Try stoicism…
Working backwards, all the tank production I mentioned was new built production and did not include any of the ~4000 tanks that were captured and converted during the war.
Of course, as they were almost useless as anything other than tractors and gun turrets after 1942. Czech and French designs, too deficient for much more than infantry support even in the early part of the war. The Czech panzers were reliable and effective, but they were quickly obsolete.
But as Steben pointed out since the German Blitzkrieg was sharpened on a tank force that was mostly Pz-I & II, it clearly points out that atleast the Germans knew how to use tanks no matter what there potential. In combat its the relative difference in the troop training and doctrine that determines success, not the number on one side vs the other.
The German tank forces generally encountered small numbers of French tanks as the French had a completely different conceptualization of what an armored battle would be and spread their forces thinly across a wide front for infantry support accordingly. What armor they did mass, they sent charging headlong in an ill-advised thrust into Belgium to meet the perceived main German attack. In theatres such as the Belgian frontier, there were instances where French tanks bested the Germans and fought them to a temporary standstill. However, French armor was ill-suited for tank vs. tank combat in design, tactics, and command-and-control. The Germans were well aware of their own deficiencies and very few PzIs or IIs actually were in the spearhead. When numbers of French tanks were encountered, the Germans relied on PzIIIs, IVs, and various Czech types to quickly overwhelm them.
It should be noted that there were few instances where the French, or the BEF for that matter, deployed their armor in a concentrated front and counterattacks to cut off the German axis of advance were attempted. But when they did, most notably in De Gaulle’s attack and in the BEF counterattack using Matildas, they too caused panic in the German lines. But it was too little, too late.
Thats a western military doctrine/obession. We refer to it as bean counting. Pretty much every major oponent the Germans squared off against through the first two years of the war out numbered them in tanks and yet they the Germans still beat them. Clearly the number of tanks do not determine the success or failure of a campaign/battle.
Actually, you’re the one with the “obsession.” You’re repeating the typical myth that the Heer/SS was some unstoppable juggernaut that could only be defeated by massive numbers, and yet they could overcome such numbers using their mad skills of “Schwerpunkt.” While this was true for the first couple years, by the end of Barbarossa, the superiority of the Wehrmacht began to show cracks and in a battle of attrition or when encountering unexpected tactical situations they did not control nor initiate. That’s part of warfare and also a standard by which an army must be judged, not just how well they out-plan their initial enemies at the outset of a war where they control the initiative. In many instances, the German Army was often no better than their adversaries. Their adversaries caught up by 1942-43. Was either Patton or Zhukov any lessor than the German generals of their period?
You’re also repeating the myth of the monolithic Wehrmacht/Heer/Waffen SS in that you are implying the Wehrmacht was the same consistent, known quality from 1939 to 1945 when nothing could be further from the truth. The hard realities of defeats and battles of attrition had fundamentally changed the training of recruits and the tactics employed soldiers in the field by 1943 to a fundamentally defensive situation where they were forced to ‘play not to lose rather than win’ (to use a sports analogy). The ability to conduct large scale offensives using “Schwerpunkt” had been lost, and their adversaries -especially the US and Red Armies, were now far more capable on conducting the large battles of maneuver as they were completely or partially mechanized whilst the Germans still had an army of panzers ans well trained infantry followed by horse and oxes dependent on railroads…
Only people who focus on strategic wars of attrition, obsess with tank numbers ,
You mean like the “people” who won WWII. 
Only people who focuses on a narrow set of circumstances where the Wehrmacht was superior to their enemies at the start of the War are apologists for the losers. Schwerpunkt worked in small spaces and ideal tank country such as France. In the vast expanses of the Soviet Union, or against an ever more competent enemy such as the British Eighth Army, however it ‘blew its wad’ and ran out of steam…
…because they need the tank relative capability, as an fallable attempt to assign numerical value to quantity of tanks, so it all can be crunched up into some ‘science of war’ equation. Germans understood that ‘Art of War’ is the key to understanding and succeeding in war. So they had a doctrine based on ‘task orders’ assigned to lesser commanders and then giving them the resources and freedom of maneuver to excute their task at hand.
You’ve completely misunderstood their conceptualizations then. The reason Germany relied on “Schwerpunkt” was in a sense out of desperation. They needed to inflict a quick and decisive victory on France and Britain in 1940 as they knew they were fucked in a War of attrition. The French and the British knew this as well which is why they delayed the start of major operations for as long as they could. Both sides knew the Germans had the advantage in training, tactics, and experience in 1940 in mechanized warfare, which is why the French were hoping for a major defensive engagement that would bloody for the Germans and take away their one advantage in resources -a manpower ratio advantage of 2:1. They then hoped to go over to the offensive once their advantages in Naval power, raw materials, and industrial might was realized by 1941 and when Germany presumably would be isolated by blockade and diplomacy…
This is refered to as “Auftragstaktik”, which featured ‘untrammeled authority’ to allow freedom of command up and down the chain of command. When Hitler took over C-in-C position of the OKW and sacked his top Panzer Generals after the failure at the gates of Moscow in Dec 1941, he sent a chilling message up and down the line, that loyalty to the Furher was far more important than the doctrine of “Auftragstaktik”. Increasingly as Hitlers Politics took over , Military leaders were promoted based on party loyalty rather than command ability.
Um, it wasn’t Hitler that threatened both Rommel and Guderian with courts martial during their relentless drives for basically ignoring and countermanding orders to periodically halt their panzers in France during “Sickle Cut” to allow the infantry to catch up. There never was such a thing as complete "untrammeled authority as it was the general staff that allowed some tactical autonomy, but demanded overall control. It was only under Hitler that such a daring attack plan into France came into fruition. You can’t just take the lousy, incompetent Hitler you want to blame for the loss of the War without acknowledging that Hitler sort of knew what he was doing and was willing to take gambles for victory his generals weren’t in the beginning, for the most part, early on and he prodded his generals to “think outside the box” for Fall Gelb and Rot…
Secondly, Hitler was responding to the fact that there was little secret that his generals of Army Group Centre were the main yoke of anti-Nazi resistance in the German Army because it was they who began to realize that a strategic, complete victory over the Soviet Union was highly unlikely once the US entered the War. Also, what would anyone else have achieved as the Wehrmacht was fundamentally unable to supply its forces with the necessary gear to contend with the Russian winter? What difference did it make at that point? The die had been cast by the Winter of 1941. The Japanese Nonaggression pact had freed up Soviet forces from the Far East and the latest T-34s were now encountered in numbers shocking the Germans. What tactical freedom would alter the balance for this? And the German command was always centralized. otherwise how does one control and sync the actions of three massive army groups?
…From that point on Hitler increasingly suffocated any operational maneuver and initiative, forcing all Division movement orders to only come from OKW…completely counter to the whole spirit and excution of “Auftragstaktik”.
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Then what was The Battle of Kursk all about? Are you implying that the Soviets knew the Enigma secrets, or even needed them, for that one? They were well aware of where the Germans were going to attack in their great do-or-die offensive merely by the massing of the forces and they simply countered it with massive works, armored counter thrusts, and an apocalyptic battle that was more to Ivan’s liking than it was Fritz’s. And the Red Army broke their ability to sustain a large battle of maneuver on the Eastern Front forever…
This was the real turning point of the war. Before that the German strategy of avoiding a two front war by sequentially defeating there enemys through lighting campaigns of mobility to defeat the armies of their enemies, with a very cost effective doctrine; ruled the day. After this point Hitler locked Germany into a two front war of attrition it could not win , even without the benifit of this highly effective doctrine… She was doomed from that point on.
Agreed.
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