I don’t know.
I’d assume so as a fair part of the Kwantung Army was transferred outside China and presumably followed the usual Japanese customs in warfare in the Pacific.
But the Kwantung Army had always been a distinct entity, in many respects running its own show, and wasn’t used to fighting the sorts of battles that were standard in the Pacific, so I don’t know if it had a different culture to the rest of the IJA.
Pre war the code of Bushido was instilled heavily into any man serving with the JIF, and in almost all cases these troops, airmen, sailors showed a fanaticism that defied belief.
By August 1945 the Kwantung Army had very few of these well trained, indoctrinated troops. For the most part the greener soldiers did not, could not have had the same level of training and indoctrination as their predecessors. While the Soviet attack blew them away, there were cases where Japanese resistance was fierce, if not suicidal.
I doubt whether the Kwantung Army was made of sterner stuff, they would have altered the result.
Regards digger.
The USSR’s biggest contribution to the defeat of Japan didn’t involve firing one shot. It was holding large Japanese forces against it for the duration of the war, which prevented them being employed elsewhere.
My main message is that Kwantung army lost not because it was weak, but because RKKA was strong. Essentially RKKA defeated a normal regular Japanese army, which was NOT worse than that fighting on the islands against Americans. [/i]
The Japanese troops the Russians fought in 1945 couldn’t be compared with the Japanese troops who fought in the Pacific and Burma, nor with the Kwantung Army that existed in 1941.
For a start, the Russians never fought the IJN’s Special Naval Landing Force (=Japanese Marines), who were outstanding, and vicious, troops.
By the time the Russians got involved, Japan’s best soldiers had generally been killed by the other Allies or were isolated around the Pacific. Just as importantly, its best generals and other officers had largely gone the same way.
If the Russians faced Japanese troops of the same quality that the other Allies fought up to the end of 1945, and especially the Japanese troops who secured all Japan’s early gains and who had to be defeated by the other Allies to reach the home islands, and even allowing for the superior numbers and weapons the Russians had, they would not have had such an easy victory. Nor necessarily any victory at all, by the time Japan surrendered.
To both Digger and Rising Sun,
We have not reached the military training yet. We will talk about it later. We will see when sertain divisions were formed and so on. For now we are trying to establish common understanding on the mental setting of the soldiers in Kwantung army. Why do you claim that the japanese soldiers serving in Kwantung army were less eager to die for their country than those one on the islands or the main land?
For the most part the greener soldiers did not, could not have had the same level of training and indoctrination as their predecessors. While the Soviet attack blew them away, there were cases where Japanese resistance was fierce, if not suicidal.
I doubt whether the Kwantung Army was made of sterner stuff, they would have altered the result.
Again, wait with training. The indoctrination, as you call it, did not come from the army service. It came from the up bringing in sertain cultural evironment. It is a process that it normaly in place from the birth. I could equaly say that they were indoctrinated to sacrifise them self even before they joint the army.
So to wrap it up, you have no grounds to say that the japanese soldiers in Kwantung army were less determined to die for Japan than those on the islands or those on the main land. Agree?
Whether they were equally, less, or more determined to die than any other Japanese troops doesn’t matter.
They simply were not first rate troops.
Focusing on the quality of the troops and their willingness to die ignores two more important factors. The Russians had massive superiority in armour and airpower, which ensured that even against first rate troops the Russians were bound to win.
Soviet air superiority was virtually absolute.In any case, if individual Japanese planes did take off from their airdromes,Russian fighters almost instantly shot them down. Superiority of Soviet aviators was ensured by three basic factors: quantity (the USSR had manymore warplanes; quality (Soviet fighters, attack planes and bombers possessed much higher tactical and technical characteristics; and, finally, Russian pilots, who had acquired enormous combat experience in battles with theGerman “Luftwaffe”, proved to have much higher flying skills.
http://www.fegi.ru/prim/flot/flot1_13.htm
To which might be added the fact that Japan had lost almost all of its battle experienced, and even battle inexperienced but well trained, pilots. Hence the kamikazes, because they could at least fly a plane into a ship even if they lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo it.
Against inferior Japanese troops, Russia’s superiority in every respect just meant that Russia got a quicker and easier victory.
Egorka
A point that needs to be made is that while the USSR didn’t contribute anything directly to the sustained fight against Japan 1941-45 and didn’t contribute anything to Japan’s many and important military defeats during that time, its attack on Japan at the end of the war made an important contribution to Japan’s decision to surrender, in conjunction with the dropping of the atom bombs.
The USN had Japan blockaded and was pretty much running a turkey shoot around the Japanese coasts by August 1945. Japan had been defeated or isolated on land everywhere else. It knew it was going to lose the war well before August and had started looking for a negotiated peace. The Russian attack was the final piece in putting a noose around all of Japan, with the prospect of a Russian invasion of the home islands through Manchuria becoming an alarming possibility when Russia attacked around the same time that the two atom bombs were dropped.
It’s impossible to know whether Japan would have surrendered just because of the atom bombs (I think it would have, if only because they threatened destruction of the home islands), but the Russian declaration of war and rapid advance in Manchuria certainly had a significant impact on the Japanese leadership and encouraged it to surrender, in the realisation that it was doomed on all fronts.
Thank you for comforting me, Rising Sun. I appreciate it.
WHAT?! It does not matter? Do I even need to comment on it?
They simply were not first rate troops.
We will deal with the technical side of the problem in the next step.
Focusing on the quality of the troops and their willingness to die ignores two more important factors.
I am not focusing on it. I am just doing it step by step. One builds a house sequentially, right?
The Russians had massive superiority in armour and airpower, which ensured that even against first rate troops the Russians were bound to win.
http://www.fegi.ru/prim/flot/flot1_13.htm
The russians superiority is not the same as Kwantung army was bad. But! We will deal with it in the next step.
To which might be added the fact that Japan had lost almost all of its battle experienced, and even battle inexperienced but well trained, pilots. Hence the kamikazes, because they could at least fly a plane into a ship even if they lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo it.
Against inferior Japanese troops, Russia’s superiority in every respect just meant that Russia got a quicker and easier victory.
Again, lets wait a bit.
First I want us agree on the mental state of the Japanese soldiers in Kwantung army.
Who do tells you about full scale invasion?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_August_Storm
On August 18, several amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there would already be Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden and undeniable establishment of Soviet sovereignty.
The Red army had enought forces to landing on the Sakhalin.
And be sure they have enough power to land at the Hakkaido as it was planned at the first time befor the capitulation of Japane.
.also,since you obviously have spent little or no time in japan itself…you would not understand the simple facts of how deep national pride in that country goes.
Are you Japanese to spread about the depth of its national feeling?
i/m sure not so …
Leave you feeling comments aside.
As far as i know the national feeling of Japane was based at the devotion to the Imperor and on the cult ineviolability of homelands.
Actualy they were the fanatic as much as they could ignored the mass victims among the civils during the terrible firebombing of Tokio in march of 1945( the victims were much worst then even after the bombing of Hiroshima).
They could be enought fanatic to send kamikaze to die…This was in the limits of their “love” and national felings toward the motherlands. Becouse the mothelands was a holy for them.
But they NEVER could lost its Imperor ( who was like a alive god for the Japanes) and its matheland.
So I will NEVER believe that Japanes should not surrender in the august when they had learned the USSR declared the war for them.
So ONLY a stupid idiot could continie the war becouse in this way they could lost everything ( and imperor and homelands) if the Red Army together with the Allies would sturmed the Homeislands and inevitably ( inspite of possible great casulates) captured it.
The way of your thinking is just a tupical after-war popular point among the USA politicans who prefered to use the public execution for the Japane ( on own egoistic political purposes) instead of the diplomatic means that could find the way to get the japanes ( who in fact already lost the war in war sence) the normal way to surrender with the analogical demands like they have to accept after the Red Army attacked the Kwantung army in 8 august.
Thus without the terrible a-bombing and bloody landing operations we could finished this war by the full surrender of Japane ( with the only conditiond of saving the institute of Imperor)
contrary to your opinion, i don’t think of the japanese as “suicidal idiots”. i don’t confuse fanatic nationalism with idiocy.to this day all ,at least all the ones i saw there,of the nation’s war memorials only speak of how the west ,and the US in particular,left the japanese no choice but to attack all of asia…
Wel i would like to hear more about how did the USA forced Japane to attack all of asia.Would you so kind please;)
also to this day the japanese goverment,unlike the germans, has NEVER apologized for any of the atrocities that its armies commited during the war…NEVER…
from forced comfort women,the rape of nanking,the murder of hundreds of thousands of philipinos during the battle for manila,to their live desections of POWs as part of there bio-warfare program,etc.,etc…
Well sure the Japanes atrocities above the other asian nations were even the worst then the Nazy’s.
So what ?
Does it means you wish to say the USA drope the a-bombing for the revenge for killed chineses?
this is one of the things that i hate about the internet in the last few years…people can put out the most illogical and under- or un-informed opinions out there and since its on the internet it must be true…it’s why i can’t stand wikipedia as a source…
Your firstly read the post about the fat from the bodies that supported the fire in oven ,befor the telling about illogical points of other members.
Cheers.
Not so.
After that the Government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye to Moscow if he were persona grata. On 10 July the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and said, “As it is now early July should not our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow without delay?” Since Soviet Ambassador Malik was ill in Tokyo and the conversations there were not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and Sato was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia’s denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but
You brought a good text , tanks Rising Sun
But this text ignored the some importaint events during the Potsdam conference.
Actually the Stalin recieved the telegram from the Tokio in 11 jule where they asked him to be the negotiators in Japane surrender.
Stalin was not against this idea but he was forced to wait till the Potsdam conference of allies.
The USA certainly knew about japanes attemps towar the Moscow and this was absolutly unaccesable neither for them nor for the Britain.
Just imagine the situation: Both US and UK has spend a lot of time and resourses to finished the japane but this insolent Imperor wish to surrender to the Stalin 
Therefore both US and UK made all possible to prevent this attempts.
They pull out the UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER that they knew was 100% unacceptable for the Japane.
So the continie of war was INEVITABLE as it wished the UK/US.
Knowing it Stalin, desided not to leave the allies and continie the war on its own purposes ( and he was right thus he could to take the whole China for itself).
So the reason why Stalin has refused the Japanes surrender was not his will, but the demand of allies.
This is very importain ADDITION.
Egorka right Rising Sun in here.
The Kwantung Army was the strongest army of Japane in the august of 1945.
Becouse after the battle for Okinawa the Japane losed practically all of the rest of its Pacific army. So they simply had no other large army except of Kwantung in the august of 1945.
The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.
Do not compare please the Japanes army in 1942 and in august 1945.
this is like to compare the Wermacht in the summer of 1942 on the with the pitiful rest ot it during the battle for the Berlin.
Actually the Japanes resistance in China was not so fierce like it was for the allies. But you absolutly wrong that the Red army did not faced the seriouce enemy as the fanatics and kamicadzes.Moreover the great problem was the Japanes forsed areas where they used the suicidal mashin-gunners who was was riveted by chain to the his machine gun.
http://www.revolucia.ru/kvantun.htm
The Japanese Armed Forces rested on the rich material, food and raw resources of Manchuria and Korea and in the Manchurian industry, which produced entire necessary for their life and combat activity in essence. On the territory, occupied by troops of Kwantung army, it find by 13 700 km of iron and 22 thousand km of motor roads, 133 airfields, more than 200 landing fields - a total of are more than 400 airport points, 870 large military storages and well equipped military posts.
In Manchuria on the boundaries with THE USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic Japanese militarists created 17 fortified areas, of them 8 - in the east against the Soviet littoral. Each fortified area occupied 50 - 100 km along the front and to 50 km into the depth. Their destination - not only strengthening of defense, but also the creation of more advantageous conditions for concentration and developing the troops. The line of the boundary fortified areas consisted of three positions.
Four fortified areas were built in Korea and one against North Sakhalin. The islands of Kurile bank were covered coast artillery batteries, sheltered into the ferroconcrete construction, and by the military garrisons, provide ford with developed lasting defensive installations.
So the power that Red Army has faced in the august of 1945 were the much stronger that for instance the allias in Okinawa. And just the soviet experience and the power lets to continie the hight temp of offencive in spirit of the germans blizkrige.
As I said earlier, I’m not trying to diminish the great success of the very brief Soviet engagement with Japan, but it wasn’t anything like what the other Allies had been doing for several years beforehand, nor did it contribute a great deal to the defeat of Japan.
This is like the war with Germany. When the allies had not anything like what the Red Army had been doing for the several years ;).
So the power that Red Army has faced in the august of 1945 were the much stronger that for instance the allias in Okinawa. And just the soviet experience and the power lets to continie the hight temp of offencive in spirit of the germans blizkrige.
WTF???do you not understand the difference between forces in a staff OOB and the actual forces on the ground?you can have all the fortified defence zones that you want and maybe even have the structures for them built but it’s meaningless when the forces manning them are under strength and inexperienced…sorry man…i’m going by the US Navy’s post war intelligence analysis survey of japanese preparations for the home island defence that included hundreds of interviews with former japanese staff officers and commanders.all of the analysis showed that,just as RS has pointed out,they had very little troops laft to man the defence areas.also,don’t even attempt to compare short hop landings around a peninsula(korea) that the soviets already held areas just north of,or short distance trips to close islands like the kuriles to the allies putting together invasions fleets consisting of thousands of vessels and hundreds of thousands of men and them sailing these across vast expanses of the pacific,getting objectives on time and on target, to pull off success after success…
This is like the war with Germany. When the allies had not anything like what the Red Army had been doing for the several years
now this…this proves exactly what you guys are all about with this constant stretching of the facts…the soviets did more to win the war than the allies…whatever.
did the soviet people suffer greatly during the war? hell yes…no one is arguing the sacrifices made by millions of the soviet people.did soviet tactics used for a large portion of the war have anything to do with these losses?..hell yes…what do you think happens when you put 10,000 guys on 3000 tanks and then charge them into fixed enemy positions.?..yeah, you take the position but at what cost?what happens when you enforce a policy of scortched earth against both your civilian population and a rapidly advancing enemy that you can’t stop?tens and hundreds of thousands starve to death…heading soldiers into german fire with machine guns behind them?it takes no leadership to stick a gun in someones back and tell them to charge or else…motivating free peoples to do it is another thing.
No way. The best remaining available troops; all the elite formations; and by far the largest number of troops (with about 2 million Japanese Defence Army troops in addition to the IJA) were in Japan to defend the home islands against the imminent invasion by the Allies other than the USSR
The Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.
By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34’s.The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland.Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border.This also removed the Kwantung Army’s 1st Tank Division, the last
armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) T[b]The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self
its most seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of
1944. [9-63][/b]
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Savoy6:
now this…this proves exactly what you guys are all about with this constant stretching of the facts…the soviets did more to win the war than the allies…whatever.
Exactly - WHATEVER!
Savoy6, you do not even try to answer on a simplest issue about the motivation of Japanese soldiers in Kwantung army.
If you noticed this forum is about communication between people. And communication in most of the world means speaking and listening. You only speak out.
I want to hear why japanese in Manchuria were less eager to die for Emperor, than japanese in Guadalcanal?
What objective arguments can you bring to light EXCEPT your personal opinion?
Eight of the twenty four divisions and seven of the nine infantry brigades, comprising over one quarter of the total Japanese manpower in Manchuria, were mobilized only 10 days before the Soviet attack, in a desperate all-out mobilization of all Japanese males in Manchuria (most of them previously deferred as over age or for other reasons).
Raymond L Garthoff, The Soviet Manchurian Campaign August 1945, Military Affairs (Journal of the Society for Military History), 1969 (October), p312, at 313 If you have access to JStor you can view it here
http://www.jstor.org/view/00263931/di962670/96p09204/1?frame=noframe&userID=83ac042d@latrobe.edu.au/01cce4406900501bdbe28&dpi=3&config=jstor
The article also notes that most of those divisions were at about 11,000 to 15,000 instead of the usual 23,000, and badly unbalanced in composition.
These were not the well-trained, seasoned, battle hardened, fit, well-supplied, first rate Japanese troops on Guadalcanal or that the Allies fought elsewhere in the Pacific and Burma.
The Japanese on Guadalcanal actually weren’t that keen on all dying for the Emperor, which is why they pulled out when they were defeated rather than hurl every last man at the Americans.
Who knows whether the Kwantung Army were prepared to die on the same basis as other Japanese troops? It wouldn’t matter in most cases, because they were going to get killed through inexperience, lack of training, lack of support, and lack of leadership anyway.
There is a very simple way to evaluate the willingness of Japanese troops in Manchuria to die. Better still, it involves only your favourite way of comparing things.
Numbers.
How many Japanese troops were committed to Guadalcanal? About 38,000. How many were killed? About 24,000 to 28,500. How many were taken prisoner? About 1,000.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-A.html
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm
How many Japanese troops were committed to fighting Russia in Manchuria in August 1945? I’m not sure. How many were killed? I don’t know. How many were taken prisoner? Most of them.
Sure, Japan surrendered, but if these supposedly fierce troops were so set on dying rather than bearing the shame of surrender they would all have committed suicide. The fact that most of them survived doesn’t suggest that they were all that keen on keeping alive the supposed tradition of dying rather than surrendering, does it? Which is pretty much what you expect of troops on a beaten side fighting a pointless action in the dying days of a lost war.
Again, the troops the Russians fought in Manchuria in 1945 cannot be compared with first rate troops anywhere in the IJA at any time.
Rising Sun,
You previously quoted this text http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Do you find it reliable and trustworsy? Can we use it as a base that represents your position?
The situation was a lot more complex than whether or not the Soviets frustrated Japan’s peace feelers towards America. Japan was playing its own game to split the Soviets and US for its post-war benefit, as outlined in the interesting article from which the following quotes come.
Concerning Japan’s “abrupt” capitulation, most studies ascribe it to the shock of either the atomic bombs or the “surprise” attack by the Soviet Union, or both, followed by the “sacred” decision by Emperor Hirohito.1 An orthodox lesson of the Pacific War is that Japan should have surrendered to the United States earlier, to save hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties.2 Had Japan done so, however, the United States would have taken over the entire sphere of Japan’s continental empire and become a dominant power in the region, perhaps imposing harsh constraints on defeated Japan. That was not what Japan desired. Japanese leaders saw a need to investigate the best way to leave the war, and, as this article will show, they calculated an end game for the nation by staking its survival on the future of East Asia after the empire’s collapse.
para 1
It was the Soviet Union that gave Japan strategic versatility in exiting the world war. The Soviet entry into the war during its last phase is portrayed simply as a betrayal to Japan in light of the Neutrality Pact. Conversely, the Imperial Japanese Army and government have been criticized for wasting time in hoping for the Soviets to help broker peace with the United States. Such vilification of the Soviet Union, however, has obfuscated a complex strategy Japan adopted toward the Soviets. A body of little-known and rarely used documents, kept since 1941 by Japanese military leaders, diplomatic officials, and scholars and journalists of international relations, reveals that these Japanese did not adhere to any hopes for Moscow to mediate peace with the United States.4 Neither did they hold onto a naïive anticipation for a break-up of the Moscow-Washington Grand Alliance, which would supposedly bring Japan its preferred terms for surrender. On the contrary, these Japanese were firmly convinced of eventual Soviet abrogation of the Neutrality Pact and entry into the war. They meticulously studied the possible timing of a Soviet attack and the manner of subsequent collapse of Japan’s colonial empire, specifically the Soviet impact on postwar East Asia. In their perceptions, the Soviet Union possessed an ability to achieve a balance of power against the United States in a postwar world. Moreover, the Soviet presence would, they hoped, prevent the United States from establishing hegemony in East Asia and recreating it solely in its image. And ultimately, the Soviet influence in East Asia would restrain harsh U.S. control of post-surrender Japan.
para 3
Obviously, as the Japanese policymakers read this article in Tokyo, they knew Japan could not “bargain” for its defeat with either the Soviet Union or the United States. A two-front war against both the United States and the Soviet Union was looking like an impossible scenario; the Soviet attack alone would be the end of Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific. However, Japan’s surrender tactic was now to have the United States and the Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia. Thus Japan’s plan for surrender and beyond, both politically and militarily in the Eurasian context, was made assuming a Soviet attack beginning in Manchuria and assessing its impact on the United States. In fact, by mid-April 1945, when the Imperial Headquarters acknowledged the rapid reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East, the Army War Operations Plans Division made no recommendations for preparations for counterattack. Instead, it made the following observation: the key to accomplishing the goal of the Greater East Asian War was to predict precisely when the Soviet attack would occur and to complete by then a quick and proper response and measure concerning it. The “quick and proper response and measure” seems, in this context, to mean Japan’s surrender. But nowhere in the observation did it hint that Japan should do so before the Soviet attack.60
para 32
From a different perspective, the Japanese also saw that a Soviet thrust into Manchuria would play havoc with Chinese politics, specifically defusing the momentum gained by the CCP, and also preventing an otherwise victorious China from becoming a threat to postwar Japan. The aforementioned Japanese “offer” of its Manchurian interests to the Soviet Union was meant to deter U.S. hegemony in China. Now the anticipated Soviet attack on Manchuria would have two effects: not only hamper such U.S. ambitions but also crush any hope for a GMD-CCP united front.
para 36
In the last phase of World War II, Japan was investigating the best way for the empire to collapse in a new configuration of power and searching for the best strategy toward the Soviets while observing the spatial and temporal origins of the Cold War in Asia. Once the war was over, defeated Japan quietly withdrew into a niche, away from the new rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and devoted its resources to the nation’s reconstruction. It seems that Japan survived and recovered in the way these Japanese wartime strategists hoped.
para 50
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/koshiro.html
The situation was a lot more complex than whether or not the Soviets frustrated Japan’s peace feelers towards America. Japan was playing its own game to split the Soviets and US for its post-war benefit, as outlined in the interesting article from which the following quotes come.
Concerning Japan’s “abrupt” capitulation, most studies ascribe it to the shock of either the atomic bombs or the “surprise” attack by the Soviet Union, or both, followed by the “sacred” decision by Emperor Hirohito.1 An orthodox lesson of the Pacific War is that Japan should have surrendered to the United States earlier, to save hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties.2 Had Japan done so, however, the United States would have taken over the entire sphere of Japan’s continental empire and become a dominant power in the region, perhaps imposing harsh constraints on defeated Japan. That was not what Japan desired. Japanese leaders saw a need to investigate the best way to leave the war, and, as this article will show, they calculated an end game for the nation by staking its survival on the future of East Asia after the empire’s collapse.
para 1
It was the Soviet Union that gave Japan strategic versatility in exiting the world war. The Soviet entry into the war during its last phase is portrayed simply as a betrayal to Japan in light of the Neutrality Pact. Conversely, the Imperial Japanese Army and government have been criticized for wasting time in hoping for the Soviets to help broker peace with the United States. Such vilification of the Soviet Union, however, has obfuscated a complex strategy Japan adopted toward the Soviets. A body of little-known and rarely used documents, kept since 1941 by Japanese military leaders, diplomatic officials, and scholars and journalists of international relations, reveals that these Japanese did not adhere to any hopes for Moscow to mediate peace with the United States.4 Neither did they hold onto a naïive anticipation for a break-up of the Moscow-Washington Grand Alliance, which would supposedly bring Japan its preferred terms for surrender. On the contrary, these Japanese were firmly convinced of eventual Soviet abrogation of the Neutrality Pact and entry into the war. They meticulously studied the possible timing of a Soviet attack and the manner of subsequent collapse of Japan’s colonial empire, specifically the Soviet impact on postwar East Asia. In their perceptions, the Soviet Union possessed an ability to achieve a balance of power against the United States in a postwar world. Moreover, the Soviet presence would, they hoped, prevent the United States from establishing hegemony in East Asia and recreating it solely in its image. And ultimately, the Soviet influence in East Asia would restrain harsh U.S. control of post-surrender Japan.
para 3
Obviously, as the Japanese policymakers read this article in Tokyo, they knew Japan could not “bargain” for its defeat with either the Soviet Union or the United States. A two-front war against both the United States and the Soviet Union was looking like an impossible scenario; the Soviet attack alone would be the end of Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific. However, Japan’s surrender tactic was now to have the United States and the Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia. Thus Japan’s plan for surrender and beyond, both politically and militarily in the Eurasian context, was made assuming a Soviet attack beginning in Manchuria and assessing its impact on the United States. In fact, by mid-April 1945, when the Imperial Headquarters acknowledged the rapid reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East, the Army War Operations Plans Division made no recommendations for preparations for counterattack. Instead, it made the following observation: the key to accomplishing the goal of the Greater East Asian War was to predict precisely when the Soviet attack would occur and to complete by then a quick and proper response and measure concerning it. The “quick and proper response and measure” seems, in this context, to mean Japan’s surrender. But nowhere in the observation did it hint that Japan should do so before the Soviet attack.60
para 32
From a different perspective, the Japanese also saw that a Soviet thrust into Manchuria would play havoc with Chinese politics, specifically defusing the momentum gained by the CCP, and also preventing an otherwise victorious China from becoming a threat to postwar Japan. The aforementioned Japanese “offer” of its Manchurian interests to the Soviet Union was meant to deter U.S. hegemony in China. Now the anticipated Soviet attack on Manchuria would have two effects: not only hamper such U.S. ambitions but also crush any hope for a GMD-CCP united front.
para 36
In the last phase of World War II, Japan was investigating the best way for the empire to collapse in a new configuration of power and searching for the best strategy toward the Soviets while observing the spatial and temporal origins of the Cold War in Asia. Once the war was over, defeated Japan quietly withdrew into a niche, away from the new rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and devoted its resources to the nation’s reconstruction. It seems that Japan survived and recovered in the way these Japanese wartime strategists hoped.
para 50
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/koshiro.html
On the general question of whether the atom bombs ended the war, the article quoted in my last post
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/koshiro.html suggests that Japan was looking for a Soviet attack to end the war and simply did not factor the possibility of atom bombs into their calculations. It also suggests that the Soviet attack on Manchuria was a necessary pre-condition to Japan’s surrender.
It’s an interesting article that alters the conventional view of the impact of the atom bombs, and of the impact of the Soviet entry into the war. If nothing else, it should make it worthwhile for Chevan and Egorka to get out of bed today.
One of the biggest problems in understanding Japan’s conduct is that most of the relevant writings before, during and after the war are in Japanese and rarely translated. Many of the English versions are excerpts in analyses by Westerners looking at events primarily from the Western perspective. It’s hard to get the sort of analysis in English of Japanese documents and thinking that the linked article provides, unless one subscribes to some rarefied academic journals.