “qualification” of an instance as ‘irrelevant’ just because it doesn’t quite fit your paradigm…

We aren’t talking about the ETO; we are discussing the PTO. if you want to discuss the ETO, start a new thread. The fact is the American troops on Guadalcanal didn’t run. They faced the Japanese troops in battle and beat them on almost every occasion.

I’ll post whatever the hell I want and broaden the argument as I see fit…

You haven’t posted anything that disproves that and until you do I will continue to assert the fact…

You don’t even get what my point is…

Yes! Thank God for the Nukes. My father was one of those who had fought the war from Day One and was afraid that his luck would run out if he had to fight another campaign in the Pacific. But what does that have to do with the American victories in 1942, which stopped the Japanese cold in their tracks?

Nothing. I don’t think I linked them, other than to say the Japanese were capable of inflicting severe losses despite a massive industrial and numerical advantage the US enjoyed. And furthermore that some of their leadership was capable and even respected by their US Marine and Army adversaries…

The fact is the kamikazes didn’t have the effect the Japanese had hoped for. It backfired and instead of respecting the Japanese for their determination, the Americans despised them for their unavailing stubbornness. It was an ironic reverse of the early days of the war, when Americans and others surrendered when the fight became hopeless; the Japanese despised them for surrendering, and ignored the fact that they had survived to fight another day.

I don’t know how you can draw any such conclusions as strategic planners indeed thought the Kamikaze threat to be severe at the hypothetical outset of Operation Downfall, especially in the Olympic phase. Not all Americans “despised” them as fighting to the last and not quitting is hardly a solely a Japanese trait. But yes, the savage Japanese high command was a bunch of bastards willing to fight to the last school child in order to preserve some sort of “face”.

#62

Not really. Coral Sea was a strategic loss for the Japanese because they did not achieve their objective which was the capture of Port Moresby, and that remains true no matter what happened at Midway.

It has everything to do with what you falsely asserted.

BTW, I ran across a statement by Eric Bergerud (Fire In The Sky, page 424, to the effect that the USN won every carrier battle of the war; "In my opinion the Americans won all the carrier battles of World War II. Every carrier battle was precipitated because one side or the other was supporting and invasion or supply convoy and the other side tried to stop it. Because the US-protected convoys achieved objectives - and thus the Japanese failed in theirs - strategically the US came out on top."

Never heard of any “home movie” by any torpedo crews. Maybe the TBD was a “flying coffin”. But that could be, and was, said of many aircraft types in WW II, including the Val, The Betty, the Nel, the F2F, the P-39. So what? You fight with what you have. BTW, the Japanese torpedo planes weren’t much better off, they lost over half of all the torpedo planes they launched against the Yorktown.

Where is yours? You were the one who claimed that Japanese Army troops were “well-trained expert jungle fighters”. You never cited a source; apparently it was just your opinion. Certainly the experience on Guadalcanal doesn’t support any such conclusion.

My statement that only the Japanese troops in Malaya and Burma received special jungle training was based on H. P. Willmott’s statement to that effect in "Empires In the Balance".

So list a few along with the page numbers. I doubt that many considered them better than US troops in such environments because there was not much actual experience4 to base an assessment of relative performance on, early in the war.

A remarkable grasp of the obvious. The point, however, is that they were never4 more than partially successful.

My intention was not to discuss the entire panorama of World War II, but to only take certain events in a limited context and draw conclusions with the acknowledgment that the conclusions could only be considered valid within that context. It is you who keeps trying to widen the discussion so that you can “make points” in a different argument.

Well, let’s see, One of the first things that should be taught “expert jungles fighters” is how to move effective through the jungle without getting lost, otherwise, any other training is useless.

You in initially claimed (in error) that the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal only “got lost once”. When I proved it was more than once, and that the Japanese troops, in fact, consistently, got lost and fumbled offensive attacks because of it, now it “doesn’t prove” they did not receive “better jungle training”.

Well, I agree with you that it doesn’t prove that, but it is certainly strong evidence of it. So where are the authorities that state the Japanese received “better jungle training” than their adversaries? I think the fact that Japanese troops on Guadalcanal consistently couldn’t find their way through the jungle discredits your opinion that the Japanese on Guadalcanal were well trained jungle fighters. Unless you can find some authorities that say otherwise, I think your opinion has been proven to be in error.

Well, as you might imagine, I am no longer impressed by what you think. That is EXACTLY what Frank is asserting, and he has numerous examples to back up his assertion. I suggest you read Frank’s book in it’s entirety; it will then become clear that the poor Japanese had little chance against the Marines on Guadalcanal at any level.

You keep mentioning the superior "fire power of US Troops, as if it were something to be ashamed of. It wasn’t and in fact was part of what gave the Marines and other US troops their fighting superiority ov er Japanese Troops.

That’s not all you initially said.

But now, you’re willing to agree that the only real advantage the Japanese had was in waging an aggressive war. So we’re coming closer together; The first time the Japanese meet troops that are well-equipped, well led, and well trained, they get stopped cold. That was my originally contention too.

Don’t put words in mouth; I never said USN pilots were Inherently superior to Japanese pilots. Nor did I ever say that USN pilots had more hours of training. What I said was that USN pilots were comparable to the Japanese in skill, and in many ways were better trained than Japanese naval pilots, particularly in gunnery (deflection shooting), team tactics, Fleet air defense, and aerial combat doctrine.[/QUOTE]

Well, I think you are juust plain ignorant of the topic, so I guess we’re even.

At least I’ve read the book, which is more than I can say for you.

Well, that certainly sounds reasonable, even if it is an erroneous assumption in 1942. The reality is that the Japanese and Americans in the Guadalcanal campaign were on essentially even terms as far as naval power and logistical assets were concerned. Actually the IJN had a slight edge in naval power and Guadalcanal was just as distant from San Francisco as it was from Tokyo. The US had no real advantage in material or troop strength over Japan in the summer of 1942; the advantages and disadvantages were just about as equally balanced as they could possibly be considering the US was supply less than 20 % of it’s industrial output to support it’s war effort in the Pacific. I will grant, however, that by the end of the campaign, the Japanese had managed to squander just about every advantage they had formerly enjoyed.

Well, let’s get something straight, here; my obligation is to supply the facts that support my contentions. If you disagree with them, it is YOUR obligation to support your disagreement with pertinent facts. I must say, you have certainly failed to execute your obligation. You appear to expect me to prove my contentions with facts, and yours as well.

Sorry, it doesn’t work that way, and that is why your case is not compelling.

#63

A strategic defeat but a tactical victory, they were still in the game and had also weakened a US fleet still largely on the defensive…

It has everything to do with what you falsely asserted.

BTW, I ran across a statement by Eric Bergerud …"In my opinion the Americans won all the carrier battles of World War II…

What have I “falsely asserted?” Yes, the US won the carrier battles, but largely because they had a decisive intelligence “trump-card,” and without Rochefort’s team, the War could have been far bloodier than it had been, and the Japanese may well have won an engagement or two. I’m not saying the US didn’t win, I’m providing context and explaining why they won other than is simple “we were better” terms…

You can’t simply ascribe the US victories to superior aviators and commanders without acknowledging that key advantage…

Never heard of any “home movie” by any torpedo crews…

Some planes yes, some no. The P-39 was hardly a “coffin” when flown within its limitations (high level interception was out of the question). The Soviets loved it for its low level maneuverability…

The Japanese may have lost half their planes, but at least their torpedoes mostly detonated after hitting their targets…

Where is yours? You were the one who claimed that Japanese Army troops were “well-trained expert jungle fighters”…

Where’s mine? Stop asking for what you haven’t provided. You said that only the Japanese IA troops in the Malayan campaign received any, “special” jungle training…

And Guadalcanal is meaningless in drawing definitive conclusions–one battle does not an army make.

My statement that only the Japanese troops in Malaya and Burma received special jungle training was based on H. P. Willmott’s statement to that effect in "Empires In the Balance".

But you’re wrong. Perhaps I am too. The IJA developed light infantry tactics in China that were applied throughout their infantry ranks. Pulled this one out:

The Japanese quickly revealed themselves as being formidable opponents, enjoying the incalculable advantage, deploying well led, highly trained, disciplined and in most cases battle-tried divisions qualitatively far superior to their opponents…possessing by far the greatest relative mobility in jungle, swamps, and plantations…(The IJA) achieved immediate results by applying light infantry fighting methods successfully developed in China to the jungle using troops who displayed little fear of their surroundings…This was not a revolutionary development in tactics. As Edward Drea observed: 'this was standard Japanese doctrine, and its execution gave tall tales of Japanese jungle warfare…

The jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth armies at war, 1941-45 By T. R. Moreman (p.15-16)

The Japanese TO&E overall gave them some inherent advantages in the Jungle when fighting unprepared Western troops…

So list a few along with the page numbers. I doubt that many considered them better than US troops in such environments because there was not much actual experience4…

They drove US forces from the jungles of the Philippines and forced a chaotic retreat to Bataan and Corregidor. I would think that that is common knowledge by now…

But oh wait! That doesn’t count. :rolleyes:

A remarkable grasp of the obvious. The point, however, is that they were never4 more than partially successful.

I never contended that they were more than partially successful. They lost, but still fought skillfully against impossible odds. They weren’t always “amateurs” when they applied new discipline and gave up “Banzai charges,” which only achieved a good effect once in the Aleutians IIRC…

My intention was not to discuss the entire panorama of World War II, but to only take certain events in a limited context and draw conclusions with the acknowledgment that the conclusions could only be considered valid within that context. It is you who keeps trying to widen the discussion so that you can “make points” in a different argument.

I’m just contextualizing things…

Well, let’s see, One of the first things that should be taught “expert jungles fighters” is how to move effective through the jungle without getting lost, otherwise, any other training is useless.

Which makes them no different from US troops and marines who “got lost” in say, the Philippines.

There are also numerous examples of well supported Japanese IA troops fighting skillfully, conducting infiltration and small unit infantry tactics, and even mobile armored warfare when so equipped against an enemy that was lacking in tactics and equipment. The marines in the 'Canal defeated the Japanese because they used superior defensive tactics and took advantage of experience of their own and others…

[i]You in initially claimed (in error) that the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal only “got lost once”…[/quote]

Big deal! I don’t have the book in front of me, I’ll grab it later today though and perhaps point out how many times US marines and soldiers also got lost or fucked up tactically…

Well, I agree with you that it doesn’t prove that, but it is certainly strong evidence of it. So where are the authorities that state the Japanese received “better jungle training” than their adversaries?..

I’ll agree that the IJA weren’t necessarily trained in “jungle warfare,” but that their operation tactics were superior initially and that their army was better suited for jungle warfare (initially, as I’ve stated repeatedly). With a large number of veterans and experience in China, this was to be expected. But the US Marines, Army, and the Commonwealth forces soon caught up training in jungle and tactics to counter IJA infiltration…

Well, as you might imagine, I am no longer impressed by what you think…

I just felt my heart break a little… :frowning:

You keep mentioning the superior "fire power of US Troops, as if it were something to be ashamed of…

Why would that be shameful? I merely stated it as a “fact.” Just like the Japanese had an advantage or armor in Malaya/Singapore whereas the British effectively had none, in addition to almost no portable anti-armor weapons. That doesn’t negate the fact that the capture of Singapore was a spectacular coup…

But now, you’re willing to agree that the only real advantage the Japanese had was in waging an aggressive war. So we’re coming closer together; The first time the Japanese meet troops that are well-equipped, well led, and well trained, they get stopped cold. That was my originally contention too.

I don’t think we were ever really that far apart. My contention is that the IJA, and to a lessor extent, the IJN enjoyed certain early advantages largely due to their experience in China, and even perhaps other areas of occupation such as Korea. But yes, well trained Western troops indoctrinated and properly schooled at countering their tactics proved the Japanese very fallible…

Don’t put words in mouth; I never said USN pilots were Inherently superior to Japanese pilots. Nor did I ever say that USN pilots had more hours of training. What I said was that USN pilots were comparable to the Japanese in skill, and in many ways were better trained than Japanese naval pilots, particularly in gunnery (deflection shooting), team tactics, Fleet air defense, and aerial combat doctrine.

Then we’ll have to agree to disagree. While USN aviators gradually became more than a match for the Japanese. But not at the outset of the War…

Well, I think you are juust plain ignorant of the topic, so I guess we’re even.

Maybe, but I’m not counting the trees in the forest…

At least I’ve read the book, which is more than I can say for you.

Dead wrong. I don’t own the book, but I’ve read it, rereading portions (about a year ago) and have the overdue library charges to prove it!

Well, that certainly sounds reasonable, even if it is an erroneous assumption in 1942. The reality is that the Japanese and Americans in the Guadalcanal campaign were on essentially even terms as far as naval power and logistical assets were concerned. Actually the IJN had a slight edge in naval power and Guadalcanal was just as distant from San Francisco as it was from Tokyo. The US had no real advantage in material or troop strength over Japan in the summer of 1942; the advantages and disadvantages were just about as equally balanced as they could possibly be considering the US was supply less than 20 % of it’s industrial output to support it’s war effort in the Pacific. I will grant, however, that by the end of the campaign, the Japanese had managed to squander just about every advantage they had formerly enjoyed.
…
Sorry, it doesn’t work that way, and that is why your case is not compelling.

Distant from San Francisco or Hawaii? I don’t want to keep going on and on with this. I agree the Japanese had more surface fighting power, but they had a distinct, and an innate, weakness in merchantmen along with huge armies of occupation siphoning off their already strained, limited logistical base. The Cactus AF was also a decisive factor. They simply got caught with their pants down, and yes, I wholeheartedly agree they squandered their advantages. But they were also pretty damn good.

I also disagree regarding troop strength, I don’t have the numbers, but the US hadn’t yet embarked for Torch, and both sides had parity in mobilization for a while, and again, the IJA would always have large numbers tied down in China…

#64

Your logic makes no sense. Of course, the Japanese were “still in the game”; so was the US, so what makes it a “tactical victory” for the Japanese but a tactical defeat for the US, if both sides are “still in the Game”?

Furthermore, The results of Coral Sea meant that the Japanese lost the next big carrier battle. Some “victory”!

What part of “having better intel” is a contradiction of the idea that “we were better”?

I didn’t. I said that the USN had better intel almost throughout the war. Go back and actually read the thread, and you will see that I mentioned that intelligence was one of the superior strengths of the USN.

Yes, WW II is full of examples of planes that were falsely maligned as “flying coffins” by people who never even flew them and don’t understand that practically all planes that are flown within their technical limitations will perform satisfactorily. BTW, how many hours do you have in the TBD?

My you do bounce around, don’t you?

First I challenged your data on torpedoes, so then you say you were mainly criticizing the TBD. Then when I pointed out that lots of serviceable planes were called “Flying coffins”, it’s back to criticizing the torpedoes. You know, you’d have a great future as a politician…

Well, my goodness, who brought up specialized jungle training in the first place? It was YOUR claim that the Japanese on Guadalcanal were “expert jungle fighters”. I pointed out, and proved, that they sure spent a lot of time lost in the jungle for “expert jungle fighters”. I personally don’t care if you manage to establish that the Japanese troops in Malaya were NOT trained jungle fighters, so I’m not going to look up and post the sources I have that say they were.

But as far as Guadalcanal is concerned, it is the campaign we ARE discussing and if you want your contention that the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal were “trained jungle fighters” to be taken seriously, especially in light of the evidence that I have presented, and documented, you had better com,e up with some evidence, or documentation to support your silly claims.

I especially like the author’s reference to “tall tales of Japanese jungle warfare”.

I further note that the Author specifically refers to China and Chinese troops as adversaries. But other than that, we have a small context problem; is the author describing a situation in Malaya? Or Burma? The title would lead one to believe his observations were limited to one or both of those regions.

He certainly isn’t talking about Guadalcanal, because Japanese light infantry tactics seldom seemed to work there, and certainly weren’t effective against the Marines. Moreover, since the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal couldn’t find their way through the jungle, and spent a lot of time completely lost, they sure weren’t trained in “any standard doctrine”. Either that or the so-called “standard doctrine” didn’t exist.

Like what? This should be interesting.

Actually they didn’t. The US troops retreated into the jungles on Bataan after trying to stop the Japanese on the Central Plain of Luzon where there was a relatively well developed road net. The retreat was one of the few things that was conducted properly by Mac’s forces, even though the administrative aspects were bungled by Mac and his staff. It was the jungle on the Bataan peninsula that stopped the Japanese temporarily and allowed the Americans to hold out for awhile.

I would think that a purported scholar, like yourself, would understand that by now.

No, what you are trying to do is widen the argument because you are losing it. Keeping the debate centered on specific points within a specific campaign (Guadalcanal) is not to your advantage because the points I am making are too focused and too well documented.

CONTINUED…

#65

CONTINUED…

Except that no one is claiming the American troops in the Philippines were “expert Jungle fighters”. And could you please list and document specific examples of battalion-size, or larger, US Army and Marine units got lost in the Philippines?

[i]You in initially claimed (in error) that the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal only “got lost once”…[/quote]

That would be progress. Why don’t you make a list and post it?

Oh yes! Why don’t you mention all of the wonderful initial successes the Japanese enjoyed on Guadalcanal, like the Ichiki Detachment infiltrating across the sand bar. LOL! Against US Marines and Army troops Japanese infantry tactics simply got them killed in great numbers.

Why state it as “fact” when it’s not being disputed? I agree that superior firepower was one of the factors that made US troops generally superior in fighting power to Japanese troops.

Well, if you consider mass murder and atrocities good war-fighting experience, you might have a case. I would contend that the Japanese experience in China actually did them a disservice, as the Chinese forces fought a completely different war than the Japanese encountered in the Pacific against US and Australian troops. In fact, when the Japanese initially came up against US and Australian troops in New Guinea and Guadalcanal, they were stunned that their China tactics seldom worked.

You aren’t paying attention; I never said anything about the “outset” of the war. I claimed it was when the USN pilots first encountered Japanese naval pilots at Coral Sea and Midway. And the fact is obvious, in every encounter between Japanese naval pilots and US naval pilots, the USN pilots consistently destroyed more Japanese planes than the Japanese were able to destroy American planes. That was true in EVERY encounter in the latter half of 1942. How, if USN pilots weren’t better than their Japanese counterparts, do you explain that inconvenient little fact?

Actually it appears you aren’t even aware of the forest.

Well, I own a copy. I’ve read it carefully, studied the maps, read the notes section very carefully, and inserted my own notes into the margins. Maybe that’s why I remember Frank’s statements more accurately,

The distance from San Francisco to Guadalcanal (via Noumea, which was the advance logistical base for the campaign) is 6,298 NM.

The distance from Tokyo to Guadalcanal (via Rabaul) is 3,093 NM.

The distance from Oahu to Guadalcanal (via Noumea) is 4,208 NM. This distance is misleading since every once of food, fuel, ammo, and equipment destined for Guadalcanal, originated in San Francisco, not Oahu.

As you can see the US was at a distinct logistical disadvantage in terms of the distance it had to transport supplies to Guadalcanal.

I agree the Japanese had more surface fighting power, but they had a distinct, and an innate, weakness in merchantmen along with huge armies of occupation siphoning off their already strained, limited logistical base.[/QUOTE]

Which was partially offset by the disparity in distance.

Just not good enough.

I also disagree regarding troop strength, I don’t have the numbers, but the US hadn’t yet embarked for Torch, and both sides had parity in mobilization for a while, and again, the IJA would always have large numbers tied down in China…[/QUOTE]

I don’t think I ever made any representation about troop strength on Guadalcanal. But since you don’t have the numbers, I’ll specify that throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese consistently underestimated the strength of the Marines, and usually were able to concentrate in only marginally superior numbers at the point of contact when attacking. The “large numbers” of Japanese troops “tied down” in China were actually less significant than the IJA’s reluctance to get involved in a campaign it considered the responsibility of the IJN.

#66

CONTINUED…

No, what you are trying to do is widen the argument because you are losing it. Keeping the debate centered on specific points within a specific campaign (Guadalcanal) is not to your advantage because the points I am making are too focused and too well documented.

Except that no one is claiming the American troops in the Philippines were “expert Jungle fighters”. And could you please list and document specific examples of battalion-size, or larger, US Army and Marine units got lost in the Philippines?

That would be progress. Why don’t you make a list and post it?

Oh yes! Why don’t you mention all of the wonderful initial successes the Japanese enjoyed on Guadalcanal, like the Ichiki Detachment infiltrating across the sand bar. Against US Marines and Army troops Japanese infantry tactics simply got them killed in great numbers.

Why state it at all, when it’s not being disputed? I agree that superior firepower was one of the factors that made US troops generally superior in fighting power to Japanese troops.

Well, if you consider mass murder and atrocities good war-fighting experience, you might have a case. I would contend that the Japanese experience in China actually did them a disservice, as the Chinese forces fought a completely different war than the Japanese encountered in the Pacific against US and Australian troops. In fact, when the Japanese initially came up against US and Australian troops in New Guinea and Guadalcanal, they were stunned that their China tactics seldom worked.

You aren’t paying attention; I never said anything about the “outset” of the war. I claimed it was when the USN pilots first encountered Japanese naval pilots at Coral Sea and Midway. And the fact is obvious, in every encounter between Japanese naval pilots and US naval pilots, the USN pilots consistently destroyed more Japanese planes than the Japanese were able to destroy American planes. That was true in EVERY encounter in the latter half of 1942. How, if USN pilots weren’t better than their Japanese counterparts, do you explain that inconvenient little fact?

Actually it appears you aren’t even aware of the forest.

Well, I own a copy. I’ve read it carefully, studied the maps, read the notes section very carefully, and inserted my own notes into the margins. Maybe that’s why I remember Frank’s statements more accurately,

The distance from San Francisco to Guadalcanal (via Noumea, which was the advance logistical base for the campaign) is 6,298 NM.

The distance from Tokyo to Guadalcanal (via Rabaul) is 3,093 NM.

The distance from Oahu to Guadalcanal (via Noumea) is 4,208 NM. This distance is misleading since every once of food, fuel, ammo, and equipment destined for Guadalcanal, originated in San Francisco, not Oahu.

As you can see the US was at a distinct logistical disadvantage in terms of the distance it had to transport supplies to Guadalcanal.

Which was partially offset by the disparity in distance.

Just not good enough.

I don’t think I ever made any representation about troop strength on Guadalcanal. But since you don’t have the numbers, I’ll specify that throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese consistently underestimated the strength of the Marines, and usually were able to concentrate in only marginally superior numbers at the point of contact when attacking. The “large numbers” of Japanese troops “tied down” in China were actually less significant than the IJA’s reluctance to get involved in a campaign it considered the responsibility of the IJN.

#67

Your inability to grasp “my logic” “makes no sense.”

Furthermore, The results of Coral Sea meant that the Japanese lost the next big carrier battle. Some “victory”!

What part of “having better intel” is a contradiction of the idea that “we were better”?

Intell? Nothing, except that you childishly omitted for your first post on the subject as if Midway was only the result of supposed superior airman and seamanship when there was also a good deal of luck involved, and a good deal of the of the US command’s job was made vitally easier as they knew the IJN plan. Just like the Japanese had luck involved with their attack at Pearl Harbor.

I didn’t. I said that the USN had better intel almost throughout the war.

Only after I confronted you about it, see the above comment. You completely, disingenuously omitted it…

Yes, WW II is full of examples of planes that were falsely maligned as “flying coffins” by people who never even flew…their technical limitations will perform satisfactorily. BTW, how many hours do you have in the TBD?

One of the most idiotic comments you’ve made! :lol: You’re getting into troll-land here. We can’t criticize a plane now unless we’ve flown it? How many hours do you have in it? How many Jap fighters have you shot down in it doing “The Thatch Weave?” :slight_smile: That’s it! No one can talk about anything unless they’ve driven, flown, or shot it!

My you do bounce around, don’t you?

First I challenged your data on torpedoes, so then you say you were mainly criticizing the TBD. Then when I pointed out that lots of serviceable planes were called “Flying coffins”, it’s back to criticizing the torpedoes. You know, you’d have a great future as a politician…

Actually, you made some silly fucking contention that the US finally modified the Mark 13 in late 1942, which was completely irrelevant to my comment as the Japanese had done this since 1936, and the US could not have attacked a shallow harbor as the Japanese had on Dec. 7, 1941…

I ignored it, because it shows that you’re either extremely dull and completely missed the point, or just a fightclub troll…

I’m beginning to suspect the latter…

Well, my goodness, who brought up specialized jungle training in the first place?

YOU DID supergenius!! YOU mentioned that the IJA in the Malayan Campaign received “special jungle training” and that they were the only ones to have…
’
And you were proved WRONG! I even acknowledge that my statement was wrong semantically, though not in spirit…

It was YOUR claim that the Japanese on Guadalcanal were “expert jungle fighters”. I pointed out, and proved, that they sure spent a lot of time lost in the jungle for “expert jungle fighters”…

“Lost in the Jungle” has fuckall to do with jungle training or tactics in this instance, and is more about command and control. And after a cursory browsing/rereading of Guadalcanal, there were a whole host of factors that went into the dismal attack, including lack of naval gunfire support and the inability of Kawaguchi to coordinate his plans with higher headquarters and the Navy…

You’ve obviously have never been in a line-unit…

But as far as Guadalcanal is concerned, it is the campaign we ARE discussing…

LOL We’re “discussing” only what you think we should be discussing, because you’re wrong and I’m beginning to believe to be reliant on Wiki, Google-books, etc. Just a hunch…

I especially like the author’s reference to “tall tales of Japanese jungle warfare”.

Right! Because you’re a fraud who leaches onto some pedestrian flaming and can’t admit you’re wrong, which is sort of the first sign of a troll…

But that also completely contradicts your unsupported statements, that have no specific quotes or “page numbers.”

I further note that the Author specifically refers to China and Chinese troops as adversaries. But other than that, we have a small context problem; is the author describing a situation in Malaya? Or Burma? The title would lead one to believe his observations were limited to one or both of those regions.

What? Chinese troops? He was talking about the Malayan and Burmese campaigns conducted by combat hardened IJA divisions who received no more specific jungle training than did the IJA on the 'Canal…

He certainly isn’t talking about Guadalcanal, because Japanese light infantry tactics seldom seemed to work there, and certainly weren’t effective against the Marines. Moreover, since the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal couldn’t find their way through the jungle…

Ad hominem simpleton’s take. The Japanese didn’t just bumble about and just “get lost.” They were often disoriented, starving, and exhausted. Any other troops would have become so as well under the circumstances, including the US Marines had they attempted something similar on such a scale. There were a whole host of factors against them launching a proper attack. Not because they, “couldn’t read a fucking compass in the jungle!” …

Like what? This should be interesting.

Reread the quote I provided earlier. The one on Chinese fighting… :slight_smile:

Actually they didn’t. The US troops retreated into the jungles on Bataan after trying to stop the Japanese on the Central Plain of Luzon where there was a relatively well developed road net. The retreat was one of the few things that was conducted properly by Mac’s forces, even though the administrative aspects were bungled by Mac and his staff. It was the jungle on the Bataan peninsula that stopped the Japanese temporarily and allowed the Americans to hold out for awhile.

The Americans were attempting to drive the Japanese back into the sea, which they failed to do, much like the opposite was true on Guadalcanal. And oh, you mean Mac fucked up? Really? You mean like Kawaguchi inappropriately “divided” his forces at Edison’s Ridge? MacArthur violated the fundamental principle of Warplan Orange, hastening the US-Filipino collapse and leading to a premature surrender at the very least…

I would think that a purported scholar, like yourself, would understand that by now.

Oh right! I understand silly double standards. That’s just basic competence, not being scholarly…

Well, “skillfully” is a subjective judgment;

It’s a “selective judgment” made by people far more qualified than you or I, including their USMC adversaries…

If you ask me they fought courageously, but hardly skillfully, they were slaughtered on Guadalcanal. The odds the Japanese fought against were largely created by their own poor command hierarchy, which frankly, was pathetic.

They weren’t just “slaughtered,” the held up the US occupation of the island for several months, and their apparent “lack of skill” (which incidentally, is again an insult to the Allied servicemen who fought them there) has more to do with the fact that they were cut off, like the Germans at Stalingrad. They fought while outnumbered, outgunned, out supplied, and with little air support. Who’s “skill” can overcome that?

No, what you are trying to do is widen the argument because you are losing it. Keeping the debate centered on specific points within a specific campaign (Guadalcanal) is not to your advantage because the points I am making are too focused and too well documented.

CONTINUED…

You’d actually have to know what the argument was to actually “win” it. It’s not my problem if you’re “ignorant” about WWII overall. But Google-phu is your friend…:slight_smile:

#68

“Specific about Guadalcanal???” WHHHAAAATTTT??? What is the title of this thread again? We’ve been discussing many facets of the PTO in relation to Japanese performance (or lack of therein)

Except that no one is claiming the American troops in the Philippines were “expert Jungle fighters”. And could you please list and document specific examples of battalion-size, or larger, US Army and Marine units got lost in the Philippines?

Which has fuckall to do with anything!! Would they have defeated the Japanese there if they had been?

And I’ll “list” them after you list all the ones that swiftly found their way through the jungle without suffering losses!

That would be progress. Why don’t you make a list and post it?

Because I’m getting tired of this, and I am questioning your motivations for it…

But perhaps we’ll get back to the instance portrayed in “The Thin Red Line,” which you previously dismissed as just “fiction.” Yes, it is a novel. But the author, James Jones, was in the infantry at Guadalcanal and based the battles on ones that took place, and closely modeled the reality. It’s also mentioned on pg. 617 of Frank’s work in a very positive light…

Oh yes! Why don’t you mention all of the wonderful initial successes the Japanese enjoyed on Guadalcanal, like the Ichiki Detachment infiltrating across the sand bar. Against US Marines and Army troops Japanese infantry tactics simply got them killed in great numbers.

Because I wasn’t using the words “initial success” in any way related to Guadalcanal, strawman…since the battle began in August of 1942, it would hardly qualify as “initial” other than the Japanese initially occupied it…

Why state it at all, when it’s not being disputed? I agree that superior firepower was one of the factors that made US troops generally superior in fighting power to Japanese troops.

But I never “disputed it.” WTF? seriously! :rolleyes:

Well, if you consider mass murder and atrocities good war-fighting experience, you might have a case.

I fucking don’t! The US Army also gained good experience in the Filipino-American War, in which they too committed horrific atrocities. Same thing with the marines in various occupations from Nicaragua to Haiti, though certainly not on the scale of the IJA in China.

I would contend that the Japanese experience in China actually did them a disservice, as the Chinese forces fought a completely different war than the Japanese encountered in the Pacific against US and Australian troops.

Not true at all. Combat experience is combat experience, and the Chinese were a very motley force of units of varying effectiveness, but it was skill combat experience. Just like the USMC gained some experienced officers in Haiti and central America…

In fact, when the Japanese initially came up against US and Australian troops in New Guinea and Guadalcanal, they were stunned that their China tactics seldom worked.

WTF are you talking about? “China tactics?” There were no “China tactics,” just the codification of small unit infantry tactics that served them well until the Allies learned how to counter their tactics in tight defensive formations and by using massed firepower with effective fields of fire.

Those tactics served the IJA very well initially in New Guinea, among other places…

You aren’t paying attention; I never said anything about the “outset” of the war. I claimed it was when the USN pilots first encountered Japanese naval pilots at Coral Sea and Midway. And the fact is obvious, in every encounter between Japanese naval pilots and US naval pilots, the USN pilots consistently destroyed more Japanese planes than the Japanese were able to destroy American planes.

Not true at all, the count was even at best overall. And you can’t just cherry-pick battles in which a number of IJN aircraft were destroyed on-board their carriers by Dauntless pilots “lucky” enough to catch them rearming

In air-to-air, things were mixed at best. And only made even through the use of tactics such as the “Thatch Weave.”

That was true in EVERY encounter in the latter half of 1942. How, if USN pilots weren’t better than their Japanese counterparts, do you explain that inconvenient little fact?

It’s been pointed out here multiple times that the Japanese aviation began to decline precipitously after Midway after the deaths of their best, and inability to replace those crews…

Actually it appears you aren’t even aware of the forest.

This is really getting old…

Well, I own a copy. I’ve read it carefully, studied the maps, read the notes section very carefully, and inserted my own notes into the margins. Maybe that’s why I remember Frank’s statements more accurately,

You don’t really seem to point to any specific, overall assessments actually. You just quote the same text over and over…if you’ve read it “closely,” you read that Frank goes into (almost nauseating) detail and explains the problems the Japanese had. And it was a bit more complex than compass reading skills…

The distance from San Francisco to Guadalcanal (via Noumea, which was the advance logistical base for the campaign) is 6,298 NM.

The distance from Tokyo to Guadalcanal (via Rabaul) is 3,093 NM.

The distance from Oahu to Guadalcanal (via Noumea) is 4,208 NM. This distance is misleading since every once of food, fuel, ammo, and equipment destined for Guadalcanal, originated in San Francisco, not Oahu.

That’s not true, actually. Not “everything.” There were forward staging bases all over the Pacific rim, including in New Zealand, Fiji, Australia, Port Moresby, etc. Another meaningless point…

As you can see the US was at a distinct logistical disadvantage in terms of the distance it had to transport supplies to Guadalcanal.

Actually they weren’t, as again, the Japanese had huge numbers of formations scattered around the Pacific whereas the men on Guadalcanal were one of the few large US formations oversees in 1942…

I don’t think I ever made any representation about troop strength on Guadalcanal. But since you don’t have the numbers, I’ll specify that throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese consistently underestimated the strength of the Marines, and usually were able to concentrate in only marginally superior numbers at the point of contact when attacking. The “large numbers” of Japanese troops “tied down” in China were actually less significant than the IJA’s reluctance to get involved in a campaign it considered the responsibility of the IJN.

The Japanese certainly underestimated the marines strength often, but they couldn’t have gotten many more in than they did anyways. And there was significant infighting between the IJA and IJN, but I recall most of it being something of the Army’s disgust at the Navy’s inability to keep their troops supplied properly, exacerbated by ignorance of the plight of the average soldier, and expectations they should soldier on regardless of disease, malnutrition, and shortages…

#69

Ok, we’ll let that one go. You can keep on thinking Coral Sea was a Japanese victory; Bergerud and I know better.

If you could read, you’d have noticed I did mention intelligence as one of the USN strengths, but I should have guessed you’d fail to notice, since you seem to have the same trouble reading Frank.

Ok, here’s my post:

“Actually, I believe the Japanese were stopped by superior quality naval forces in the May/June 1942, time frame. These were the naval battles of Coral Sea and Midway, of which I was speaking. And by “quality” I mean in the widest possible sense of the word. The IJN was certainly no pushover during this period, but the USN proved slightly better, not in every area, mind you, but in the areas that happened to count. American naval pilots were slightly better trained, (but much less experienced) than Japanese naval pilots particularly in the areas of carrier doctrine, scouting, team tactics, aerial gunnery, and fleet air defense. American naval officers were better at planning, fleet tactics, engineering, and intelligence The IJN was no doubt far more skilled in small unit night fighting, and torpedo tactics, but as it eventuated, these areas did not assume a great deal of importance until later in the year.”

That was from post #21 in this thread. I believe I was the first to mention superior American intelligence. If you have other information, post it.

Comment? I made no comment; I asked a question, which BTW, you haven’t answered.

My point is still valid; lots of planes were labeled “flying coffins” during WW II, by people who were not qualified to determine their merits. It’s irrelevant whether you think the TBD was good or bad. What counts is it was what the USN had and that it did give good service under circumstances where it was used as it was meant to be.

My, my, such language! Something must have gotten under you skin. A debate isn’t worth getting so upset.

I was merely correcting you mistaken impression of the Mk 13 with data that indicates the US could make attacks in shallow water by late 1942.

Now, as for your “silly, fornicating” contention that the Japanese had modified it’s torpedoes in 1936, it’s simply wrong.

Dr. Ken Kotani, in "The Pacific War Companion, pages 34-35, says the following;

“Genda stressed the IJN’s superiority of aircraft carriers and the necessity of the task force for the operation. He also addressed technical problems, such as the fact that Pearl Harbor was too shallow to permit the use of torpedoes. Yamamoto read the draft, and realized that it would be necessary to modify torpedoes for Pearl Harbor.”

The “draft” in question was dated April, 1941, and the author cites Japanese records as his source. So it is obvious that the Japanese didn’t have any “modified” shallow water torpedoes before the summer of 1941.

Well, I’m beginning to suspect that you are in way over your head, and rather than admit it and learn something, you are resorting to accusations of “trolling”, and other name calling.

No, I said I believed that the Japanese troops in Malaya had received specialized jungle training, and that they were the only ones to my knowledge who had.

As for being proven wrong, no I haven’t been. Your source talks about jungle fighting in realtion to Japanese troops, but never specifies which troops received any training, or where, or when, or even “If”.

Goodness, please calm down. Getting lost in the jungle and being unable to find one’s way or navigate through jungle growth does have a lot to do with fighting in the jungle, as Frank makes perfectly clear. Yes, the Japanese did have problems with command and control (another weakness relative to the Americans), but the fundamental reason that was true was because the Japanese soldiers and their officers were not at home in the jungle. NGS wouldn’t have made much difference because the Japanese troops could not coordinate and execute the precise timing required to take advantage of NGS. You are obviously looking for a rationale for the Japanese troop’s inability to fight effectively in the Jungle. It was simple, they had never been trained to live, move, or fight efficiently in the jungle.

#70

Continued…

Correct, I was in the Navy. That’s why I rely on military historians rather than my own opinions in those areas.

Well, consistency is often considered a virtue, but not when you are consistently wrong. You are wrong …again.

I’m a fraud? You certainly haven’t done very well in proving it. I’ve established my points and documented them. Have you turned up a single one of my sources that says something other than what I have represented? No, not a single one.

In fact, you have come out looking pretty silly when I have posted my sources. I could go back and list all the mistakes you’ve made and erroneous information you’ve posted, but why pour salt in a wound?

Well, then either the quotation is taken out of context, or it doesn’t refer to jungle fighting training as you originally claimed.

"(The IJA) achieved immediate results by applying light infantry fighting methods successfully developed in China"

Hmmm…

Who are you quoting in your last sentence? Certainly not me, as I never said that?

I have never characterized why the Japanese seemed to keep getting lost in the jungle, just that they did, and that this cost them severely in several battles.

You wrote; “The Japanese TO&E overall gave them some inherent advantages in the Jungle when fighting unprepared Western troops…”

And I asked “Like what?”. The previous source you quoted mentions nothing about the Japanese TO&E, or what advantages it might confer.

Oh, it just dawned on me; you probably don’t understand what “TO&E” means, you are just using the term to appear knowledgeable about military matters. The term “TO&E” means Table of Organization and Equipment. It refers to how the troops are organized, command structure, and what equipment (mainly weapons and vehicles) is authorized for a given unit.

So now, I ask again, what advantages against western opponents, were conferred on Japanese troops by their TO&E?

Well, not actually. It was Mac’s plan to drive the Japanese back into the sea and he’d convinced (“deceived” would probably be a better word) the JCS that he could do it with his understrength American division, and the woefully inadequately trained and equipped Filipino levees; Washington should have known better. The retreat into the Bataan peninsula was the only part of the Philippines defense that was done in a reasonably professional manner, except for the administrative details. The original plan had been to let the Japanese have everything but Bataan and Manila Bay and hold out as long as possible. Not sure what you think Kawaguchi’s botched attack has to do with Mac in the Philippines, so I’ll not comment on that aspect until you elaborate a bit

No, I doubt you understand anything about it, you certainly haven 't shown any real knowledge of what happened, just the conventionally accepted “wisdom” that the “History 101” student is expected to regurgitate on demand.

Not really. The US occupied the tiny portion of the island that was important to them, and began operating the airfield (which was the reason for being there in the first place) after a matter of 13 days. The Japanese troops on the Island kept attacking the airfield, and it was the security of the airfield (not it’s operation) which was in question until about December 15, 1942. The Japanese decided to pull their troops out about this time and their forces on the island switch over to defensive operations.

The Japanese got themselves into a bad spot over Guadalcanal because they underestimated the fighting ability of the Americans and over estimated their own.

Granted, it’s difficult to keep the argument focused with you jumping all over the map when your points are shot down, but then I’m not really interested in “winning” anything, just making sure that the events are accurately presented and their significance underst0od.

Now I know you will come back and claim that I don’t know anything because I don’t hold with your popular misconceptions and generalizations about the Japanese, but that doesn’t matter. I’m confident that I have far better knowledge of the Pacific war than do you.

As for being “ignorant” about WW II, that should be much more your concern than mine; I haven’t had any problem refuting your erroneous assertions so far.

#71

Regardless of the title of the thread which was something about JAPANESE MILITARY STRENGTH, I have specifically limited my statements to issues which mainly occurred in the Guadalcanal campaign or the associated New Guinea campaign. and Naval battles which took place during 1942. You may post anything you want, of course, but I will not discuss any matter ouitside the limits I have stated above.

Ok, so I guess you can’t find any sources which support your assertion; I’ll just mark it down as conceded.

Well, you were the one who claimed there were plenty of instances where US troops did even more poorly that the Japanese in jungle fighting, so I just assumed you could put together a list of those instances. But now I can see that is just one of your empty opinions, and more of your ignorant bluster.

With reference to James Jones "Thin Red Line", yes, Frank does mention it; he says, "This book deserves far more recognition than it has yet received." LOL! I’m not sure if he’s is referring to Jones’ literary talent, or if he thinks its a rip-snorting action read, but he certainly doesn’t claim it is highly accurate. Maybe he’ll be impressed enough by the movie to call it a documentary?

Well, I guess that is another in put of your data we can forget.

Either you are really forgetful, or you are trying to back away from assertions that you now realize you can’t support with evidence. Either way, it just makes you look ignorant.

Then you don’t have a case. I certainly don’t believe any atrocities committed by American troops (an undocumented assertion by you) in Haiti or the Philippines gained them any useful combat experience.

I doubt you will be able to find anyone, combat veteran or otherwise, who will agree that “combat experience is combat experience”. That is simply a moronic statement. It assumes that you can use the same techniques and tactics against highly trained, well-motivated, well-led, and well equipped US Marines, as you would against lightly armed and equipped, poorly trained, and poorly led, Chinese conscripts. I certainly invite you to try; the results surely would be interesting.

Well, you can’t have it both ways; you were earlier boasting of the highly effective infantry tactics the Japanese learned in China. Now it’s they didn’t learn how to fight in China, it was just something that they, uhm, well…just sort of learned at their mother’s knee. I think it more appropriate to ask WTF are YOU talking about?

Yeah, like the poor untested Marines learned at such great cost at the Battle of the Tenaru, ROTFLMAO! Took them all of of two minutes too!

CONTINUED…

#72

Continued…

You think I’m “cherry-picking” certain battles? That’s not what I’m saying; I’m saying in EVERY MAJOR NAVAL AIR BATTLE DURING 1942 the USN pilots destroyed more Japanese aircraft than they lost themselves. There wasn’t a single major naval air battle in which the Japanese gave better than they got. That includes Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz. If you think it’s untrue, why don’t you post an example where it wasn’t true?

And no, the count was not even. Not even close to being even where just naval pilots are concerned, and overall, the Allies destroyed more Japanese planes than vice versa. According to Bergerud, “Fire In The Sky”, page 428; "We have unusually good [numbers] to illustrate the grim flow of events at Guadalcanal. Authors John Lundstrom and Richard Frank have conducted careful studies of both US and Japanese losses during the Guadalcanal campaign…Frank, who employs much of Lundstrom’s research, concluded that the Allies lost 615 aircraft during the entire campaign, including the carrier battles, and the Japanese lost 682.

That may have been true after Midway, where carrier-based pilots are concerned, but where land-based naval and military pilots are concerned, the Japanese had a noticeable edge at the very beginning of the Guadalcanal and New Guinea campaigns. This edge however, quickly evaporated, for whatever reasons, and by October, 1942, the Allied pilots at Henderson field felt they held a definite advantage over Japanese pilots and air crew. (Frank, “Guadalcanal”, page 345).

No assessments? LOL! they just aren’t assessments that support your opinions, so you ignore them. No, I’m not quoting the same text over and over, although it might feel that way to you because so many of your assertions are being proven wrong because of the many different sources I have quoted.

And yes, Frank does go into detail about why the Japanese kept getting lost, and no, it wasn’t just about reading a compass; it was a fundamental lack of understanding of jungle terrain and a profound feeling of uneasiness in the jungle.

Translation: another point you’d better stay away from.

No, you made the assertion that the logistics for the US were easier where Guadalcanal was concerned and I just proved you wrong once again.

On Page 136, Frank says; “In April [1942] the Army set up it’s supply line to run directly from San Francisco, and, lacking resources at Pearl Harbor, the Navy soon followed suit.”

The only “forward staging bases” in August, 1942, was Auckland in New Zeal Land, 5,680 NM from San Francisco, and 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal, a total of 7,505 NM. Auckland was chosen because it was the only port in the area where cargoes could be unloaded and reloaded combat style, which of course, was necessary for Guadalcanal-bound cargoes.

Noumea ended up as the ultimate advanced base because of it’s relative proximity to Guadalcanal, but there too there were problems. The other “advanced staging bases” you mention are all in your imagination. All logistical supplies bound for US forces on Guadalcanal were shipped from San Francisco to Auckland in the early days, and later from San Francisco to Noumea.

Yes, the Japanese had men scattered all over the Pacific, but so did the US and in overall numbers the Americans needed far more logistical resources than the Japanese did. And as far as the needs of forces on Guadalcanal, the Americans were at a far worse disadvantage than the Japanese were, so, once again you are wrong.[/QUOTE]

Well, it’s true, they couldn’t feed the ones they already had on the Island, and while they continuously kept running reinforcements into Guadalcanal, they could neither feed them properly nor keep them supplied with ammo, fuel and medical supplies, so that is true also.

But the problem of accurately estimating enemy forces on Guadalcanal stemmed from poor intelligence and reconnaissance methods and a tendency towards wishful thinking.

True, and the Navy was exasperated by the Army’s inability to control and coordinate their forces so the Navy could lend support. It was kind of a mutual recrimination society.

#73

Wizard v Nick (aka Nick v Wizard)

:wink: :smiley:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LuW4pfr85MI

#74

Which tactics would they be?

The ones that steadily pushed the Australians back down the Kokoda Track under pressure of relentless Japanese attacks and infiltration tactics for which the Australians had no counter?

Or the ones that saw the US 32nd Div collapse in the field at Buna in the face of Japanese defences, never mind an assault by the Japanese?

Or do we exclude the inconvenient Japanese successes in Papua and just look to the later New Guinea campaigns?

Where are the primary sources from Japan that their troops were stunned that their China tactics failed to work?

#75

I suppose Vice-Admiral Mikawa just had to be content with destroying four Allied cruisers and encouraging the American transports to depart without unloading most of their vital stores to avoid being caught by the Japanese, in the same way that Mikawa departed without pressing on to destroy the transports to avoid his ships being caught by the Allies.

The Japanese decision not to press on to the transports was as rational as the Allied decision to withdraw them, even if 20/20 hindsight says they shouldn’t have. Neither decision proves any inherent strength or weakness in either nation’s people or tactics.

Any more than the way the Japanese luck in the way it encountered the US cruisers at Savo makes the IJN superheroes any more than the final piece of luck which brought the US into contact with the IJN carriers at Midway.

It’s all summed up in my signature.

#76

Not necessarily in practice.

After the US transport ships withdrew with most of the US supplies after the Battle of Savo Island the US had to make do with the limited supplies carefully transported all the way from the US and actually landed on Guadalcanal, which luckily for the US were supplemented by captured Japanese stores which enabled them to continue without the supplies taken away by the transports.

Lucky for the USMC that the Japanese had a shorter supply line to make up the deficiency in US stores coming from much further away.

#77

How are we to reconcile that with your following statement at #56?

I understood the latter comment to mean that American soldiers individually were better in their ‘fighting ability’, which I took to mean skills in individual combat, than Japanese.

But the former quote refers to military advantages beyond a ‘one for one’ basis.

So, which is it?

Japanese soldiers were not the equal of American soldiers one on one?

Or regardless of their combat ability, even if Japanese soldiers were the equal of American soldiers one on one then ultimately they were not because the Americans had advantages beyond the personal combat skills of individual and collective Japanese soldiers?

#78

Here we go with Strawman “101.” I never said it was a “Japanese victory,” liar. I said it is generally considered mixed as a “strategic American” victory and ‘tactically’ a Japanese one (which is almost universally accepted)…

If you could read, you’d have noticed I did mention intelligence as one of the USN strengths, but I should have guessed you’d fail to notice, since you seem to have the same trouble reading Frank.

[i]“Actually, I believe the Japanese were stopped by superior quality naval forces …American naval officers were better at planning, fleet tactics, engineering, and intelligence [/b]The IJN was no doubt far more skilled in small unit night fighting, and torpedo tactics, but as it eventuated, these areas did not assume a great deal of importance until later in the year.”

That was from post #21 in this thread. I believe I was the first to mention superior American intelligence. If you have other information, post it.
[/i]

Rather disingenuously. “Intelligence” can mean many things including superior USN fleet reconnaissance procedures (a factor of course). But the breaking of the code was the fundamental reason for the battle being fought to begin with, I as attacking your overall critique of the Japanese command decisions as opposed to the inherently superior US ones without acknowledging that the US command had a huge advantage of a ‘marked deck’ and could read his enemy’s hands…

It was the key factor and a massive “force-multiplier” in the US victory, not just another subset of “superior” US skills…

YOU CAN’T just claim the US was inherently superior in all (or most) facets of skill in that battle without acknowledging they had a massive trump card and the USN was able to accurately predict the basic battle plan of the IJN…

Comment? I made no comment; I asked a question, which BTW, you haven’t answered.

I have no idea what it was but I’ll answer it if you re-ask it, I’m honestly tired of pouring over who said what…:slight_smile:

My point is still valid; lots of planes were labeled “flying coffins” during WW II, by people who were not qualified to determine their merits…

I’ve never heard of some of the aircraft you’ve mentioned being called “flying (or suicide coffin in the case of the TBD) coffins.” The Devastator was marked by some its aircrews as being such. Any aircraft that is somewhat obsolete will certainly be marked with such a moniker…but according to Barrett Tillman (TBD Devastator units of the US Navy), the TBD Devastators launched 108 sorties, resulting in 95 torpedo drops and four confirmed hits, and two ships destroyed. It was simply past its prime by 1942. The point is that the USN was fielding an obsolete aircraft armed with inferior torpedoes which hardly supports any of your contentions…

My, my, such language! Something must have gotten under you skin. A debate isn’t worth getting so upset.

Since when is an old salt offended by such language? Upset? Yes, because I’m typing here with a huge NFL game day–and a lady to meet and make things good with. But that has nothing to do with you, so I cannot blame you for it.

It’s all my choice…

I was merely correcting you mistaken impression of the Mk 13 with data that indicates the US could make attacks in shallow water by late 1942.

Now, as for your “silly, fornicating” contention that the Japanese had modified it’s torpedoes in 1936, it’s simply wrong.

Dr. Ken Kotani, in "The Pacific War Companion, pages 34-35, says the following;

“…Yamamoto read the draft, and realized that it would be necessary to modify torpedoes for Pearl Harbor.”

The “draft” in question was dated April, 1941, and the author cites Japanese records as his source. So it is obvious that the Japanese didn’t have any “modified” shallow water torpedoes before the summer of 1941.

But I said 1941, meaning the IJN was ahead…

The IJN began mounting wooden plates in experiment dating back to 1936…

[i]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_91_torpedo

The project revised Type 91 aerial torpedos, as the revision 1 supporting wooden tail plates, taken off on water entry, in 1936. The team demonstrated the launching tests of Type 91 aerial torpedoes wearing wooden shock-damper objects at altitude 500m (1,640 ft) and 1,000m (3,281 ft) in the following year, 1937…

It enabled to keep Type 91 rev.2 aerial torpedo running under the water no deeper than 20 meter (65.6 ft). Actually the cutting-edge pilots of torpedo-bomber squadrons in Dai Ichi Koku Sentai or The 1st Air Flotilla of the carrier strike force were able to launch their torpedo so as to sink in the water depth no more than 10 meter (32.8 ft) after water entry. Anti-rolling controller made aircraft possible to torpedo-bomb not only warships anchorage in shallow military port but also warships steam in chopped waves of heavy sea in full speed.[/i]

Well, I’m beginning to suspect that you are in way over your head, and rather than admit it and learn something, you are resorting to accusations of “trolling”, and other name calling.

LOL “Over my head?” Oh, quite contraire. I think your just repeating the same blanket, silly assertions now with selective facts and post hoc argument…

But I am drowning in text…

No, I said I believed that the Japanese troops in Malaya had received specialized jungle training, and that they were the only ones to my knowledge who had.

Nice backpedal, apology accepted (who’s the “politician” now?)…

As for being proven wrong, no I haven’t been. Your source talks about jungle fighting in realtion to Japanese troops, but never specifies which troops received any training, or where, or when, or even “If”.

It says that they were generally thought of as better conditioned for jungle warfare overall and their infiltration tactics more adaptable. It also basically said the Japanese had perfected and adapted these tactics from their experiences in China…

Is it really that hard?

Goodness, please calm down.

But it was Saturday night!! :mrgreen:

Getting lost in the jungle and being unable to find one’s way or navigate through jungle growth does have a lot to do with fighting in the jungle, as Frank makes perfectly clear.

Of course it “has a lot to do” with jungle fighting skills. It also has nothing to do with the skill set of the individual Japanese soldier, nor does it adequately account for the difficulties that the Japanese encountered there.

It’s a blatant oversimplification and a silly conclusion tantamount to “concluding” that the IJA was better at mobile armored warfare because they defeated a US armored unit in the Philippines in a tank battle…

Yes, the Japanese did have problems with command and control (another weakness relative to the Americans),

In that particular case they did. In others, they enacted skillful tactical movements such was the fallback operation on Okinawa…

…but the fundamental reason that was true was because the Japanese soldiers and their officers were not at home in the jungle.

Being “at home in the jungle” is a rather obtuse, relative notion. No one is “home” in the jungle that hadn’t much time in one, and I’m sure members of the Chindits, Marine Raiders, Merrill’s Marauders were not necessarily “at home” in the jungle, even if they were very skilled at fighting in it. The Japanese were conducting a difficult tactical movement at night, and failed. But they cannot be solely judged on this one instance just as US troops cannot be judged merely on their lacking performance in the Hürtgen Forest…

NGS wouldn’t have made much difference because the Japanese troops could not coordinate and execute the precise timing required to take advantage of NGS. You are obviously looking for a rationale for the Japanese troop’s inability to fight effectively in the Jungle. It was simple, they had never been trained to live, move, or fight efficiently in the jungle.

I’m looking to explain a single operation without stereotyping, blanket generalizations, and selective isolation and cherry-picking of facts, which you are very guilty of. You’re using “facts” to engage in a greater lie and the simplistic notion that “we were better” which is hollow and meaningless pronouncement to a degree…

#79

There is nothing to reconcile, and there is no “either or” answer.

My comments were based on documented historical events. I think everyone can agree that during the fighting in the Pacific war, whether in the early days of Guadalcanal and Attu, when the numerical odds were nearly even, or in the closing months of the war, when there was little hope left for Japan’s military fortunes, that one of the most important factors in their defeat was the overwhelming advantage in fire power, that the Allies wielded.

The Japanese had always known that, in a war with the US and it’s Allies, they would likely face superior firepower, and in fact, had a foretaste of the reality at Nomohan in 1939, so that came as no surprise. But the Japanese believed that this factor could be overcome by superior Japanese military skills, and tactics, such as inherently superior Japanese hand-to-hand fighting (the emphasis on the use of the bayonet and close quarters fighting), use of darkness for closing with the enemy, infiltration tactics to neutralize artillery, and the indoctrination of the individual Japanese soldier to the point where the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for minor tactical advantages, was a given.

This outlook received some justification in the fighting in China, Malaya, Philippines, and Burma. But only when coupled with the fact that the Japanese held the initiative, was on the offensive, and the opponent was cut off from resupply and significant reinforcement, or was poorly trained and/or led. When the adversary was not fighting under such physical and psychological burdens, when free rein to use the superior technological advantages of the western way of making war was available to their opponents, the Japanese were proven to have badly miscalculated the relative merits of various military strategies.

At Iwo Jima, for example, the Japanese all but abandoned their fantasy that bayonets against heavy artillery made any military sense. The Japanese on Iwo Jima planned to fight the battle of Iwo Jima almost entirely underground; they dug thousands of bunkers and something like eleven miles of fortified tunnels. They dug in artillery on a scale unprecedented for the Japanese, forbade “Banzai” charges, and vowed not to survive the battle. It was, by any measure, a tacit admission that their pre-war tactical conceptions were badly flawed, that “Japanese fighting spirit” could not compensate for the disparity in artillery, tanks, automatic weapons, massive preparation and logistics.

The more controversial calculation, the assessment of individual fighting skill’s, the inherent, as the Japanese perceived it, racial superiority of the Japanese soldier, is a touchier subject, because we, in the West, supposedly reject theories of racial superiority/inferiority. Furthermore, such comparisons are, inevitably generalizations and someone will always be willing to point out the “yeah, but…” exceptions to the rule.

So, with some trepidation, because no matter how much I might buttress my arguments with incontrovertible facts, some moron will always charge me with racism, jingoism or “ultra-nationalism”, I will state that the Japanese soldier seldom demonstrated the kind of superior one-on-one fighting skill, that would have made the Banzai charges, the bayonet attacks, and the in filtration tactics, ultimately successful. In instances where Japanese troops engaged Allied troops in hand-to-hand fighting, the Japanese usually suffered higher casualties than they inflicted on their opponents.

Part of this is attributable to the advantage of heavier firepower which rested with the Allies, however, where the firepower ratio was more or less even, and in battles where superior firepower, could not be brought to bear for whatever reason, and the Japanese were able to close to the length of a rifle with their adversaries, they still usually suffered higher casualties and seldom achieved their objective. Examples would be the battle of Wake Island, Attu, the Points, Makin, the Tenaru, and Gavutu-Tanambogo.

It must also be noted that one of the Allied policies was to fight battles in such a way that casualties were kept to a minimum, so reliance on superior firepower, numerical advantage, and isolation of the battle field were standard features of Allied tactics. Yet even when it was not possible to create these ideal conditions, Japanese soldiers usually either failed to achieve their objectives, suffered prohibitive casualties, or both.

What caused this oddly consistent outcome in battle after battle? We’ve mentioned the Allies’ superior fire power, but there were other factors, as well. Most can be lumped under the rubric of better “battlefield management”. Far superior battlefield communications, command, and control made it easier for the Allied commanders to direct events and create conditions prejudicial to Japanese chances of success. Generally speaking, Allied Staff work was more professional and based on more realistic calculations and assumptions. With the exception of pre-war planning of “First Phase” operations, Japanese battle planning ranged from the merely mediocre, to the fantastically mystical and delusional. This obviously cost the Japanese military many chances to at least delay ultimate defeat.

Finally, the art of military intelligence was not held in as high regard as on the Allied side, and incalculable harm was done to Japanese efforts top prosecute the war. John Prados, in “Combined Fleet Decoded” comments that the Japanese viewed intelligence differently than the Western Allies; the Japanese saw intelligence as something that was valuable in overcoming difficulties which might be encountered on the offensive, but seldom paid much attention to defensive applications. Be that as it may, as the war progressed, Japanese intelligence became less and less a factor, while Allied intelligence grew progressively more comprehensive and timely. It is impossible to quantitatively measure the effect of this issue on actual battles, but it could not help but have a deleterious effect on the Japanese war effort.

I therefore conclude that, from the time that the Japanese first threatened the regions that the Allies regarded as “must defend” positions, they were up against forces that were, at the very least on a basis of parity, and in many cases, were superior to the Japanese in overall fighting power. And furthermore, that the records of various clashes establish that, as a rule, Japanese air, ground, and naval forces failed to achieve their objectives in these clashes, while suffering greater losses than the Allies. To me this is not a fluke, or the result of luck, or coincidence. To me this consistent trend demonstrates that the “fighting ability” of the Japanese was less than that of the Allies. In some cases the reasons for this are clear, in others not so clear, but the fact that usually “we won”, and “they didn’t”, is, to me, conclusive evidence that the Allies’ enjoyed, both individually and collectively, advantages which the Japanese were unable to compensate for in their tactics, training, and strategy.

#80

The US transports withdrew with “most of the US supplies…”??

I don’t think so. Frank in “Guadalcanal” does not elaborate on what supplies went with the transports, but says that it included 1,800 troops and most of the Marine’s heavy equipment. But other sources I have read indicates that the Marines had at least 17 days worth of food and four units of fire for all their weapons. And they did have a considerable amount of artillery; two battalions of 75 MM pack howitzers, one of 105 MM howitzers, and a battery (12 guns) of 90 MM AA. It was mostly the food and Japanese construction equipment that was useful, but without spare parts, that usefulness was very limited.

As for captured Japanese materials, it was considerable, and there were also 200-300 head of cattle originally belonging to the nearby Lever Brothers plantation. But all of this was a one-shot deal, the captured food, fuel, and equipment was only a fraction of what was needed to sustain the Marines in fighting trim. In practice the Marines would ultimately have to rely on the US logistical effort, which in practice, required much greater effort than that of the Japanese, if only because the far greater distance (almost twice as far as the Japanese route) between the US West Coast and Guadalcanal

Not really. The captured items were helpful, but as noted above, were only a temporary boost. Even though the US logistical effort was at great disadvantage on Guadalcanal, it was the fact that US logistics effort succeeded, where the Japanese did not, that allowed teh American forces to prevail.