Polish Army on the Eastern Front

I called them bastards not because they were in London or they were anticommunist, of course, but because they sacrificed all these people in a mission which was suicidal from the beginning. What i’m trying to say… Red Army did not save the rebels not because of it was intentional, it was impossible to capture and hold Warsaw in that time, BUT of course Polish govt in London thought that Stalin is such evil, that rebels would need to battle Red Army if they even somehow manage to defeat Germans. Simply put, in their imagination Red Army was not better than Wehrmacht, so how they hoped to actually achieve Polish independence? It was purely reckless scheme and it destroyed all these POLISH lives, which were sacrificed trying to achieve impossible goal. It is strange that Poles themselves doesn’t hate this govt which i called ‘bastards’.

Who told you that Armia Krajowa considered fighting against Red Army?:smiley:
Have you ever heard about liberation of city of Wilno in the beginning of July 1944 (Vilnus 9 Lithuanian capital city)? In fact Armia Krajowa together with Red Army units liberated the city. And they COOPERATED. But just after the fighting finished, Soviets started large scale arresting of Armia Krajowa soldiers. They had been arresting soldiers of Polish Army. Wasn’t the situation similar to the September 1939? Remeber that whole society already knew what happened to the hundred of thousands of Poles after 17th of Semptember 1939. So, these who were in Warsaw expected the worst from the Soviets. But there was no idea to fight Red Army.

Again, you talk about things that you have no idea about. Polish goverment in exile has never ordered to start the uprising. They realised that Armia Krajowa’s HQ has the better look at the situation in occupied country, so they gave HQ a free hand. It was up the Gen. Bor-Komorowski to start the fight in Warsaw.

Warsaw Uprising was just the culmination and the most known battle of “Operation Tempest” which started in March 1944.

"During the night of 4-5 January 1944, the first Red Army tanks crossed the Polish-Soviet border established in 1921. In reality this border was recognized neither by Moscow nor by the Western powers, and following the revelation of the Katyn massacres, the Soviet Union had broken all diplomatic links with the legal Polish government-in-exile in London on the pretext that the Poles had demanded an international inquiry by the Red Cross, a demand that by chance coincided with a similar request by the German authorities.

The Polish resistance assumed that as the front approached, the Home Army, would mobilize the population and begin to fight the Germans, and that the Red Army would come to its defense. The operation was code-named Tempest (Burza). The first skirmishes took place in late March 1944, in Volhynia, where the partisan division of the Home Army fought alongside Soviet units. On 27 May the Red Army forced several Home Army units to lay down their arms. Consequently, most of the Home Army had to fight their way through German lines back to Poland .

The Soviet Union 's way of proceeding here – cooperation on a local level followed by forced disarmament – is confirmed by examples elsewhere.

The most spectacular actions took place in the Vilnius region. A few days after the fighting was over, the Internal Troops of the NKVD arrived and, in accordance with Order No. 220145 from headquarters, began systematically disarming Home Army soldiers.
According to the report received by Stalin on 20 July, more than 6,000 partisans were arrested, while 1,000 managed to escape. All the leaders of the partisan units were arrested. Officers were interned in NKVD camps, where they were offered a choice between remaining there or joining the Polish army of Zygmunt Berling, formed under the aegis of the Soviet Union .

The Home Army units that had participated in the liberation of Lviv suffered the same fate. All these events took place on what the Soviet authorities considered to be their territory.

On 1 August 1944 the commanders of the Home Army began an uprising in Warsaw , knowing that Soviet military commanders were planning to launch an all-out attack on German positions in Warsaw on 8 August.
Stalin halted the offensive on the Vistula River , which had already been crossed to the south of Warsaw, and allowed the Germans to crush the rebellion, which lasted until 2 October.

To the west of the Curzon Line, where the Home Army had mobilized between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers and liberated many small areas, NKVD, SMERSH (the military counterespionage section), and filtration units proceeded in the same manner, in accordance with the USSR’s Supreme Command No. 220169 of 1 August 1944.

According to a report compiled in October, which contains details of how that directive was carried out, around 25,000 soldiers, including 300 Home Army officers, were arrested, disarmed, and interned.

NKVD units and SMERSH operational groups had their own prisons and camps where they detained Polish partisans as well as Volksdeutsche and German prisoners. Officers and soldiers who refused to enlist in Berling’s army were sent to distant gulags, along with their comrades from Vilnius and Lviv.

The exact number of those imprisoned as a result of Operation Tempest is still not known; estimates vary between 25,000 and 30,000.
The territories newly annexed by the USSR in the autumn of 1944 subsequently witnessed arrests on a massive scale followed by deportations to the gulags or transfer to forced-labor sites, particularly in the Donetsk region. Although most of the deportees this time were Ukrainian, it has been estimated that these various forms of repression also affected tens of thousands of Poles.

NKVD and SMERSH operations did not cease once most of the Home Army units had been dispersed.
On 15 October 1944 Beria signed Order No. 0012266/44, which decreed that a special division (Division 64, known as the francs-tireurs et partisans) be stationed in Poland.
In the border regions of Poland, NKVD units from Belorussia and Ukraine lent a hand in the operations. After the formation of Division 64 in late 1944, more than 17,000 people were arrested; 4,000 were deported to distant Soviet camps.
After 1 March 1945 the Soviet units were put under the command of the general adviser to the NKVD, General Ivan Serov, through the Polish Ministry of Public Security (of which he was appointed head), and they remained in Poland until the spring of 1947.

Until August-September 1945 they were the main security force on the ground in zones where there was still effective independent partisan resistance.
From January 1945 to August 1946, 3,400 fighters from different resistance groups were arrested. Most of them were sent to camps; the rest were handed over to the Polish authorities.

In addition, some 47,000 people were detained for interrogation. After the entry of the Red Army into the Polish regions annexed by Germany in 1939, there had been arrests not only of Volksdeutsche but also of all Poles who, under pressure from the Germans, had signed the so-called third national list (Eingdeutsche). At least 25,000 to 30,000 civilians from Pomerania and Upper Silesia were deported to the USSR, including 15,000 miners who were sent to the Donbass region and to the mining regions of western Siberia.

The NKVD did not stop at mass repressions, manhunts, and pacification operations.
At the end of the summer of 1944, SMERSH set up local groups that operated regularly in Poland , recruiting in particular a network of informers. The best-known operation, led personally by NKVD commander Serov, was the arrest of sixteen leaders of the underground Polish government, including the deputy prime minister, three of his assistants, the leader of the Home Army, and members of the Council for National Unity – a sort of underground parliament that had been established during the German occupation. On 22 February 1945 the council had protested the Yalta accord and had given notice that it was prepared to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union.
As a result, General Serov had invited the leaders of the underground government to make themselves known publicly. The moment they arrived at the agreed meeting place in Pruszkow, near Warsaw, they were arrested and taken directly to the Lubyanka [prison] in Moscow. On 19 June a public trial began in the Palace of Trade Unions, where the great prewar show-trials had been held. At the same time, talks began in Moscow between the pro-Soviet Polish authorities and representatives of the Polish democratic forces to discuss the clauses of the Yalta accord that affected Poland .

The democratic forces had already declared their willingness to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union . The verdict of the trial was reached the same day that the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain consented to the agreement among various Polish parties for the formation of a coalition government, in which the Communists and their satellite parties held a huge majority. The sentences at the trial were relatively light – the longest was ten years in prison – but three of the accused never returned to Poland. Leopold Okulicki, the general commander of the Home Army, died in Lubianka prison in December 1946."

Andrzej Paczkowski. Poland, the “Enemy Nation”, pp. 372-375, in Black Book of Communism.
“Crimes, Terror, Repression”. Harvard University Press, London, 1999.

"The Home Army’s attempt to free Warsaw before the entry of the Red Army was prompted mainly by political and ideological reasons. The Uprising was expected to be short, a week long at the most, and have the character of a mopping-up operation.

The main reasons for starting the Uprising:

Liberate the City.

Most of the underground believed that a Polish London-based government-in-exile had to be established in Warsaw before the newly created Russian-sponsored Committee of National Liberation would take charge.

Military developments on the Eastern and Western fronts appeared to have created a singular opportunity to wrest control of Warsaw from the collapsing Germans shortly before the entry of the victorious Red Army. At the same time, the Soviet-controlled radio Kosciuszko issued appeals to Warsaw inhabitants to raise up against Germans.

German Collapse.

During the Spring east front offensive, twenty five German divisions had been destroyed. Red Army and Russian-commanded Polish troops reached the Vistula river. Disorganized front Wehrmacht troops were withdrawing through Warsaw and German civilians, in panic, were evacuating from the city. At the same time, the attempted Hitler assassination was announced. On the western front, victorious Allied troops were breaking through Normandy defenses.

Call for 100,000 Men.

On July 27, the German Governor of occupied Poland Hans Frank called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to arrive at several concentration places in Warsaw. They were to be employed as laborers constructing German fortifications around the city. The Home Army interpreted this call as an attempt to neutralize and destroy the underground forces and urged everybody to ignore it. At the same time, expecting German retributions, the Home Army commander ordered mobilization in the Warsaw region.

The main reasons for the Uprising’s failure:

Global Politics.

In the early spring of 1943, the Soviet Union broke off its diplomatic relationships with the Polish government-in-exile. This was in response to a Polish call for an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre. From that point on, the Soviet Union’s government became openly hostile to the lawful Polish government in London and its representation in occupied Poland.

Lack of Support.

The Russian Eastern front offensive had stopped on August 3rd just ten miles from Praga, Warsaw’s right bank district. Although Russia controlled over 100 airfields within Warsaw’s range, their planes disappeared from the Warsaw sky until September 10th.
Moreover, the first massive Allied airdrop took place on September 18th at the time the Uprising was already doomed.
This delay was in large part caused by the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow Allied planes on missions to Warsaw to land on its airfields. On September 16th, when the Red Army had reached Warsaw’s right bank, it made only a half-hearted effort to storm the city. All their attempts were conducted by the Russian-commanded Polish Army of Gen. Berling.

Miscalculations.

The Home Army believed that the Soviet Union’s military goal of their spring offensive was to capture Warsaw. Poles were unaware that this objective might be superseded by the Soviet Union’s political goal of eliminating all of the potential opponents of the future communist-led government in Poland.

The Home Army did not took into account the consequences of the agreement reached among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the Teheran conference at the end of 1943, which placed Poland within the Soviet sphere of influence (control).
Also, unknown to the Poles, at that conference Stalin received from Roosevelt assurances to acquire the Polish eastern provinces the Soviet Union occupied during 1939–1941 as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact."

http://www.warsawuprising.com/faq.htm

Personally I think that the most significant and blatant refusal to support insurgents, was grounding soviet YAKs and LAGGs.
Soviet Aviation had in this time absolute air superiority - they just gave Germans a free reign over Warsaw skies.

Lancer44

If they expected worst from Soviets, how could they hope to achieve independence? Again we come to conclusion that this decision was reckless and doomed Polish rebels which otherwise would live.

Again, you talk about things that you have no idea about. Polish goverment in exile has never ordered to start the uprising. They realised that Armia Krajowa’s HQ has the better look at the situation in occupied country, so they gave HQ a free hand. It was up the Gen. Bor-Komorowski to start the fight in Warsaw.

Then it was this general who made this decision. He is responsible (and it was govt fault to trust him), but i doubt that Poles which died in uprising care about who exactly decided it’s worth a try.

Where they would live? In Donbass? Or Kolyma? Behind the Arctic Circle?

Death of 200,000 civilians, women, children and elderly is regrettable. Destruction of the city and loss of historical value buildings, books, artefacts irreplaceble. (Most would be stolen by Red Army anyway…)

Warsaw Uprising gave Poles moral strength through years of soviet occupation. German crime of murdering Wola district inhabitants was done with Russian Kaminsky Brigade help together with other Eastern units.
This was not forgotten. Believe me. Soviet Army had very strong Northern Army Group in Poland with headquarters in Legnica.
No one I know, no one ever had seen soviet officer or soldier in Warsaw after 1956…
You knew how Poles liked you and decided to live like leppers behind 3.6 meter fences, separated from the locals. In East Germany soviet soldiers were everywhere, very visible. Friends. Slogans on every wall.
In Poland unless someone travelled close to Legnica or Zielona Gora and had an opportunity to see airfields with hundreds of Mi-24s, soviet army was invisible.

But you were occupants and legacy of Warsaw Uprising helped to remember and be impervious to sick ideology.
Poland will tend 600,000 graves of soviet soldiers forever. Anyway you “liberated” us from nazis…
It was like swapping one disease for the other. Would you like to swap tuberculosis for syphilis?

Well, I’m just asking…

Personally, I think Komorowski was a tragic person. His duty was bigger than him. He was a good soldier, cavalry men. History placed too much on his back. The burden of promoting him to CoC when he was in German captivity was also risky political move.

Cheers,

Lancer44

Not at all. It seems you’re trying to say that entire population of Poland was forced to live somewhere else. It is clearly not the case.
Furthermore, if these Polish patriots joined Polish Army which fought with Red Army (as many did) they would be honoured after war. For example, Poles which fought in Berlin are heroes in Poland, no?

BTW, it seems that you think that Russians tried to destroy or humilate Poles everytime. Of course no. USSR wanted communist Poland of course, but remember that it became separate country which actually gained territories after war, and Poles were always treated as equal people, friends - concept of “lesser” races which must serve better race was invented by another country, you know. It was never meant to harm Poland as country or Poles as nation. There were a number of Poles which became Heroes of Soviet Union for example, there was no such thing as discrimination - remember that entire communist ideology was built on concept of equality of people. There were no oppresion of people because they are Poles or any other nation. The law was harsh to soldiers which thought they can offend local people - Soviet command was very sensitive to keeping good relations with local population.
If you think that to die in a pointless rebellion which simply could not succeed is better than live, for example ‘to fight another day’, then i give up. Imagine if it was your father sent by general Komarovsky to Warsaw - you would not born.

And you’re wrong once again Sneaksie. Former AK members, who joined the Polish Army commanded by Soviets, met at least with disapproval. And later, after the war was over, they came back home. But who waited for them? Oh, what a surprise! Security Service, or what is worse, “Informacja Wojskowa” (Military Intelligence) - a equivalent of Soviet “Smiersz”.
So Sneaksie, please don’t tell fairy tales about Home Army heroes blessed in communist Poland. I told you, you have no idea what you are talking about. Soviet version of history is not even a version, it’s fairy tale.

But his name is Polish in orgin.

Hi , mst. Hoebbels.
Wy just 40 000 , this is not actual number today. Let will consider 400 000. This much better. :rolleyes:

Actually, it’s generally agreed upon to be ‘only’ 22-28,000, my mistake. The NKVD ONLY murdered up to 28,000.

Why, what is the actual number Chevan, since you seem to have many good mass death estimates.:slight_smile:

Wrong , Kovalski.
London’s radio called to rebel in Warsawin 1 august 1944. Who was behind it , Poles govn. or Britons? I think both.

Gen. Bor-Komorowski started the fight in Warsaw according London’s order.
Or may be will you say that he did it personally?

Like always you are wrong Chevan.

http://www.warsawuprising.com/doc/kosciuszko.htm

Moskow Radio Station Kosciuszko July 29, 1944 broadcast.

Text by the BBC MonitoringService on July 30, 1944.

[Moscow, in Polish, July 29, 1944. 8:15 p.m.]
Appeal to Warsaw: Fight The Germans!

No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to the Hitlerite power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for decisive action. The Polish Army now entering Polish territory, trained in the Soviet Union, is now joined to the People’s Army to form the Corps of the Polish Armed Forces, the armed arm of our nation in its struggle for independence.

Its ranks will be joined tomorrow by the sons of Warsaw. They will all together, with the Allied Army pursue the enemy westwards, wipe out the Hitlerite vermin from Polish land and strike a mortal blow at the beast of Prussian Imperialism. For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived. The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw and add new destruction and thousands of victims. Our houses and our parks, our bridges and our railway stations, our factories and public buildings will be turned into defence positions.

They will expose the city to ruin and its inhabitants to death. They will try to take away all the most precious possessions and turn into dust all that they have to leave behind. It is, therefore, a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort; that by direct, active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories and stores, we not only hasten the moment of final liberation, but also save a Nation’s property and the lives of our brothers.

I’m interested what you’ll say now…

Cheers,

Lancer44

radio Kosciuszko issued was a evident provocation ( if it really was). Kosciuszko called pro-soviet polish forces to start the rebel, but AK didn’t consider this calls. The foundation for rebellion became the London’s radio and order by Bur-Komarovski.

German Collapse.

During the Spring east front offensive, twenty five German divisions had been destroyed. Red Army and Russian-commanded Polish troops reached the Vistula river. Disorganized front Wehrmacht troops were withdrawing through Warsaw and German civilians, in panic, were evacuating from the city. At the same time, the attempted Hitler assassination was announced. On the western front, victorious Allied troops were breaking through Normandy defenses.

Mate , in summer of 1944 Germany still was far from collapse.
Red Army reached the Vistula river with great losing also. They made 500 km march crushing germans in heavy battles.
Furthermore , in the end of offensive in august 1944 Gjukov’s armis were contr-attacked by gernans in northern direction.
Therefore , some soviet unit , uncluding aviation were regrouped there to stop the german attack.
Germans was STILL STRONG in 1944. And nobody ( besides Poles in London) didn’t underestimated the situation. Not Churchill, not Rusvelt not Stalin.

Call for 100,000 Men.

On July 27, the German Governor of occupied Poland Hans Frank called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to arrive at several concentration places in Warsaw. They were to be employed as laborers constructing German fortifications around the city. The Home Army interpreted this call as an attempt to neutralize and destroy the underground forces and urged everybody to ignore it. At the same time, expecting German retributions, the Home Army commander ordered mobilization in the Warsaw region.

And again, Nickdfresh wrote that from 40 000 rebels was easly armor just 3 500. Against 16 000 german mostly police forses, but already in end of august they were 50 000 germans with heavy armaments.

The main reasons for the Uprising’s failure:

Global Politics.

In the early spring of 1943, the Soviet Union broke off its diplomatic relationships with the Polish government-in-exile. This was in response to a Polish call for an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre

This was in response to a Polish call for an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre TOGETHER WITH NAZISTS
This idiots made “friend service” for Hitler propoganda.
Hoebbels shouted on all the world that Nazi conduct valid war against the evil Bolsheviks and those who they are supported.
Do not forget that in 1943 nobody knew about Auschwitz.

Lack of Support.

Moreover, the first massive Allied airdrop took place on September 18th at the time the Uprising was already doomed.
This delay was in large part caused by the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow Allied planes on missions to Warsaw to land on its airfields.

This delay was the resault of pragmatic decigion of Britans and Americans staff. The were waited when polish rebels take power and crushed the german forces in city.
Whan it become the evident thet poles overestimated its forces , they made just symbolic support for political reason ( and then using the convenient “Stalin’s refusing” to stop the unsensless flis).
I told you , Lanser, that no more 5 % of air help got into the hands of rebels. Britains and American had the big lose of airplains also.

The Home Army did not took into account the consequences of the agreement reached among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the Teheran conference at the end of 1943, which placed Poland within the Soviet sphere of influence (control).
Also, unknown to the Poles, at that conference Stalin received from Roosevelt assurances to acquire the Polish eastern provinces the Soviet Union occupied during 1939–1941 as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact."

So, i told already that they was idiot in London. They didn’t understand the situation (politic and military).
Thay wanted “to play in war” by his people.
Sneaksie was right when named they by b…

Personally I think that the most significant and blatant refusal to support insurgents, was grounding soviet YAKs and LAGGs.
Soviet Aviation had in this time absolute air superiority - they just gave Germans a free reign over Warsaw skies.

Personaly , mate, you can consider Poland as the Centre of Civilisation.
And of course, Stalin must was to think just about Warsaw in 1944. And all of Soviet army must fight for save the polish rebbels, who even didn’t informed Moscow about begining of uprising.
Excuse me , mate , it’s wrong.
I unberstand the westen Cold war’s point about “Stalin’s refuse to support the London’s rebbelion”.
This was the pitiful attempt to put responsibility to the Soviet, to at the same time and use the new possibility to quarrel Russians with the Poles.
They supported this adventure.

That’s a lie. The order came from Bor-Komorowski as he was authorized by goverment in exile to make a decision. No radio station from London was involved.
Your point of view Chevan, is classic for soviet propaganda.

How your comment is corresponding with Lacer44’s text about “Call for 100,000 Men”?

Oh, how could they do this???
They forgot that International Red Cross was Nazi organization!
They should ask Uncle Joe for help, don’t you think Chevan?
It is the easiest way to find out who was a killer - just ask the man with blood on his hands.
But you forgot that polish goverment already asked about all these officers, and Joe’s answer was that “Soviet Union is a big country, they might have lost somewhere”.
So why Joe didn’t tell that he haven’t had any polish officers in his captivity?
Because it would be a lie, Chevan.

And you’re lying again Chevan.
Since the very beginning of Uprising, US and british military attaches were trying to get the Soviet approval for airdrop and using soviet airfield in Ukraine.
But again, there was NO ANSWER. For more than two weeks soviet goverment was deaf.

Beacuse, when Uncle Joe approved the airdrops (Operation “Frantic 7”) it was already too late. That’s why he approved it.
And you’re lying about airplanes’ losses. Why don’t show specific nubers?

Oh, I’m really getting used to your vocabulary.

I’m starting to belive that it was way too difficult for Soviet Air Force to shoot down some Stukas over Warsaw.

Lancer , what is the “true” do you open for me?
Actually, Red Army tried to cross the Vistla river in august 1944.
Rocossovski wanted to take the Warsaw quick . the Soviet tanks attacked the briges near the Prage. But they was destroed and was froced to retreat.
Germans still had the strong defence in western coast of river.
Perhaps , The Moscow radio try to use polish resistense to help the soviets .

By the way , can somebody find the text of London’s radio issue where was the call for the rebellion?

True?

Just for start: http://www.warsawuprising.com/doc/Roosevelt_Churchill_Stalin.htm

Allied support for Warsaw: Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin communications.

Selected documents.

  1. Aug. 4, 1944 message from Winston Churchill to Josef Stalin

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin

At urgent request of Polish Underground Army we are dropping, subject to weather, about sixty tons of equipment and ammunition into the southwest quarter of Warsaw, where it is said a Polish revolt against the Germans is in fierce struggle. They also say that they appeal for Russian aid, which seems to be very near. They are being attacked by one and a half German divisions. This may be of help to your operation.

  1. Aug. 15, 1944 Andrey Y. Vyshinsky, First Assistant to the People’s Commissar for
    Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, message to Ambassador Harrison in Moscow

The Soviet Government cannot of course object to English or American aircraft dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, since this is an American and British affair. But they decidedly object to American or British aircraft, after dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw.

  1. Message from Josef Stalin to Winston Churchill on Aug. 16, 1944

After the conversation with M. Mikolajczyk I gave orders that the command of the Red Army should drop arms intensively in the Warsaw sector. A parachutist liaison officer was also dropped, who, according to the report of the command, did not reach his objective as he
was killed by the Germans.

Further, having familiarized myself more closely with the Warsaw affair, I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet command had been
informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it.

  1. Aug. 15, 1994 Ambassador Harriman message to F. D. Roosevelt and the Acting
    Secretary of State

In Molotov’s alleged absence, Vyshinski received us early this afternoon [15 August]. We informed him that we believed the decision of the Soviet Government was a grave mistake and that it would have serious repercussions in Washington and London. We pointed out that Vyshinski’s letter did not tally with Stalin’s promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the resistance movement in Warsaw… Vyshinski adhered to the statements made in his letter and to the view that the outbreak in Warsaw was ill-advised, not a serious matter, not worthy of assistance, and that it would have no influence on the future course of the war. There were no reasons to reconsider the Soviet position. He said that the Soviet Government had nothing to fear as to public reaction abroad since the exploits of the Red Army and the Soviet people clearly spoke for themselves. I pointed out that we were not requesting Soviet participation in the operation and stated that I could not understand why the Soviet Government should object to our endeavour to assist the Poles even if our attempt to get arms to them should not bring about the desired results. Vyshinski maintained that the landing of the American planes at the Soviet bases constituted participation and the Soviet Government did not wish to encourage ‘adventuristic actions’ which might later be turned against the Soviet Union…

Clark Kerr inquired whether he understood correctly that there had been a change in Soviet policy from Stalin’s promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the Poles in Warsaw. Vyshinski maintained that there had been no change in policy, that it was primarily a matter of the best ways and means of effecting this policy, that the Red Army was helping Poland, and that the question was purely military in character. He was evasive when asked whether the Soviets intended to assist directly the Poles fighting in Warsaw.

  1. Aug. 17, 1994 Ambassador Harriman message to F. D. Roosevelt and the Secretary
    of State

I recommend that the President send immediately a strong message to Stalin and instruct me to deliver it personally provided he is in Moscow, otherwise to Molotov (it would be helpful also to receive guidance on the oral explanation desired in order that there may be no doubt Stalin understands the President’s views).

In making this recommendation I assume that I am not so out of touch with American opinion but that I reflect your views in believing that we can not (repeat not) accept the Soviet position when they allow the Poles fighting in Warsaw to be killed without lifting a
hand and arbitrarily prevent us from making efforts to assist.

My own feeling is that Stalin should be made to understand that American public belief in the chances of the success of world security organization and postwar cooperation would be deeply shaken if the Soviet Government continues such a policy.

… Care should be taken however to avoid anything in the nature of a threat, and it should be borne in mind that we have so far no official knowledge that Stalin personally is committed to the decisions Vyshinski expounded as those of the Soviet Government.

  1. Aug. 18, 1944 Winston Churchill’s telegram to F. D. Roosevelt

The refusal of the Soviets to allow the U.S. aircraft to bring succour to the heroic insurgents in Warsaw, added to their own complete neglect to fly supplies when only a few score of miles away, constitutes an episode of profound and far-reaching gravity. If, as is almost certain, the German triumph in Warsaw is followed by a wholesale massacre, no measure can be put upon the full consequences that will arise. I am willing to send a personal message to Stalin if you think this wise and if you will yourself send a separate similar message.

Better far than two messages would be a joint message signed by both of us. I have no doubt we could agree on the wording.

  1. Aug. 24, 1944 message from F. D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill

My information points to the practical impossibility of our providing supplies to the Warsaw Poles unless we are permitted to land on and take off from Soviet airfields, and the Soviet authorities are at the present time prohibiting their use for the relief of Warsaw.

I do not see that we can take any additional steps at the present time that promise results.

Stalin’s reply … to our joint message about the Warsaw Poles is far from encouraging to our wishes to assist.

[Signed] Roosevelt.

  1. Aug. 25, 1944 Winston Churchill’s telegram to F. D. Roosevelt

Uncle Joe’s reply adds nothing to our knowledge, and he avoids the definite questions asked. I suggest following reply:

“We are most anxious to send American planes from England. Why should they not land on the refuelling ground which has been assigned to us behind the Russian lines without enquiry as to what they have done on the way. This should preserve the principle of your [government’s] dissociation from this particular episode. We feel sure that if wounded British or American planes arrive behind the lines of your armies, they will be succoured with your usual consideration. We do not try to form an opinion about the persons who instigated this rising, which was certainly called for repeatedly by radio Moscow. Our sympathies are, however, for the ‘almost unarmed people’ whose special faith has led them to attack German guns, tanks, and aircraft. We cannot think that Hitler’s cruelties will end with their resistance. On the contrary, it seems probable that that is the time when they will begin with full ferocity. The massacre in Warsaw will undoubtedly be a very great annoyance to us when we all meet at the end of the war. Unless you directly forbid it, therefore, we propose to send the planes.”

If he will not give any reply to this I feel we ought to go and see what happens. I cannot conceive that he would maltreat or detain them. Since signing this, I have seen that they are even trying to take away your airfields at Poltava and elsewhere.

  1. Aug. 24, 1944 message from F. D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill

… I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to U.J. [Uncle Joe].

I have no objection to your sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so.


First air drop was 4-th of August 1944. Last one 18-th of September 1944.
Further prolonging of airlift was senseless because area still held by insurgents was so small that recovery of drops was just 5%.
Early August recovery was 85%.
34 bombers and 360 airmen were lost from RAF, SAAF, US Air Force and Polish Air Force.
Soviet Air Force refused co-operation and grounded its fighters.
Without escort, heavy bombers were easy prey for a few remaining German night fighters. At least 50% of these young, brave fellows could survive the war if not soviet lack of good will.

I cannot post “London radio issue where was the call for rebellion”. for the simply reason that it doesn’t exist. The only “call for rebellion” come from Moscow and I already posted it.

Lancer44

Kovalski , your poin is a classic Anglo-American propoganda of Cold war period.
The anti-soviet “Operation Tempest” was created in London. Certainly , HQ in Warsaw had operative command of AK . But obviously , without assent from London they noting did.
Read more about “London’s radio calls”.

How your comment is corresponding with Lacer44’s text about “Call for 100,000 Men”?

“Call for 100 000” was nothing, because the weapon were enough just for 3 500.

Oh, how could they do this???
They forgot that International Red Cross was Nazi organization!
They should ask Uncle Joe for help, don’t you think Chevan?
It is the easiest way to find out who was a killer - just ask the man with blood on his hands.
But you forgot that polish goverment already asked about all these officers, and Joe’s answer was that “Soviet Union is a big country, they might have lost somewhere”.
So why Joe didn’t tell that he haven’t had any polish officers in his captivity?
Because it would be a lie, Chevan.

Kovalski , International Red Cross was used by germans for its propoganda. Thanks for Poles in London.
The fate of polish officers in USSR this wasn’t reason “to play for Nazi”.

Beacuse, when Uncle Joe approved the airdrops (Operation “Frantic 7”) it was already too late. That’s why he approved it.
And you’re lying about airplanes’ losses. Why don’t show specific nubers?

Listen , Kovalski , if i will hear one more “lie” , i will send you the same phraises.
If you nothin now about airplanes losses , this is not mean that it wasn’t.

I find one interestin document in FSB arhive
http://fsb.gov.ru/history/autors/makarov.html
this is the evidence of german comendant of Warsaw the Gen. Shtagel. He was prisoned by the Soviets in 1945.
This is unique document. It’s showed the Warsaw uprising by the germans eyes.

…The Red Army, which attacks by the motorized forces from the southeast and the east, approached on 30-40 km the city. 73 divisions and parts of the division of Hering was located before the parts of the Red Army, so that the substantiated prospect for a long time was presently detain Russians

…The mass of population and entire clergy were unquestionably they were stupefied by uprising and in essence they were against it. They even without that have enoud sufferings

…The armament of rebels it had to be intensified by air.
Beginning approximately from the 4th day of uprising they were discarded the special balloons, in which were located the machine guns, ammunition, and, first of all anti-tank means together with the ammunition supply (English anti-tank means). In the balloons civil clothing and cigarettes were located sometimes also (from Havana in Cuba).
The large part of the balloons fell into the hands of Germans; on one night were only selected about 40 balloons.
Flights for the purpose of the supply of rebels ceased after within one night it was biased from 9 to 12 aircraft.
Crews consisted of Englishmen, since they, with exception of surnames, rejected to give any indications; therefore place, from where they accomplished flights, I do not know.

…Approximately 15 aug 1944 on the London radio came out the Bur-Komarovski, which called friendly, located in Poland and, until now, not participating in combat forces to arrive for aid to rebels, who arrived in Warsaw to the difficult position. In what volume this order was executed, to me it is unknown

On motion it is combat the Germans east of the Vistula uprising hardly it had any effect. Front there became stronger.
Everything, that it was necessary from the allowance, front found on the eastern shore. Only at first sometimes it was necessary to make the hook through Modlin. Connection with the West through the city was interrupted only to the short period. The Fuehrer at the eastern front was the General Gill, who had at his disposal 2-3 divisions.

…The failure of uprising is explained by the poor armament of the rebels, who were forced to rapidly surrender with the encounter with the heavy weapon. Furthermore, not all preparations were carry ouied properly. However, in particular the uprising was hopeless, since it began without the combined actions with the Red Army.

So , gentlemens , you can see some interesting points from German’s offiser:

  1. Soviet troops were stoped in Vistla for a long time becouse german forces were strong here.
  2. Just less then 10 % of population support the rebellion. Mostly civil people was agains this adventure.
  3. Britains already from 5 august treid to fry into Warsaw, but had much loses( Strange ,why they didn’t need the Soviets airfield?).
    This air support was also non-effective. Most of “help” take the Germans.

Cheers.

Hi Chevan,

Mate, beside my little ambition to turn at least one Russian soul into friend of Poland, I would also like to see this Forum growing, attracting more interesting people, influential people - hey we can even do some politics!

But what you are sending is junk. I don’t mean your language ability. I can cope with it, even if sometimes I’m puzzled. generally I understand you 85%.

The problem is with your way of thinking… it is completely opposite to commonly known logic, say mathematical way - it is universal and the same in Hindu, Russian, Czech or Tibetan languages… But not in this case.

No offence, please and no personal advances,
What you are trying to pursue in your “discussion” with Kovalsky - “baloons” and so on… is so absurd that I refrain now from any comments…

Please stop this s…t.
Thank you very much for disclosing your sources… They are out of this planet.

Continuation of this discussion on this level is seriously damaging reputation of our Forum.

Regards,

Lancer44

Any version which is not accurate with Soviet one, is the propaganda of Cold-War. Great!

The main purpose of “Operation Tempest” was to secure all cities which were placed in polish teritorry. Because Home Army was an official polish army fighting with Germans, no wonder that polish leaders wanted to do it. And please learn that the whole operation wasn’t anti-soviet, because nobody planned to attack Red Army.

Please read it:

Nobody knew what would happend with these 100000 men. It has nothing to do with Home Army fighting abilities. The AK leaders wanted to prevent the Germans from sending these men to slave-work camp etc.
By the way, very similiar situation took place in 1863 when Russians wanted to force over 12000 Poles to join Tzar’s Army.

It’s not my hobby to call you a liar, but if you attempt to spread soviet propaganda, please do not expect some nice treatment.

Testimonies of German officer held in Soviet captivity. Very reliable source of information. Nice try. What next?

If you think that we are enemies of Poland, you are terribly wrong.

The problem is with your way of thinking…

What do you not understand in Chevan’s thinking?

No offence, please and no personal advances,
What you are trying to pursue in your “discussion” with Kovalsky - “baloons” and so on… is so absurd that I refrain now from any comments…

What’s wrong? You know Russian language - just read the source Chevan provided. It’s not anti-Polish or whatever at all.

Thank you very much for disclosing your sources… They are out of this planet.

?

No. You are replacing one propaganda with other. Propaganda with either direction is propaganda.

Testimonies of German officer held in Soviet captivity. Very reliable source of information. Nice try. What next?

Military governor of Warsaw - i’ll call this MUCH more reliable source than 100 passionate books with words like “betrayal” in title. What do you like not in this source so much? He wrote about evident things like no AT capability of rebels, most part of dropped supplies found by Germans, etc. It’s quite normal for encircled troops - exactly the same picture was in Stalingrad were most dropped supplies were captured by Red Army. Chances of encircled troops holding against regular army even with airdrops are futile. Recall Arnem sdandoff for example.

I’m not answering for Lancer44, but his “sources” are non-existent, something you unintentionally confirmed in answering Lancer’s statement on Chevan’s “out of this planet” sources as “?”, which is quite correct actually. Chevan states something patently wrong, then argues with you about it while providing no documentation or external support for his beliefs. Then one provides sources to back up his argument, and Chevan completely disregards it without providing anything of his own. It just seems very suspicious. He’s either a person that enjoys arguing like a troll, or has some sort of political agenda that is tantamount to being a Russian propagandist, which serves no one on this board since it is not “discussion.”