Things Hitler could have done to win WWII

[steben]

@Trap77

Which leads to, how many Main Battle Tanks (Panzerkampfwagon Mark IV’s) did the German Army have for it’s invasion of France? Less than 500. They had more Mark III’s but those were smaller and used mostly against other tanks. The Mark IV fired the high explosive round necessary for killing troops.

You don’t often win battles and by no means wars by “killing troops”.
Don’t get my wrong, I understand your input, but at the time around 1939-1940 tank - and surely “combined” mobile - warfare was a very enigmatic newcomer. Yes, the allies had 3x more fighting vehicles, most well armoured and with potent guns etc, yet the Germans had tactics and skill on their side. Literature explains very well how the shortage of material was bypassed by the german blitzkrieg - aided by spreading blur, propaganda and strategical deception - punching at the small target areas once the actual fighting began with all they had, most often deliberately driving away from danger zones, enemy tank formations etc…
Mere numbers and technical differences between standing armies became very futile.
Germany won by strategy and tactical superiority, which summarizes all german succes throughout the war. Not to mention the effect of the Luftwaffe, which was designed as fying panzercorps, ground support and artillery all in one.

Overall, the German Army in the 1939-1941 era was not that powerful.

In materialistic numbers and figures, yes.
But training, new tactics, morale and discipline were monopoly af the germans at the time.
And again don’t forget the luftwaffe and their new skills at the time. On top of it, as a major exception, the ME109 was at the outbreak a very top notch machine, which outclassed by technical evolution and the germans typically used this fully.

[Nickdfresh]

@Trap77

…
On the issue of Poland, yes that was exactly the plan in '39. The German Army only had 5 mobile divisions, the rest went in on foot and the artillery was hauled by horses. The only real place to put up a well fortified resistance in Poland is the hills and forest land around Warsaw.

The plan: Allow the German Army to go all the way to Warsaw. Have the Polish army hold them and grind them down with concealed anti-tank weapons around Warsaw while at the same time the combined British and French Armies walk across the Rhine, take the industrial Rhur Valley from the Germans and force a capitulation of Germany.

…

I believe that Panzerknacker posted an interesting thread on one of the most potent anti-tank rifles in the world at that time that was developed by the Polish Army. Sadly, the weapon was kept mostly secret and in armories - limiting not only the Poles training with the weapon and preventing its general use as the vast majority of the Polish Army was not even AWARE such a rifle existed. With the speed of the Heer advance, the resulting chaotic situation, and the general ignorance of the weapons forced the abandonment of many of them. No one knows what impact numbers of these rifles distributed would have achieved as a man portable anti-armor weapon. But there is little doubt that they would have been effective against the thin armor of the first and second generation panzers…

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wz._35_anti-tank_rifle

[steben]

@Nickdfresh

I believe that Panzerknacker posted an interesting thread on one of the most potent anti-tank rifles in the world at that time that was developed by the Polish Army. Sadly, the weapon was kept mostly secret and in armories - limiting not only the Poles training with the weapon and preventing its general use as the vast majority of the Polish Army was not even AWARE such a rifle existed. With the speed of the Heer advance, the resulting chaotic situation, and the general ignorance of the weapons forced the abandonment of many of them. No one knows what impact numbers of these rifles distributed would have achieved as a man portable anti-armor weapon. But there is little doubt that they would have been effective against the thin armor of the first and second generation panzers…

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wz._35_anti-tank_rifle

Actually, the Poles did a great job anti-tank-wise. I can’t elaborate at this instant, yet the Germans lost a big deal of their light armoured panzers to anti-tank guns.
Again, the panzer drive’s succes depended a lot on the spread of anti-tank weapons, resulting in poor firepower density where the panzer spearheads punched though. An error the allies didn’t correct enough the next year as well, when they mistakenly relied more on the Ardenne pines than their guns.

[Nickdfresh]

@steben

Well, some remarks on this: Germany din’t only have the industry as well (they made more projects than UK+US) but had better designs as well IMHO.

The problem was - as you mentioned - the Germans did not have the resources to USE them and surely couldn’t handle the maintenance.

Germany’s industry was a complete clusterf***. This was something endemic to Hitler’s regime as he seemed to enjoy reigning over chaos and bitter rivalries for his affections. Germany didn’t even go over to a full war economy until after the US entered and had already planned her increased output under the peacetime (semi) mobilization of 1940-41. Speer was the one who brought order to the chaos and Germany did not have anything close to the industry necessary for fighting a two front war.

As for their better designs, those were still somewhat late and largely in-response to the Red Army’s T-34s and KV-1s and the Germans never quite solved all the ‘teething’ problems of their Tigers or Panthers, at least not with the need of quick fixes and “Jerry-rigging.” I would also add that the German fixation on “bigger and better” (but mostly bigger) tanks and the multitude of designs was almost as much of a problem as they had too many projects in the hands of too many different groups. This detracted from the ideal of a more coherent production program to get the troops more Panthers augmented by Panzer Mark IV’s, a few Tigers as breakthrough tanks/tank destroyers, and dedicated TDs such as the Stuggs & Jagdpanzers IMO.

The United States also had some “better designs” which were largely relegated to stateside as the US Army’s Ordinance Dept. conducted much research based on the feedback of actual ground commanders who indicated quite clearly that the “Tank Destroyer Doctrine” was working according to plan. These were only really brought into the European Theatre of Operations at the end and bore fruition in such models as the M-26 Pershing, which itself was loosely based on the Sherman’s supposed successor, the M-27, as design similar to the T-34 in specifications…

[steben]

@Nickdfresh

Germany’s industry was a complete clusterf***. This was something endemic to Hitler’s regime as he seemed to enjoy reigning over chaos and bitter rivalries for his affections. Germany didn’t even go over to a full war economy until after the US entered and had already planned her increased output under the peacetime (semi) mobilization of 1940-41. Speer was the one who brought order to the chaos and Germany did not have anything close to the industry necessary for fighting a two front war.

As for their better designs, those were still somewhat late and largely in-response to the Red Army’s T-34s and KV-1s and the Germans never quite solved all the ‘teething’ problems of their Tigers or Panthers, at least not with the need of quick fixes and “Jerry-rigging.” I would also add that the German fixation on “bigger and better” (but mostly bigger) tanks and the multitude of designs was almost as much of a problem as they had too many projects in the hands of too many different groups. This detracted from the ideal of a more coherent production program to get the troops more Panthers augmented by Panzer Mark IV’s, a few Tigers as breakthrough tanks/tank destroyers, and dedicated TDs such as the Stuggs & Jagdpanzers IMO.

The United States also had some “better designs” which were largely relegated to stateside as the US Army’s Ordinance Dept. conducted much research based on the feedback of actual ground commanders who indicated quite clearly that the “Tank Destroyer Doctrine” was working according to plan. These were only really brought into the European Theatre of Operations at the end and bore fruition in such models as the M-26 Pershing, which itself was loosely based on the Sherman’s supposed successor, the M-27, as design similar to the T-34 in specifications…

I do not have any doubts regarding what you are telling here, you know.
I just pointed out that “big tank projects” were not a lonesome German issue.
And yet for some reason, of course it could be I look at it too much in the german doctrine way - tank vs tank that is - I pull the card of the German heavy designs.

And, yes, Germany didn’t have the monopoly on design as well. The T34 was exactly what the soviets needed in this war. The M4 may as well have been the perfect design for the US doctrine.

[ubc]

@Nickdfresh

But not tanks. Their total of production was a drop in the bucket compared to the Allies. They only held on mainly because they were fighting defensively by 1944, and the Allies all had made mistakes of one form or another which prevented them from performing better against the panzers…

And Hitler didn’t make mistakes ? Hitler was the biggest mistake that happened to Germany in the 20th century .:shock:

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/weapons_and_manpower.htm

This site underscores the figures. Germany plus Italy/Rumania & Hungry etc are easily 50,000 tanks/SPGuns. Compared to Russia, they have a 2:1 advantage, while the west would be a little less since something like 20-25% of the allied forces were in the Pacific fighting the Japanese.

Combined the allies have 4:1 advantage but if Germany can fight each allie seperately, they can defeat any invasion of “Europa”…that is if numbers alone were the deciding factor Especially if you consider production near the end. The combined allied production in 1944 was 51,000 tanks & SPguns, while Germany produced 19,000 tanks and SPGuns. Which suggests the allied advantage was disappearing. In this case the allied combined advantage is only 2.7:1 bearly enough to succeed. One can see why Stalin needed the second front so much and clearly even with this, more was needed. This is where allied Strategic Bombing campaign comes in, because the first thing they were able to achieve after neutralising the Luftwaffe, was to bomb the German fuel industry into extinction. Its kind of hard to wage mechanize warfare without any fuel.

[Trap77]

What a fine and totally cool discussion we have going on. Great responses.

About those Italian/Rumanian/Hungarian tanks, and forces: Most of those people did not like fighting and dieing for the 3ed Reich. The Italians produced crappy tanks, because FIAT simply did not want to militarize. The Italians build cool sports cars but not tanks.

Second line troops don’t do that well agiant top first line troops. Every battle in WWII shows that, on all sides.

But, it was a huge fault of Hitler: Being mean to others, especially his friends. That strategy never works. Hitler self-isolated and that was a major downfall.

As for my point about German Army tank strength; I was making the point that a major concerted effort to take out the German Main Battle tanks in France might have slowed the German advance enough for the superior numbers of Frence troops to carry the day.

As for the 109, as good as it was, the Spitfire was better. The 109 was based on a German race plane. Good speed and agility, poor fuel capacity and hard to land.

[steben]

@Trap77

As for my point about German Army tank strength; I was making the point that a major concerted effort to take out the German Main Battle tanks in France might have slowed the German advance enough for the superior numbers of Frence troops to carry the day.

Well, I guess the French might 've thought just that, yet they simply couldn’t make it happen because of rigid old command structure against the communication&command marvel of the speedy German army. And again: the allies were decieved.

As for the 109, as good as it was, the Spitfire was better. The 109 was based on a German race plane. Good speed and agility, poor fuel capacity and hard to land.

Ok, but talking about blitzkrieg on the western continent, that didn’t matter that much.

[steben]

… and even if struck by admiration of Hitler’s plans and bravery… and even if you wanted the communistst to have lost etc…

Wouldn’t it have been better the Germans still would have become more like we are (and therefor like they are today themselves) after the war? I mean: if Germany would have won, what the hell would be the benefits if they wouldn’t have changed their ways?

I’m asking this because of the sheer internal problem I have for myself: I never liked Stalin to gain so much out of WWII, yet a Europe under Nazi rule would’ve been like the history of eastern Europe, yet this time up to Le Havre…

Let’s say I point my arrows more at continentals. Non-Europeans will easily say: hell yeah mister, of course.

[Rising_Sun]

@steben

I mean: if Germany would have won, what the hell would be the benefits if they wouldn’t have changed their ways?

The Nazis would have got what they wanted, which is why they went to war.

Just like everybody else who starts a war of aggression aims to get what they want.

Imposing their will and system on the conquered territories for their own benefit are the benefits.

[Nickdfresh]

@ubc

And Hitler didn’t make mistakes ? Hitler was the biggest mistake that happened to Germany in the 20th century .:shock:

Of course he did. I think I’ve pointed out many of them in this thread or another. But I was speaking in terms of doctrine - specifically the US Tank Destroyer doctrine that was formulated in the panic of unpreparedness and the Fall of France in 1940 and misinterpreting the lessons of the rapid collapse due to German armor. This caused the US to keep the M-4 Sherman tank virtually unchanged until far too late in 1944, and it inhibited the development of bigger, better tanks such as the M-26 Pershing until the final push into Germany when its impact was more psychological than military. It could have been deployed by the late summer of 1944…

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/weapons_and_manpower.htm

This site underscores the figures. Germany plus Italy/Rumania & Hungry etc are easily 50,000 tanks/SPGuns. Compared to Russia, they have a 2:1 advantage, while the west would be a little less since something like 20-25% of the allied forces were in the Pacific fighting the Japanese.

Just numbers. Firstly, how many did the Allies produce? Secondly, most Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian stuff was obsolete and on another, much lower level than the Allied equipment produced after 1941. The Italians were knocked out of the Axis by 1943 and at least some of their equipment was on the side of the Allies. And if you add up the numbers of German panzers actually not obsolete by 1942 (the Pz Mk IV, Panther, Tiger, King Tiger, and the last versions of the Pz Mk III IIRC) and even add the assault guns/tank destroyers such as the Stug and Jagdpanzer, and its a drop in the bucket against American production of the Sherman, various tank destroyers, and the Pershing. Then factor in the British and certainly the massive Soviet production of the T-34 and IS2s.

Even with the US and Commonwealth commitment to the Pacific, there were only so many tanks needed as Shermans were used mainly in an infantry support role as volcanic island geography generally did not favor tanks or battles of maneuver, and much of it was second rate until 1944…

Combined the allies have 4:1 advantage but if Germany can fight each allie seperately, they can defeat any invasion of “Europa”…that is if numbers alone were the deciding factor Especially if you consider production near the end. The combined allied production in 1944 was 51,000 tanks & SPguns, while Germany produced 19,000 tanks and SPGuns. Which suggests the allied advantage was disappearing. In this case the allied combined advantage is only 2.7:1 bearly enough to succeed. One can see why Stalin needed the second front so much and clearly even with this, more was needed. This is where allied Strategic Bombing campaign comes in, because the first thing they were able to achieve after neutralising the Luftwaffe, was to bomb the German fuel industry into extinction. Its kind of hard to wage mechanize warfare without any fuel.

How would the Germans fight each allied nation separately? Even if they only fought the Soviet Union bucked-up by US support, they might have achieved a stalemate, but complete unconditional Soviet surrender was probably highly unlikely. Secondly, play with numbers all you want, but the Luftwaffe was largely shot out of the air by 1944 and there was little fuel for extended operations. The Allies, especially the US, actually began paring down production by 1944, as well as her conscription manpower, because they already had more than they could move via the sea. And much more than they would need after the defeat of Germany…

You are also ignoring the cliche of the German Heer and SS being a steel tipped arrow on a shaft of wood. They were towing their Panthers by oxen in Normandy by early 1944 and came nowhere near the United States in production in trucks and soft-skinned field cars. All this while the Wehrmacht was still a rail-bound army using horses and ox-carts while the US and GB forces were almost totally mechanized. The Soviet Red Army was also still somewhat reliant on rail and horse, but significantly less so than the Heer. This thanks to the massive shipments of Jeeps and Dodge/Studebaker trucks from the US…

[Nickdfresh]

This thread seems very much related to one started, and somewhat pointless, possibly intentionally so. And again, it’s in the wrong forum.

I’m not trying to be a prick here, but why do a bunch of posters who started this month seem intent on spamming the wrong forum with nearing a dozen threads on innocuous Hitler-topics?

[Rising_Sun]

@Nickdfresh

… but why do a bunch of posters who started this month seem intent on spamming the wrong forum with nearing a dozen threads on innocuous Hitler-topics?

An unquenchable thirst for knowledge?

[steben]

@Nickdfresh

This thread seems very much related to one started, and somewhat pointless, possibly intentionally so. And again, it’s in the wrong forum.

Funny that it ended up here once I used the word “military”, but actually my question is not really military related. I think I understand what you mean with wrong forum.

I’m not trying to be a prick here, but why do a bunch of posters who started this month seem intent on spamming the wrong forum with nearing a dozen threads on innocuous Hitler-topics?

My post doesn’t really focusses on Hitler or his favourite movie. I’m talking about exactly the same proces you talk about (the "what if…"s). I wanted to confront the question about the war with question about the afterwar.

[steben]

@Rising_Sun

An unquenchable thirst for knowledge?

Only all the people and processes besides and around Hitler are subject of and to knowledge, not Hitler himself. I think we all know enough about him by now.

[steben]

@Nickdfresh

…This caused the US to keep the M-4 Sherman tank virtually unchanged until far too late in 1944, and it inhibited the development of bigger, better tanks such as the M-26 Pershing…

…and its a drop in the bucket against American production of the Sherman…

Well, the Sherman can’t have been bad then after all?

I value the Sherman better than the T34, you know. At least as infantry tank, it was very good. The war itself shows us all that the way the allies fought had succes, not? I think the mere production rates of Germany and the US, simply justified the Sherman.

[ubc]

Nick

Firstly this thread doesn’t belong to anyone in particular and all are welcome to contribute. If you don’t like the fact that we are going over ‘old ground’, then exercise your right not to participate. Don’t read or post on this thread, thats what the rest of us do. People are entitled to their opinions and have a right to express them too.

You argue that allied micromeddling their doctrine was some how important in underminding allied war efforts, but Hitlers complete rejection of German military doctrine and replacing it with his own half assed seige mentality, is not relevant? This is an odd POV.

You comment on obsolete Axis tanks, but ignor that 1/3 of all allied tanks built during the war were light tanks and by defination obsolete, compared to medium and heavy tanks. Fact is all tanks can be useful if you know how.

Most of the 19,000 tanks produced in 1944 were StugIII/JagpzIV/PzIV/or the heavies.If we break it down we have

~ 5000 tanks/Spguns based on Tiger/Panther chassie
~ 13,200 Tanks or SPguns base on the Pz III/IV chassie
~ 700 Sp guns based on Pz II/38t

In 1944 the Russians produced
~ 6000 light tanks or SPguns
~ 18,000 T-34 and SU AFVs
~ 5,000 heavy tanks and ISU AFVs

Allied figures are rather obscure so some one else will have to supply them.

The other examples you site are anachdotal and thus not useful to this discussion.

[Trap77]

Quick point about the Sherman:

It was the tank that the LST’s and other transports were designed to carry and deposit on the Beaches of Normandy. That fact alone makes it the ‘choice’ tank for the Allies in Western Europe through the fall of 1944.

Recall also that the port of Antwerp does not become operational for the allies until well into the fall of '44. The lion share of the supplies were being landed on the beaches of Normandy until Antwerp becomes operational.

Given the size and weight of a Heavy Tank, no to mention fuel consumption, the real need was to get the MOSTEST into battle the quickest…choce: Sherman M4

As far as Sherman v. T34 goes…look to Korea for that answer. Things got ugly for the Sherman against the T34 in that Theater.

[steben]

@ubc

You comment on obsolete Axis tanks, but ignor that 1/3 of all allied tanks built during the war were light tanks and by defination obsolete, compared to medium and heavy tanks. Fact is all tanks can be useful if you know how.

True.
Just the simple fact the blitzkrieg succeeded with rather light equiped divisions gives your quote enormous credit.

Most of the 19,000 tanks produced in 1944 were StugIII/JagpzIV/PzIV/or the heavies.If we break it down we have

~ 5000 tanks/Spguns based on Tiger/Panther chassie
~ 13,200 Tanks or SPguns base on the Pz III/IV chassie
~ 700 Sp guns based on Pz II/38t

In 1944 the Russians produced
~ 6000 light tanks or SPguns
~ 18,000 T-34 and SU AFVs
~ 5,000 heavy tanks and ISU AFVs

Why would one wonder Stalin wanted a double front?
If you put this figures bext to battle results/value things would have gone nasty for the soviets.

[steben]

@Trap77

Quick point about the Sherman:
Recall also that the port of Antwerp does not become operational for the allies until well into the fall of '44. The lion share of the supplies were being landed on the beaches of Normandy until Antwerp becomes operational.

Given the size and weight of a Heavy Tank, no to mention fuel consumption, the real need was to get the MOSTEST into battle the quickest…choce: Sherman M4

voila!
Tank design in summary

As far as Sherman v. T34 goes…look to Korea for that answer. Things got ugly for the Sherman against the T34 in that Theater.

I don’t know enough about that to comment.
I sure know on the other hand that Israel used with succes the Sherman Firefly.

I must admit I rather spoke of the 1942-1945 period and definitely not to ground the T34/85 - of which I think it was the main Korean match - which had for once a good gun. The 34/76 was in my eyes rather a design phase than a historic MBT.