M-27 Tank: Should the US Have Replaced the M4 Sherman?

World War II American Military
#21

The Sherman tank was good enough to do the job, provided IF (like it’s most direct comparable German panzer -the Mark IV) it was continually upgraded. You bring up some good points, but I would argue here as elsewhere that the unreality of the “Tank Destroyer Doctrine” as laid out in FM18-5 (I think) was realized as early as during North Africa as TDs were only ever deployed as they were trained too in one instance as far as anyone knows, and with some mixed success. But according to Christopher Gabel who wrote a very specific work on the subject, even the tank destroyer crews realized that their stated role was a unworkable and even folly, and they were soon put to uses as indirect fire artillery, assault guns, and even as conventional battle tanks rather than as ‘hunters’ and ‘stalkers.’

There was in fact a sometime rancorous debate between the main proponent of the TD Doctrine, Army Ground Forces Command and the Ordinance Department, which favored newer tanks matching the Panthers and Tigers. One thing that Gabel plainly states though that cannot be refuted was that the numbers of tank destroyer units were marginalized and fewer and fewer of them were being sought to fill allocations by actual combat commanders that realized it simply wasn’t working and was based on a flawed theoretical premise and not real world experience. This was especially true as the TDs doctrine was articulated in post-Battle of France panic that set into the unprepared US forces and was essentially a defensive concept that was wholly inappropriate to the coming offensives the US would undertake that perhaps they could not have foreseen at that point. I would argue that it isn’t “hindsight,” but non-sight by certain generals in the USAGFC that was responsible for what was a minor debacle and key blunder…

You can see a copy of Gabel’s paper/book here:

http://books.google.com/books?id=IA1ljqnb7IwC&dq=tank+destroyer+doctrine&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=PgYF0Ncp-e&sig=Jwe03N18p2-s8cdCYBl6zm1gbK8&hl=en&ei=rRS4Sej8NpbGM8-kmdcK&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result

You can also download it as a PDF file from the link in this thread: http://ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=120143&postcount=53

#22

Nice link Nick. As far as the flawed doctrine of using tank destroyers you have a good point but I stop short of placing all the blame on the generals with the information they had at the time. The only real test of their doctrine they had prior to Normandy was the fighting in North Africa since Sicily and Italy were mountainous areas that didn’t favor tank warfare and in the limited time U.S. forces were engaged it would have been hard to justify (per the views at the time) throwing out a doctrine. Compound that with the fact that in North Africa the only tanks that the Sherman faced that were even on par in firepower and armor were the few up gunned Panzer IV and very limited numbers of Tigers and I have trouble faulting them completely. Now perhaps if the high command hadn’t got complacent after North Africa or if the Soviets had acted like the Allies they were supposed to be in sharing information about tanks like the Panther the general staff would have been more at fault. Also it was June of 1944 before the general staff even realized they had been outclassed by the Germans in tanks and in a one year period the U.S. along with the British had essentially caught back up with the Germans in tank development and was already reversing their doctrines.

The U.S. army probably noted also that the Germans were still using tank destroyers themselves so this was a vote of confidence for the use of tank destroyers. The Germans just benefited in having advanced tanks in late 1944 and early 1945 to fill the void that American Forces still had.

#23

My 2 cents:

US Army did have the T-34-like tanks almost from day one: the M4 Sherman. The 75mm armed variant was as good as T-34-76, while 3in armed one could pierce as much steel as the T-34-85 could.

What US Army needed was a heavy tank to fill any gaps that could open; something like KV-85. A tank with tick armor, even with 3in until the 90mm becomes available.

#24

It should be noted that the Allies captured Tiger tanks as early a mid-1943 in North Africa and some Panthers were also encountered. And in my opinion, the upgunned Mark IV was panzer, and reason, enough to begin to upgrade the Sherman.

The truth is that even with relatively few modifications, some of the tank destroyers would have made fine tanks. The M-36 Jackson/Slugger was essentially a defacto tank…

#25

Perhaps the reason for sticking with the Sherman was simply because the Sherman perfectly fit the role of what a tank was supposed to do by the U.S. doctrine of the time. The new tank would have better filled the grey area between a tanks job of infantry support and a tank destroyers role of engaging enemy tanks. With the benefit of hindsight we can clearly see that a tank to fill the role between the Sherman and the tank destroyers was exactly what the U.S. needed but that would have also required a complete overhaul of training doctrine for armored warfare. Perhaps the high command didn’t want to go through all that in the middle of a war that they were already winning. It is tragic for many brave tank crews but throughout history high commands have usually been very reserved about changing doctrine, especially when the current doctrine is succeeding.

That is probably correct. I saw it coined something like this in a book: The US decided early in WWII, that they would win or loose that war with the Sherman.
The non-replacement of the Sherman was partly a result of the flawed tank-hunter doctrine, partly pre-occupation with mass-production. In my opinion, the US should have put the T27 in production, but in a climate where even the fitting of the 76mm gun to the Sherman was opposed, it probably didn´t have a chance. I´ve always thought the unneccesary lateness in fitting the 76mm to the Sherman as something close to criminal ineptitude among decisionmakers. Superior weapons after a few months production line disruption due to relatively minor modifications would have done the US better in case of the T27 and the P-38K. All those variations to the Sherman theme, and yet it had to retain it´s high ugly profile…

#26

Well remember the only reason that mounting the 76mm gun in the Sherman was opposed was because of the tank destroyer doctrine. The medium velocity 75mm gun was much better at firing HE rounds that were better for infantry support while the high(er?) velocity 76mm gun was better for penetrating armor. To mount the 76mm gun in the Sherman was in a small way admitting that the tank destroyer doctrine wasn’t effective on the battlefield since the only reason it was fitted was to improve the Sherman’s anti tank capabilities and actually decreased their effectiveness in infantry support.

#27

Replacing the Sherman no, but probably it could complement it in relationship 3 Sherman with one M-27. Replacing it completely would cause a lag in production with a downfall of available tanks in the front.

#28

The change over of production would have been almost seamless and a non-issue, since they US Army had more tanks than they had shipping for anyways. In any case, there always would have been Shermans (or M-27s) that mounted the M-3 75mm short gun for infantry support while a 76mm armed tank would have gradually phased out the “tank destroyers” which were only effective in defense. Their shining moment was perhaps during the Battle of the Bulge, where an M-10 Wolverine made several critical hits with tungsten rounds on two Panthers, knocking out both and halting the German onslaught into Bastogne bluffing the Germans into believing the defenses were stronger than they were until the US units of the 101st and stragglers were organized into a cohesive, mobile defense…

#29

Make note gentlemen that when trying to apropriate new machines into the military there is a thing called the arms appropriation comitty, everything has to go through them too and with a strained economy, supply lines all over the world and inter Military relations these things get difficult, make note the 76mm high velocity cannon started its life as an anti aircaft gun belonging to the navy if I rember correctly.

Also during the war when my Gramps unit (H co 2ndbat BRO)was supported by TD’s the platoons consited of 4 to 5 shermans and one 76mm TD, untill the bulge few if any 90mm TDs were available to front line units like the 634th. Not to mention the 76mm Shermans.

After WW II TD doctorine was completely abandoned, as the Slugger became a TANK not a TD as the classification of TD was an open turret and a Tank a Closed turret.
Patton was also very against changing the doctorine as he stated if we change it then they are Tanks and not Tank Destroyers, and thats what happend in the end.

Also most TD units were equipped with Half Track mounted cannons or the 37mm AT gun and 57mm at gun untill the complete change in TO&E for Normandy.

#30

I guess I’ll get flamed for this but IMO the M4/75 is a better tank than the T34/76. I think the T34 is held is such high regard today because it came as such a shock to the Germans and scared the hell out of them. However it had some serious problems and if the Germans had not invaded the Russians had planed to stop production and introduce the T43. The T34/76 had a two man turret this meant that the commander was usually the gunner, the lack of skilled crew meaning that a less experienced crew man had to serve as the loader. It also suffered from very poor visibility when buttoned up, there are accounts of T34’s driving right past German tanks because they could not see them. When the T34/85 was introduced they finally got a 3 man turret. In addition the T34 had the drivers hatch in the glacis plate and this proved to be a weak spot that was never fixed. While the early M4’s had a problem with the cupola’s over the driver and assistant driver’s heads it was quickly fixed. The T34 also suffered from a weak transmission, especially in early models though this improved as the war progressed. Both tanks had comparable armor over the front arc and similar guns. The lower height off the T34 was some what of an advantage but did mean that it was tacticly limited due to lack of gun depression. Both the T34 and M4 suffered from burning ammunition due to exposed ammo stowage in the sponsons and it was a bit worse for the M4 since it carried more ammunition.
The problem with the M4 was a failure to upgrade the armament, the hull could accept a 90mm gun as proven by the M36B1 but Army tactics prevented this. By time the error was realized in Normandy and reinforced during the Battle of the Bulge it was easier to introduce an improved tank, the M26.
Just a thought, I don’t think Patton would have been able to make the sweeping advances he did it he had the German Panther, it just broke down too much. The M4 was dependable , easy to repair, and easy to operate.
The usual American response to a concentration of German armor was several batteries of heavy artillery and fighter bombers.

#31

It’s my understanding Patton was given the option of producting Shermans or Pershing. He told the production board he wanted Shermans so he would have enough tanks.

Same old quantity .vs. quality arugment. He felt the Sherman was good enough as long as we had enough of them (which we did.)

Deaf

#32

Patton didn’t have such command authority as too deciding which tank to produce. He certainly had input and probably favored the Sherman. But it was the Ground Forces Command that hindered the Ordnance Dept’s development of better and heavy tanks in favor of the ever more discredited Tank Destroyer doctrine. His name escapes, but the commanding general of USAGFC, who later was killed in combat, had far greater leverage than Patton over what got built and what remained a testbed mule, and continued to favor the TD doctrine long after US field commanders had begun requesting less and less TD units…

Christopher R. Gabel wrote an excellent paper (The Leavenworth Papers) on tank destroyers (download “No. 12” if interested) and their US doctrine…

#33

This story probablly originated in a January confrence of armored unit leaders in in the UK. A variety of subjects were discussed, including recomendations for changes in tank design and armament.

Gen Leslie McNair was commander of Army Ground Forces from its inception to the late spring of 1944. He was holding a job with SHAEF when killed by a stray USAAF bomb at the start of Operation Cobra in late July. In his defense McNair was not a dolt or buercratic moron. He did a credible job at completing the mobilization and equipping the US Army Ground Forces in 1942 - 43. But it is inevitable mistakes would be made and the critics snipe.

I’ve frequently seen copies of this in the used book stores. Its cheap and worth diverting a bit of lunch money for.

Zalogas book on the M26 is also recomended. A good outline of the history of the T20 series & the M26.

The rare & expensive holy grail of M26 books would be Hunnicutt. His thick volume is a’ MUST BUY’ if you find a copy at a yard sale table.

#34

Amazon lists 5 copies of hunnicutt’s book from $100.- to $190.- (US) should someone wish to acquire a copy.

#35

His media power probably helped: congressmen couldn’t brush aside his thoughts without angering their constituents, and congressmen dictate the Army’s budget…

#36

I got Hunnicutt’s book for quite a bit less on Ebay…

#37

Who knows? Patton did hold up the issuing of the 76mm toting M-4A3E8s until it was blindingly obvious that U.S. tankers needed something more than a “medium velocity” gun.

Interestingly the U.S. Army also started equipping some Shermans with the British “Firefly” 17 pounder gun. But a few hundred conversions were made when it was stopped in favor of the Pershing…

#38

The Firefly should have been THE Sherman to begin with! Yea I know arming an American tank with a British gun would have sent Patton into a tizzy, but still it really was the best solution. The 17 pounder was a proven gun and a real good solution.

Deaf

#39

How reliable was the 17-pounder’s anti-personnel round?

#40

Unfortunately, what Patton thought about it or otherwise is pretty much irrelevant. UK production was essentially maxed-out during WW2, and worse still was a very poor fit to US mass-production methods*. To get an understanding of this, read up on the implementation of Merlin engine production at Packard. It took just under a year to get the first prototype engine running in the US, and although I can’t find a date for when mass production started I’d be amazed if the engine was available in significant numbers for at least another 6 months. Follow this argument through to tank guns (a slightly less complex device, but one which requires a specialist industrial base to make the barrels), and you’re looking at being forced to make the decision about what tank gun to use before D-Day if you’re going to use the Firefly before the end of the war, or even by the end of 1942 (at which point no US tank units had any significant experience) to have it available for D-Day. Not going to happen.

  • US mass production methods relied on relatively low-skilled people repeating a very small part of a process, with the process being defined by very highly skilled manufacturing engineers and with extensive use of Statistical Process Control (abandoned by the US and taken up by the Japanese after the war - resulting in the Japanese economic miracle. For further reading start with William Edwards Deming). The UK approach was a much more craftsman-led, with it not being uncommon to find say an engine using Metric, Imperial and Whitworth fastenings, and even on occasion selective assembly to get something to fit. Converting something from one production method to another requires a complete redesign, not merely building a production line.