Or did he, as a loyal Japanese naval officer and strategist obliged to serve in a war he knew Japan would almost certainly lose once America marshalled its industrial and manpower might, do the best he could to deliver a crushing blow to his nation’s enemy at the outset?
From a naval viewpoint, what else could he have done in the first attack that would or could have crippled American naval power better than Pearl Harbor, and that was within the capacity of Japan?
Agreed.
But it’s an interesting path he took to 2/26 as he started out exercising his power with the Tanaka government some years earlier.
I’ve made a very modest study of this history and the best I can conclude is that there were elements in Japanese political and other institutions which operated in ways which are largely beyond the comprehension of Westerners because of the obscure intricacies of those Japanese institutions etc and Japanese society, plus the controls steadily imposed by the militarists (which is a convenient term here for all the fascist, ultra-nationalist, etc elements in Japan between the wars).
While it should be apparent that I’m no fan of the “Hirohito as a puppet of the militarists” view, it also needs to be recognised that the history of emperors in Japan was that they could be captives to various interests, either or both physically or in other ways.
Hirohito was potentially and rather slightly in the same position and by all accounts aware of it, but with the unusual benefit of the militarists boosting him as the soul of the nation and thereby making it virtually impossible for them to assassinate him as he later claimed was a risk if he disobeyed them.
Overall, after looking at his whole history, he comes across as a sneaky little bastard who was always willing to back a winner and to ditch him once he looked like a loser who could threaten the survival of Hirohito and or the imperial line. Which is pretty much the history of most hereditary rulers around the world.
Definitely, but understandably
I think MacArthur was an affront to justice and humanity in the way he ran the Occupation and the post-war trials of the Japanese.
I also think he gave the survival of the Emperor more importance than the little bastard, and the institution, deserved.
The big question for MacArthur etc at the end of the war was whether the Japanese would be governable if the Emperor was tried for war crimes.
Personally, I think they would have been.
The Japanese then were not a people to challenge authority. The Emperor had told them in his surrender broadcast, in his quaint way of avoiding admitting anything including defeat, that they were beaten. That meant they would co-operate with the Allies in the Occupation.
Or, and this is the question which is rarely deeply considered in the ‘What if’ discussions: What would have happened if the Allies had tried the Emperor for war crimes and hanged the little bastard like he deserved?
Well, for a start, the Japanese should (but not necessarily would) have seen a connection between the Emperor’s conduct and the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in his name and under his command. So maybe they would have some understanding of their guilt for such events.
In those circumstances would they have engaged in another of their brilliant if stunningly empty post-war moral and intellectual gymnastics by rendering the Emperor a victim of unjust victor’s justice, rather like they make Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims of an unjust victor (which victor didn’t start the war and which victor suffered an attack about as relatively devastating in 1941 as could be mounted in 1945 with a new weapon).
There are three premises in your argument that need to be examined;
!. Pearl Harbor “crippled” American naval power.
Yamamoto as a “strategist”.
Yamamoto as a “loyal” naval officer.
I would argue, and I think the correct answer is manifest, that the Pearl Harbor strike did not cripple American naval power in the Pacific. The most important naval losses at Pearl Harbor were the eight battleships berthed there. Of those eight ships, three were never repaired and the other five eventually were repaired and returned to service. Another twelve vessels were damaged or sunk, but none of these ships were all that important to the operations of the Pacific Fleet. The three Pacific Fleet carriers, which should have been the primary targets, were absent from the base.
In fact, none of the damaged and destroyed ships were, in the event of war with Japan, tasked with anything other than defending Pearl Harbor. Contrary to Yamamoto’s supposition, these eight old battleships weren’t going to try to intervene in Japan’s First Phase operations and wouldn’t have found themselves engaging the Japanese fleet off Sumatra or Java, even if they had remained operational. These battleships badly need refits and rebuilding to give them any chance of competing with the rebuilt capital ships of the IJN. Moreover, even if these battleships had been of the most modern types, there were not enough destroyers to screen both them and the US carriers, nor the required support and replenishment vessels to allow them to operate further west than about the region of Midway.
The ships of the Pacific Fleet with the greatest offensive potential, Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga (soon to be joined by the Yorktown and Hornet), were still operational, and utilizing almost all of the available screening destroyers and support ships. These carriers were, in effect, the total effective power of the Pacific Fleet and were untouched by Yamamoto’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
So at the expense of completely negating the only reasonably viable strategy available to Japan, and uniting the will and determination of an entire country behind an enemy war effort, what did Yamamoto accomplish? The destruction of three old battleships and the temporary removal of five more from the task of defending an advanced base, which the Japanese, in any case, had no chance of successfully destroying.
Let’s now examine Yamamoto as a “strategist”. We’ve already seen how he managed to destroy, on the first day of the war, the only potentially “winning” strategy Japan could pursue to obtain a successful end to the war, but what about his military strategy? There are only two major battles which can fairly be attributed to Yamamoto’s strategic “genius”; Pearl Harbor and Midway. Pearl Harbor, of course, was a brilliant tactical victory, but an abysmally stupid strategic mistake. In my opinion, the tactical aspects of Pearl Harbor must be credited to Yamamoto’s air staff which did the detail planning for Pearl Harbor, so even the tactical success cannot, in all fairness, be accorded to Yamamoto.
That leaves Midway. Midway was, of course, a huge tactical disaster for Japan. Strategically, it cost Japan the initiative in the Pacific. But it must be admitted that Japan was fatally over-extended and would have soon lost the strategic initiative, no matter what the outcome of Midway. However, from a strategic perspective, Midway makes absolutely no sense even if the operation had been successful. The island is too small to support much more than a local air defense, is too distant from Japan and too close to a major American base to be easily supplied, and could only be held if the IJN was willing to commit a major portion of it’s naval, air, and logistical resources to it’s defense. These arguments were made prior to Midway, by the Japanese Naval General Staff, but Yamamoto, arrogantly and foolishly, ignored them.
It could be argued that Yamamoto realized that Midway was not the prize, but only a kind of bait to lure the remnants of the US Pacific Fleet to it’s annihilation. But if that was the intent of the operation, it is only necessary to point out that Yamamoto deployed the major portion of the Japanese Navy, something like 164 combatant ships, and only managed to bring that concentrated fire power on a single major unit of the American Navy, and only managed to sink that ship through the fortuitous intervention of a single Japanese submarine.
I’m afraid any rational person, informed of Yamamoto’s record, would not be likely to conclude he was a competent strategist.
Finally, was Yamamoto a “loyal” naval officer? Well, I don’t think his superior, Nagano Osami, would give an unequivocal answer to that question. Yamamoto, at the beginning of the war, was Commander of the Combined Fleet which was more a concept than an actual fleet. The Combined Fleet encompassed the major combatant components of the Japanese Navy. These vessels may or may not have been under the direct command of Yamamoto depending on the circumstances and ongoing operations. The US counterpart of Yamamoto’s position would be Commander in Chief of the US Fleet or, Cominch in US Navy parlance. Admiral King held this post during WW II, but combined it with the position of Chief of Naval Operations. In the Japanese Navy, Commander, Combined Fleet, reported to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano, who was responsible for planning strategy and coordinating operations.
However, for the two most important, and strategically disastrous, battles in the early part of the war, Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto usurped Admiral Nagano’s authority by forcing his opinions and desires on the Naval General Staff. Moreover, these opinions were not shared by the Naval General Staff and Yamamoto only got his way by threatening to resign if the operations were not approved. The situation is analogous to Nimitz forcing his opinions on strategy on the JCS. That such a thing would be tolerated in the Japanese Navy cannot be explained by resort to western notions of organizational discipline and loyalty. But even in Japan, Yamamoto may have been termed patriotic, but certainly not “loyal”.
You ask, what else could Yamamoto have done to cripple American naval power? This question, of course, is misleading, because Yamamoto’s plan did not cripple American Naval power, and in fact, barely touched the effective naval power of the Pacific Fleet. But I will answer that what Yamamoto should have done was to follow orders like a loyal naval officer and carry out his assigned duties, leaving strategic planning to those duly authorized to develop war plans. If Pearl harbor had not been attacked, it would have had little effect on the Japanese First Phase operations, but would have avoided the outrage felt by the American public and government, and would have left alive the possibility, slight though it may have realistically been, of a negotiated peace.
I generally agree with your sentiments about Hirohito. I think the 2/26 incident demonstrates he was more or less secure from any directly coercive influence the militarists might have attempted to exercise. Certainly he does not seem to have been susceptible, barring the possibility of an irrational individual (always a possibility in interwar Japan), to any assassination threats from his political or military opponents.
However, it should be noted that Hirohito, as Crown Prince before his ascension to the throne, on 27 December, 1923, did have a pistol fired into his carriage en route to the Diet, by Namba Daisuke, a son of a Diet member and a Communist activist who was later executed for the act. Whether or not this was a serious assassination attempt is open to question.
As Herbert Bix hints several times in his book on Hirohito, it seems to me that the most serious threat to Hirohito’s life and continued political reign were his own brothers with whom he had a rather rocky relationship. I agree Hirohito came across as a sneaky little manipulative bastard. I also wonder about his relationship with MacArthur, specifically, who was using whom? But that’s one tangled puzzle that I doubt will ever be sorted out properly
Can’t really disagree with anything you write. I will only say that I think if justice had actually been done, and Hirohito had breathed his last at the end of a gallows rope that it would have been far more difficult for the Japanese to rationalize their behavior during the war.
As for being governable if Hirohito had been tried, I really believe the Japanese would have been; Akihito was what? Twelve or thirteen by that time, and one of Hirohito’s brothers would have been appointed as a regent until he became of age to ascend the throne. Frankly I think that would have better served at least MacArthur’s purposes, if not that of the Allies.
I wasn’t arguing that he crippled it, just that he tried to but at best only postponed the US response through the USN.
I confess to being confused by the endless versions of and amendments to ORANGE and RAINBOW, but my understanding is that the US Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii was tasked with considerably more than just defending Hawaii, as is outlined in RAINBOW FIVE (WPL-46) promulgated in May 1941:
CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREASection 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be
organized into task forces as follows:
a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET;
b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA
c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the
PACIFIC AREA:
a. TASK
SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY
DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE
DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH
RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;
b. TASK
PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND
MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN
TRUK;
c. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS
TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;
d. TASK
SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS
FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155 EAST;
[28]
e. TASK
DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY “D”;
f. TASK
DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY “F”;
g. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY
ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES,
AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V,
Section 1);
h. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA
AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING
LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS
IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
i. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;
j. TASK
ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO
TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;
k. TASK
ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL
ZONES.
[29]a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT in Chapter III,
Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U.
S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be
established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval
Operations, when so directed by that officer.c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT and
the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in
the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations
directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html
I don’t think we can lay all that on Yamamoto. He was, after all, just the instrument of national policy devised by others.
You might find this an interesting paper on the wider topic of what I think has reasonably been called “a strategic imbecility”, but also on the failures of thinking and policy on both sides leading to the war with Japan: http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Japan_s_Decision_for_War_in_1941.pdf
Where else can we lay the blame? The plan to attack Pearl Harbor was conceived by Yamamoto, when no one else in the Japanese political hierarchy thought it was necessary. When even his own service opposed the plan as too risky, and considered the potential results not justified by the likely costs, Yamamoto put his career on the line to by threatening resignation if the plan were not approved. Had it not been for Yamamoto, the Pearl Harbor attack would never have taken place. There is no other Japanese individual or group of individuals who felt the plan was necessary to the success of the Japanese First Phase of operations. On the contrary, many Japanese thought the war effort would be better off without the Pearl Harbor attack. So Yamamoto is directly and primarily responsible for the strategic results.
Yes, it was interesting. Aside from some factual errors, it seems well reasoned, although I do not completely agree with the author’s views. I think the conclusion that Japan was faced with two mutually unacceptable options is wrong, as is the depiction of the likely demands of the US. I also believe that for a nation, pride, ideology and “honor” are no excuse for irrational behavior. Nor for wishful thinking, and a willful refusal to face unpleasant facts.
Well, that was the rationale for the attack, and it failed. Which leads one to question why he thought he could be successful in crippling the Pacific Fleet with a carrier raid on a handful of ships, particularly a raid planned with inadequate intelligence about the US carriers.
It’s not easy to wade through the US war Plans of the period and some are internally inconsistent, as if hastily prepared and inadequately reviewed before publication. In the version you quoted, I believe there is a provision (almost literally in the “fine print” section) to the effect that reinforcements from the Pacific Fleet would be not provided for the defense (or recapture) of Guam and the capture of the Marshalls and there is another little zinger to the effect that no units of the Pacific Fleet shall be sent further west than would allow them to steam to the Panama Canal zone in 21 days. When one considers the practical requirements of that kind of voyage, this provision limits deployment of Pacific Fleet units to about the longitude of Midway
The IJN general staff. Yamamoto didn’t act unilaterally. Without general staff approval Pearl Harbor wouldn’t have happened.
In the end it was the general staff which weighed up the arguments for Pearl by Yamamoto and against it by others and decided to go for Pearl.
My understanding is that Yamamoto thought he had a better chance of limiting the USN response to Japan’s attack on the Philippines by hitting ships at anchor in Pearl than being brought to battle at sea. If the Pearl plan worked there was no damage to the IJN, which would not be the case with a sea battle.
It also had the advantage of Japan taking the initiative and dictating the time and place of battle, instead of responding to USN initiatives which Yamamoto considered would wear down his numerically inferior force over time. This fear was reinforced by IJN war games that had been run for battles at sea up to mid-1941 consistently resulting in the IJN coming off worse than the USN.
In view of your point about the ships at Pearl being old and inadequate against the Japanese fleet, and your quoted comment above about deficient intelligence about the US carriers, do you know if Yamamoto was properly informed about the essential futility of his attack in destroying the USN response by hitting more or less unimportant ships? I would have thought that he would have had good intelligence about the capacity of the ships at Pearl in view of the extensive Japanese networks in Hawaii.
I noticed that and wondered what it meant in practical terms. Thanks for clearing that up.
I assume that that was because the US planners anticipated an attack on the Canal, which Yamamoto actually began to plan before his death later in the war.
There is also a reference in RAINBOW 5 to “SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155 EAST”. Do you know where those boundaries would be in relation to various landmarks?
No, The General Stall did not willingly approve the Pearl Harbor plan.
Actually, the Army section of IGHQ never expressed an official opinion, but privately tended to think it was a reckless idea.
The Navy section, headed by Admiral Nagano Osami, disapproved of the idea, and felt it was very,very risky, and unnecessary to boot. Nagano continued to oppose Yamamoto’s plan for the Pearl Harbor attack until Yamamoto threatened to resign if the plan were not approved. Admiral Nagano, on shaky ground with the Emperor, felt he could not afford to oppose a figure of Yamamoto’s popularity, and capitulated.
[i][b]"In heated arguments during the summer of 1941 between the general staff and Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet staff over the wisdom and propriety of the Hawaii operation, the chief of the staff’s Operations Section, Captain Tomioka Sadatoshi, provided an extensive list of objections to the Hawaii plan. In sum, he argued that the Japanese navy could not afford to wager its carefully built-up naval air strength in such a desperately risky venture, particularly in view of the fact that it would be needed in other major operations. More than anything else, Tomioka feared that diverting surface and air strength to the Hawaii attack would critically undermine the southern operations and, hence, the major objectives of the coming war. Even if the navy were willing to undertake such an enormous gamble, in Tomioka’s view, the Pearl Harbor strike was not truly necessary. Of course, there was the danger that the U.S. Pacific Fleet might try to hit the southern operations in the flank, but Tomioka argued that the enemy would far more likely launch an attack on the Marshall Islands. That would be all to the good since the navy had great confidence that it could intercept the enemy there and launch a smashing counterattack.
The bitter controversy between the general staff and the Combined Fleet staff was not resolved during the summer of 1941, even as training and preparations for the Pearl Harbor operation continued. Nor was it resolved during the September map exercises at the staff college or in October aboard the Nagato; those discussions and exercises relating to the Hawaii operation were held separately and were accessible only to those few naval officers who would be involved in carrying it out. Of all the points of contention, the sharpest concerned the number of aircraft carriers to be used in the attack. Yamamoto had originally proposed four; the September map exercises simulated an attack with three, which the umpires judged to have achieved only marginal results. But those on the general staff working out the details for the invasion of Southeast Asia insisted on reserving some carriers for the southern operations since the navy’s land-based air power, specifically its fighters, did not have the range to reach the necessary targets and return.
Then, in early October, the navy general staff was brought around to Yamamoto’s idea. There were several reasons for this volte-face, some operational, some bureaucratic. To begin with, the compromise between the army and navy on nearly simultaneous attacks on the Philippines and Malaya eased navy planning considerably. The availability of the splendid new carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku in late September permitted two other carriers to be released for the southern operations and thus eliminated one of the general staff’s key objections to the Yamamoto plan. Finally, Yamamoto had carefully and quietly passed the word to the high command that rejection of the Pearl Harbor plan would result in his resignation. Keenly aware of Yamamoto’s popularity and prestige within both the navy and the government and faced with the prospect of disharmony, the general staff gave in." [/b][/i]
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3531646.html
In the Spring of 1942, essentially the same thing happened with the Midway Operation; the Naval section of the IGHQ opposed Yamamoto’s plan and Yamamoto threatened to resign if it was not approved. Admiral Nagano and the NGS caved in a second time, but this time the NGS proved to be correct; Midway was a disaster for the IJN.
The Japanese NGS argued that the likelihood of the Pearl Harbor Strike force retiring without damage was just about zero, and war games conducted to test the plan indicated that Japan would probably lose three to four carriers, even if surprise were achieved. Even Yamamoto admitted that the Japanese carriers might suffer such casualties that they would be prevented from further participation in the war for at least six months. Yamamoto felt that crippling the US Pacific Fleet was worth the potential cost. Almost no one in the Japanese Navy felt there would be no damage to the fleet as a consequence of Pearl Harbor
Yes, that is correct. Yamamoto was aware that the strategy of the “decisive Battle” had the drawback of surrendering the initiative to the USN, which might delay confronting the IJN until they had overwhelming superiority. If the issue had been purely a naval confrontation, that would have definitely been a correct assessment. But in reality, given the overall Japanese plan of campaign, the US could not simply ignore the Japanese advances. As a consequence, Japan would have gained the initiative, in any event.
Little has been written on this issue. John Prados in “Combined Fleet Decoded” wrote that Yamamoto, in early 1941, began keeping a binder on Pearl Harbor and the ships stationed there. What, exactly, was contained in that binder, I do not know, but I would assume the characteristics of the major units of the Pacific Fleet would be available to Yamamoto. Professional essays about the speed, armament, and other particulars of the Pacific Fleet ships were being published in Journals such as the Naval Institute “Proceedings” fairly frequently in the 1930’s up until the advent of war. Moreover, the units assigned to the Pacific Fleet were well known to the Japanese, and certainly that information would have been available to Yamamoto. It’s inconceivable to me that Yamamoto, as a professional naval officer, would not have had an accurate picture of the capabilities and limitations of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
As for the movements of these ships, he was probably less well informed, and certainly could not have predicted, except in more or less general terms, whether any given ship would be in port on any given day. The movements of the US aircraft carriers were especially problematical for Japanese intelligence because, being few in number, they were particularly busy in the second half of 1941. As an example, the Enterprise was scheduled to arrive at Pearl Harbor on Saturday, 6 December, 1941, but bad weather had delayed the fueling of her destroyer screen, and thus she was behind schedule and did not arrive at Pearl Harbor until after the attack.
I do not believe Yamamoto was aware of any of the specifics of Rainbow 5, and only generally aware of the intent of the various versions of War Plan Orange. While he should have been able to deduce a fairly accurate picture of what the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was capable of in terms of operations in the western Pacific against the IJN, whether he ever actually conducted a realistic assessment of Pacific Fleet capabilities, I do not know.
I have my own theory why Yamamoto was so keen to execute an attack on Pearl Harbor, despite a seeming lack of necessity, but at this point, most of the evidence supporting my theory is circumstantial.
Yes, although, I know of no concrete evidence of a Japanese plan, other than the building of some aircraft-carrying submarines, for an attack on the Panama Canal, such an attack scared the hell out of US Navy planners because the Canal was effectively a very valuable force multiplier. It was considered the southern apex of the “Strategic Triangle” which was more or less a “sacred cow” in pre-war US defense planning, trumping even the “Europe First” strategy. An attack on the Panama Canal was considered even more threatening than an attack on the continental US.
Well, the southern Solomon islands are about 8 degrees south of the equator and about 159 East longitude, so the equator is about 500 miles north of the Solomons and 155 east longitude is about 250 miles east of the southern Solomons. The Gilbert islands straddle the equator, and lie about 172-175 East longitude, and were British territory up until the start of WW II. Also included in this area would be Fiji, Samoa, New Zealand. Essentially this would encompass the southern end of the Hawaii-Australia sea route, except for the east coast of Australia. It would appear that this provision was designed to cover cooperation with any British (or Australian/New Zealand??) naval forces maintaining the sea communications between Hawaii and Australia.
Actually, RS, I believe that the smartest thing would have been NOT to attack Pearl Harbor. Had they not done so and had they not attacked the Philippines, the US never would have declared war on the Japanese for attacking the British, French and Dutch. Japan’s thinking was deeply flawed here.
Yes and no.
It would have been better not to attack the Philippines if that guaranteed keeping America out of the war, but how could the Japanese be sure the Americans who with the British were applying embargoes to Japan wouldn’t go to war when the Japanese attacked Malaya?
If you were a Japanese strategist, would you be worried that if you countered the oil embargo by attacking the NEI, which from memory had something like a third of the world production of oil at the time, then the Americans might go to war with you to try to deny you that oil as well?
And as a Japanese strategist wouldn’t you be worried about the possibility that if the Americans went to war and you ignored the Philippines then you’d be faced with an American base in your new backyard and across your LOC to your conquests? Plus if you ignored Hawaii a base in the mid-Pacific from which the USN could sail westards to counter your attempts to take a long route home east of the Philippines?
It was probably a case for the Japanese of damned if they did and damned if they didn’t.
With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been better if Britain and America didn’t impose the condition of Japan withdrawing from China as a condition of lifting the embargoes, because Japan was never going to agree to that. Perhaps then a solution might have been found which avoided war.
I agree with you that The Japanese were in a corner over the attack on Malaya, Borneo and Singapore; They could never be sure that the US wouldn’t declare war and attack their sea communications, particularly the bottleneck of the Luzon Straits. Neither could they expect the US to remain quiescent over a blatant attack on Britain when it was in a life and death struggle with Nazi Germany. Better for the Japanese to be safe and neutralize the Philippines by occupying them.
I do not agree, however, that it was necessary to attack Oahu; The Pacific Fleet was in no shape to threaten the Japanese First Phase operations in Asia. And it was the nature of the attack on Oahu that destroyed any chance of a negotiated resolution to the war. It would have been much better for the Japanese to attack only the Philippines and let the sleeping dogs at Oahu lie.
As for the oil embargo, it should have been imposed much earlier, say in 1938. The Roosevelt administration really had no alternative in 1941. To continue doing business as usual with Japan, even when the US knew the Japanese were positioning themselves for an imminent war with the US and it’s potential allies, simply was not acceptable, at least not in a democracy where the public’s opinion counts for something. Had the war developed while Roosevelt was still allowing exports of oil and other strategic materials to the Japanese, it would have been very difficult to explain that to the American public.
The US demand for a Japanese withdrawal from China was also a reasonable demand. The withdrawal from Indochina was, of course, not negotiable as far as the US and Britain were concerned for the Japanese occupation was tantamount to an act of war. But the withdrawal from China could have been negotiated, and certainly could have been phased to allow the Japanese to save a reasonable amount of “face”. It’s likely that Japan would have held on to Manchuria because the US made no mention of Manchuria in it’s initial demands on Japan. That would have left Japan with Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and southern Sakhalin. Had they been satisfied with these territories, and withdrawing from a war they couldn’t win anyway, they would have had no need for additional oil, over and above what the US was willing to supply. and the US would have been quite willing to resume normal trade relations. It was the Imperial Japanese Army that refused to make any concessions whatsoever, ordering the US about like it was some inconsequential banana republic. Without some meaningful concessions, the US wasn’t inclined to make any itself, and there was no basis for any alternative but war.
BTW, I remember reading in one source that in 1940, the us produced approximately 61% of the world’s oil, another 14% was produced by South America, 10% was produced by the Soviets and less than 3% was produced by the NEI, not 30%.
Source; http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1940/1940%20-%202302.html
Oh, well, at least there is a 3 in it. 
One thing to keep in mind here is that unless the US were directly attacked either in Hawaii or in the Philippines, the United States would not have gone to war, period. Politically, there was no way, and Congress would not have gone along with Roosevelt in declaring war over the NEI, Singapore or any other possession owned by any other colonial power. Believing it would have done so is silly, since the US didn’t go to war over France, Holland, or Great Britain in the first instance where greater strategic interests were at play from the get-go.
I read somewhere in one of my books on the Pacific War that the US allocated about 10% of its overall war-making resources to the war in the Pacific with the remainder going to Europe. Think about that - 10%. If there had been no war at all in Europe, Japan would have been finished in 1943. This is akin to fighting your enemy with one arm broken and one arm tied behind your back and there still being no doubt of eventual victory.