I have to disagree with that, Nick. One of the major problems with the Eighth Army at the time when Monty took over was one of morale. The soldiers had lost faith in their commanders. Their ‘winning’ general (Richard O’Connor) having been captured, and they had adopted a ‘loosing’ mentality (sweeping generalisation).
One of the complaints of the front line officers of the trenches of WW1 was that the staff were too far back and out of touch with the conditions of their forces. Auchinleck (The Auk) was very aware of this and, when he took command of the Eight Army, he insisted his staff sleep on the ground the same as the forward troops had to do. This is all very well in a junior officer, sharing the hardships of his troops, but an Army commander should be working to improve the lot of his troops, not sharing it. Monty recognised this immediately and addressed the problem. Another factor which limited the success of the Eighth Army, was the interference of Churchill. This was something which Monty would not tolerate, refusing to go on the offensive until his troops were trained and ready.
Naturally, winning generals, like winning politicians, have a number of qualities which make them both good generals and good leaders, charisma not being the least. Some may envy this charisma, while others recognise its value and exploit it.
There is a clip on one of the D-Day ‘docus’ frequently aired on the History Channel etc. where a British veteran relates to Monty’s speach before they go. Something in the vein of “… and good hunting in the fields of France!” to which the teller says “What a load of codswallop”. This may be so, but it was the same codswallop which inspired the Army in North Africa especially as he began to improve their training and conditions, and allow them R&R in Cairo. And, no doubt, he inspired a lot of the junior leaders on D-Day, if not the troops. But for the most part, the troops did like Monty, particularly after the success of El Alamein (as did the British public for decades later, which would not have been the case after the troops had returned home if he had been so disliked). Where the troops at EL Alamein lacked the tactical experience, particularly among the armoured units, they made up for it with fighting spirit (e.g. Kidney Ridge), it didn’t come from nowhere, and it too can be listed as a decisive factor.
Speaking of ‘Others’
One of the winning factors for both Richard O’Connor at Bedda Fomm and the Auk at the First battle of EL Alamein, was their staff planner, Brigadier (acting Major General) Eric ‘Chink’ Dorman Smith. It was said of him that he would draw up ten plans for every operation, three of which were workable and one of which was a winner. If one reads a little in-depth on both the above mentioned operations, the strategy and tactics employed (the command, control, communcations and coordination of forces) and the success of his partnership with the Auk at El Alamein, and the way in which they absolutely trounced the Afrika Korp offensive, then, one can be left in no doubt that he is one of the unsung heroes of the Western Desert Campaign - a very clever chap indeed.
