My Thoughts on Imperial Japan

World War II Japanese Military
#41

That’s true. But keep in mind that Japan was also occupying China with large numbers of men not only engaged in combat against the Kuomintang and Peoples Liberation Armies, but also to deter any Soviet aggression. Britain and Australia both also allocated resources against Japan, not least of which were significant numbers of ground troops. Secondly, the “resources” have to be looked at. I believe in At Army at Dawn, Atkinson states that it took essentially two cargo ships resupply an avg. US division in the Mediterranean (for a certain period of time), North Africa, or Europe whereas in the Pacific it took ten ships, making a quick rolling up of the IJA in say–Manchuria–a very costly, difficult task.

Adm. King, an Anglophobe (people-phobe actually :smiley: ), pushed for a Pacific “First” strategy in the midst of contentious talks with the British. I believe Marshall and FDR asked him what his plan was, he began to sputter as he had none, which effectively ended any internal debate…

#42

I don’t think anyone in the US thought seriously about pushing teh Japanese out of Manchuria; That was clearly up to either the Soviets or Chinese. The Soviets actually accomplished at the very end of WW II, but quickly withdrew and allowed the Chinese Nationalists to occupy the province.

I’d be interested in the source of this statement? Everything I have read about King was that he was never at a loss for words, and, moreover, did have plans for offensives in the Pacific. Certainly, Marshall found out he had several plans for Pacific offensives when Mac proposed a campaign that King thought was foolhardy. As Robert Love, a Professor of Naval history at the US Naval Academy, has pointed out, Admiral King was one of the most “lethal” strategists in history.

#43

I don’t think that was a forgone conclusion at all. There was about an even chance that the US would have declared war on Japan, absent any attacks on American territory. Even if it hadn’t, the US certainly would have continued it’s buildup in the Philippines, which would have been just as threatening to the Japanese. The Roosevelt administration had already warned the Japanese that any hostile move against the British or Dutch would be viewed as an act of war. Furthermore, the US had made it plain that British and Dutch naval and air forces were welcome, in the event of war with Japan, to use American facilities in the Philippines.

The fact that the US didn’t go to war over Holland, France, or Britain doesn’t prove anything about what might have happened in the Pacific against Japan. Remember, the war in Europe was perceived as a ground/air war, whereas the Pacific war was seen as a naval/air war. Also, public opinion about the Pacific war was different than it’s perception of the European war.

#44

I was speaking hypothetically in a War with Japan only. As Manchuria was almost prime tank country, the depleted Japanese were rolled up there quickly…

be interested in the source of this statement? Everything I have read about King was that he was never at a loss for words, and, moreover, did have plans for offensives in the Pacific. Certainly, Marshall found out he had several plans for Pacific offensives when Mac proposed a campaign that King thought was foolhardy. As Robert Love, a Professor of Naval history at the US Naval Academy, has pointed out, Admiral King was one of the most “lethal” strategists in history.

From An Army at Dawn, p. 16. Rick Atkins writes:

“Following another visit by Churchill to Washington in mid-June 1942, the fraternal bickering intensified and the Anglo-Americans entered what turned out to be the most fractious weeks of their wartime marriage. On July 10, Marshall and the chief of naval operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, suggested to Roosevelt that if the British continued to insist on ‘scatterization’ in North Africa, ‘the U.S. should turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan.’ The irascible King, who had once been accused by Roosevelt of shaving with a blowtorch, went so far as to predict that the British would never invade Europe ‘except behind a Scotch bagpipe band.’ Roosevelt likened this repudiation of Germany-first (policy) as ‘taking your dishes and going away.’: he asked Marshall and King to send detailed plans for ‘your Pacific Ocean alternative’ that very afternoon–knowing that no plans existed.”

I agree that King was brilliant. But he was hardly infallible with dropping the ball regarding the initially marauding U-boats off the East Coast. As for plans, how detailed and ready they were is up to perhaps whether one considers tentative contingency planning to be a war plan. I believe he was one of the backers of “Operation Sledgehammer,” (an early, emergency invasion of France) which could more aptly have been called Operation Ball-peen hammer…

#45

We’ll just have to disagree on this. Roosevelt (like Wilson before him) had run on a platform of staying out of the war. I think that a reading of the contemporaneous record, especially having to do with Congress, would show that there was no voting support for a unilateral declaration of war absent a direct attack. It didn’t matter that the NEI, British and French “deserved” our support, Roosevelt just couldn’t do it. Nor can I imagine the US public supporting a war over Malaysia or Singapore or Hong Kong. Most Americans didn’t even know where Pearl Harbor was, much less any of those places. Honestly, I think the fact that we didn’t act when western Europe was invaded does tell the story.

#46

Regardless of the American domestic situation, a major problem facing America in deciding whether to support the NEI was uncertainty about how the NEI would react to a threat from Japan. The last thing America needed was to commit itself to the support of the NEI if the NEI was going to accommodate Japan rather than fight.

While the article focuses on the Australian-Dutch relationship regarding the NEI, America was central to that war planning so American considerations about defending the NEI are covered in some detail here. http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j29/herman.asp

#47

And thus Hitler would have no reason to declare war on the USA.

So in effect the Japanese by their actions set in train a chain reaction of events that would lead to the defeat of their Axis partner.

The alternative raises the possibility of a Nazi victory against the Soviet Union and England.

Either way, war was certain.

digger

#48

If I’m reading Atkinson correctly, he’s claiming that on July 10, 1942, that King had no specific plans relative to an offensive in the Pacific, that he could show to Roosevelt? And Roosevelt knew that no such plans existed?

Does Atkinson offer any kind of footnotes on this statement?

The reason I ask is that on April 16, Turner, Chief of Naval planning under King, presented a four-phase plan for the USN"s offensives in the Pacific and Roosevelt approved it. By July 10, King and Marshall had worked out detailed planning for the Solomons campaign, which was adopted on July 2 by the JCS. On July 6, MacArthur agreed to provide support for the offensive. So by July 10th, there could hardly be any doubt that detailed plans existed for Marshall’s and King’s intended moves in the Pacific.

Moreover, King did not “drop the ball” over the initial U-boat offensive off the East Coast. That is a false assertion made primarily by British historians who have employed sloppy and just plain poor scholarship. Clay Blair, in “Hitler’s U-boat War” has demolished that little myth. if you want, I will dig out the specific citations by Blair to that effect.

#49

Well, that’s alright with me. I definitely think the US would end up in any war between the Brits and the Japanese; the only question would be how long would it take for Roosevelt to get the votes in the Senate.

And by the Fall of 1941, the US was definitely in the war against Germany, at least the US Navy was in the shooting war against Germany in the Atlantic; Hitler had plenty of reason to declare war on the US months before Pearl Harbor.

I think you are giving too much credence to American public opinion about staying out of any war. By 1941, the attitude had changed dramatically.

#50

Roosevelt ran on a peace/modified-isolationist platform, then proceeded to introduce the first peacetime conscription, and one of the largest arms buildup, in US history. He was also attempting to goad the Germans into “incidents” by authorizing what amounted to a secret, undeclared War on the U-boats resulting in a few confrontations between US destroyers and Kriegsmarine subs resulting in the sinking of a US Navy destroyer IIRC. The Fall of France had changed things dramatically in the US and even many isolationists were clamoring for an overhaul and modernization of the US military…

Above all else, if the the Japanese had launched operations against everyone short of the US, there is little doubt that even if the US hadn’t become a direct belligerent, there would have been various political and military escalations designed to force a conflict between the US and Japan. It’s not out of realm of possibly that the US could have sent active fighter squadrons to China, rather than the Flying Tiger mercenaries, under the guise of protecting the Chinese from Japanese aggression and area bombing…

#51

All quite true. I seriously doubt that there was any way Roosevelt could have sat idly by and let the Japanese rampage through the western Pacific.

The fall of France in June, 1940, changed the political reality in the US. Nothing exemplifies this more than the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act in July of that year. Just as it’s name implies, the Two Ocean Navy Act authorized the establishment of a Navy capable of successfully fighting in the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously. In both cases, the enemy would be Axis countries; Germany and Italy in the Atlantic, and Japan in the Pacific. By 1941, Roosevelt had the political support necessary to declare war on Japan if it attacked Britain or the Netherlands, or their territories, in the Pacific.

#52

I agree. Furthermore, a general Japanese offensive against the Brits and Dutch probably would have mistakenly killed some US personnel at some point…

#53

Probably, Nickd, but it would also probably not have resulted in a declaration of war by the US. There were already US personnel being killed in the Atlantic and that did not lead to a declaration of war against the Germans. Personally, I am certain the Roosevelt DID want to get in on the war for the simple reason that he was pretty sure we would have to do so eventually. The political reality in Congress and around the country made it impossible for him to make a unilateral declaration of war no matter how mkuch he might have wished it. We sometimes thjink of the US as being some sort of monolith - at least back then - but it was anything but that. US involvement in WW2 seems inevitable today, but it wasn’t.

#54

Interesting, but I doubt either outcome would have occurred. The Germans were actually incapable of invading England and their navy couldn’t guarantee a corridor wide enough to afford protection to the army. Add to that the fact that they had already been defeated in the air by the RAF and invasion was basically unthinkable.
As for the Russians, frankly, they could have defeated the Germans all on their own. It would just have taken longer and cost even more lives than the horrific numbers already incurred. The allied invasion of Europe shortened the war by about two years, I figure, but the Germans were already statistically beaten. Of course, massive amounts of allied aid played a crucial part in all this. Not to mention, by the by, that a Russian defeat of Germany would have engulfed all of western Europe in the process, save for England, not a happy prospect.

#55

It is true that Japan’s main concern was China. That and oil, and that was in the DEI. The Pacific War for Japan didn’t consume all that many troops but was for the most part a naval war. Once their navy was finished, it was basically all over for Japan in the Pacific.

#56

I pretty much agree with you here; a German invasion of Britain during WW II just wasn’t a practical possibility due to the weakness of the German navy, and the inability of the Luftwaffe to suppress the RAF.

I also pretty much agree that the Soviets probably could have beaten the Germans eventually, though the timing would be long term. I do however see the possibility of a stalemate between the Germans and Soviets; something along the lines of WW I, when Russia was not defeated outright but was unable to stay in the war due to domestic troubles being exacerbated by the war. I think that could have happened to either the Soviets or the Germans.

However, in either case, Japan would have seen numerous opportunities to profit by grabbing territories in Asia and the Pacific. The only way I can see the US staying out of a Pacific war, is if Japan had refrained from “striking South” and attacked the Soviet Union. The United States perceived it as vital to US interests to maintain trade relations with China and the rest of Asia. That was directly contrary to Japanese ambitions of hegemony in Asia and everyone knew it. Once the United States passed the “Two Ocean Navy Act” in 1940, was with Japan was inevitable; neither country was willing to give up what each perceived as their vital interests in Asia.