M-27 Tank: Should the US Have Replaced the M4 Sherman?

World War II American Military
#41

I can’t find my source, and maybe I’ve got it wrong in my ancient brain, but I seem to recall that McNair was partly responsible for his own death when he supported a bombing approach wanted by the army against that proposed by the air force.

My recollection is that McNair went forward to observe the bombing and was duly killed by a bomb which fell back into the US lines in accordance with the army bombing approach imposed on the air force and exactly as the air force had warned would happen.

I think my source for this might come from The War Between the Generals by David Irving, before he became less reliable on the Holocaust denial stuff, but I don’t have a copy now.

#42

I’ll comment on the gun stuff later, after the U.S.A. vs. Canada Olympic hockey game…

As far as Gen. McNair, he may have been capable in some organizational sense. But Gable describes McNair, and a cohort at the Army Tank Destroyer school, as “an island of faith surrounded by a sea of doubt” regarding their dogmatic interpretation of, and adherence too, the Tank Destroyer doctrine. Field commanders were questioning its wisdom even early on in North Africa as being wasteful and unrealistic–as the Ordinance Dept. was coming out with innovative tank designs that rivaled anything coming out of Germany or Tankograd…

#43

Mcnair had no command authority on tis issue. His official job at that point was commander of the First US Army Group (FUSAG), which existed only as a deception operations directed at German intelligence agencies. He had been recently transfered from the US and command of Army Ground Forces there to Europe. It was Eisenhowers habit to keep a number of supernumaries around in case he had to fire a General or two and the FUSAG job was somewhere to park McNair till a real job opened up.

What McNair did call wrong was ignoring Ike’s directive that senior generals not unecessarily expose themselves. He was not suposed to be that close to the combat zone. McNair had ignored this warning in January 1943 and been wounded in Tunisia. Ike sent his bandaged ass back to the US posthaste & Marshall let it ride thinking McNair had learned his lesson.

A brigadier General Varnum had ignored this directive in 1943 & was shot down over Germany. Unfortunatly Varnum had inside knowledge of the ULTRA system and the penetration of the German Enigma encryption system. Fortunatly the German never suspected Varnum and did not interrogate him on that subject.

Bradley & Dolittle were the principle players on the questions of heavy bombers making tactical airstrikes in Normandy.

#44

It went far beyond TD doctrine, or the US Armys use of early 20th Century industrial management theory. Perhaps the most important failure was one of intelligence analysis. Very few senior commanders, including Patton, had any idea how many heavy tanks, Panthers and Tigers, the Germans had sent to France before 6th June. Nor were they up to speed on the effectiveness of the many other German AT weapons. In Tunisia and Italy the Germans had never possesed more than 20 operating Tigers on any day and the average was far lower. Because the US Army test showed too many problems with the use of heavy tanks, and the Germans had used so few in 1943 it was thought they would not be significant in 1944 either.

Note that in this assumption the US tank leaders were partially correct. From June 6th through 30 July less than a dozen Tiger tanks wandered into the US sector of Normandy. If I recall correctly only one German armored division in the US sector had any Panther tanks. It was not until the middle of August that the US 1st and 3rd Armies begain fighting significant numbers of Tigers and Panthers. The severe losses of US Army Sherman tanks in Normandy were for many other reasons than the inferiority of the M4 Sherman to the Mk VI Tiger or the MkV Panther. Overall perhaps 30% of the US tanks knocked out in the Normandy fight were hit by German tanks. The majority were nailed by AT guns, assuallt guns, infantry AT weapons like the Panzerfaust, artillery, or mines.

#45

Dear Nick!

Do you have any evidence? Pls,. send me a quote!
i have just sources (incl. Zaloga books) stating NO any 17prd-gun in US service.

Other hand: tell the truth guys, the REALLY succesfull post-war US tanks had no US guns (british L7 and german 120mm SB)

#46

That would be correct. Indeed NO 17-Pdr’s entered U.S. service. The few hundred conversions were made, but never left Britain–at least in American service IIRC…

Here’s the quote you so desperately need:

Additionally, interest in mounting the British 17 pounder in U.S. Shermans flared anew. In February 1945, the U.S. Army began sending 75 mm M4s to England for conversion to the 17 pounder gun. Approximately 100 tanks were completed by the beginning of May. By then, the end of the war in Europe was clearly in sight, and the U.S. Army decided that the logistics of adding a new ammunition caliber to the supply train was not warranted. None of the converted 17-pounder M4s were deployed by the U.S., and it is unclear what happened to most of them, although some were given to the British as part of Lend-Lease.[27]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_Sherman#Gun_development

I think I first read this in the book about the Pershing I acquired off Ebay…

Other hand: tell the truth guys, the REALLY succesfull post-war US tanks had no US guns (british L7 and german 120mm SB)

So? What’s your point?

The British L7 105mm gun was excellent in it’s day, and a U.S. source modification was made increasing its effectiveness and prolonging its life on the M-60A3. And the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore was actually a sort of a joint, German-led, project IIRC…

#47

There were a lot of quantum leaps in technology during World War II and the peripheral years prior to and after, perhaps more than during any war in the 20th century. We saw it in aircraft, small arms, electronic warfare, production capabilities, etc. My consensus is that if a proposed change interfered with the steady rate of production, delivery and training, then it was shelved or put on the back burner, but not abandoned altogether. It would have been great if the M26 Pershing tank could have been the MBT of U.S. and perhaps British forces. Perhaps if the U.S. entry into World War II had been a couple of years later or if the Germans had held off on starting the war for a few years, there would have been more Pershings and less Shermans, Grants, and General Lees. Look at the sudden obsolescence of the U.S. submarine force which had to be brought up to post-war standards with streamlined hulls and superstructures, improved steering and diving capabilities, snorkels and other “add-ons” until the first generation nuclear submarines came on line. Look too at the sudden transition from un-supercharged piston aircraft engines and aircraft with silk covered control surfaces to flush riveted all aluminum frames, pressurized cabins and jet engines. That quantum leap in aviation took place in the span of about five years, yet when C-54 and B-29 production commenced, B-17, B-24 and C-47 production continued as a matter of necessity. When World War II ended, almost all of America’s air power was suddenly obsolete and so was everything else. The temporary relief from war gave the major powers a little time to cull their huge and obsolete arsenals and modernize their production capabilities. Going back to the issue of tanks, it is unlikely that the U.S. will ever again be caught flat footed with an inferior tank. The ongoing priority since the end of World War II has been to maintain tank design superiority over all potential enemies.

#48

A lot of people debate wether or not the m27 should have replaced the m4 as it was originally intended to do, but the ease of build of the m4 couldn’t be met by the m27 and it would have been impossible to change a mbt in the middle of war. Thats why they ended up fighting along side each other. They were both replaced after the war by the heavier m26 Pershing.

#49

Thank you azza. I corrected my statement in identifying the Pershing tank as the M27 to the M26. I think that the problems faced in production between two entirely different designs was the reason for continuing M4 production, with extensive modifications in the form of the M4A3, M4A4 and M4E8, and a gradual introduction of the later tanks.

#50

A lot of good tankers died due the faults of the Sherman. When the Germans found out that we were rehabilitating battle damaged shermans in mass they made sure that the next ones that they knocked out were burned to destroy the armour plating or should I say the heat treating of the hull which made it useless to rebuild. From what I understand, It was Patton’s call on the armour that he wanted and he chose the M-4 over the Pershing even though the Pershing was starting to enter the logistic pipeline before June 6, 1944.

#51

Good Tankers have died in every model of tank ever put into the field, its the risk everyone assumes when they swear the Soldiers Oath. As to General Patton, as influential as he may have been, he did not have the brass to control the decision of which vehicles would be issued beyond organizing operations for his own units. Its not just a question of what,and how much is in the pipeline, there is also the matter of training men to fight these machines, and utilize their strengths properly.A tank is nothing without a trained and competent crew to operate it.This takes time, and maybe it was time that could not be spared. These are just my thoughts on the subject.

#52

How did the Germans do that?

Specific rounds for those tanks?

How did the Germans identify those tanks in the field?

#53

Recovery and repair of vehicles & equipment damaged in battle was a common practice for all sides of a conflict, even before WW II. As far as I have discovered, there was no particular heat treating provided to Sherman armor, it being described as homogeneous. As for fires, it was difficult to keep the M-4 from burning after a hit, so it wouldnt take any real sort of effort to set one blazing. Even with the advent of wet storage for main gun ammo, there was always the gasoline problem to consider.The decision of salvage or scrap was more likely one of repair turn around time, those tanks with more severe damage plundered for spares used to refit vehicles with less damage. With the degree of replacement availability the M-4 had, it may not have been time/ cost effective to refit badly damaged tanks The M-4 was able to deal with Panzers I through III fairly easily, and early IV were manageable, It wasnt until the V&VI showed that things got out of hand. The truth is that the M-26’s larger, higher velocity gun was its principle asset for dealing with Panthers and Tigers, its armor(also homogeneous) while better than the M-4, was not all that could be hoped for.

#54

This tactic was hardly exclusive to the Germans nor the Sherman. I’m rereading tracts of An Army at Dawn, and it was very typical early on for sapper teams to take the field in the early morning after the battle and blast apart the wounded hulls of enemy tanks. Specifically, the British did this to good effect in Tunisia in a follow-up battle after Kasserine where a major Afrika Korp offensive was blunted and Rommel ended up losing many of his remaining tanks for no gain…

From what I understand, It was Patton’s call on the armour that he wanted and he chose the M-4 over the Pershing even though the Pershing was starting to enter the logistic pipeline before June 6, 1944.

That’s a myth. Gen. Patton had little actual say and was in no position to order what tanks the U.S. should develop and deploy. It was far more the fault of Army Ground Forces Command(er) Gen. Lesley McNair --who piously held the faith in the failed Tank Destroyer Doctrine and who attempted to frustrate not only the deployment of the Pershing, but upgrades of the Sherman into a AFV with sufficient antitank capability so as to prevent its crews from “tank hunting” or “stalking”…