Kwantung Army

[Rising_Sun]

@Egorka

Rising Sun,

You previously quoted this text http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Do you find it reliable and trustworsy? Can we use it as a base that represents your position?

Egorka

It’s probably as good as anything, as figures seem to vary wildly.

David Glantz, who is the source for some of the figures in the Global Security link, provides Soviet estimates (which later he says were probably serious over-estimates) before the attack of 713,000 Japanese troops in the Kwantung Army; 170,000 Manchukuoan Army; and 44,000 Inner Mongolian forces. (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, p.29)

I don’t have casualty figures.

I’ve seen post-surrender POW figures ranging from 600,000 to 1,000,000 + with and without sources being quoted. At least one figure seemed to include Japanese civilians captured in Manchuria. I don’t know whether the auxiliaries (Manchukuoan Army and Inner Mongolian forces) were treated as POW’s and included in any figures.

I don’t know how reliable these figures are, but 140,000 Kwantung Army troops were said to have swapped to the Chinese communists rather than surrender and another 10,000 to 20,000 didn’t surrender until 1948. http://www.wanpela.com/holdouts/registry.html

It’s in the nature of the confusion following a national surrender like Japan’s that a lot of troops would have made their way back to Japan or otherwise avoided capture by the Soviets.

[Rising_Sun]

@Egorka

Rising Sun,

You previously quoted this text http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Do you find it reliable and trustworsy? Can we use it as a base that represents your position?

Egorka

I can do better than that as I’ve borrowed David Glantz’s August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria which is one of the sources for the Global Security link figures, although there still seem to be some large gaps in the figures.

At p.29 he provides Soviet estimates before the attack of 713,000 Japanese troops in the Kwantung Army; 170,000 Manchukuoan Army; and 44,000 Inner Mongolian forces. In note 1 to Ch. 11, at p.229, he says that Soviet estimates of casualties and prisoners fall short of the 713,000 troops Japan claimed in Manchuria and North Korea.

In note 1 to Ch. 11 he says Japan estimated 21,000 Japanese troops were killed but, as Japan lost all Kwantung Army records, this is based on demobilization figures while unit battle accounts show heavier losses. The Soviets say 84,000 Japanese were killed. Glantz also says that Manchukuoan casualties accounted for a significant part of Japanese losses, along with an indeterminate number of Japanese reservists and civilians who fought in garrisons alongside Japanese soldiers. Japan estimated Soviet casualties at 10,000, while the Soviets say their casualties were 32,000 of which 8,000 were killed.

No Japanese figure is given for Japanese taken prisoner but the Soviets say they took about 594,000 Japanese prisoner.

I’ve seen post-surrender POW figures around 600,000 elsewhere but I can’t recall the source. I don’t know whether the auxiliaries (Manchukuoan Army and Inner Mongolian forces) were treated as POW’s and included in any figures, but as the Manchukuoan casualties were included in Glantz’s Soviet casualty figures I assume that the same goes for POW’s.

On Glantz’s figures, we get a maximum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 927,000 deployed against the Soviets, so:

927,000

• 84,000 killed (including unknown number of civilians and reservists)

843,000 (+ or - unknown number of civilians and reservists)

• 594,000 POW

  249,000 unaccounted for.

The 249,000 unaccounted for might be troops who avoided capture; troops who went over to the Nationalist or communist Chinese forces; or troops who never existed in the first place. Or a combination of all of the above.

Taking 249,000 ‘unaccounted for’ from the maximum figure of 927,000 gives a minimum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 678,000.

On the wider question of willingness to die for the Emperor, Glantz concludes at p. 184 that some Japanese units fought very well, including “death units” which caused Soviet awe by throwing their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks.

However, Glantz also says that cease-fire rumours disrupted Japanese operations. He also notes at p.185 that, because of confusion at high command levels and conflicting orders, many units withdrew from battle. Such unwillingness to fight and withdrawal from battle were not features of any other battles in which the Japanese engaged with the other Allies.

[Chevan]

@Rising_Sun

No way. The best remaining available troops; all the elite formations; and by far the largest number of troops (with about 2 million Japanese Defence Army troops in addition to the IJA) were in Japan to defend the home islands against the imminent invasion by the Allies other than the USSR

Oh common, the 2 million Japanese Defence Army were mostly from a worker from a reserve and teenagers - this could not be the “elite” (and army at a common sence).
I rather think the so called “elite” Japane army was fully distructed in the previous battles.
You wrote

By the time the Russians got involved, Japan’s best soldiers had generally been killed by the other Allies or were isolated around the Pacific. Just as importantly, its best generals and other officers had largely gone the same way.

The Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces.

That’s right the Manchuria with occupated Korea and China was the last resource and breadbasket for the Japane.
Therefore its defence was critacally improtaint for the defence of Japane in the strategic-war sence.

However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.

Oh tell us the “definition” of Japane elite division in Kwantung Army please.
Was this the division that killed a most of Chinese guerrilas and raped a a most of women?
Becouse as it told mst savoy6 large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas

By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942.

Oh yea, it was found reduced half
According to the russian military archives datas in the august the Kwantung army had:

http://www.cultinfo.ru/fulltext/1/001/008/060/322.htm
the 1st front (3-4 and the 5th of army),
the 3rd front (the 30th and 44-4 armies),
the 17th front (34-4 and 59-4 armies),
independent (4th) army,
two (2-4 and the 5th) air forces and Sungariys military flotilla.
Furthermore, to it were operationally subordinated army Manchjo-Go, troops of internal Mongolia (prince de Van) and Sungary’s army group.
In the composition Kwantung army. and the subordinated to it troops were counted 37 infantry and 7 cavalry divisions, 22 infantry, 2 tank and 2 cavalry brigades (only 1 million. 320 thousand people), 1155 tanks, 6260 artillery of different calibers, 1900 aircraft even 25 ships

Not bad “reducing” after 1942 up to the 1 320 000 peoples.

The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor.

But this 'manpower" was able to bring the 35-30% of casulites for the US trops in the battles for Okinawa and Ivo Jima being the severely deficient in aircraft,engineer support, communications and armor. And without the Any tanks.

What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34’s.

Yes those 'few" (about 1000) tanks were too weak agains T-34 but it was a enought seriouse when crashed US troops in Birma and Britains in Malaya.Right?
Becouse the Japanes easy tanks was a enough good in the jungles.

The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland.

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border.

Aha? all the “elite” divisions.
Have you a exact number , quantity and names of those divisions to check how much they were “elite”?

This also removed the Kwantung Army’s 1st Tank Division, [b]the last
armor division in Manchuria.[b]

Oh really?
The LAST tank divisions were removed into Japane in march but … they forgot its 1000 tanks in Manchjuria ,that were suddenly found in august.

The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self

Nevertheless the 1/4 part of its “shadow” made a nightmare for the USA marines in the Okinawa and Ivo Jima.

You know Risin Sun i have to conclude you are capable to find the “sorces” that contradicts at the your previous posts.

[Chevan]

@Rising_Sun

The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.

This is a nonsence.
The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the 1938-39 at the borders conflicts like in the like of Halkin-Gol
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkin_Gol
The 30 000 of Kwantung Army ( the most experienced Japane army at that time has tryed to capture the some of the soviet lands.)
But they were crushed…
For the comparision:
The 36 000 of Japanes were enough to crush the 85 000 British garrison in the febriary of 1942 in the Battle of Singapore.
And only 75 000 of Japanes were enought to capture the whole Bataan with its 150 000 garrison at that time.

[Chevan]

This could explaine the increased the quantity of Kwantung Army befor the august of 1945.

http://volk59.narod.ru/Manchuria.htm
In spite of the efforts of the Japanese to concentrate as much as possible troops on the islands strictly of empire, and also in China south of Manchuria, Japanese command paid attention to Manchurian direction, especially after during April 1945 the Soviet Union officially declared, that the Soviet-Japanese pact about the neutrality more was not urgent.
For this very reason from the 9 infantry divisions remaining themselves in Manchuria at the end 1944 the Japanese to August 1945 unrolled 24 divisions and 10 brigades.
True, for organizing of new divisions and brigades the Japanese could use only the untrained draftees of low-order ages and limited suitable elder ages - such in summer of 1945 was called 250 thousand, which comprised more than half of personnel of Kwantung army.

Don’t forget that the mostly teenages were in Japane Home Defence Army also at that time.

[Chevan]

@Rising_Sun

On Glantz’s figures, we get a maximum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 927,000 deployed against the Soviets, so:

927,000

• 84,000 killed (including unknown number of civilians and reservists)

843,000 (+ or - unknown number of civilians and reservists)

• 594,000 POW

  249,000 unaccounted for.

The 249,000 unaccounted for might be troops who avoided capture; troops who went over to the Nationalist or communist Chinese forces; or troops who never existed in the first place. Or a combination of all of the above.

Oh Look at that Egorka
Our friend Rising Sun has bagan to like a mathematic
Yes you right Rising Sun.
Well indeed the 249 000 unaccounted are proved nothing.
This could be the simple teenagers form native population ( Cinese, korean and mongolian) who were send at the their houses after the war as it was for the kid-members of FolKsturm after the battle of Berlin.
Or you right this could be the part of former Kwantung soldiers who avoided the encirclement and went out of the soviet zone of occupation.

[Firefly]

In what previous battles were the Japanese forces in China destroyed?

[Chevan]

They were not destroed , they were particulary redused durin the Pacific war.
But then were made up till the august 1945 mostly from of teenagers.

[Egorka]

Guys! Wait for me! I also want to be part of the quarrel!

Ok, now seriously. Since I was the one who brought this topic up I want you to listen to my supposition.

1. I did not mean to claim that Kwantung army was all that elite and that they all were skilled like paratroopers. My first claim is that they were one of the best REMAINING land forces available to Japan in August 1945. It is true that USA/UK inflicted huge damage to IJA and many of the best soldiers and officers were lost. But it is “normal” after so many of fighting. Germany had exactly the same situation. For that matter USSR too.

2. When we talk about strength of Kwantung army we should always remember to what TASK this force was assigned. The expected task of Kwantung army in 1941 could only be attack - therefore it was supplied accordingly. In Sommer 1945 the task turned up side down to DEFEND against USSR attack.
We know that different military units perform differently in attack and defence. F.ex. the relative lack of tanks was not as big obstacle for japanese in defense as in the offense. So my claim is that Japanese had very reasonable resources for DEFENSIVE action. The size of the japanese forces was very reasonable for leading defensive war.

3. Japanese COULD stop the advance of soviet army IF they planed and placed their forces accordingly. F.ex. they could relativly easily with very small force complitely block the tank armies of the Trans-Balkal Front when they had to cross Grand Khinghan Mountains to secure positions on the central Manchurian plain. The Japanese did not do it because they were GROSSLY DECEIVED by the Soviets. The similar situation was in Normandy, as some of the best German troops were concentrated at Pa-De-Cale.

4. This DECEPTION was done across all 3 “dimentions”: TIME of the attack, PLACE of the attack and the AMOUNT OF FORCES in the attack. Almost like in Normandy.

5. Japanese Suprime comand WAS SURE that the soviet attack will be repulsed successfuly! This means they we sure that the soviet attack would at least stall. Why did they need it to stall? See next point.

6. After stalling of the initial Soviet attack when the front line stabilises, Japanese planned to use BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPON ON MASS SCALE. They had very large quantities of this wepons produced, stored and ready for deployment in Manchuria. The special porcelan shells were armed with the viruses and could easily be used IF there was a stable front line.

7. On top of that the terrain across which the RKKA had to move was UNTRAFFICABLE. In the west: “They believed the western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains.”
In the North and East: “In addition to the two major river crossings, 150 kilometers of spurs descending from the Lesser Khinghan Mountains and vast stretches of marshland on both sides of the rivers were significant obstacles.” and “Under the worst weather conditions possible, the Russians initiated an offensive under the cover of darkness approaching from areas thought impassable by large troop ormations.”
So please no la-la-la about an easy terrrain. The terrain was the BEST FOR DEFENCE and WORST FOR OFFENSE!

8. And this one is about bushido code that applied to the japanese Kwantung army soldiers just as much as for other units! They were following it! And the reason why they did not kill them self is well explained in the link on GlobalSecurity.org. The one you Rising Sun provided.

The rough conclusion: The Kwantung army was crushed because of (most important first):

• DESEPTION and CAMUFLAGE
• SUPERIOR STRATEGY and TACKTICS
• SUPERIOR FORCES

and NOT because of WEAKNESS and EASY TERRAIN FOR RUSSIANS.

Loving you even more!

[Rising_Sun]

@Egorka

Guys! Wait for me! I also want to be part of the quarrel!

Ok, now seriously. Since I was the one who brought this topic up I want you to listen to my supposition.

1. I did not mean to claim that Kwantung army was all that elite and that they all were skilled like paratroopers. My first claim is that they were one of the best REMAINING land forces available to Japan in August 1945. It is true that USA/UK inflicted huge damage to IJA and many of the best soldiers and officers were lost. But it is “normal” after so many of fighting. Germany had exactly the same situation. For that matter USSR too.

2. When we talk about strength of Kwantung army we should always remember to what TASK this force was assigned. The expected task of Kwantung army in 1941 could only be attack - therefore it was supplied accordingly. In Sommer 1945 the task turned up side down to DEFEND against USSR attack.
We know that different military units perform differently in attack and defence. F.ex. the relative lack of tanks was not as big obstacle for japanese in defense as in the offense. So my claim is that Japanese had very reasonable resources for DEFENSIVE action. The size of the japanese forces was very reasonable for leading defensive war.

3. Japanese COULD stop the advance of soviet army IF they planed and placed their forces accordingly. F.ex. they could relativly easily with very small force complitely block the tank armies of the Trans-Balkal Front when they had to cross Grand Khinghan Mountains to secure positions on the central Manchurian plain. The Japanese did not do it because they were GROSSLY DECEIVED by the Soviets. The similar situation was in Normandy, as some of the best German troops were concentrated at Pa-De-Cale.

4. This DECEPTION was done across all 3 “dimentions”: TIME of the attack, PLACE of the attack and the AMOUNT OF FORCES in the attack. Almost like in Normandy.

5. Japanese Suprime comand WAS SURE that the soviet attack will be repulsed successfuly! This means they we sure that the soviet attack would at least stall. Why did they need it to stall? See next point.

6. After stalling of the initial Soviet attack when the front line stabilises, Japanese planned to use BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPON ON MASS SCALE. They had very large quantities of this wepons produced, stored and ready for deployment in Manchuria. The special porcelan shells were armed with the viruses and could easily be used IF there was a stable front line.

7. On top of that the terrain across which the RKKA had to move was UNTRAFFICABLE. In the west: “They believed the western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains.”
In the North and East: “In addition to the two major river crossings, 150 kilometers of spurs descending from the Lesser Khinghan Mountains and vast stretches of marshland on both sides of the rivers were significant obstacles.” and “Under the worst weather conditions possible, the Russians initiated an offensive under the cover of darkness approaching from areas thought impassable by large troop ormations.”
So please no la-la-la about an easy terrrain. The terrain was the BEST FOR DEFENCE and WORST FOR OFFENSE!

8. And this one is about bushido code that applied to the japanese Kwantung army soldiers just as much as for other units! They were following it! And the reason why they did not kill them self is well explained in the link on GlobalSecurity.org. The one you Rising Sun provided.

The rough conclusion: The Kwantung army was crushed because of (most important first):

• DESEPTION and CAMUFLAGE
• SUPERIOR STRATEGY and TACKTICS
• SUPERIOR FORCES

and NOT because of WEAKNESS and EASY TERRAIN FOR RUSSIANS.

Loving you even more!

Egorka,

An intelligent and comprehensive analysis, although I don’t agree with it as a full explanation.

I think that, cutting through all the detail about how many troops were there, terrain and so on, the main factors that caused defeat were that the Japanese were caught in the process of moving their troops to better defensive positions; the Japanese high command was timid and confused; and most of all the Soviets were better troops; better equipped; and better led.

Glantz notes that because of various deficiencies in equipment, training and leadership the Japanese considered none of the largely new Kwantung divisions facing the Soviets combat ready and some divisions only 15% ready. (p.33) Against them was a highly professional Soviet force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war, leading some of the best Soviet units. “The Manchurian operation qualified as a post-graduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in Western Russia in 1941.”(p.184)

I’ve found a copy of Glantz’s book here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp but it seems to lack the page references in the hard copy I’ve been using.

[Rising_Sun]

@Chevan

Oh common, the 2 million Japanese Defence Army were mostly from a worker from a reserve and teenagers - this could not be the “elite” (and army at a common sence).

I didn’t say that the JDA were elite troops. It was mentioned in addition to the other catergories I mentioned.

I rather think the so called “elite” Japane army was fully distructed in the previous battles.

Thus reinforcing my point that the Kwantung Army facing the Soviets in 1945 were not first rate troops.

That’s right the Manchuria with occupated Korea and China was the last resource and breadbasket for the Japane.
Therefore its defence was critacally improtaint for the defence of Japane in the strategic-war sence.

Maybe not. See my posts # 96 and 97

Oh tell us the “definition” of Japane elite division in Kwantung Army please.
Was this the division that killed a most of Chinese guerrilas and raped a a most of women?
Becouse as it told mst savoy6 large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas

In August 1945 there were no elite divisions in the Kwantung Army.
In 1941 there were quite a few. Where do you think the troops used in the southward advance came from?

By August 1945 the Kwantung Army was focused on the Soviet threat. The Central China Expeditionary Army was organised more as an anti-guerilla army.

Oh yea, it was found reduced half

Yes, it was. As is clear from the context, this refers to the end of 1944. Forces were built up again in 1945.

According to the russian military archives datas in the august the Kwantung army had:

Not bad “reducing” after 1942 up to the 1 320 000 peoples.

Those figures probably refer to full strength units in the Japanese OOB. As Glantz notes some divisions with nominal strengths of 20,000 had as many as 18,000 men; most had 12,000 to 16,000; and some had as few as 9,000. (p.26)

But this 'manpower" was able to bring the 35-30% of casulites for the US trops in the battles for Okinawa and Ivo Jima being the severely deficient in aircraft,engineer support, communications and armor. And without the Any tanks.

There is no comparison between those Pacific campaigns and Manchuria. The battle areas were compact at Okinawa and Iwo Jima compared with Manchuria; the IJA was contained on islands with no room to manouevre; the defensive strategy on both islands was to dig in and make the attacker pay dearly for every inch of ground, which is exactly what happened, and exactly what didn’t happen in Manchuria as shown by the widths of front, depths of advance, and rates of advance shown in Appendix 3 here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp.

Yes those 'few" (about 1000) tanks were too weak agains T-34 but it was a enought seriouse when crashed US troops in Birma and Britains in Malaya.Right?
Becouse the Japanes easy tanks was a enough good in the jungles.

This is a meaningless comparison. Japanese tanks generally weren’t decisive in the Pacific jungles; generally they were facing infantry without armour or with limited armour; and they never faced anything like the number and quality of tanks the Russians employed in Manchuria.

Aha? all the “elite” divisions.
Have you a exact number , quantity and names of those divisions to check how much they were “elite”?

I have the exact number, 16, and names of the those divisions.

Four divisions, 11th, 25th & 57th Infantry and 1st Armoured, were removed from the Kwantung Army to the home Islands in March 1945, being the last of 16 first line divisions taken from the Kwantung Army in 13 months. Edward J Drea, Missing Intentions, Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, Military Affairs, 1984, p.66, at p.67 & n.17 Drea records the previous units as:

July 1944

1st and 8th Infantry Divisions and 2nd Armoured Division to Luzon.
24th Infantry Division to Okinawa

The 24th, a [heavy] triangular division with three regiments, three battalions per regiment, and three companies per battalion, was organized and equipped for strategic warfare against mechanized and well-armed Russian forces of the sort the IJA clashed with at Nomonhan in 1939. It had abundant combat support units, with artillery, engineer, transport, and reconnaissance elements organic at regimental level. Each regiment, battalion, and company had its own artillery unit, and each battalion also boasted an antitank gun company. The transport regiment included three motor transport companies. In a word, the 24th, with its firepower, mobility, specialization, and consistent triangular structure was fashioned for large-scale operations with another modern army. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp#14

June 1944

9th Infantry Division to Okinawa
28th Infantry Division to Miyakojima
68th Infantry Division to Taiwan (subsequently Leyte)

February 1944

29th Infantry Division to Guam
14th Infantry Division to Palau

Unspecified dates 1944 - 45

12th, 23rd, & 71st Infantry Divisions to Philippines and Taiwan

Oh really?
The LAST tank divisions were removed into Japane in march but … they forgot its 1000 tanks in Manchjuria ,that were suddenly found in august.

What is the basis for this figure, apart from Soviet estimates?

Nevertheless the 1/4 part of its “shadow” made a nightmare for the USA marines in the Okinawa and Ivo Jima.

As they would for Russian troops in exactly the same situation.

You know Risin Sun i have to conclude you are capable to find the “sorces” that contradicts at the your previous posts.

I don’t know what this is supposed to mean. Is there something wrong with continuing to educate myself? I don’t have a problem in changing my view when evidence is produced to alter it, nor do I confine myself just to sources to prove a particular point of view.

I’m interested in learning more about the history of the war, not just in trying to prove that Russia always fought the biggest, baddest, meanest enemy and virtually won the war all by itself while the other Allies just fiddled about on the edges.

[Chevan]

@Rising_Sun

I didn’t say that the JDA were elite troops. It was mentioned in addition to the other catergories I mentioned.

JDA was not troops in the common sence. It was like a germans folksturm - rather voluntares than the experienced troops.

Thus reinforcing my point that the Kwantung Army facing the Soviets in 1945 were not first rate troops.

No , this is just proves the mistaken points of savoy6 that the Kwantung Artmy fought ONLY with China’s guerrials.
In this perspective your point about "elite"divisions that were sended to the home islands is also controversials.
How could they be "elite’ if whole their work was to kill the civilians and patrtisans?

In August 1945 there were no elite divisions in the Kwantung Army.
In 1941 there were quite a few. Where do you think the troops used in the southward advance came from?

i.e. do you wish to say that all Japanes about 5 million army was given from the Manchguria in the 1941?

Those figures probably refer to full strength units in the Japanese OOB. As Glantz notes some divisions with nominal strengths of 20,000 had as many as 18,000 men; most had 12,000 to 16,000; and some had as few as 9,000.

Indeed the Glats in his work
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp
is not discussed the soviet datas.
He wrote
Composition of Forces Facing the Soviets in the Far East
Personnel: 1,217,000
Weapons:
Tanks 1,155
Guns 5,360
Aircraft 1,800
Forces:
Japanese 993,000 (Manchguria 773 000 + Korea,Sachhalin, Kuril islands garrison 280 000)+ Auxiliary 214,000 (170 000 of Manchikko Army +44 000 of inner Mongolia forces) = 1 217 000 of mens.

There is no comparison between those Pacific campaigns and Manchuria. The battle areas were compact at Okinawa and Iwo Jima compared with Manchuria; the IJA was contained on islands with no room to manouevre; the defensive strategy on both islands was to dig in and make the attacker pay dearly for every inch of ground, which is exactly what happened, and exactly what didn’t happen in Manchuria as shown by the widths of front, depths of advance, and rates of advance shown in Appendix 3 here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp.

Well conditions were the same - the total shortage of everything by the Japanese and the absolut war superiority of allies and Soviet.
True, the tactic was a different - the allies used the its airforces and the ship artillery, the soviets used its power armoured armies and artillery.
But the infantcry of allies and soviet were in the simular situation - they faced the suicidal troops, that was ready to die.
BTW the Red Army has a casulates about 12 000 of perished - at lest it could be conpared with casulated of Americans in the battle of Okinawa.

This is a meaningless comparison. Japanese tanks generally weren’t decisive in the Pacific jungles; generally they were facing infantry without armour or with limited armour; and they never faced anything like the number and quality of tanks the Russians employed in Manchuria.

Perhaps their tanks were not so good las the T-34, but the the japanes easy tanks were much better as the armoured car role and agains the infantry. So even having the 57-mm and mashin-gun gun they could be the problem for the soviet infantry and transport escorts.

I have the exact number, 16, and names of the those divisions.

But you still did not say what does mean the "elite " divisions for the Kwantung Army
And tell me please what the was the reason to call for instance the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions from your list was the more “elite” then the 24 other divisions that faced the Red Army in august?

What is the basis for this figure, apart from Soviet estimates?

And do you have another datas exept the soviet estimetes?
BTW David Glantz is fully agreed with it.
Moreover this figure give us the Wiki also.
So does it mean the Wiki is soviet too?

As they would for Russian troops in exactly the same situation.

That’s absolutly rigt
The Red Army faced the simular fanatics in the Mahcguria and only the powerfull and quick soviet offensive has halped the achive the success.

I don’t know what this is supposed to mean. Is there something wrong with continuing to educate myself? I don’t have a problem in changing my view when evidence is produced to alter it, nor do I confine myself just to sources to prove a particular point of view.

I’m interested in learning more about the history of the war, not just in trying to prove that Russia always fought the biggest, baddest, meanest enemy and virtually won the war all by itself while the other Allies just fiddled about on the edges.

I’ve told you where you get a controversial points - For the first time you have proved the Kwantung army was a too weak thet was busy ONLY in the fight with guerrilas - then you suddenly called a 16 divisions like “elite”. Where is the logic my Friend?
The login in the emotions i think.
You tryed to prove the Kwantung Army was the weaker then the other Japanes troops- but here is a some of intersting contraductions in here.
How do you think whey the Ruswelt wished so much the joing the Red Amry to the fight with Japane in the Mancguria if the Kwatung Army were the “pitful shadow of itself” as you wrote.
Why did need to sucriface the China to the Stalin. (becouse the allies sertainly knew - Stalin would get the China for himself). If the Kwantung Army was a so weak why the American marines after the capturing Okinawa ( where they fought with “real” enemy) don’t wish to crush the “the pitfull rest” 1 million og Japanes in the Manchguria and China.?

[Rising_Sun]

No , this is just proves the mistaken points of savoy6 that the Kwantung Artmy fought ONLY with China’s guerrials.
In this perspective your point about "elite"divisions that were sended to the home islands is also controversials.
How could they be "elite’ if whole their work was to kill the civilians and patrtisans?

No idea. I didn’t say anything about the Kwantung Army killing civilians and partisans. At post #100 you said “The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the 1938-39 at the borders conflicts like in the like of Halkin-Gol” The Japanese can’t be both the most experienced when fighting the Soviets and no good for much else the rest of the time.

do you wish to say that all Japanes about 5 million army was given from the Manchguria in the 1941?

No. From memory they took 12 of about 50 to 55 divisions from China.

No.
Indeed the Glats in his work
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/car...z3/glantz3.asp
is not discussed the soviet datas.

Yes.

See the notes to Table 1, which is based on Soviet sources.

You’re including troops outside Manchuria in South Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.

Well conditions were the same - the total shortage of everything by the Japanese and the absolut war superiority of allies and Soviet.

No way. The Japanese didn’t have a total shortage of everything at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, otherwise they wouldn’t have been so hard to defeat.

True, the tactic was a different - the allies used the its airforces and the ship artillery, the soviets used its power armoured armies and artillery.

No comparison. For a start, the Pacific campaign involved major amphibious assaults and associated naval battles. The USN as gun platforms were subjected to kamikaze air attacks that didn’t occur in Manchuria, because the Soviets had total air superiority. The USN got mauled at Okinawa in ways that land based artillery never would have.

But the infantcry of allies and soviet were in the simular situation - they faced the suicidal troops, that was ready to die.

No. Less than 10% of Japanese troops facing the Russians in Manchuria died. On your figure of 1,217, it was only 7% of Japanese troops. On Okinawa about 90% of the Japanese troops died. The same at Iwo Jima. Which brings me back to the point that no matter how much you and Egorka want to believe it, the troops fighting in the Pacific were much more determined to fight to the death than those in Manchuria. About 9 to 13 times more determined.

BTW the Red Army has a casulates about 12 000 of perished - at lest it could be conpared with casulated of Americans in the battle of Okinawa.

No way. Work out casualties as percentages of total Soviet and American forces in each campaign and you’ll see just how little similarity there is.

But you still did not say what does mean the "elite " divisions for the Kwantung Army.

No, and I’m not going to. You wanted numbers and names so you could check how elite they were. I’ve given you the information. If you want to dispute whether they were elite, first line, experienced, combat ready, trained, untrained or simply non-existent, you do the research.

And tell me please what the was the reason to call for instance the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions from your list was the more “elite” then the 24 other divisions that faced the Red Army in august?

Because, if you’ve been following the posts, you will know that the best divisions were pulled out of the Kwantung Army before August and what was left wasn’t very good or even combat ready. When you’ve researched the history of the long-established units taken from Manchuria and those that were raised rapidly from the remnants of other units and reservists and unfit men to replace them, you’ll see the difference.

And do you have another datas exept the soviet estimetes?
BTW David Glantz is fully agreed with it.

Not with the figures you’ve presented of 1,217,000. He says 927,000.

Moreover this figure give us the Wiki also.

In that case it must be right, given Wiki’s great reputation for accuracy.

So does it mean the Wiki is soviet too?

No. Just that it’s as wrong as the figures you’ve been using.

That’s absolutly rigt
The Red Army faced the simular fanatics in the Mahcguria and only the powerfull and quick soviet offensive has halped the achive the success.

You’re flogging a dead horse.

I’ve told you where you get a controversial points - For the first time you have proved the Kwantung army was a too weak thet was busy ONLY in the fight with guerrilas - then you suddenly called a 16 divisions like “elite”. Where is the logic my Friend?

Logic? I never said a thing about the Kwantung Army fighting only guerillas, or anything to do with guerillas. You said it had the most experienced Japanese troops in 1938-39. You have the Kwantung Army in August 1945 being strong, when it’s fighting the Soviets who always fight only the biggest and best of everything, and weak because it never had any elite units and was good only for killing civilians, at the same time.

The login in the emotions i think.

Not here, it’s not.

You tryed to prove the Kwantung Army was the weaker then the other Japanes troops- but here is a some of intersting contraductions in here.
How do you think whey the Ruswelt wished so much the joing the Red Amry to the fight with Japane in the Mancguria if the Kwatung Army were the “pitful shadow of itself” as you wrote.

I imagine because they were enemy troops and the conventional way of fighting a war is to defeat the enemy, without regard to their quality. I didn’t see the USSR holding back when Germany was on its knees in 1945 and being defended by untrained old men and children.

Why did need to sucriface the China to the Stalin. (becouse the allies sertainly knew - Stalin would get the China for himself). If the Kwantung Army was a so weak why the American marines after the capturing Okinawa ( where they fought with “real” enemy) don’t wish to crush the “the pitfull rest” 1 million og Japanes in the Manchguria and China.?

Because they left that to the Russians who, for all their marvellous military brilliance and world beating military, naval and air power, confined themselves to fighting essentially a land war on one front on one continent while the other Allies fought on land and sea all over the planet for the preceding four to six years, doing practically nothing of military value to the war effort but thereby enabling the Russians to get to the point in August 1945 where they could defeat the biggest and best Army Japan ever put in the field with the best Japanese equipment and limitless resources of Japan at the end of an exhausting war so that the Kwantung Army could be beaten by a platoon of Heroes of the Soviet Union using nothing but broomsticks and nail files produced in the USSR on the most advanced production lines in the world by workers fed from the boundless agricultural productive capacity of the USSR which didn’t need Lend Lease, support from the other Allies, or anything else to beat Germany and Japan single-handed, and frighten Italy into surrendering in the process.

I really don’t see any point to responding to further posts in the same vein. Like many other issues involving the USSR, this has just become a pointless and tedious pissing contest with no prospect of resolution upon any terms other than agreeing that the USSR won WWII and fought all the important battles while the other Allies did little more than cheer it on from the sidelines.

[Egorka]

Rising Sun:
No. Less than 10% of Japanese troops facing the Russians in Manchuria died. On your figure of 1,217, it was only 7% of Japanese troops. On Okinawa about 90% of the Japanese troops died. The same at Iwo Jima. Which brings me back to the point that no matter how much you and Egorka want to believe it, the troops fighting in the Pacific were much more determined to fight to the death than those in Manchuria. About 9 to 13 times more determined.

You amase me! I know there is nothing I could say that you would find unbiased. There is nothing I could tell you from Soviet sources that you would not deny. But here is a quote from the paper you reffered to. And it was writen in 1986 - there is no way it is prosoviet!

[INDENT]

extract from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
The Soviet Army Offensive: Manchuria, 1945
CSC 1986

The continued combat impaired already poor
communications between Japanese headquarters and field
units. This delayed tramsmissions of cease-fire orders on
17 August 1945, during which time the Kwangtung Army was in
preparation for a counter attack in the southeast.
This atmosphere of confusion and anxiety by the Japanese was
intensified by the Japanese warrior code of Bushido (fight
to the death). Existing Army/Navy regulations expressly
prohibited servicemen from surrendering. Surrender was
considered shameful and dishonorable, subject to court-
martial and execution. To absolve the traditional stigma of
surrender and remove legal liabilities, IGHQ published an
order which stated that the nation and government of Japan
would not regard servicemen “delivered” to the enemy as a
result of the cease-fire order as having surrendered under
the old law. This had a tremendous psychological effect on
the Japanese soldiers… with no dishonor there was no reason
to commit suicide. On 19 August, the Kwangtung Army
transmitted this order to its field commands and the
Japanese capitulated everywhere.

[/INDENT]

Was there a similar “order which stated that the nation and government of Japan would not regard servicemen “delivered” to the enemy” issued during the last stages of battle for Okinava, for example?

[Egorka]

Rising Sun:
I really don’t see any point to responding to further posts in the same vein. Like many other issues involving the USSR, this has just become a pointless and tedious pissing contest with no prospect of resolution upon any terms other than agreeing that the USSR won WWII and fought all the important battles while the other Allies did little more than cheer it on from the sidelines.

So there is no way one can challenge a common Wester perseption without being accused of pulling blanket?
It is very sad that there is no intent to listen what so ever… Plus there is constant accusation of glorifying my country above others.
I understand that you are probably not accustomed to hear a determined opposition that would present soviet action in favorable light, but what is point of having this forum then?

[Rising_Sun]

@Egorka

I understand that you are probably not accustomed to hear a determined opposition that would present soviet action in favorable light,

I can assure you that I have become rapidly accustomed to it on this forum, which mimics Soviet chauvinism and revisionism on some other military forums.

The purpose of historical discussion is not to present past events in a way favourable to a given nation. That is just chauvinistic history at best and propaganda at worst.

I don’t have any difficulty in examining issues from different perspectives, or in acknowledging the Soviet contribution, such as at post # 79.

At posts #96 and 97 I volunteered an important and different assessment of the significance of the Russian attack in Manchuria in Japan’s strategic assessment of how to end the war on the best terms for Japan. Curiously, it has been completely ignored.

Perhaps because it takes away the glory of the Russian attack in crushing the massive, suicidal, magnificently equipped Japanese forces facing the Russians in August 1945, following the magical transformation of the Japanese forces from being good only for murdering civilians, following their magical transformation from being the best troops Japan had when Russia faced them in 1939.

Perhaps because it doesn’t come from the Russian archives which are the source of all truth and knowledge about WWII.

About all it did apparently was stimulate Chevan to say that I’m capable of finding sources that contradict my previous posts.

Chevan seems to find that remarkable, and worthy of comment. I don’t. The difference is that I’m trying to get a balanced perspective, not present Soviet or any other action in a favourable light. It’s the difference between an open and a closed mind.

but what is point of having this forum then?

To discuss and learn about the history of WWII in an attempt to get a balanced perspective on the myriad factors and events involved.

Not to engage in a chauvinistic contest to put one nation above another.

That’s how wars start.

[Chevan]

Come on , Risin Sun.
I have no intentions to insult you or to show the disrespect at the your knowlages.
But i think we are going around in here.

@Rising_Sun

No idea. I didn’t say anything about the Kwantung Army killing civilians and partisans. At post #100 you said “The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the 1938-39 at the borders conflicts like in the like of Halkin-Gol” The Japanese can’t be both the most experienced when fighting the Soviets and no good for much else the rest of the time.

Yes the Japanes 30 000 army that has attecked the Halkin-Gol in 1939 WAS THE MOST ecperienced Japanes force IN THE 1939. Coz the Kwantung Army was the ONLY Japane army that fought at thet moment.

No. From memory they took 12 of about 50 to 55 divisions from China.

i.e. from the Kwantung Army, coz the Kwantung army was responsible for the occupation of China?

Yes.

So much better

See the notes to Table 1, which is based on Soviet sources.

You’re including troops outside Manchuria in South Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.

But all the troops in the South Korea and China was sabjiudated operatively at the Kwantung command in august of 1945.
So it could be enought right to calculate its forces together.

No way. The Japanese didn’t have a total shortage of everything at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, otherwise they wouldn’t have been so hard to defeat.

Really they had enought arcrafts and big-caliber artillery to fight with Allies ships. ?
If so why they do not begain the fire till the marines has reached the coast?

No comparison. For a start, the Pacific campaign involved major amphibious assaults and associated naval battles. The USN as gun platforms were subjected to kamikaze air attacks that didn’t occur in Manchuria, because the Soviets had total air superiority. The USN got mauled at Okinawa in ways that land based artillery never would have.

And had in summer 1945 allies abssolut air superiority too?
How many the rest of plains did the Japanes used in the battle of Okinawa. And were those plants a first line aircraft or obsolete?

No. Less than 10% of Japanese troops facing the Russians in Manchuria died. On your figure of 1,217, it was only 7% of Japanese troops. On Okinawa about 90% of the Japanese troops died. The same at Iwo Jima. Which brings me back to the point that no matter how much you and Egorka want to believe it, the troops fighting in the Pacific were much more determined to fight to the death than those in Manchuria. About 9 to 13 times more determined.

Well you get the total figures of the perished Japanes for the all period of operation “august storm” and simply devide at the common quantuty of Japanes.
But you uses the 90% of japanes casulated only in two separated battles, right.
So could you get us the statistic of whole Japane army that were fought with allies and what persentage of casulaties were?
I suggest thet the rest of Japane army that was not in China, Korea and Mongolia fought with allies we far from 90% of death rate.
Let calculate the averal death rate for the Japanes who fought in the Pacific-
The total death of Japanes soldiers -1 740 000
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ww2_casualties
The total quantity of peoples who were call for the army duty were about 6-7 mln peoples for the period 1941-1945.
So as we could calculate the overal death rethe the Japane soldiers durint the whole Pacific company was about 1,7 /7 = 24%.
Still far from 90% right.
Indeed the hight rated of captured POWs by the Red Arrmy was explained the mass surrender of the rest Japanes armies AFTER 17 september when the order of imperor on capitulation has reached the troops. But this does not mean the some of units of cuicidal soldiers continie the figh till its dead.

No way. Work out casualties as percentages of total Soviet and American forces in each campaign and you’ll see just how little similarity there is.

Well that exactly that i 'm talking about.

No, and I’m not going to. You wanted numbers and names so you could check how elite they were. I’ve given you the information. If you want to dispute whether they were elite, first line, experienced, combat ready, trained, untrained or simply non-existent, you do the research.

He he
I 'm not need the research coz i know you simply could not to pove you point -ONLY the 16 divisions that were sended to the Pacific were the Elite.
You used the american author who a possibly a “little biased” and he prefered to portray the US fight with “elite” Japanes troop but the Soviet faced only “poor armoured troops”.

Because, if you’ve been following the posts, you will know that the best divisions were pulled out of the Kwantung Army before August and what was left wasn’t very good or even combat ready. When you’ve researched the history of the long-established units taken from Manchuria and those that were raised rapidly from the remnants of other units and reservists and unfit men to replace them, you’ll see the difference.

Again where get you the information that the those division that wer pulled out of Kwantung Army were the “best”.
Sorry i could not able to confirm it from your earlyesposts.

Not with the figures you’ve presented of 1,217,000. He says 927,000.

No he says 1217, but he added the the Kwantung Army the units of Japane allies , who in fact were under operative command of Kwantung Army.

In that case it must be right, given Wiki’s great reputation for accuracy.

But this “accuracy” did not bother you in the thread about official version of holocaust;)

No. Just that it’s as wrong as the figures you’ve been using.
You’re flogging a dead horse.

OK let’s bury this horse.

Logic? I never said a thing about the Kwantung Army fighting only guerillas, or anything to do with guerillas. You said it had the most experienced Japanese troops in 1938-39. You have the Kwantung Army in August 1945 being strong, when it’s fighting the Soviets who always fight only the biggest and best of everything, and weak because it never had any elite units and was good only for killing civilians, at the same time.

Does it mean the Allies ALWAYS fought with Japanes in the 1944-45 that had the biggest and best of everything ?

I imagine because they were enemy troops and the conventional way of fighting a war is to defeat the enemy, without regard to their quality. I didn’t see the USSR holding back when Germany was on its knees in 1945 and being defended by untrained old men and children.

Germany was the Agressor who attacked the USSR and coused the millions victims, but was the Japane the simular agressor for ht eUSSR in the 1945. I/m sure not.

Because they left that to the Russians who, for all their marvellous military brilliance and world beating military, naval and air power, confined themselves to fighting essentially a land war on one front on one continent while the other Allies fought on land and sea all over the planet for the preceding four to six years, doing practically nothing of military value to the war effort but thereby enabling the Russians to get to the point in August 1945 where they could defeat the biggest and best Army Japan ever put in the field with the best Japanese equipment and limitless resources of Japan at the end of an exhausting war so that the Kwantung Army could be beaten by a platoon of Heroes of the Soviet Union using nothing but broomsticks and nail files produced in the USSR on the most advanced production lines in the world by workers fed from the boundless agricultural productive capacity of the USSR which didn’t need Lend Lease, support from the other Allies, or anything else to beat Germany and Japan single-handed, and frighten Italy into surrendering in the process.

Oh that’s good sarcasm Rising Sun my respect;)
So why the allies asked the Platon Of the Soviet Heroes for the joining to the war agains Japane if the one single of US Super-marine-Rembo could done the whole job and cuptured the whole “the rest of shadow” of Kwantung Army.
Why the allies licked the ass for the Stalin : presented him the Poland and whole the Eastern Erope ?

I really don’t see any point to responding to further posts in the same vein. Like many other issues involving the USSR, this has just become a pointless and tedious pissing contest with no prospect of resolution upon any terms other than agreeing that the USSR won WWII and fought all the important battles while the other Allies did little more than cheer it on from the sidelines.

Oh now you’ve insulted.
Do not need to lead this thread to the absoud please . Nobody here try to declare simular like that you wrote.

Cheers.

[Chevan]

@Rising_Sun

At posts #96 and 97 I volunteered an important and different assessment of the significance of the Russian attack in Manchuria in Japan’s strategic assessment of how to end the war on the best terms for Japan. Curiously, it has been completely ignored.

About all it did apparently was stimulate Chevan to say that I’m capable of finding sources that contradict my previous posts.

Chevan seems to find that remarkable, and worthy of comment. I don’t. The difference is that I’m trying to get a balanced perspective, not present Soviet or any other action in a favourable light. It’s the difference between an open and a closed mind.

Yes you right trying to have the open mind.And this quality i/m trying to raise in me.
I think one of the best your trait - you try to be the relatively objective and neitral ( as much as it possible for you).And i thankful to you for it.
And you are wrong thinking that we are not appreciate your post 96/97.
But trying to not present the Soviet action in the favorible light you inevtably begin to use the old cold war arguments that perhaps no more accurate than the soviets.

[Dani]

Chevan and Rising Sun! Hold on your horses! As this topic slipped away it will be splitted making a new one: Soviets in Manchuria - August 1945.

Do you agree Chevan? You know what I mean…

[Chevan]

Let’s go Dani.
Just move the all of post that deels the Kwantung army fro this thread to the new.