Ummm… is this the same guy we’re talking about here? About the only time he attempted something on a major scale that wasn’t a set piece and involved manouver (Arnhem) it was a bloody shambles.
Nope, he genuinely believed that he was a strategic genius, the only decent general in the war and the US should cede supreme command to him. “On another planet” would be a better description.
Not quite true. In the attack on the Mareth Line, when Monty’s frontal attacks had been held he sent part of his army on a wide flanking maneuver which took the German’s by surprise (they had used up all their mobile reserves holding the frontal attacks) , and caused them abandon the strong defensive position.
Difficult to maneuvre an army between the confines of the Med coast and the northern boundary of the Quatara Depression. Having said that, he did switch his axis of attack from the north to the south.
Just as difficult to maneuvre his army up the Italian peninsula, particularly with its steep mountainous spine.
I suppose that I’m the product of a generation that saw Monty as a hero. Yes, he courted the limelight, but the country needed an Icon.
Up until El Alamein, the Nazi forces had seemed unbeatable. Of course, there were minor victories by commandos and the like. And there was the victory in the skies over britiain, but that hadn’t initially stopped the bombing.
MonTgomery delivered a victory over german land forces and, in doing so, he defeated a man who was considered to be their best general (if not most the famous, who led a force of great repute), where all others had failed. So, I would say that regardless of what is said of Monty through the benefits of hindsight, he delivered - cometh the hour, cometh the man!
Military history, like so much else, is prey to the dictates of fashion. There was a time when El Alamein and the desert war loomed large in British historiography. After all, it had all the classic ingredients of a good story.
In the person of Montgomery, we had a charismatic British commander, matched by Rommel, one of the most striking German generals. The theatre of war was both harsh and romantic, the classic tactician’s paradise and quartermaster’s nightmare. A British rifleman told a chum that it was:
‘A different kind of war. There were no civvies mixed up in it. It was clean. When we took prisoners we treated them fine and they treated us fine. We had a go at them, and they had a go at us. Then one of us f***ed off.’
The late Ronald Lewin, both a veteran of the campaign and a distinguished military historian, acknowledged his own compassion when Axis forces eventually surrendered in North Africa in May 1943, for ‘…this had been a good enemy.’ And, of course, there was a famous victory: El Alamein, which encouraged Winston Churchill to declare that we had neither a victory before it nor a defeat after it.
Little-known about Montgomery, is that he was closer to the front line than any of his contemporaries in the US Army Groups. 21AG HQ didn’t wait for a convenient chateau in which to set up shop - Monty himself lived in a caravan towed behind a gun-tractor. He was also a genius at picking the right men for his staff: if people showed ability, he’d back them to the hilt. OTOH, the worst criticism he could direct at an officer was one word: “Useless!” With that adjective ringing in his ears, the unfortunate officer would be reassigned within hours. Monty kept in touch with operational units through a network of hand-picked, highly-motivated young liaison officers. These young dashers would tour the divisions and sub-units, and report back to Monty’s HQ at the end of the day. This meant that subordinate commanders couldn’t put their own spin on any bad news - Monty’s trusted messengers brought back the unvarnished truth. All of these features of Monty’s style of management, far more than any brilliance as a tactician or strategist, were what made Montgomery a success. Also contrary to popular belief, there were American commanders he admired. One such was Lt Gen Lawton (Lightning Joe) Collins; Generals Courtney Hodges & Bill Simpson were two more. All three served under him when he asked Eisenhower to transfer their cut-off US 1st and 9th Armies to his command during the Battle of the Bulge. All three returned to Bradley’s US 12AG with some reluctance, having developed a deep respect for the way Monty ran his outfit, and the way he’d treated them. He never earned any kudos as a diplomat - but his soldiers knew that he valued them; they were made to feel part of an elite, and they fought accordingly. And that’s what it’s all about, isn’t it? As long as the troops will fight for you, you’ll win battles.
Cheers,
Cliff
Why do you feel this is little known, Cliff?
What I should have said was, “little-noticed, or at least not often discussed”. Everyone seems to want to compare Monty with Patton (who Montgomery dismissed as “a good Corps commander” - ouch!) or Bradley, who Montgomery at least respected as a good Army commander (not Army Group - Army. Ouch! again). If you study the tasks these men were given, you then realise that Eisenhower knew the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinate commanders, and employed them accordingly. As I pointed out, Monty’s main focus was looking after his troops and getting the best possible performance from them - not throwing them at the enemy without thought or planning, as Patton did in the Ardennes.
Cheers,
Cliff
And as had other British commanders in N.A. before Monty arrived (e.g. ‘Strafer’ Gott).
It was only towards the later years of the war, with the invasion of the European mainland, that the Allied Armies began to become more effective in armoured warfare. In 1942 and 1943 , the Allies consistently lost armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions.
Monty had no choice but to conserve his troops, but he could be ruthless with them when necessary, sacrificing numbers of tank units in frontal attacks, as he did at times at El Alamein, as they hadn’t the tactical skills to deal with the A.K.
Im sorry but crazy ppl like Patton and Monty are the perfect ppl you need in a war. This is all true before 195?. They are commanders of the old style IMO. They both were brilliant in how they conducted themselves. (Yes im even talking about Patton) They both did our countries a service by winning the war.
OK. Honestly … They both should have been dismissed by todays standards. Both of them lost alot of men on the grounds of arrogance.
Some ppl just become alive in a crisis and these are both typical examples.
If we are going to argue Patton v. Montgomery the we should do it in another thread.
I would point out that … yes it is surprising that Eisenhower became the supreme allied commander… not an easy job. ( I would not want it)
Lets try to keep this one on Monty for this thread.
Well, let’s be fair then. How much “planning” did Monty engage in when he essentially by-passed German positions in the Scheldt Estuary thus denying Antwerp to the Allies and possibly prolonging the War?
While Patton could be a sanctimonious prick, and Bradley was relatively unassuming general easily tagged as a “good corp commander,” Monty was notorious unpopular with his contemporaries, and not just the American ones (Eisenhower’s second, RAF Air Marshall Tedder wanted him fired for his performance in the early stages of the Normandy campaign). With the folly of Market Garden which left Britain’s finest trapped behind German lines, and the fact that Monty couldn’t have gotten out of the Italian campaign fast enough (a brutal, war of attrition where Monty was in his element) leaves some skepticism over his arrogant dismissal of his contemporaries…
BTW, I do not hate Monty, and I think overall he was a very good general. But he was no one to run around making critical statements about his contemporaries…
I mean, I sort of dislike Patton’s cult of personality, but for a “Good Army Commander,” Patton reached his objectives on Sicily far faster than Monty did…
He didn’t by-pass them. The German positions were on the northern side of the Scheldt Estuary, Antwerp was on the south side. Montys forces advanced on Antwerp from the south west.
Well, he failed to pay proper attention to Antwerp and clear and secure a vital port, and it is recognized as one of the larger Allied blunders of WWII…
No general is perfect, and there were many blunders committed by even the best in WWII…
I’m just saying that Monty seemed to have a bit of a big mouth and an overweening tendency to be hypercritical of others, but he conveniently ignored or minimized his own failings in his memoirs…
http://www.ww2f.com/information-requests/14883-scheldt-estuary-15th-army.html
Why not… everybody else did.
At least Monty never said anything uncomplimentary about the ordinary G.I. unlike Alexander, who everybody seem to think was a gentleman
Touché 
At least Monty never said anything uncomplimentary about the ordinary G.I. unlike Alexander, who everybody seem to think was a gentleman
Of course not, Monty loved everyone under his commands. In fact, I’d wager he simply couldn’t have had enough GIs in his command. 
And from what I’ve read about Alexander, he was considered to be somewhat of a dolt by those around him…He looked the part, but I think Atkin’s wrote that many felt him too dull and that he was too enabling of Monty and Clark…
Isn’t that true of most highly successful, or just highly ambitious and unsuccessful, people?
At Monty’s level, they need enormous self-belief to do what they have to do.
That self-belief, which often verges on or crosses into self-righteousness, conceit, and contempt for their critics no matter how justifiable the criticisms may be, doesn’t stop just because events turned out differently to the way the great man intended.
Objective insight doesn’t go with unshakeable self-belief.
Like modern captains of commerce and industry, their successes are due entirely to their own magnificent qualities while their failures are due to incompetence and conspiracies by others and to various other circumstances beyond their control.
Well - that just about puts the cap on the whole topic, wouldn’t you say? I can’t disagree with a single thing you’ve said there. Didn’t he once make a bet with Eisenhower that, if he reached a certain objective in a certain time, Ike had to give him a B-17 (or was it a B-24 - cant remember) for his personal use? Ike laughed it off as a joke, but Monty insisted on claiming his bomber. I don’t think that little escapade improved his image in American eyes.
Cheers,
Cliff
No, I wouldn’t! RS is merely reflecting upon his own self-image and has lost focus on Monty. This comes to most when they achieve a certain age. :lol:
re:Eisenhower, Patton, Rommel, Guderian, McArthur, Zhukov, Nimitz, Donitz, etc.;
What a strange list.
Eisenhower had the singular distinction, in matters of high command, of never having operational command of a battle and never setting foot on a battlefield, so no-one will ever know if he made a good, bad or indifferent commander.
Patton was never more than a flamboyant cavalry commander. He was good at galloping across open spaces with little opposition but when he came up against stubborn opposition, he came to a halt, as in the Lorraine campaign. Without good armies on his flanks he would have been creamed.
The Germans always put their best men against the Brit and Commonwealth troops. Six Panzer divisions opposed the Brits and Canadians around Caen whilst there were just two remnants (Panzer Lehr was reduced to one tenth of its original complement), facing the Americans at the time of the breakout. None opposed Patton in Brittany and none on the way to the German border. A Panzer Division consisted of 22000 first rate troops, tanks, artillery and motorized supplies. The ‘Statics’ that the Americans took on consisted of 8000 second rate troops per division (often non-German) with few tanks and horse-drawn equipment. Even then, they were held up round St.Lo.
The British and Canadians had to contend with Panzers, river and estuary crossings and heavily fortified ports.
Of course you can’t compare naval commanders to field commanders.
He had operational command during the Battle of the Bulge for a time, and was key in strategic decisions and planning. There were a lot of Allied generals who had had experience in operational commands that never could have performed Ike’s role…
Patton was never more than a flamboyant cavalry commander. He was good at galloping across open spaces with little opposition but when he came up against stubborn opposition, he came to a halt, as in the Lorraine campaign. Without good armies on his flanks he would have been creamed.
A rather silly and vast oversimplification. Patton’s actions during Cobra precipitated a complete collapse of the Heer in France. While there was much hope that the Allies could storm into the Saar Industrial region, the Americans found it as the French did before, essentially a large bowl filled with natural obstacles and easily defended. The reason why there were few German troops there was because they HAD been largely annihilated during the slaughter of the Falaise pocket…
Also, the Eighth Army was running out of fuel and burning almost as much of it in trucks used to supply as it was at the front. So, large scale attack was impossible with the supplies being split between Patton and Monty, and the main objective was the Ruhr area anyways. The Saar was an after thought and was more Eisenhower’s idea to pursue a retreating army to destroy as much as the German capacity as possible. A total invasion of Germany through the Saar was only a faint hope…
The Allies simply didn’t have the logistical base (since they yet didn’t have a port) to sustain such a long supply line…
The Germans always put their best men against the Brit and Commonwealth troops. Six Panzer divisions opposed the Brits and Canadians around Caen whilst there were just two remnants (Panzer Lehr was reduced to one tenth of its original complement), facing the Americans at the time of the breakout.
Yes of course, they put the Aryan supermen against the British only…
Actually, the Germans had deployed their panzers there because of the Palais de Calais feint. And there were few panzers inside Caen itself…
None opposed Patton in Brittany and none on the way to the German border. A Panzer Division consisted of 22000 first rate troops, tanks, artillery and motorized supplies. The ‘Statics’ that the Americans took on consisted of 8000 second rate troops per division (often non-German) with few tanks and horse-drawn equipment. Even then, they were held up round St.Lo.
The British and Canadians had to contend with Panzers, river and estuary crossings and heavily fortified ports.
Of course you can’t compare naval commanders to field commanders.
Um, the Americans (along with the Canadians) had largely destroyed the panzers they faced and reduced the German Army. And there were in fact retreating German troops, and the Siegfried line was in fact defended…
The Allies simply couldn’t sustain such a drive when they were landing supplies on the beach…
You realise of course that the entire Allied battle plan for Overlord was for the British & Canadians to tie down as many German units as possible on the Allied left, allowing the US to break out on the right and encircle them. The number of German units facing the British/Canadians is not a reflection of tactical prowess but of the efforts put into making the Germans think this was the main axis of the Allied attack.