I’m doubt the somebody will use a-bomb. Do not forget the next who developed were the soviets (1949) and in the 1950-yy when the scientists already something knew about danger of radiation - it was clear -the aplication of a-bombing could lead to the ecological catastroph and region and when Makkartur demanded the a-bombing in Nothern China in 1951-52 for the 'profilactical aims"- the USA gov refuse it.
The problems of first a -bombing was a hurry - you absolutly right.
When nobody yet know about this bomb , peoples were ready to justify it ONLY for the finish this war more quickly. But the problem was - could it be human to finish this war an such brutal way when the Japane could be forced to capitulate only by diplomatic means and does the it legitime and human to test this on the peoples to learn the effect?
It’s been said several times in this thread that little was known about the effects of radiation in 1945.
Although I didn’t question that initially, on reflection I don’t think that’s right.
I recalled recently that Marie Curie died of radiation poisoning and that some of the pioneers in radiation had radiation burns, so I did a bit of internet research which confirms that there was plenty of knowledge well before 1945 about the dangers of excessive radiation exposure. See http://www.physics.isu.edu/radinf/50yrs.htm
There was undoubtedly a lot more learnt about the effects of nuclear weapons after the A bombs were dropped, but the knowledge before 1945 should have been sufficient to enable a reasonable prediction that the release of a vast amount of radiation over densely populated areas would cause radiation poisoning, although it is probably unlikely that the precise nature and extent could be predicted for a previously unknown nuclear reaction.
I don’t accept that one of the main, or even minor, purposes of detonating the A bombs in 1945 was to experiment on human beings to find out what that type of radiation poisoning did.
That, unfortunately, was done in peacetime, long after the effects demonstrated in Japan were well known. And with much less military or moral justification than the Japanese detonations.
In Australia, thousands of servicemen and Aborigines were intentionally and deceitfully exposed to nuclear blast radiation in the British nuclear program, in which the Australian government was complicit, which fallout also drifted over some of the major cities
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/10/08/1034061204848.html
http://www.sea-us.org.au/thunder/britsbombingus.html
Russia did the same, on a predictably larger scale
http://www.neu-samara.de/index.php?artikel=9&sprache=en
And America, after exposing the Pacific region to nuclear blasts, did the same as Britain / Australia in Australia and Russia in Russia http://historytogo.utah.gov/utah_chapters/utah_today/nucleartestingandthedownwinders.html
The French carefully confined their tests to Algeria and the Pacific http://canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz/peace/nukenviro.html
Who knows what other nuclear powers did?
These peacetime events suggest that the problem was not any deficiency in American wartime morality or a uniquely American problem of any type. There was a lot more justification for nuking Japan in 1945 than for the subsequent large scale experiments by nuclear powers when they intentionally exposed their troops and civilians to nuclear radiation when there was no military or other imperative for doing so.
writen by Rising Sun*
I don’t accept that one of the main, or even minor, purposes of detonating the A bombs in 1945 was to experiment on human beings to find out what that type of radiation poisoning did.
I do not have time right now t give a link, but if you read the transcripts of the group of the officials and scientists in USA where they discuss the target selection for the nukes you will see that the studdy of the bombing effect was one of the main issues.
I think the link to that document has been brought in this forum during last 6 months or so. Maybe even by me! 
I will try to find it a bit later.
Ok. Here are two documents about the A-bombing in 1945.
1. Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee. Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945.
(source: http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html)
some quotes:
- The agenda for the meetings presented by Dr. Oppenheimer consisted of the following:
A. Height of Detonation
B: Report on Weather and Operations
C: Gadget Jettisoning and Landing
D: Status of Targets
E: Psychological Factors in Target Selection
F: Use Against Military Objectives
G: Radiological Effects
H: Coordinated Air Operations
I: Rehearsals
J: Operating Requirements for Safety of Airplanes
K: Coordination with 21st Program
- Status of Targets
A. Dr. Stearns described the work he had done on target selection. He has surveyed possible targets possessing the following qualification: b[/b] they be important targets in a large urban area of more than three miles in diameter, b[/b] they be capable of being damaged effectively by a blast, and b[/b] they are unlikely to be attacked by next August. Dr. Stearns had a list of five targets which the Air Force would be willing to reserve for our use unless unforeseen circumstances arise. These targets are:
B. It was the recommendation of those present at the meeting that the first four choices of targets for our weapon should be the following:
a. Kyoto b. Hiroshima c. Yokohama d. Kokura Arsenal
- Psychological Factors in Target Selection
A. It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are b[/b] obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and b[/b] making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.
B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size and with possible focussing from nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor’s palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value.
- Use Against “Military” Objectives
A. It was agreed that for the initial use of the weapon any small and strictly military objective should be located in a much larger area subject to blast damage in order to avoid undue risks of the weapon being lost due to bad placing of the bomb.
2. Harry S. Truman, Diary, July 25, 1945
(source: http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-jl25.html )
We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.
Anyway we “think” we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexico desert was startling - to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1,200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.
He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful…
[INDENT]Truman quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) pp. 55-56. Truman's writings are in the public domain.
[/INDENT]
And here is another interesting interview of Leo Szilard - one of the bomb farthers:
Leo Szilard, Interview: President Truman Did Not Understand.
quote:
Q: Would most other nations, including Russia, have done the same thing we did, confronted with the same opportunity to use the bomb?
A: Look, answering this question would be pure speculation. I can say this, however: By and large, governments are guided by considerations of expediency rather than by moral considerations. And this, I think, is a universal law of how governments act.
Prior to the war I had the illusion that up to a point the American Government was different. This illusion was gone after Hiroshima.
Perhaps you remember that in 1939 President Roosevelt warned the belligerents against using bombs against the inhabited cities, and this I thought was perfectly fitting and natural.
Then, during the war, without any explanation, we began to use incendiary bombs against the cities of Japan. This was disturbing to me and it was disturbing many of my friends.
Is the proportion of the population engaged in (a) military production (ordnance, weapons, rations, uniforms, transport, shipping etc) and, separately (b)military-related production (steel, coal mining for steel plants, electricity for aluminium plants, oil refining, electric motors for aircraft and other military weapons and transport etc) relevant in determining whether using the the A bombs, or any other bombs, on civilian targets is justified?
[Nagasaki] depended heavily on the Mitsubishi Corporation, which operated shipyards, electrical equipment works, steel mills and an arms plant that together employed 90 per cent of Nagasaki’s workforce.
J. Samuel Walker, Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, University of North Carolina Press, 1997,p.80
Assume that all of Mitsubishi’s production was military or military related.
Would 90% of the civilian workforce of Nagasaki being involved in military or military related production make their city a more legitimate target than, say, Dresden at the other end of the scale which had no military installations and no military value as a target?
I think it does.
Egorka
I don’t see anything there that alters my view that
I don’t accept that one of the main, or even minor, purposes of detonating the A bombs in 1945 was to experiment on human beings to find out what that type of radiation poisoning did.
My bold.
It might have been something that was considered by someone or some committee at some stage, but I don’t recall it appearing in any of the considerations leading to the decision to use the A bombs.
Even the note on Radiological Effects, in the link to your quote is concerned solely with radiation effects on the pilots of the planes.
Radiological Effect
A. Dr. Oppenheimer presented a memo he had prepared on the radiological effects of the gadget. This memo will not be repeated in this summary but it is being sent to General Groves as a separate exhibit. The basic recommendations of this memo are (1) for radiological reasons no aircraft should be closer than 2-1/2 miles to the point of detonation (for blast reasons the distance should be greater) and (2) aircraft must avoid the cloud of radio-active materials. If other aircraft are to conduct missions shortly after the detonation a monitoring plane should determine the areas to be avoided.
That consideration of radiological effects is, however, directly relevant to my earlier questioning of how much was known about the likely effects of the bombs on the radiation as distinct from blast and thermal fronts. If they could calculate the ‘safe’ distance for the aircraft, they must have had data to enable calculation of, at least, some sort of estimate of the radiological effects on the ground.
Chevan, I appreciate your post, but I stand by what I said. And, in case your wondering, it was one man’s and one man’s only decision to make: Harry Truman. Applying today’s perceptions and moralities to actions taken in August, 1945 is a trap you should try to avoid if you plan on studying history, Chevan.
I did not mean to show that the bombs were supposed to be used for testing the radiological effect on humans. I just meant that in general they did everything to measure the impact and learn. Ironicaly it happened on a live people.
I dod not think that the bombs were dropped to test. I already mention and here it comes again. IMHO there were 2 reasons:
[ol]
[li]To minimise the American losses and hasten the course of war
[/li][li]To impress the world. Mainly USSR.
[/li][/ol]
The difference with these two were that the 1st one was SHORT term shot (the war was almost over) wheras the second one was LONG term shot, and as such it had gratere importance. That is why I tend to say that the main (but not the sole) reason for the A-bombing was to make impression on USSR and affect the post war world order.
You see Truman wrote himselv in his diary 25-july-1945: “I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children” and “The target will be a purely military one”.
And we know what happened in reality, don’t we? So it must have failed one way or an other.
Sorry Rising Sun to quote Dresden as having no industries for the German war effort is totally wrong. From memory Dresden had 127 industrial plants engaged in Germany’s war production at the time of the raid.
Regards digger
No need to apologise, mate.
I’d rather be corrected than remain wrong.
Looks like I’ve fallen for popular comments about Dresden rather than bothering to check it out myself.
Thanks mate. Like many aspects of the war, the details of what really happened are still shrouded in fog, Dresden in particular. Frederick Taylor’s excellent book ‘Dresden’ published by Bloomsbury-ISBN 0 7475 7084 1 explodes many of the myths and misunderstandings surrounding the Dresden raid.
Regards digger.
It appears that, whatever the scientists might have known or been able to extrapolate from existing knowledge, the military who made the operational decsions about using nuclear weapons had absolutely no idea about radiation issues.
<page580> Use of poison gas against Japanese defenders was a very real possibility,^182 but it was the existence of the new “big bombs” that seemed to offer the best way to offset the growing imbalance of forces in the invasion area. Shipment to the Pacific of components for a third atom bomb to be used against Kokura or Niigata was halted on 9 August to await further developments, but production in the United States continued unabated.^183 If President Truman was forced to continue using nuclear weapons and the dropping of these bombs on cities failed in its strategic purpose of stampeding the Japanese into an early surrender, Marshall was interested in using the growing stockpile tactically to support the Olympic landings. It was believed that seven bombs would be available in time for this initial invasion operation.^184
A more complete appreciation of the dangers posed by nuclear radiation was still years away, and plans called for the majority of the atom bombs— approximately three for each corps zone of advance— to be dropped on beach defenses,^185 with hideous consequences for the hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers and Marines who would soon pass directly through the devastated areas after landing, and the tens of thousands more men using the same ground for base and airfield construction. It was also estimated that of the 2,200,000 Japanese civilians in the minimum Olympic target area who were unlikely to be evacuated to the north with the retreating Imperial Army, or to have been killed in the preinvasion bombardments, perhaps as many as 180,000 would live in internment camps^186 that would have been located on or near the blast sites. In all, several million Japanese and Americans would be direc! tly affected by nuclear fallout or residual blast radiation on Kyushu.
http://home.kc.rr.com/casualties/
Extracting the following conclusion doesn’t do justice to the author’s detailed examination of the history of how casualty estimates were determined for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, and related issues, but it confirms that the estimate of a million casualties for the invasion (not just the landings) was what the Army worked out from reasonable data based on WWII battle experience, and especially battle experience fighting the Japanese.
What can be stated as fact, is that the estimate that American casualties could surpass the million mark was set in the summer of 1944 and was never changed. In the spring of 1945 various planners and senior officers quibbled over the estimate, or facets of it relating to specific operations, but the statistical possibility of a million casualties, combined with the <page 581> experience of combat attrition of line infantry units in both Europe and the Pacific, had already prompted the Army and War Department manpower policy for 1945, and thus, the pace for the big jump in Selective Service inductions and expansion of the training base in the U.S. even as the war in Europe was winding down. Japan had lost its navy, and its cities were being essentially destroyed by U.S. airpower, but this was largely irrelevant to their ability to inflict casualties on American forces with the aim of forcing the U.S. into a! negotiated peace.
Researchers look at the forest of documents created over fifty years ago and almost immediately become lost during their hunt for extreme comments and inconsistencies. The fundamental truth, however, was that the Army and War Department manpower policy of 1945— in all its aspects— was established in such a way that the Army could sustain an average of 100,000 casualties per month from November 1945 through the fall of 1946 and still retain relatively fully manned and combat-effective units through its use of new Selective Service inductees and reassigned soldiers from demobilized units. That casualties would be massive was so basic an understanding, that it was functionally a “self-evident truth” held by decision makers at virtually all levels. Little or no paper discussion was required or conducted within the Army, and events beyond its purview rendered an invasion unnecessary.
The Army, as an institution, believed its soldiers would suffer extreme losses during an invasion of Japan, and all its actions in 1945 were based on that assumption.
http://home.kc.rr.com/casualties/
I think it might have failed in the initial message from Truman to Stimson. Assuming Truman actually said to Stimson what he conveniently recorded in his diary, which absolves him from responsibility which other documents suggest lies directly at his feet. It’s a human failing to record our view of events as we believe or wish they had occurred, rather than as they actually did.
I read somewhere - book, not internet - that Stimson had a rather different recollection of the conversation which Truman records in his diary.
According to the link for the following quote, Stimson left Potsdam on 25 July, so it’s not clear whether Truman’s entry refers to a discussion with Stimson on 25 July or earlier. It looks like Truman was involved in deciding which cities would be - or at least which would not be - targets as, according to Stimson’s diary, he agreed that Kyoto should be removed from the list.
We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act [a-bombing Kyoto, Japan’s cultural center] might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians.
http://www.doug-long.com/stimson8.htm
It is instructive that on 25 July the Acting Chief of Staff sent out the order to drop A bombs on Japan, which orders omit Kyoto which had been in the original list and in the final paragraph says that the order is issued on Stimson’s authority. This suggests that Stimson had communicated to the ACS the modified target list agreed with Truman.
July 25, 1945
To:General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces1.The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nugata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.
2.Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.
3.Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.
4.The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.
THOS. T. HANDY General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/ferrell_book/ferrell_book_chap6.htm
If my deductions are correct, Truman knew full well that women and children were going to be hurt in the cities listed for attack.
But, maybe, he took a ‘purely military’ target to be one with a strong military-related capacity, which goes back to my earlier post on that aspect.
He wouldn’t be the first president to split hairs on things that seem clear to the rest of us. Bill Clinton got oral sex from an intern but he ‘never had sexual relations with that woman’. Maybe Truman saw the targets in the list as ‘purely military’. The civilian casualties were then just unfortunate, as were those in the phrase ‘collateral damage’ coined by the Americans in a later war.
The full part of the relevant entry in Truman’s diary is (my bold):
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10. I have told the secretary of war, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance.
Truman’s handwritten diary here http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=5&documentdate=1945-07-17&documentid=63&studycollectionid=abomb
The reference to the old capital is to Kyoto, which confirms Stimson’s position about deleting Kyoto from the target list. “He and I are in full accord”
The reference to issuing a warning seems to be to the Potsdam Declaration delivered on 26 July, the day after Truman’s entry. That ‘warning’ went a long way short of telling Japan to surrender or it would be nuked.
If Truman was as liberal with his intention to hit only military targets as he was with his intention to issue a warning to Japan about being nuked, it’s no wonder he didn’t have a problem with Hiroshima and Nagasaki (which in any event was the secondary target if the huge Japanese arsenal at Kokura was obscured, which it was).
This was abandoned in case something went wrong.
We have Powerful weapon…surrender. No! Thud Opps sorry the next one will be will work I promise. 
Just want to add that all the posts in here minus things that deal with radiation effects(since they were mostly speculation) was all issues brought up to Truman. So go back to the start and read thru and tell me what you would do. I think you would find the votes would be about the same. It was a hard decision anyway you look at it. I think this is “probably” one of the hardest decisions just about anybody has ever had to make in the area of global politics and war.
Votes in the thread are irrelevant to my opinion.
If I had had to make the decision in light of what was known at the time, rather than the hindsight which constitutes much of this thread (which is all fair and reasonable historical analysis rather than the ‘Johnny on the spot decisions’ which people had to make then) and most of the rest of the post-war writing on the subject, I would have dropped every A bomb I could find on Japan, as quickly as I could get them. Just like they would have dropped the only one they had on Pearl Harbor if they’d had it.
This may seem heartless and cruel and amoral. It is. All war is.
Surprising though it may seem, I am an avowed pacifist. Until war breaks out. Then I say we do what has to be done to win and bring it to the quickest end. Without excessively delicate regard for the enemy. And, in the case of Japan in WWII, an enemy which by its actions demonstrated that it operated on primitive and brutal principles which would respond only to the application of greater ones to bring it to its knees.
Agree with you here!
From the part you quoted from me: My point was to show the diversity of things that were thrown at Truman and in the end is was him alone that had to make the decision.