Kwantung Army

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#61

Mate, I’m happy to try to raise it in you a bit more.

But it could be painful.

For you. :wink:

I think one of the best your trait - you try to be the relatively objective and neitral ( as much as it possible for you).And i thankful to you for it.

Thanks. Seriously.

We’re all prisoners of our personal, ethnic and national pasts, but we should all try to see things from the other side.

Objectivity is a subjectively determined state.

Complete objectivity occurs when someone agrees with us. By our subjectively determined objective standards. :smiley:

And you are wrong thinking that we are not appreciate your post 96/97.

I’m not interested in anyone appreciating it, in the sense of being grateful for it.

I’m interested in anyone appreciating it in the sense of understanding it; discussing it; disputing it; or agreeing with it; and giving their reasons for their position because that paper offers an interesting alternative to the orthodox views about what forced Japan to end the war. It makes the USSR’s attack on Japan in Manchuria the most important step in Japan surrendering, even if the USSR and the other Allies didn’t even begin to suspect that, and completely alters the significance of the USSR’s late entry into the war against Japan, for reasons that have everything to do with Japan’s post-war aims and nothing to do with USSR / USA post-war aims.

Posting that paper, which alters my previous views about the significance of the atom bombs, reflects my view that if I find something interesting I should make it available for consideration. Whether or not I agree with it. The aim is to present all the available information to allow the most informed interpretation.

But trying to not present the Soviet action in the favorible light you inevtably begin to use the old cold war arguments that perhaps no more accurate than the soviets.

I’m not trying to not present the Soviet action in a favourable light.

I’m trying to reach a balanced view of the Soviet and Japanese military actions against the various factors affecting all nations involved.

I don’t know where ‘old Cold War’ arguments come in, so far as affecting Western views of the USSR‘s WWII effort is concerned. Perhaps this reflects your assumptions, or what you’ve picked up from Russian / USSR history, about how the West thought.

I can’t speak for others, but here’s my personal experience on some relevant factors, to illustrate how things really were.

In October 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, I was sitting in my schoolyard discussing with another kid what it would look like when the Russian atomic missiles came over the horizon and how it would affect the city we lived in which had rings on the phone book cover showing the different zones of diminishing damage from a nuclear weapon dropped on the city centre, all of which went beyond where we lived and went to school near the centre.

At that time; before; and after other significant Cold War events, nothing ever came up about the USSR’s WWII history being altered by the Cold War.

In fact, we grew up through our education system and general public information with an admiration for the Murmansk convoys supplying the gallant and indomitable Russians, and both admiration and sympathy for the huge sacrifices of the Russian troops and the immense suffering of the Russian people under the Germans in Russia and the terrible treatment of Russian POW’s in German hands.

We knew a lot more about those things than what Stalin did to his own people during his regime before, during and after WWII.

I don’t know what you think the West understood about the USSR during the Cold War, nor do I know what anyone else here or in Britain or America thought, but an awful lot of people were blinded to the evils of the Stalin era, and later eras, because they thought that the socialist ideal was being practised there.

I was, in an abstract and idealistic sense, one of them in them in the late 1960’s and to a lesser extent in the early 1970’s, despite also being during that time a soldier training to and willing to fight the communist forces in Vietnam.

I still think that there are few great ideals better than “From each, according to his ability. To each, according to his need.“

But if you live in a Western democracy where the bludgers contribute sweet FA and suck up everything, including a disproportionate amount of police and court and prison time, you‘ll change your mind about how that great principle works in practice.

The failure in Western intellectual circles to challenge and denounce the Stalinist era, and the subsequent perversions of socialist theory in the USSR and China, is a bigger political and moral failure than the failure to do the same with the Nazi assault on the Jews. (Not that persecuting Jews hasn’t been a popular sport in Europe for centuries.) And saw a lot more people killed.

#62

45 posts or so moved to an old thread from 2005.

So far I added it in Japanese Military section.

#63

The Soviets do seem to have an advantage in World War II in terms of contribution but people should not despair over this or try to deny it. There are many other wars in which the Soviets/Russians did not have an overwhelming role such as World War I or the American Civil War.

#64

I’m not disputing their immense contribution, and sacrifice, against the Germans in Europe, but where is their contribution to defeating the Germans elsewhere. Notably on the seas? And the same for the Japanese?

#65

Realistically, I think Germany did more to damage its cause than any of its opponnents. There is no rationale for trying to fight the entire world.

With regards to the Soviets the problem is the huge descrepancy in casualty figures. The British, Americans and others did not suffer casualties on anywhere close to such a scale.

#66

If Stalin hadn’t killed most of his marshals, army commanders, corps commanders, divisisional commanders and sundry other officers a few years before Russia entered the war, there might have been more competence with fewer casualties.

Or maybe a regime which didn’t value the lives of its own citizens as much as Britain and America did was happy to sacrifice them in vast numbers.

Probably both.

#67

This is the most tupical mistake of the western propoganda during the Cold war, Rising Sun.
Indeed all of those “marshals, army commanders, corps commanders, divisisional commanders and sundry other officers” that was purged in the 1937-38 had NO ANY REAL COMBAT EXPERIENCE.
Certainly the Great Purge was a cruel action, but many of "victims’ in fact deserved it.
As fo instance the bloody NKVD leaders like Jagoda and Ejov who was responsible for the mass excutions in the befor the 1938.
All of the soviet commanders ( whom are you talking about) has ONLY the experience of the supprestion of the anti-communists uprising and a mass terror actions agains the population.
I do not think them their “experience” could help the red army in the 1941;)
Indeed the Red Army had not bad experience: they succesfully defeated the Japanes agressive attemps in the 1938-39 in the Halkin-Gol and Mongolia.
The soviet aces showed itself from the god side during the Spanish civil war.
Actually the winter war 1939-40 was a worst planned ( they ignored the special o f the winter temperature in the jenuary).
But it was not a ONLY red Army mistake- as we know the Germans made the simular lack in the planning during thewinter of 1941 in the battle for the Moscow.
The problem of the Red Army was the just only amall part of the army could cet the REAL combat experience till the 1941- about 50 000 in the Far East and about 250 000 in the Finland.
For the comaprision the Germans army in the 1941 was fully trained and prepeared to the wide combat actions - they had about 2 millions of troops that had A REAL combat experience.
The main tragedy of the Red Army was the lack of quality of low and average offisers corp. The soviet low commanders had a lack of real experience therefore the initial phase of war was so unsuccesfull for them.
The Germans in the opposite had a best low officers corp in the world in the 1941-43. As it wrote the Eric von Manstaine in his memours "Lost battles’ - the reason of initial success of German army was the excellent prepare of the low and awerage command staff.
So actually the Great Purge had no any influence to the soviet lacks in the 1941-42.
BTW this supported by the history - As we know in the France and in the Polan there were no the Stalins purge - does it help them to fight with germansin the 1939-40…:wink:
Or unsuccesfull balles of Britain agains the Japanes and Germans in the Nothern Africa in the first period of war - was it the resault of repression of Britis high staff;)?

Or maybe a regime which didn’t value the lives of its own citizens as much as Britain and America did was happy to sacrifice them in vast numbers.

It too easy to spread the tell about “regime that send its people to die” - if your own country there is the ocean between you and your mortal enemy, right.
I would wath at your “speculation” if the Japanes landed to the Australia- would the Australian army so effective agains them at least as much as the Red Army was?

#68

I doubt it.

All armed forces are based on higher ranks training lower ranks. Even socialist armies never ran as collectives. Especially the Red Army in WWII. Otherwise it wouldn’t have needed so many political commissars to supervise the military which didn’t operate as a collective.

Remove the middle to senior ranks in an army and you’re still left with junior ranks trained by the missing people.

If the remainder do well in battle, they must have been well trained by the missing senior ranks.

Which suggests that the missing senior ranks would have been a lot more value alive than dead.

BTW this supported by the history - As we know in the France and in the Polan there were no the Stalins purge - does it help them to fight with germansin the 1939-40…:wink:
Or unsuccesfull balles of Britain agains the Japanes and Germans in the Nothern Africa in the first period of war - was it the resault of repression of Britis high staff;)?

The Soviets, happily freed of the dead wood of the burdensome senior ranks, didn’t do too well in the initial periods either. Their retreats weren’t any different to France and Britain. They just had more room to move, and lot longer to the sea at their rear.

It too easy to spread the tell about “regime that send its people to die” - if your own country there is the ocean between you and your mortal enemy, right.

I would wath at your “speculation” if the Japanes landed to the Australia- would the Australian army so effective agains them at least as much as the Red Army was?

Australia was the first nation to defeat the Germans in battle, before the USSR got involved in WWII and even longer before the USSR had a win, and the first to defeat and force the evacuation of a Japanese landing force in WWII.

As for the Red Army being effective against the Japanese, Nomonhan was a series of accidents that grew into a much bigger battle than was ever intended by either side.

The USSR never faced a planned and sustained attack by the Japanese even remotely like that faced in Japan’s southward advance, so there’s nothing to suggest it would have done any better than the other Allies in WWII. Particularly based on the crushing Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905.

#69

And who do tell the senior ranks were DEAD in the 1941?
They were purged in the 1937-38 this means the other commanders took its plase later.
Thrue , the new senior ranks also had no real combat experience. Moreover the problem for them was the FEAR ( they saw what was happaned with its precursors and how did they finished;))
But this was a purge - not the “execution” of hight ranks staff .
BTW in the 1938 to the red army has come the its best war commanders like Gukov, Rokossovskij and Konev- the best soviet generals( as it was proved lated)
The Red Army got its first combet experience in the 1938-39 with Japanes.Where the new generation of the soviet generals has proved its potential.( The soviet troops in the Halkin-Gol was under command of Gukov)
So i/m really do not see the reason to tell the Great Purge was the reason of soviets failures in the 1941-42.

The Soviets, happily freed of the dead wood of the burdensome senior ranks, didn’t do too well in the initial periods either. Their retreats weren’t any different to France and Britain. They just had more room to move, and lot longer to the sea at their rear.

Exactly this is support my point, thanks,
now do you see the reason of initial defeat was to the purges but the simply weakness and lack of real combat experience of the Red Army ( exactly like and the France&British troops in the 1940 in the Europe)
But its wrong to say the Red Army retreat like and British and France troops :wink:
Inspite of the lack of command the some of soviet unita had resisted very srong( in the comparition with the France resistanse in the 1940 for instanse)
BTW and you are wrong about more “room to move” for the Red Army.
Indeed the “moving room” was limited by the line- Murmansk-Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad-Baky.
The lost of any of those cities was mean the LOST OF THE WAR for the USSR.
The Barbarossa only planned to capture the territory western then the Volga river- so all of the cities above were the LAST line.
Becouse inspite of the enourmous territory of the USSR the whole industry , most of the human and all of the resources was LIMITED By this LAST line.
Therefore all the tells about a “great moving room” is the exaggeration.

Australia was the first nation to defeat the Germans in battle, before the USSR got involved in WWII and even longer before the USSR had a win, and the first to defeat and force the evacuation of a Japanese landing force in WWII.

Oh common i did not mean you national proudness.
I just wish you to compare what could be if the Japanes attacked Australia as they did in Malaja - was the Australian high command so kind to save its own soldier, be prefered to retreat and leave the australian peoples for the Japanes slaughter?
You simply never know the german occupation therefore so it so easy to speculate about it in the instance of the critical period for the Red Army in the 1941.
It’s so easy to criticize the soviet high command in the 1941 , imagine yourself as the “great commander”, when the German henocige had come to the USSR.

As for the Red Army being effective against the Japanese, Nomonhan was a series of accidents that grew into a much bigger battle than was ever intended by either side.

Oh my friend its seems you naver heared about Japanes plans of the invasion to the Suberia :wink:
it was so called the “Nother direction” the invasion to the USSR and the occupation it from the Kamchatka till the lake of Baikal - the whole half of territory of the USSR.It was detailed war plan that was developed by the suff of Kwantung command.
After the occupation of the Mongolia it waqs the lovely plan of Kwantung army and they lobbied it in the Tokio.
The attack of the 1938-39 was the simple battle-reconnaissance of the ability of the Red Army to fight.
If they won there were no any doubt they should bagan the full scalle invasion.

The USSR never faced a planned and sustained attack by the Japanese even remotely like that faced in Japan’s southward advance, so there’s nothing to suggest it would have done any better than the other Allies in WWII. Particularly based on the crushing Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905.

The USSR faced the most power war mashine in the world in the 1941, that had a excellent planning, perfect victorious combat experience and the best hight command that the Japanse even could not a dream.
I know for the sure the whole Japanes army was just a pitiful parody for the Germans army of the period 1941-42
But nevertheless this Japane army was able to crush the more bigger in quantity the allies armies in the 1941-42.

#70

So no high ranks were executed?

Rather than me present unreliable Western figures, how many Red Army officers do the Soviet archives show as having been executed?

Assuming any were actually killed by the great and gentle Stalin.:wink:

BTW in the 1938 to the red army has come the its best war commanders like Gukov, Rokossovskij and Konev- the best soviet generals( as it was proved lated)
The Red Army got its first combet experience in the 1938-39 with Japanes.Where the new generation of the soviet generals has proved its potential.( The soviet troops in the Halkin-Gol was under command of Gukov)
So i/m really do not see the reason to tell the Great Purge was the reason of soviets failures in the 1941-42.

If the purge had no effect on the army and the people left were so good in their brilliant defeat of the magnificent Japanese at Nomonhan, then why weren’t they just as good when Germany attacked?

Becouse inspite of the enourmous territory of the USSR the whole industry , most of the human and all of the resources was LIMITED By this LAST line.
Therefore all the tells about a “great moving room” is the exaggeration.

So nothing moved east? No war materials were produced further east?

Oh common i did not mean you national proudness.

This is what happens when the Soviet line is pushed as if nobody did anything else, and nobody has anything else to be proud of because they didn’t face the biggest, baddest bastard on the block. Which, as I have said often enough before, only the British Commonwealth was doing from the fall of France until Germany attacked Russia.

I just wish you to compare what could be if the Japanes attacked Australia as they did in Malaja - was the Australian high command so kind to save its own soldier, be prefered to retreat and leave the australian peoples for the Japanes slaughter?

Actually, the Australian high command would have retreated to lines to defend the main productive and population areas, and any Australian left outside those lines would have been left to the Japanese.

You simply never know the german occupation therefore so it so easy to speculate about it in the instance of the critical period for the Red Army in the 1941.
It’s so easy to criticize the soviet high command in the 1941 , imagine yourself as the “great commander”, when the German henocige had come to the USSR.

Imagine yourself as the Australian battalion, company and platoon commanders fighting the Japanese from Malaya down through the NEI and up through New Britain in the knowledge that if you don’t defeat the Japanese, your family will be subjected to an even worse version of the rape of Nanking because the Europeans got it worse from the Japanese.

Russians didn’t have a monopoly on being at risk of brutal extermination by an enemy which hated them.

The USSR faced the most power war mashine in the world in the 1941, that had a excellent planning, perfect victorious combat experience and the best hight command

So?

The British Commonwealth faced exactly the same machine alone, and fought it, long before the USSR came into the war. And with a bloody sight less resources and men, and over a bloody sight bigger area of the globe than the USSR ever had to deal with.

I know for the sure the whole Japanes army was just a pitiful parody for the Germans army of the period 1941-42

So why make such a big deal of the Russian attack on the Japanese in August 1945?

What happened between 1938-39 when the post-purge Russian generals defeated the mighty Japanese and the Japanese somehow turned into a parody in 1941-42, before magically turning back into a magnificent fighting force when facing the Russians in the dying days of the war after having the tripe belted out of them for several years beforehand?

It always seems that when the Russians / USSR fight anyone it’s the biggest fight in town with a sell-out crowd in the biggest stadium on the planet, but when anyone else fights the same enemy it’s an amateur bout between pygmy morons in a toilet cubicle in a country shithouse.

#71

Here is some data in Russian: http://militera.lib.ru/research/pyhalov_i/02.html

I will summirise and translate it later. Just give me some time.

#72

Rising Sun, listen to me please. I want to tell you something. Please get one thing in your mind before you post comments:

We, Russians, do not claim to be better than anyone!

So there is no use in exhagerating and twisting our statements into selv elevating propaganda speech.

When I say “our statements” I mean mine nad Chevan’s.
Chevan, if I got something wrong please correct me.

Statements like this is an insult, Rising Sun. It is an insult because it is a lie that it has been clamed by any one in this forum:

This is what happens when the Soviet line is pushed as if nobody did anything else, and nobody has anything else to be proud of because they didn’t face the biggest, baddest bastard on the block.

#73

Still thinking of your words…

This is what happens when the Soviet line is pushed as if nobody did anything else, and nobody has anything else to be proud of because they didn’t face the biggest, baddest bastard on the block. Which, as I have said often enough before, only the British Commonwealth was doing from the fall of France until Germany attacked Russia.

You are right,the British Commonwealth was facing the same “the biggest, baddest bastard on the block”. The difference is that in case of the UK the the baddest bastard spat at your and eventually tried to step on your foot, wheras in case of USSR the bastard tried to take the heart out of the chest.

And please stop implying that anyone claimes some kind of moral superiority over other allies!

#74

Rising Sun, how many officers were arrested in the period before June 1941 (especially the 1937-1938 purge) in RKKA according to your sources?

As I said, I will summirise my info later. I just need to print it first (I hate reading from the screen).

#75

Oh this is very interesting source mate thanks.

Thus, actual loss from the army of the command- commanding and political composition comprises:

  1. in 1936-37 yr. - 19 674 men, or 6,9% to the listed number (including of 2827 men of armed forces political personnel).
  2. in 1938-39 yr. - 11 723 men, or 2,3% to the listed number (including of 3515 men of armed forces political personnel), i.e., are almost three times less against 1936-37 yr.
    As a result of the accomplished great work the army to a considerable extent was cleaned of the spies, saboteurs, conspirators, who do not suggest the political confidence of foreigners, from the drunkards and the spongers,

The “lost” does not mean the “executed”, but the dismissed fro army.
BTW the big part of dismissed were later restore in army after the getting complains.

Repression they did not put yes and we could not put because of the insignificance of their scales in comparison with the overall mass of the officer corps of the visible imprint on the educational level. A certain drop in the portion of officers, who have average military education in 1938-1939 is explained not by repressions, but by significant inflow into the army of officers from the reserve, from the extended-servicemen and especially officers, who finished the courses of Junior Lieutenants. At the same time in the pre-war years is observed steady tendency toward an increase in the percentage of officers, who have academic formation. In 1941 this percentage was highest within entire interwar period and was equal to 7,1%. To the repressions, in 1936 this number composed 6,6. The carried out calculations show that in the period of repressions was observed the steady increase in the quantity of command personnel, which has average and high military education. Thus, academic formation in 1936 had 13 thousand faces of command personnel, in 1939 - after the actual end of repressions - 23 thousand, in 1941 - 28 thousand officers.
Military education in the volume of military school had respectively 125, 156 and 206 thousand soldiers "

Not bad for the Great Purge the level of the high educated officers even increased;)

#76

I agree Savoy. One might also say that the Russians were rather “late” in entering WW2 in Europe. They were too busy swallowing Poland and other independent Eastern European (Baltic) states as a result of their pact with Hitler, something that is rarely mentioned by our ex-soviet brethren in here.

Having said that, let me add that the Soviet contribution to Allied victory in Europe was simply massive. Their contribution against Japan was simply predatory and unneeded, but it was war and the world was standing on its head. The soviets adore talking about how terrible Hitler was - and he was most certainly all that and more - but Stalin was no picnic himself. He gave Hitler the free hand he needed to attack in the west which was not exactly helpful in the struggle against Hitler.

The millions of Russians who died in this terrible war must have wondered just what Stalin “bought” with the time he secured as a result of sleeping with Hitler. Perhaps that question could better be asked of the Russian officer corps which Stalin decimated all on his own. Or of the entire captured Polish officer corps which was found under ten feet of dirt in the Katyn forest by Germans, who were no slouches in the callous murder department.

The Russians did fight bravely against the Germans and there is a good case to be made that, properly supplied mostly by the Americans, they might have beaten the Germans all on their own, but we’ll never know. One might make the case as well that if Stalin had not entered into a pact with Hitler but had simply attacked Germany at the same time as the Germans struck Poland, things might have developed very differently indeed.

It’s all speculation of course, but that’s part of the interest, isn’t it? The Russian contribution to victory was real, but it was definitely not the whole story and Ivan needs to face up to Stalin’s role in enabling Hitler. No, Natasha, it isn’t all about you.

#77

I agree Savoy. One might also say that the Russians were rather “late” in entering WW2 in Europe. They were too busy swallowing Poland and other independent Eastern European (Baltic) states as a result of their pact with Hitler, something that is rarely mentioned by our ex-soviet brethren in here.

Do you mean like that USSR/Stalin was selfish and came “late” in to war. Wheras UK/USA were generous and selfdefying and entered the war early. Is this your logic, royal744 ?

#78

Not exactly sure what you mean, Igor, but, I know what I meant, which is that Stalin “did a deal” with Hitler and cynically carved out his portion of the steak he and Hitler had agreed to carve up. Even this singular act of cynicism on Stalin’s part “might” have been marginally understandable if Stalin had used the time thus gained to good effect instead of leaving his army and air force like a doormat waiting for the Germans to walk over them. Alas, this was not to be, Igor.

#79

I agree Rising Sun. You have a good way of putting it.

#80

Originally Posted by Rising Sun*
So no high ranks were executed?

Rather than me present unreliable Western figures, how many Red Army officers do the Soviet archives show as having been executed?

Hello,

Here is a short summury of the documents presented in the work “The Great Slandered War”. The chapter 2: “Was RKKA beheaded?”.

There are 2 commonly exhagerated statements existing bout the purge of 1937 - 1938 in RKKA:
[ol]
[li]During the purge almost whole officer corp of RKKA was annihilated, as the result in 1941 the army was left without experiensed officers.[/li][li]Tuhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir and other “inncent victims” were genious commanders which removal was fatal.[/li][/ol]

So, how many officers were repressed?

Here is some common exhagerated statement from different sources:
General-colonel D.Volkogonov: “According to the existing data, from May 1937 till September 1938 (i.e. 1,5 years), 36 761 people were repressed in the army and more than 3000 in the navy. … Part of them, though, were just fired from the Army.”
General-leitenant N.Pavlenko: “… were repressed 36 791 commander.”
L.Kirshner: “It is known that during the pre war period 44 000 people were repressed in the officer corp - i.e. more thqan half of the corp.”
The fomer cheif ideologist of Communist party of USSR A.Yakovlev: “More than 70 000 officers were annihilated by Stalin before the War.”
V.Rappoport and Y.Geller: “That is why we have to conclude that loss of the officer corp during the 2 years of cleancing accounted for app. 100 000 people.”
V.Koval: “Without any wars almost all glourious officer corp of RKKA - the spine of the army - perished in the dangions of NKVD.”
Melnikov and Chernaya: “Almost whole middle officer corp was killed by the hands of the executioners.”

According to the book “1937: Golgotha of the elite of RKKA” by N.Cherushev, 2003, page 39, the reduction in the officer corp in the period 01 January - 01 November 1937:

[u]Military district[/u]    [u]Dismissed[/u]   [u]Of those arrested[/u]
Moscow                1252            363
Leningrad             1015            60
Belorussia            1215            279
Kiev                  1126            382
Harkov                780             257
North Caucasian       569             101
Volga region          315             106
Ural                  297             102
Sibirian              204             128
Trans Caucasian       395             138
Middleasian           136             98
Trans Baikal          295             14
OKDVA                 1867            642
Air forces            1205            285
Navy                  705             171

During the first 10 month of 1937 and taking into account other military 
related units (military schools, rear office emplyees, intelligence office, 
officers in the reseve) - 
[b]13 811 officers were dismissed, of those 3 776 arrested[/b].

Another document (РГВА. Ф.37837. Оп.19. Д.87. Л.42-52. citied as in N.Cherushev “Statistics of anti army terror”, 1998) gives wides picture of the repressions:

Memo

During the last 5 years (1934 - 25 Oct 1939) the following number of the officers was being dismissed:

1934: 6596 ppl. or 5,9% of the total.[INDENT]
a) for drinking and moral decay - 1513
b) due to illness, invalids, death - 4604
c) arrested and convicted - 479

1935: 8560 ppl. or 7,2% of the total.
a) politico-moral issues, incomepetence, volountiraly - 6719
b) due to illness, invalids, death - 1492
c) arrested and convicted - 349

1936: 4918 ppl. or 3,9% of the total.
a) or drinking and moral decay - 1942
b) due to illness, invalids, death - 1937
c) arrested and convicted - 782

1937: 18658 ppl. or 13,6% of the total.
a) for politcal reason (excluded from the party, connection to enemies of the state) - 11104
b) arrested and convicted - 4474
c) for drinking and moral decay - 1139
d) due to illness, invalids, death -1941

1938: 16362 ppl. or 11,3% of the total.
a) political motives - 3580
b) foreign nationals, bourn aboad and connected with abroad - 4138
c) arrested - 5032
d) for drinking and moral decay - 2671
b) due to illness, invalids, death - 941

1939 until 25 Oct: 1691 ppl. or 1,6% of the total.
a) political motives - 277
b) arrested - 67
c) for drinking and moral decay - 197
b) due to illness, invalids - 725
c) death - 425

The total for the 6 years period - 56785 people.
Total for 1937 - 1938 : 35020 people. Of those arrested - 9506 (27,2% of dismissed)
…
…
…
The leader of the 6th unit
Colonel Shiryaev
20 October 1939

[/INDENT]

to be continued in a new post…