Nick, leave Herman alone!
Oh please, that was a response to your own arrogant posting of:
Only people who focus on strategic wars of attrition, obsess with tank numbers ,
So what should we “focus on?” The happy times when the panzers ran free bereft of the realities if their factory origins?
Your painting with a very wide brush with such generalisations that when you include such insulting comments, you are no longer discussing the post or thread , but arguing boardering on flaming. When its common knowledge that you are the moderator, you set the tone for the thread and the board in general .
You’ve thrown out plenty of insults of your own, sunshine. I’m “flaming?” No, actually, you claiming some innate superiority of knowledge (which you’ve done at several points here) would be trolling…
I have no time for argument. In that last post of mine only the first sentence refered to you and as such I used your name. The rest was to the discussion atlarge which I indicated and also referenced. Its in the post.
Yes Stalin is equally to blame for Soviets defeat in Barbarossa, while Hitler is to blame for Germanys defeat at the gates of Moscow. It was his unrealistic schedule that had the Wehrmacht defeat the Red Army by Smolensk, a mistake that he further compounded by diverting the main emphasis of the invasion from Moscow to the flanks. Anyone who has studied the Blitzkrieg in its excution would have know that [as was the case with the counter attacks by the allies in France 1940], the Soviets were too committed to forward defence, to mount any effective counter offensive, so the flanks were no were near as vulnerable as Hitler feared.The Kiew operation was a waste of time and resources.
Um, my basic understanding is that the operations in the Ukraine were to gain valuable foodstuffs, and further to deny them to the Soviets, which hardly seems a waste of time or resources. Secondly, what good have taking Moscow have been in the end? What would this have achieved? Napoleon took Moscow and still lost. The real problem was not the diversion to the flanks, but the complete lack of winter equipment getting to the troops in time to stave off the effects of the Winter that the Wehrmacht would never really recover from.
And the Soviets would have mounted a counter offensive regardless of whether the Germans entered Moscow or not. Even if they entered the city, what would that have meant?
However reviewing Soviet prebarbarossa wargames its clear they had not understood the sheer increase in tempo of operations that this new method of fighting implied. The Germans achieved in a matter of days, what the soviet 1940 wargames assumed would take weeks.
Maybe, but the Germans at least knew that June of 1941 would not be a “wargame.” Had the Soviets anticipated the attack many knew was coming, the Germans would have suffered even greater casualties. Certainly, they would have pushed the Red Army back regardless. But the Red Army units that went over to high alert under the guise of “readiness exercises” performed far better than those that were sleeping…
BTW Mansteins Kharkow -Kursk operation was supposed to sequential excuted in April May 1943. Instead Hitler intervened and tried to turn such an operational maneuver into a summer offensive. But the operational maneuver was based on the fluid situation in April 1943 , not the summer when the Soviets knew where Hitler intended to attack and had months to prepare for it. The Soviets had their own share of spys in the west.
Firstly, it was not just Hitler that intervened, it was was the majority of the general staff opposing any hasty offensives as the Heer suffered terribly the previous winter. Zhukov knew where the attack was coming in April even before the “Lucy Ring” tipped off the Kremlin as it was an obvious target area and the Soviets know were conducting constant battlefield reconnaissance and such a large scale operation was impossible to hide and were able to deduce that a thorn in the German lines would be unacceptable to any sound commanders. As it was, the Germans barely had time to rush their knew Tigers and Panthers to the battle area before the timeline of the operation to not only make good their losses, but to match the Soviet machines already online…
Several German commanders mentioned in their memoirs that the operation could’ve still become a success if it wasn’t aborted because of the allied Sicily landings…
I recall that on some British series on the History Channel, but it was a bloody, disorganized brawl by that point anyways. This may be a case where Hitler really screwed himself as Germany could have effectively ceded Italy and fortified the mountainous frontiers and effectively kept the Allies pinned down. But then, I think OKW feared that if Hannibal could cross the Alps with elephants, maybe Monty or Clark could have done it with Shermans…
Hannibal didn’t have aeroplanes.
A greater and more immediate threat was that airbases in Italy gave the Allies a vastly improved range into German occupied areas.
Kharkow-Kursk was not planned as a summer offensive, but excuted as a spring counter offensive [March-April 1943] to set up for any summer offensive. But Manstein wanted any build up of forces to be used as more counter offensives. The Drive on Kursk was supposed to just straigten out the line prior to any summer action. The shortened line would free up valuable forces. The inital halt was asked to regroup the panzer groups before resuming, but would only have lasted a couple of weeks. However Hitler intervened and delayed the whole process to turn it into a “summer offensive” a couple of months later.
The primary aim Hitler might have had for Kiew was not part of the original plan. In fact the original plan emphasised to avoid diverting the main effort from Moscow. Economic arguments never figured in these military campaigns. The original plan was to reach Moscow as fast as possible and take out the political center of Russia. However the original plan also envisaged that the Red Army could be defeated by Smolensk, followed by a quick march on Moscow.
The winter fighting had little to do with the problems, it was more to do with the lack of planning for railway traffic/conversion to allow supplies to be pushed forward fast enough for the armies to keep marching. Since Hitler was so convinced the Red Army was weak and could be beaten by Smolensk, the planning for railway conversion/prepwork extended only to Smolensk.
Had Hitler taken the Red Army seriously, they would have planned for railway supply all the way to Moscow and made more of an effort to build up railway construction units. As a result of the defeat of France, Germany had twice as much railway freight cars and locomotives and had considerable latitued to divert such resources and personnel to extended the logisitical mission to Moscow and beyond. Once Moscow is reached it can be encircled and isolated and defences built up for the inevitable counter attack. If the Germans can get there before the winter they can dig in sufficently to weather a serious increasingly desperate Soviet counter attacks through 1942, thus sapping the Red Army resources. This inturn should free up German resources for operational maneuvers in 1942, to sweep through the south to cut off the Baku oil from the Red army, bringing them to the point of collaspe.
Wow,
I think we have enough material here to form the basis of a good book.
Yes, ultimatly Hitler could not bring himself to understand that the Russians were inflicting losses on the German Army that the Germans could not afford nor replace. While, on the other hand, the Russians could call upon their vast reserves in manpower and material from their Eastern streaches in Siberia.
Ther Germans were amazed at how Soviet armies could almost materialize our of no where. Siberia saved Western Russia in WWII.
Kursk: That should have its own thread.
I submit that ultimatly it was the courage and determination of the Soviet Soldier that won the day in that battle, that couldron of death. Again, the Soviets were able to call upon vast reinforcements during the last days of the battle that turned the tide.
(I still say that Hitler wanted to deliver a final ‘punch in the nose’ in that theater against the Soviets and then attempt to consolidate his holdings in the East)
Oh and perhaps that famous historian and author that was referred to earlier is Alan Clark who wrote the stunning book "Barbarossa’.
<<Salute>>
You guys Kill Me!!..LOLOLOL;)
Rising Sun* leave Nick alone!
Um, I don’t have my books handy but I think it wasn’t just Hitler that halted the panzers, those were orders given by OKH and the Germans were having numerous problems and it was a collective decision, not merely the Furher’s prerogative (regardless of how many of the Wehrmacht generals attempted to white wash their actions and failures by placing the blame solely on Hitler. Not least of which was the devastating loss of 800,000 soldiers at and around Stalingrad. They also had an acute shortage of panzers, especially of the variety that could meet the T-34 on equal terms and final deliveries were unable to be achieved until early summer.
The primary aim Hitler might have had for Kiew was not part of the original plan.
Anyone who has ever been in a military knows that no plan survives ‘first contact.’ (no matter how little they might have actually done, like in my case)
In fact the original plan emphasised to avoid diverting the main effort from Moscow. Economic arguments never figured in these military campaigns. The original plan was to reach Moscow as fast as possible and take out the political center of Russia. However the original plan also envisaged that the Red Army could be defeated by Smolensk, followed by a quick march on Moscow.
The winter fighting had little to do with the problems, it was more to do with the lack of planning for railway traffic/conversion to allow supplies to be pushed forward fast enough for the armies to keep marching. Since Hitler was so convinced the Red Army was weak and could be beaten by Smolensk, the planning for railway conversion/prepwork extended only to Smolensk.
Had Hitler taken the Red Army seriously, they would have planned for railway supply all the way to Moscow and made more of an effort to build up railway construction units. As a result of the defeat of France, Germany had twice as much railway freight cars and locomotives and had considerable latitued to divert such resources and personnel to extended the logisitical mission to Moscow and beyond. Once Moscow is reached it can be encircled and isolated and defences built up for the inevitable counter attack. If the Germans can get there before the winter they can dig in sufficently to weather a serious increasingly desperate Soviet counter attacks through 1942, thus sapping the Red Army resources. This inturn should free up German resources for operational maneuvers in 1942, to sweep through the south to cut off the Baku oil from the Red army, bringing them to the point of collaspe.
Moscow was only the symbolic political center of Russia. It could easily have been replaced and the political leadership could have been transferred to the East just as their tank factories were sent to ‘Tankograd(s).’ Even if the Germans enter Moscow, there is absolutely no guarantee of victory just as the Germans didn’t fare well in street fighting in Stalingrad a year later. Secondly, the Winter counteroffensive by the Soviets with units released from the East by Japanese nonbelligerence may well have caused even more of a set back had AGC been fighting in street to street fighting in Moscow.
The lack of planning was thorough. But the Wehrmacht couldn’t just transfer the entire French rail system to Russia, as they still had to maintain networks in the West and occasionally feed their armies there and the French. They simply did not have the manpower to both commit large numbers of combat forces against the Soviets and still maintain a proper logistical support network. The Wehrmacht also believed they somewhat alleviated their supply problems by use of French military trucks, AFVs, tractors, etc. But found to their horror they only exacerbated their problems with maintenance, spare parts, and that the French vehicles were much less hearty than the Opels and Mercedes…
While Hitler’s emphasis to hit the Ukraine did draw off strength, it also made sense on some level. That was the breadbasket and a central communications hub for the Soviets and they would be forced to defend the area and at least theoretically the Germans would have to put less resources into occupying and defending it. What didn’t was the cruelty of the local populace inherent to the German occupation which turned many otherwise sympathetic against them. And Hitler was far from the only German to severally underestimate the fighting quality of the Soviet Union’s forces and many if not most of his generals echoed his “kick the rotten door in” thesis…
About city objectives: the madness of draining resources and manpower in order to occupy a single city is inherent to all targets. Whether Moscow or Stalingrad: if not encircled (look at 6th army themselves) no city is economic nor strategic.
The Soviet rail network with its hub in Moscow didn’t need full occupation of Moscow to be disrupted. Cutting it off was enough. And thusfar strategic factor of Moscow.
Even in war games (and we all know war games) encircling and continueous mobility is the key.
off the top of my head…this is a list of things Hitler could/should have done differently, in chronological order…
Of course hindsight is 20/20
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Development of a 4-engine bomber. This was originally a big part of the pre-war luftwaffe plan (Ju 89) but was cancelled in 1938.
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Less reliance on a blue-water German navy. They could never catch up with the British and French, and their efforts could have been much better served producing more land-based weapons. While the Germans were making enormous efforts to develop their surface navy and produce over 1000 Uboats (the Uboats admittedly did pose a viable threat), the Russians for instance produced almost no ships during the war, concentrating almost entirely on land weapons, which they used to overwhelm the Germans. The German Navy had almost 1,000,000 men at is peak late in the war. Being a land power primarily, could they afford this?
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Decision not to capture Dunkirk. After reading various memoirs, including Guderian’s and Bake’s (the panzer commander who was about 5 miles away from Dunkirk when told to stop), it is very obvious that Hitler was in a position to easily capture the city destroy the BEF, thereby possible forcing Churchill’s hand for a negotiated settlement with the British.
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Not forcing Franco to allow the Germans to capture Gibraltar.
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After the Battle of France, it was very apparent that panzers were the key to victory. Hitler ordered that panzer production be increased to 800 a month. When told the cost (2 billion Riechmarks, 100,000 workers), he decided that the toll on the civilian economy was too great, and kept production levels at the same level as before the invasion. Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt did not feel this constraint about keeping civilian production at a high rate at any time during the war. The Panzer IV had been in production since 1938, and only had 400 available for Barbarossa. This ruling starved German formations of panzers in 1941/42 when the war was still arguably winnable.
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After the victory in France, Hitler temporarily stopped all new weapons development programs. He also temporarily demobilized a large number of divisions.
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Battle of Britain. Sea Lion was always a pipe dream. Germany didn’t have the naval resources to invade Britain. The air war over Britain was just a huge drain of Luftwaffe resources that could better be used in preparation for Barbarosa.
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Getting involved in the Mediterranean. Mussolini’s incompetence forced Hitler’s hand here. Italy should have stayed out of the war entirely. The resources in fuel, armor and aircraft needed in the Med could have been much better used in the East, and may have been enough to tip the balance in Germany’s favor. If all the Panzers that had been sent to Africa up to December 1941 would have been available to send at that time to assist in the final push to Moscow, it could have dramatically changed the balance of power for AGC which had maybe 200 machines still running. I talking hypothetically, but the battle for moscow was a very close call.
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Invasion of the Balkans. This was a waste of time and resources, and later a drain of German resources, as many divisions needed to be stationed there. Hitler could not have met his May 15th Barbarosa timetable in any event (due to flooding along the Bug, and logistical issues), but they certainly could have started the offensive in early June. 2 extra weeks of good weather for German mobile troops would conceivably been enough to all for Moscow to have been captured.
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The Moscow option. If he would have kept the historical timeline, Hitler should have either focused on capturing Moscow with all of AGC’s resources, or, if he still insisted on the capture of Kiev, he should have shut down his offensive after the Viazma encirclement of operation Typhoon in early october. The soviets were surprised that the Germans even started typhoon so late in the year given the fact that the autumn rains would completely immobilize both armies. Hitler could have dug his armies in, waited out the winter weather, and with prepared positions, easily repulsed the Russian winter counter offensives, without the massive loss of men and equipment that came with the disaster in front of Moscow in late 1941.
Declaring war on America. This was insanity. He was already fighting on two fronts, and in an unprovoked fashion, declared war on the mightiest industrial power on earth. He declared war right after Pearl Harbor. It is very doubtful that the US Congress would have declared war on Germany until Hitler forced their hand. This led to America being in a position on November 1942 for land throughout North Africa in Operation Torch, which happend at the same time as the defeat at El Alamein and the initial encirclement at Stalingrad. Torch left Hitler with no choice but to occcupy all of France, needing a large number of divisions to do so…divisions that could otherwise have been routed to the East to possibly relieve Stalingrad. As it was, only the 6th Panzer division could be spared for the task, and this was not enough.
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Hitler’s “Norway Fixation”. Hitler stationed more than 400,000 troops in Norway, where they bascially did nothing for 5 years. For instance, if even half of those troops could have been shipped over to AGN, the capture of Leningrad could have very conceivably been accomplished in 1941, thereby resulting in the freeing of a large number of divisions for deployment elsewhere.
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Hitlers insistence of giving up no captured ground. AGC’s front line looked like a jigsaw puzzle with half the pieces missing in 1942. By straightening out the line, he could have easily had another dozen divisions available for other parts of the front…namely the south, where the main focus of German activity was in 1942.
Treatment of the occupied territories’ population. The Germans were initially greeted as liberators in the Ukraine, but everywhere in Russia, German policies led to an unprecedented partisan movement which severely affected the German’s ability to prosecute the war. If Soviet numbers are to be believed, the Germans suffered several hundred thousand casualties at the hands of partisans, and lost countless amounts of supplies along supply lines which the partisans either interdicted or destroyed.
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Sending the 11th army to Leningrad. They were a very cohesive fighting force after the fall of Sebastopol. Hitler sent part of the army to Greece (where it did nothing for the rest of the war), part to AGC, and the rest to Leningrad, where it never was used for an offensive. As Manstein says in his memoirs, keeping it in the south would certainly have paid huge dividends if it was used for protection on a flank of the 6th army. The Russians in 1942, were almost certainly not strong enough to have broken through a Don River line comprised of these troops.
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Hitler’s vacilation of Blau’s objectives. Hoth believed that an unfortified Stalingrad was ripe for the taking in July 1942 by a fast moving thrust by the 4th Panzer army. Hitler decided for no apparent reason that the 4th pz army was needed to support Army Group A (caucuses). It spent a month in a huge traffic jam (75% of all armor in the east was in area a few kilometers square ), doing nothing at all, before it was reassigned to Paulus for the drive on Stalingrad. By then, defenses were stiffened, and a chance to take Stalingrad without a bloody battle were lost…as was the entire war in the East.
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No retreat from Stalingrad. Hitler’s will would never allow a retreat, but one was certainly possible in late November 1942 (the germans had twice as many troops in the pocket as the Russians thought and they would not have initially been able to deal with that large an attacking force with their thin screen of troops), and although it would have suffered great hardships in a retreat towards the Muis, it would have put AGS in a much better situation to hold off the Russians in their 1943 offensives.
Tunisia. Hitler send massive amounts of aid to the Africa Corps once it was cornered in Tunisa, and had no hope of holding out. He allowed none of these troops to be sent back to Germany, even when defeat was definite. Over 300,000 prisoners were taken, a large percentage of which were high quality german troops and experienced panzer crews.
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Delays in the production of the ME262. large numbers of ME262’s in the summer of 1944, which should have been case, would have made the bombing campaign of the 8th air force much more difficult.
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Citadel. It went against every tenant of Blitzkreig philosophy. Attacking the enemy at the strongest point of their line without the element of surprise or numerical superiority. It was sheer lunacy, especially after the losses the previous winter. The resources squandered there made it impossible for Manstein to perform another miracle like the one he did the previous winter in recapturing Kharkov.
end of part 1
continued…
- Hitlers repeated inability to see the reality of the Eastern front after Citadel. He insisted on holding on to the Donetz basin, the Crimea, the Kuban bridgehead, without the troops to do so. His overextended divisions were never in a position in the South to form a line of any strength, and his divisions were defeated piecemeal. The Russians had massive superiority in men, tanks, and thanks to lend-lease, mobility in the form of 1000,s of excellent american trucks now starting to arrive in huge numbers (420,000 total).
Private Armies…His sanctioning of the Luftwaffe field divisions, the Volkstrum, and the SS. With infantry divisions being bled white on the Eastern Front, there were about a half million surplus luftwaffe personnel of excellent quality available. Goering would not let his National Socialists in the Luftwaffe be tainted by traditional German Army leadership, so insisted they be grouped in their own Divisions. They had no experienced combat leadership and were generally slaughtered by the Russians. A luftwaffe field division was the obvious place to break through a german defensive line. Instead of these potentially high-quality troops being integrated into existing depleted veteran divisions, filling out their ranks and making them formidable fighting forces, they were essentially completely wasted, while the exisiting German infantry divisions remained far understrength and of limited combat value
because of this.
The Volkstrum was an idea originally floated by Goebbles to Hitler in early 1943. He was rebuffed by Hitler. When he was finally allowed to organize it in late 1944, he reportly said, “if that fool would have allowed me to do this 18 months ago, we would not be in this mess”. The Volkstrum did allow for many more divisions to be organized, but Bormann, seeing Goering and Himmler essentially grabbed control of the Volkstrum making it is his own. Again, divisions of relatively ill equipped young boys and older men, had limited value, and could have been better utilized being integrated into existing units.
SS Troops fought hard and were of significant value, but in many cases, a private in an SS squad had the education and leadership qualities to be a non-commissioned or regular officer in an army infantry division. That, and the fact that they received the newest and best weapons, severely limiting what reinforcement was available for the regular army divisions that were fighting for their lives.
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Uboat production. Although 70%+ of German manpower was on the eastern front. over 50% of the manufacturing resources were in the West. Most of the luftwaffe, the huge effort to build the West Wall, the V weapons programs, and the U-boat production effort are examples of this. With U-boats doing less and less, would it have made more sense to limit their production (until the new XXIII boats were ready), and focus manufacturing resources on panzer, truck or support weapon production?
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Bagration. It would have been a huge disaster in any event. The Soviets were too strong for it not to have been. Hitler’s refusal to reduce the length of the front line, in order to hold onto cities like Vitebsk for “political reasons”, was a recipe for disaster. Then his no retreat orders for his largely immobile infantry divisions, made Bagration a debacle of unequaled size. As Newton, the author of Walther Model’s biography stated, Hitler’s stand fast orders turned a loss that should have been about 150,000 soldiers and having the offensive petering out around the Polish border, into a loss of over 300,000 men and the offensive going all the way to the Vistual river. The Germans were never to recover from this battle. Even the Soviets never planned for the offensive to be so successful after their huge losses in other attempts against the 9th army and other AGC formations.
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His conduct against the allied invasion. There was never a realistic chance stopping the Allies in Normandy. The allied air forces made this a forgone conclusion. In hindsight, it was time to give france up, which Hitler would never do. If the troops in the South of France and along the Atlantic Wall, which were almost all lost, could have been moved en-mass to the German border ( the old Segfried line, and other natural defensive positions), they would have very possibly outnumbered their allied attackers. I don’t believe the Allies would have had the strength to break through those lines with the 75 or so divisions they had available until well into 1945, if not longer. Think of Monte Casino, but with the Germans have vastly superior resources in men, armor and artillery. The only significant advantage the Allies would have enjoyed would have been air power, but given the rugged terrain, it would have been of limited use.
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Army Group North. First they had to stay in the Baltic States for political reasons (keeping Finland in the war). Then after Finland stabbed the Germans in the back, they stayed in Courland for the purposes of Donetz’s u-boat training. Keeping 26 good divisions in Courland while East Prussia was being raped, seems to be sheer madness (and there were also those 400,000+ troops still in Norway at this time).
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Battle of the Bulge. With the Russians on the doorstep of Berlin, was it advisable to send the German’s best armor to fight in hilly forrested terrain in the winter? It was a gamble, but one the Germans could reasonably not afford to take given the horrors that were about the face East Germany’s population at the hands of the Russians.
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No defense in depth. Elastic defense was always a word not tolerated by Hitler. With the Germans exhausted and depleted still from Bagration, Hitler insisted that German front lines be only 1-2 miles from Russian front lines along the Vistula. The 46,000 guns assembled by the Russians for their January 1945 offensive made child’s play of these defenses, destroying the divisions on the line and occupying most of East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania.
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Appointing Himmler in charge of Army Group Vistula. labled a “military ignoramous” by Guderian, Himler was appointed commander of the only army group between the Russians and Berlin. In the few weeks he was in charge, he did tremendous damage to the German army.
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Offensives in Hungary. When the Battle of the Bulge was over, and the Russians were on the Oder, the remnants of the armored forces from that battle were sent to Hungary, as well as new armored troops. With the Russians a few miles away from Berlin, sending over 1000 panzers and the only really cohesive panzer divisons to Hungary seems crazy, in spite of the few oil wells that were there.
Some of my points are certainly debateable, and I have not read all this thread. I’m not predisposed to think of Hitler as the worst commander in the history of warfare. However he was a man who placed the force his will over logic and rationality, which was an unforgivable sin. After looking objectively at his decisions, I have to say that he certainly did more damage than any commander in history ever did to his military and his country.
It surely looks like most of your points can be summarized: strategic failure of Hitler’s views. After 41-42 it make no sense eventualy to drag criticism towards German strategic policy. We all know German command did all to ignore Hitlers medieval orders where possible. In a way it makes the Wehrmacht generals even bigger.
Yet on the other hand I don’t understand your view on the me262’s. At the point in the war where the Germans were able to build them, they ware King Tigers in the air: draining resources, halting normal production, maintenance and fuel problems… And by the way: teh Allies had ways to counter the early jets. The Mustangs were able to fight them very well.
The Moscow was far NOT just a political centre, but the general cross all the railway, water and autoban ways and lines of supplies.
Although i /m agree the capturing of Moscow wasn’t the guaranty for germans they had won the war.
The fall of Moscow also may case the Japanes Kvantung army to start an agression in Syberia. I heard also the Turkey was waiting the fall of Moscow to began an attack of Caucaus alongside the Axis powers.
The lack of planning was thorough. But the Wehrmacht couldn’t just transfer the entire French rail system to Russia, as they still had to maintain networks in the West and occasionally feed their armies there and the French. They simply did not have the manpower to both commit large numbers of combat forces against the Soviets and still maintain a proper logistical support network. The Wehrmacht also believed they somewhat alleviated their supply problems by use of French military trucks, AFVs, tractors, etc. But found to their horror they only exacerbated their problems with maintenance, spare parts, and that the French vehicles were much less hearty than the Opels and Mercedes…
Yeah thay were much surprised by that:)
Yet they widely used the captured Chechoslovakian vehicles for the first time.
But i have to add that GErmans had discovered the most of Opels and Mersedess didn’t work when temperature fall down till the -40:)
While Hitler’s emphasis to hit the Ukraine did draw off strength, it also made sense on some level. That was the breadbasket and a central communications hub for the Soviets and they would be forced to defend the area and at least theoretically the Germans would have to put less resources into occupying and defending it. What didn’t was the cruelty of the local populace inherent to the German occupation which turned many otherwise sympathetic against them. And Hitler was far from the only German to severally underestimate the fighting quality of the Soviet Union’s forces and many if not most of his generals echoed his “kick the rotten door in” thesis…
I heard the Germans got such impression of Red Army after finnish Whinter war, that caused the big casualties among reds, mostly due to frost.But they didn’t learned the lesson from it of it untill the Winter 1941:)
BTW Hitler also underestimated the Americans as soldiers. He consider America as a “most weak link of allied coalition”.
till, at least Battle of Bulge…
I think part of the Over-estimation of the French and Under-estimation of Russia came from WW1.
There, things were pretty much the other way around. The Germans expected an easy victory in the West and tough fighting in the East.
What happened is history, the West ground itself to a standstill while the Germans could celebrate several victories in the East.
So Hitler might just not have realized that the times have changed and that the Czarist Russian Army did not equal Stalin’s army?
But even Czarists Army fought succesfully the Austro-hangarian army in 1915.Until the boslhevics has transformed the “Imperialistic war into the Civil one”.
Honestly i think the Hitler’s general “under-estimation of Russia” comes not from ww1 but from his owm “race-superiority concept” of German race over Slav race.
He never hided the fact he applied the “untermenshen ideology” to East.The general concept of Russian Army in GErmany that time was …“Boslshevic mongols hordes , leading by jewish NKVD commisars by fear”. Such army can’t fought well on definition.
So he starts very risky plan Barbarossa, having fighting Britain at back.
But don’t you think that a large part of the perceived weakness the Germans had of a Communist Army could be traced back to the behavior the soldiers showcased in 1917?
Maybe they believed that (Untermensch theory aside), a Communist army would lack the discipline and authority of a fascist/royal army.
Well the disciplice have an influence at combat effectiveness without doubt but it’s not at all. The fact that the Red Army have finaly won the Tsarist White army in Civil war would force the foreign observer to make the certain conclusion, to the favor of Red Army.
the another importaint even that Hitler simply ignored- the Soviet participater enough effective in Spanish civil war of 1936 . The Soviet wearpon and officer corp fought well there. Ad to that hte Soviet success to repel the Japane agression in Halkin-gol in 1939.
So honestly , if to look outside- the Red Army wasn’t weak like Hitler tryed to think.
The GErmans army ( i.e. the officer corp) was superior of course in 1941-43.But Red Army at least was much stronger than French army( or any other European army )that time
Wish I had a dollar for every re-play of WW2 with all the ‘What-ifs’.
Chevan is right , Hitler had no real strategic vision and stumbled from one situation to another being as opportunistic as he was in his rise to power.
The trouble with the fuhrerprinzip is that the Boss is right even when he is wrong.
Blitzkreig was a strategy that was designed to overcome Germany’s initial economic and material weakness. To win a series of short, sharp, wars by ‘knockout blows’. Even Hitler in 1939 did not believe that Germany could sustain a long war against the Western powers and expected a compromise peace after the initial battles. The unexpected success led to the gambler’s instinct to double the bet and re-double the bet.
Paul Kennedy “Rise and fall of the great powers”, suggests that, from purely economc critera, once the ‘knockout blows’ against Britain in 1940 and against Russia in 1941 had failed, the jig was really up and the war, from 1941 was only sustained by a ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories and an increasing willingness to sacrifice troops. Albert Speer confirmed the fundamental weaknesses of the Reich wartime economic system.
Hitler was also a techno-nut. He was totally besotted by new technology, especially if it promised to be bigger and better, so scarce resources were ploughed into dozens of projects that, in the final analysis were not cost-effective.
Of course, a better road to World domination would have been to form a customs union with Austria in 1936, not an anschluss. The same with Czechoslovakia and Poland–making them client states within a few years in a common currency area. Joining a military pact with Britain and France and being nice to Jews and slavs—and when the time came to invade Russia, just splinter off Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia etc into independent and aliied states----WHAT AM I SAYING—THAT’s THE EU!