I have my doubts because some aspects of the published letters contain idioms that you don’t see in English but you do in Spanish. But you’ve given me enough information to contact him myself so as I said we’ll see.
BTW I think you’ll find I’m right about the Type 21, they only had the two 20 mm cannon in 1982. There wasn’t time to fit extra cannon before they sailed.
Hello LoneRanger,
Keith will contact you with a perfectly good explanation on his error in the number of 20 mm cannon, maybe will drop by the forum.
[b]
I have my doubts because some aspects of the published letters contain idioms that you don’t see in English but you do in Spanish. But you’ve given me enough information to contact him myself so as I said we’ll see.
[/b]
ON this Lone Ranger… why are you surprissed that an English man uses some Spanish words or expressions? half of the population of England has moved already to Spain or they are in the process of doing it!
Don´t you think that when e-mailing me he would resist the oportunnity to use the small Spanish he understands?
Haven´t you noticed the scarcity of English people in London this years?.. They are all moving to sunny, sweet southern Spain… anyway, if you come over here, drop me an PM and I will happily “convert” you into a part time Spaniard. I have already “mentored” dozens of English families over here as I am an state agent… Everyone of them are now my friends…
Cheers and Hi- Ho Silver!!!
Juan.
From Keith to Juan, (Further from an earlier message of earlier today).
[b]"Hi Juan,
I forgot to say that no one has contacted me from your forum yet. If they
do I will try and put their minds at rest that I am a real life, walking,
talking Antelope survivor.
Amen to that!
Keith"
[/b]
Come on Lone Ranger, send him the e-mail so we can close this chapter !! If you PM me with a valid e-mail, I will make sure Keith receives it.
I’ve already sent an email, through my gmail account to the company that he is half owner. He hasn’t replied yet, assuming it got through the spam filter.
My point is that idioms don’t translate from one language to another, I’m not saying I don’t believe you. A few things don’t fit thats all.
For the record here, I can confirm that Panzon has corresponded with Keith and the emails were in fact genuine. I contacted Keith through his works email and he replied.
Thanks Lone Ranger,
And now, I would like to leave this matter aside as I regret having brought it in…
As I said before, the idea was to bring something different that at its core spoke about heroism ( on both sides), hindsight and to show that at the end of the line, Argentina and England should have never gone to war… they were always good friends… or almost:), putting aside “the hands of God” and off course the last visit of the “Pumas” to the “Lions” in Twickengham last November… and on this regard, I hope no French forum member takes seriously the Rugby lesson received in the Stade de France on Saturday…:evil:
Those are the only wars civilized countries should fight… our next battle should be in a Rugby or Futbol pitch where the field is somewhat more at “level”.
Cheers to everybody.
Pánzon.
Panzon, please dont take the caution voiced by brits here to be accusing you of lying or anything, its just that the guys here on the Forum like to have proof of something as so many people pretend to have lives different from that they actually live.
It is nothing personal its just being cautious. I hope that it wont put you off interacting in this Forum if that is what you wish to do.
Cheers
Well…the user “Gun Plumber” is not the example of quality information either and I dont see him subject of any scrutiny as Panzon case.:rolleyes:
Aniway.
[i]
Catch me if you can!!!On May, 21st, then Lt. Horacio Sánchez Mariño (Argentine Army), flying
Bell UH-1H AE-418 helicopter, took of on a commandoes insertion flight
near Mount Kent, during the Malvinas War. He was intercepted by a
Harrier CAP that, even though it could not shoot down the said
helicopter, it forced Lt Sanchez Mariño to make an emergency
landing. The crew and passengers left the helicopter, as one of the
Harriers fired a salvo of rockets that barely missed the aircraft,
with no casualties. Some shrapnel, however, damaged the main blades,
which were repaired on site with a household glue (“Poxipol”). The
helicopter went on flying -thanks to this field expedient repair- till
the end the hostilities
[/i]
Actually I take issue with that comment, he gets treated exactly the same way. Why do you persist in these unjustified sniping attacks?
Amen to that.
Is not sniping I am trying to be fair with everybody. The british members here arent fair, specially M.o.S
Good advertisising matierial there for the glue Panzerknacker. It should be used on television.
Panson and LoneRanger, the Argentines and English never went to war. The British and the Argentines did.
Other than that, no we shouldn’t have gone to war, it was a fools gambit played by the Argie Junta, and should never have been allowed.
Panzon, you will find that many here will support you and trust you once you have earnt aht trust. We have had a share of lunatics coming on to these threads and spouting rubbish. (See Iron man and his wisdom of WW2 from an American perspective, brought to you via Medal of Honour 
)
I would say that MoS is quite fair, as fair as most others on this site Panzerknacker. I do not agree with everything he says, but I do feel he is fair.
Originally posted in “Argentine militaria” moved here for being Malvinas related.
The Torpedo Armed Pucará
The South Atlantic conflict caused the Argentinean Armed Forces to face not only a world power when it comes to military might, but also their own internal limitations and failures in warfare.
Not only the maritime might, but the certain threat posed by the British submarines was evidenced with the sinking of the cruiser ARA “General Belgrano” on 02-May-82, and for this reason, the Argentinean Navy and Air Force sought to implement solutions to counteract this troublesome situation.
Despite the controversial decision to withdraw the ships from the fleet to safer waters, the Naval Aviation developed, besides their attack operations to naval targets, many options to protect the fleet from attack coming from enemy ships and submarines, and part of the success of these options was due to the withdrawal of the fleet to shallow waters.
On the other hand, the Air Force, despite having had little experience in attack operations against naval formations, began to evaluate the possibility of adapting aircraft and to develop tactics specifically aimed to
that end, in an attempt to increase its attack capabilities.
By the middle of May, 1982 the Strategic Air Comand of the Air Force decided to undertake a series of test flights, with the purpose of make operational the IA-58 Pucará, armed with torpedoes.
The weapon chosen in this case, would be the U.S. built Mk.13 torpedo, which by then had almost been withdrawn from use by the Argentinean Navy. Built between the years 1944 - 1952, it was a sturdy weapon, having been designed to be launched from boats and aircraft.
While not being the most modern weapon, the large number of examples remaining in the inventory caused its selection for the evaluation being conducted. The then Comodoro Jorge S. Raimondi was placed in charge of the project, conducted at the Naval Base of Puerto Belgrano, in order to obtain cooperation from the Navy. The Navy quickly supplied enough torpedoes, which were equipped then with the brackets necessary to mount them to the airplanes, and after a long time of inactivity, the torpedoes’ mechanisms and systems were back in service.
On 21 May, lands at the Comandante Espora air base, Pucará registered as AX-04, which had been assigned to the Centro de Ensayos en Vuelo (Flight Testing Center) at the Area Material Córdoba, flown by Capitán Rogelio R. Marzialetti and the Supervisor Mario A. Loiacono (both belonging to the CEV).
This specific aircraft was a standard series unit (A-509) having been modified after leaving the assembly line, to be employed as prototype for the evaluation of weapons and aircraft systems, and having as part of its equipment, a film camera to be employed to document the moment when the torpedo was launched. The torpedo was carried on the aircraft’s Aero 20A-1 central weapons station.
The first launch of a Mk.13, takes place on 22 May, the torpedo having been a practice round, not equipped an explosive head. The launch zone established by the Navy, was located 40 miles from Puerto Belgrano, and would be the same location where later the same day, the second test launch would take place.
Launch involved having the aircraft establish a 20 degree dive, at a speed of 300 knots and at approximately at a height of 100 mts., resulting on the destruction of the torpedo when it impacted the sea. The same happens the next day when the parameters were a 45deg. dive, speed of 250 knots, and approximate height of 200 mts.
It became evident that there was something missing for the torpedo to be effectively deployed from an airplane with the performance of the Pucará.
Lacking the torpedo’s operational manuals for air deployment, the only information available was that it should enter the water at an angle of approximately 20 degrees. With a less acute angle, the torpedo would bounce when hitting the water, thus damaging the internal and propulsion mechanisms, and if the angle was greater, then there existed the risk that it would “spike” itself on the bottom of the sea.
After consultations conducted with retired sub-officers who had been assigned to the Army’s torpedo shops, a nose-mounted aero-dynamic brake was installed on the Mk.13, and a biplane stabilizer was installed in the tail end, additions that would be destroyed when the torpedo hit the water.
After these modifications were undertaken, the first successful launches take place on 24 May, off Trelew, in the waters of the San Jose Gulf. These took place while the airplane was on a straight and level flight attitude and at a height of 15 meters, and it was then determined that the optimal speed was 200 knots, since higher speeds caused the torpedo to impact the bottom of the sea.
A total of 7 practice runs were conducted, and another 10 launch, this time with an explosive head, was conducted on 10 June, on a zone with deeper waters and near cliffs, North of the Port of Santa Cruz, but the depth here was not enough to compensate for the speed of 250 knots developed by Pucará A-566 which hade replaced AX-04 on the testing.
A last attempt is conducted on 14 June, in the neighborhood of Pingüino Island (near Puerto Deseado) chosen because of its maximum depth and ruggedness of the shoreline, and establishing a definite launch speed of 200 knots, but while the preparations for launching were taking place, this operation is completelly cancelled, due to the surrender of the Argentinean troops which were fighting in the Malvinas.
It is worth mentioning that at the same time that this project was being undertaken, studies were also conducted regarding the launching from the Pucará, of anti-ship mines Mk.12, in an attempt to mine the San Carlos Straits (in the Malvinas Islands), but this did not go beyond the loading up testing of the mines to the airplane.
While these testing operations were taking place, the Air Force deployed a section of IA-58A Pucara from the Grupo 3 de Ataque, to the airport of La Plata (Buenos Aires) to conduct patrolling missions on the approaches to the Río de La Plata, due to the possibility of British submarines operating in the area.
The end of the South Atlantic conflict, marked the end of the evaluation of the employment of the Pucará for the delivery of torpedoes and other specific weapons, for use against naval targets, and the aircraft involved in the testing, were returned to their parent units.
Canberra, the forgotten aircraft of the Argentine Air Force.
The Argentine Air Force has incorporated, as soon as begun the ‘70 decade, the Canberra bombers to its dowry. On a total of 12 airplanes, of which 10 were B.62 and 2 T.64 trainers, towards the principle of the conflict there were in good condition 10 airplanes.
The Canberras of the Grupo de Bombardeo 2 (Bombing Group 2) was painted with the typical English colors: Dark Green and Medium Sea Grey. The numerals of these were painted in white, with the letter “B”. The numbers, also in white, went from the 101 to the 110, for the B.62, and 111 and 112 for the T.64. They will be able to appreciate better the details in the graphs that illustrate the text. The only outer difference between the B.62 and T.64 is the nose, while the first had the transparent nose, because they carried the acquisition target equipment, the seconds had it plated in aluminum[/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Verdana].[/FONT]
In Malvinas
The 1st. of May, date in begin the battle, was planned 3 sorties with Canberras. In the first of them did not find the targets, but in the second were in inferiority of conditions, since they were intercepted by the Harriers of the Invincible aircraft carrier. These downed the B-110, whose crew, First Lieutenants Ibáñez and González, ejected themselves.
From 1st. of May, and with the experience of the happened, the bombing priority of the Canberras changed. This was a healthful measurement due to the defenselessness that these airplanes had respect to the Royal Navy airplanes. It is enough to remember that the other airplanes of the related episode could escape thanks to the ability of its crews who, with evasive maneuvers, could avoid the Harrier of the 801 Sqn. It was so until the 21 of May the Group 2 had time to evaluate its tactics again.
From that date they began to operate at night from high altitude. Thus, the Canberra began to bomb, primarily, troops and materials concentrations. These operations took place on the San Carlos Bay, against the troops stationed there.
As the war intensified, and the British came near to Puerto Argentino, the Canberra continued bombing the British troops until the last day of the conflict
Although these incursions were not absolutely precise, generated annoyance between the British troops.
So it was so the Royal Navy in vain tried to neutralize them. In several occasions the Harriers take off in alert to intercept them, but the opportune control from Puerto Argentino (Malvinas CIC), with the AN-TPS 43F radar, avoided always such interceptions. Of all ways, towards the last days of the war, the Canberra formation flew with escort of Mirage III of the Group 8. In one of these last missions, the B-108 was hit by a Sea Dart missile of the destroyer Exeter, downing it.
His pilot, Captain Pastran, could eject itself, not the navigator, captain Casado. Like peculiar data, a pair of Canberras attacked an oil tanker of Liberian flag that supposedly took fuel for the Task Force. It is possible to be appreciated in one of the profile drawings profile of the airplanes that carried out the bombing, with its respective kill mark.
The Argentine Bomb question part1.
Translation of an article first edited by the monthly magazine “Guerra Aerea por las Malvinas” ( Air war for the Malvinas) Reguero publisher, 1987.
The true History of argentine bombs.
Even today, more than 4 years after the end of the war for the Malvinas exist in a lot of media- including some foreign publications and studies- interroganst about the efficience of bombs used by the Argentine aviation.
Those doubts turned around the quality of maintenance of bombs, right arming or their fuzes, the presumed obsolencence of those artifact or the lack of training of the personnel in charge.
Now is possible to end the polemic and provide an answer to the classic question: why the bombs didnt explode ?
For that an expert was called, the vicecomodoro (1) Arturo Pereyra who during the War was precisely the specialist in Armament of the Departament of Operation High command air Force South, wich was created for conducting tactical, defensiva, suppy and strategical operations in its influence Area ( the patagonia)
When the war started the Argentine Air Force was studing adecuation of its weapons systems in order to operate over the sea, both in interdiction against supply ships or direct attack to warships.
The first idea was that attacking those “floating fortresses” like the english warship were, filled with flak , missiles and radars with the materiel in existence and according to the classic doctrines of employement was impossible.
According to the NATO recomendations, in order to strike a frigate like the british one a minimum of 16 aircrafts are needed, in a way that those saturate the ships radars and the defenses could be penetrated.
The idea is that even some could be shot down, others will reach the target.
That same doctrine indicates also the optimal angle of attack of the aircraft, a dive of 45º starting from an altitude between 3000 and 4000 meters.
In that scenario with the weapons in hand of the Argentine Air Force it could meaning the destruccion of all its aircarfts, maybe before a single bomb would be launched.
(1) No idea how the rank vicecomodoro in translated in US or UK ranks.
The argentine bomb question part II
As result other system was adopted, based in the achievement of some degree of surprize, with a very low flight and a bomb drop nearly over the target.
But that bringed the need to modificate the bombs, specifically the fuzes, the part called “fire train” (meaning the system wich makes the explosion) in a way they will explode at the moment of impact.
This fact wich seems easy, is actually the result of a delicate balance between several factors. In first place you need to consider the arming safety, a device present in every bomb wich avoid the detonation until a preselected distance from the launching aircraft.
This device requires 1, 2 or 3 seconds, depending on setting, to arm the bomb.
Given the way used by argentine aviators wich implied to launch the bomb at 250 meters per second at very close range. the space of time between they left the aircraft and hit the target wasnt enough for arming.
This problem was discussed with the pilots and they agree to reduce the arming time, sacrificing safety in favour of efectiveness.
Is worth to mention that not only they agree…sometimes that were reduced to fullfill the desire of the pilots.
After being armed the bomb, it teorically should explode in the moment the target is hit.
But if that happens it would damage the launching aircraft since the time would match the moment in wich the aircraft passed over the target due the bomb and aircraft velocity are more or less the same.
And not only the attacking airplane but also other components of the formation making the attack a “suicide mission” thing that was never in the mind of argentine pilots.
“when you define the retard of explotion. explains Vicecomodoro Pereyra- you must choose between two ways, one safe for the launching aircraft and other adecuate for maximum damage in target. As the risk in this late case are excessive you need to put away target damage efficience to provide safety for the aircraft to avoid suicide missions. That time could not be inferior to 8 or then seconds”
Now other problem is on the table, the hull of this modern warship is very thin. 10 to 12 mm, reinforced only with an armor of 25 to 50 mm in the magazine area. If the bomb in its trajectory does not find any hard surface, as the engine or some bulkheads it would go trough from side to side.
If you consider that the average width of the hull is 15 meters and the bomb velocity is 250 m/s that gave as result that teorically, without any possible “drag” created by internal componentes of the ship, it should take only 0,06 seconds to get trough the hull.
Is obvious then the dificulties to adjust the parameters between those very tight figures.
Iv’e read in the forum of 7 Vulcan missions , of which 3 carried Shrike Missils -
Only one launched and hit a 35 mm Fire Director Skyguard , does someone know about the other two missions - If missils were fired or not - Any Details -
Thank You Regards Enrique
Wiki has got quite a good article on it. It appears that of the three Shrike missions, one was cancelled in the air (equipment failure), the second was a near miss causing minor damage to an Argentinean surveillance radar (AN/TPS-43), and the third hit the Skyguard system.
Thank you , I was the Radra Operator on the ANTPS 44 Alert Mk 2 from the Army - I do remmebre the one that hit the Skyguard , I thought that the one launched to the ANTPS 43 ( Air Force Radar) was another type of missil launched from a Helo from accross the Bay -
Regards Enrique
I’m not certain, but I’ve got a feeling that we didn’t have any suitable helicopter-launched missiles deployed at the time. The missiles we had deployed were Sea Skua (eight fired during the Falklands war, all at shipping targets), SS-11 and AS-12. The latter two are derivatives of the Nord Aviation SS-10 anti-tank missile.
The SS-11 was fired from Scout helicopters, with a maximum range of around 3,000m. The only credible reference I’ve been able to find to it being used in 1982 is on the RAF website (http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/surrender1.html), where 4 Scout helicopters equipped with it are credited with destroying a gun emplacement near Moody Brook. Wiki has a similar statement, but places the gun battery at Wireless Ridge and states that it was undamaged.
As-12 was a significantly larger version used as an anti-shipping weapon. The only reference I can find to it being used in 1982 is when nine of them were launched against the submarine ARA Santa Fe in South Georgia (only four hit, and two of those didn’t explode until after passing through the conning tower). It does have a much heavier warhead and about twice the range, however. Both missiles use Manual Control to Line Of Sight (MCLOS) targeting so in theory could be fired at anything the gunner could see, although accuracy tended to be poor.