Not having been there , I can only speculate, but I do know that the war dept. would have as a matter of course, constructed a scenario to plan for any possibility including an invasion by Japanese forces upon the soil of the U.S.
The probablity of such an attack was not the greatest issue, but you can be sure that Washington would plan as though it was already coming. That they may have altered their priority list later on is part of the process.
And as far as the people are concerned, in America we are the gov’t. And we try not to forget our responsibility to governing ourselves, and protecting our country and our ways. Kindest regards Mr Egorka. - Raspenau -
Well after pressure placed on Japan im sure the US government had a good idea they would be attacked. What surprised them is the level of the attack at Pearl Harbor. As a result…the US realized that if Japan had been ready that they could have easily landed in the US proper. Of course this would have been to much for the Japanese and an extremely dumb idea.
I think there were many tards in the government that thought a invasion would happen but im not convinced FDR thought this. Counter measures were put in place but nothing like that of the UK. German sub commanders were surprised to show up on the east coast of the US were all the lights we on. A welcomed contrast to Europe. One man wanted to camoflauge the White House in case of air attacks…FDR wouldnt have it. They also considered building the Pentagon without windows so it would be more structually sound. This was also aborted. There are loads of these examples and are not the decisions of a country that is worried about an immenent invasion. Or course im talking about the mainland US.
The US government was very worried about Alaska and recruited the natives there to assist in its defense. The Japanese did invade some of the Aleutians Islands.
You have to remember also that the US joined in the end of 41. Japan had been in China for sometime and the Germans were starting to get bogged down in Russia. Japan and Germany…the 2 major threats for a US invasion were already having trouble. Japan was more a threat than Germany. Germany couldnt even take out the UK when they had the chance…so the threat from them was small. Japan showed that they had the capabilities to launch effective seaborn invasions. However I think it was soon realized that an invasion of the US proper would not be to the advantage of Japan. Hence it would be silly for the US to hide behind its defences and not take the fight to the enemy. I think this becomes clear in the “Doolittle raid.” This is an attack launched in a risky manor only 4 months after the US had lost a huge chunk of their pacific fleet. Again it would appear to me that this a is a huge risk for little outcome/success for the US. Again the risk isnt that big if your not worried about a Japanese invasion.
Anyhoo thats my take on it.
Oh and one more thing…the way the government thinks about it is not how you say it to the public. You want them to join the effort and support the war…tell them that Japanese and the Germans on already on the way over. 
It’s an important point, even if Presidents and Administrations pay only lip service to it at times.
In WWII, the American people were, with rare and unimportant exceptions, united in their outrage over and determination to avenge Pearl Harbor and, shortly after, the Philippines. Their representatives in Congress reflected this, to the very end. It ensured that America, as reflected by the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, would, and could, accept nothing less than unconditional surrender.
And as far as the people are concerned, in America we are the gov’t.
Mr. Bush will not be happy to hear that!
So as I see it:
American public - alerted for possibly comming japanese and want revenge.
American Gov. - having the intelligence does not expect Japanese comming to main land but needs to meet the publics revenge urges.
Right?
So… conclusion: The poor japanse Americans were deported for no real reason what so ever except satisfying the publics revenge urges. Right? 
And you think I opened this thread for no cunning reason? Hey not! All the threads should end showing how terrible US was and how peace loving Stalin was!
Wrong.
Public opinion was an important factor but there were sound grounds for concern.
There were legitimate grounds for concern about the loyalty of many Japanese and those of Japanese descent in America, as shown by the responses to the loyalty question here http://home.comcast.net/~eo9066/1943/43-09/IA106.html
The activities of organisations such as the Black Dragon Society inside (see last link) the camps and previously were also legitimate grounds for concern.
I can’t lay my hands on it but somewhere there is an intelligence intercept by America or a statement by someone in Japan which came to American attention about the Japanese in America being ready to act against America after the war began.
Here’s the general background to the decision to intern Japanese.
Agitation for a mass evacuation of the Japanese did not reach significant dimensions until more than a month after the outbreak of war. Then,
–120–
beginning in mid-January 1942, public and private demands for federal and state action increased rapidly in tempo and volume.18 Among the first of these were letters of 16 January addressed by Representative Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica, California, to the Secretary of War and to other members of the Cabinet, urging that all Japanese–citizens as well as aliens–be moved inland from the coast and put in concentration camps for the duration of the war.19 Behind this and similar suggestions lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned, of course, by the nature and scope of Japan’s early military successes in the Pacific. A GHQ intelligence bulletin of 21 January, for example, concluded that there was an "espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nations . . . thoroughly organized and working underground."20 In conversations with General Clark of GHQ on 20 and 21 January, General DeWitt expressed his apprehension that any enemy raid on the west coast would probably be accompanied by “a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage” among the Japanese population.21 In talking with General Gullion on 24 January, General DeWitt stated what was to become one of the principal arguments for mass evacuation. “The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less . . . ominous,” he said, "in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage that there is a control being exercised and when we have it it will be on a mass basis."22
The publication of the report of the Roberts Commission, which had investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, on 25 January had a large and immediate effect both on public opinion and on government action. The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by Japanese consular agents and by Japanese residents of Oahu who had "no open relations with the Japanese foreign service."23 The latter–121–
charge, though proven false after the war was over, was especially inflammatory at the time it was made. On 27 January General DeWitt had a long talk with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California and afterward reported:
There’s a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles–in that area too–they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it’s not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don’t trust the Japanese, none of them.24
After another talk two days later with the Attorney General of California, Mr. Earl Warren, General DeWitt reported that Mr. Warren was in thorough agreement with Governor Olson that the Japanese population should be removed from the state of California, and the Army commander now expressed his own unqualified concurrence in this proposal and also his willingness to accept responsibility for the enemy alien program if it were transferred to him.25In Washington, as Major Bendetsen told General DeWitt on the same day, 29 January, the California Congressional delegation was “beginning to get up in arms” and its representatives had scheduled an informal meeting for the following afternoon to formulate recommendations for action. Some Washington state Congressmen also attended this meeting, to which representatives of the Justice and War Departments were invited. Major Bendetsen reported General DeWitt’s views to the assembled Congressmen and, though denying that he was authorized to speak for the War Department, nevertheless expressed the opinion that the Army would be entirely willing to take over from Justice, "provided they accorded the Army, and the Secretary of War, and the military commander under him, full authority to require the services of any other federal agency, and provided that federal agency was required to respond."26 The Congressmen unanimously approved a suggested program for action, which called for an evacuation of enemy aliens and “dual” citizens from critical areas, but which made no specific mention of the Japanese.
p. 120 - 2 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WH-Guard/USA-WH-Guard-5.html
Rising Sun,
What is your view on the deportation that took place during the WW2 in USSR? Do you know about them? If yes how wohuld you comment in the light of what we have mentioned in this thread already?
Egorka
It’s not an area I know anything about.
Not a chance. The US Government may have imagined so but the actual mechanics was far beyond the Japanese military.
Even if they could have landed 1 single Division in California it would have taken more resources than the whole Japanese maritime Fleet had to keep just that 1 supplied.
Think of the round trip involved for a supply ship. logistics always dictate military action.
Not to mention they would have been overrun with tanks in perfect country for armoured maneuver…
However, paranoia and overestimation of ones enemy was probably the rule of the day…
There were forts already in place at the mouth of the Puget Sound in the Pacific Northwest. If you get a chance to get out that way the forts are definitely worth checking out. The Oregon/Washington coastline would have been nearly impossible for the Japanese to invade IMO. High cliffs make up most of the coastline. And the distance they would’ve had to travel would have curtailed any sort of surprise attack.
‘Eight coastal military forts, most of them dating from the turn of the 20th century, now serve as historic state parks. Fort Columbia and Fort Worden survive almost fully intact, but all - Fort Casey, Fort Flagler, Fort Ebey, Fort Ward, Manchester and Fort Canby at Cape Disappointment - have at least some original structures and wonderful water views.’
to argue against one of my own posts on a alternative post, whislt it would be difficult to launch an intercontinental invasion on the scale of WWII (unlike the relatively small and safe invasion of US/UK of iraq - notwithstanding the “aftermath”).
The US was prepared to invade mainline japan - and without the A-bombs would have probably had to at some point, it mmust be at least a strong posibility, even if it prolonged the war and maybe by a significant factor…
now if things had gone the otherway and teh japanese had pushed the US back to its mainland politucal borders (or even just to North america) the japanese would have had the resoruces to feed its factories… it may have taken time but it could probably build a big enough “deep water” fleet… let see who built the largest battleship and largest submarines of the war - i think that was japan!?
now if the germans with a population of @60mm took on the british, russians and then the usa to varying degrees of sucess, what could have 100m japanese done againt 200m americans, (of course it depends if the USSR had still joined in with the war, would theyhave done so if they had rolled up western europe?)
and of course most of all, i an sensing people talking of a japense invasion in the 1940s … what if they had waited ??
One supposes that the risk was rather high in the imagination at a time when we had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of a truly nefarious and barbaric enemy, but the question must be directed at the ACTUAL risk which was pretty close to zero. The Japanese didn’t really have any interest in occupying the mainland of the US, or Australia, for that matter. What they had an ineterest in was holding the Anglo-saxons at arms length and discouraging them from ever interfering in their quest for 1) oil and 2) in securing their ill-gotten gains in China and Korea. They had the wholly unrealistic belief that everyone else was so incredibly inferior to them that all they had to do was surprise us and we would never return the favor. This is almost as unrealistic and stupid a belief as the one we had that the Japanese were a “short and doll like people” with buck teeth and who couldn’t see very well. Funny, except that the consequences of both beliefs led to the dropping of nuclear device on two of Japan’s cities not too long after their unscheduled visit to Pearl Harbor!
They certainly didn’t have the slightest intention of invading or occupying America but, while they had no approved operational plans or immediate strategic intentions of invading or occupying Australia, it was part of their long term ambitions, although not formed intentions, to conquer and exploit Australia, along with India and Siberia as parts of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. There is, however, uncertainty about the intentions towards Australia and India as they were not so clearly part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere as was Siberia, which was in the middle sphere. Australia and India are in the outer sphere on some conceptions of it, and apparently not on others. By early 1942 I think Australia was very clearly in it. Henry Frei’s book “Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to WWII” covers the divisions in Japanese thinking and the evolution of Japanese intentions towards Australia before and during WWII.
Here’s one consideration of the competing views http://www.users.bigpond.com/battleforaustralia/battaust/AustInvasion/JapNavy_AustInvasion.html
For my part, Dr Stanley’s propositions are based on superficial and selective ‘evidence’; elevate illogicality to an art form; and are laughable in the extreme. There are just so many things wrong with his papers that they would sustain a generation of Ph. D’s tearing them apart in detail. Or even half-way decent undergraduates.
Rising Sun, think OIL. It was all about oil The Japanese had to have it to continue their consolidation of China, Korea and Manchuria which were their main objectives. The US had cut them off from American exports and, fatally, the Dutch refused to sell it to them as well. Without oil there could be no Imperial Japanese Navy, much less Imperial Japanese Army. The Dutch, who held the East Indies (Indonesia) with a pathetically small and weak army and whose home country in any case was occupied by the Germans were easy pickings. The Indonesians were not favorably disposed towards their colonial masters, much less so than the Indians towards the British. Everyone knew the Dutch weakness, but no one could come to their assistance in time.
Where the Japanese made an absolutely fatal decision was in attacking Pearl Harbor which they did not need to do in order to secure their access to Dutch oil. Roosevelt simply could not have forced congress to acquiesce because isolationists were quite powerful in both the House and Senate. Because the Japanese failed to understand this, their attack on Pearl Harbor guaranteed their defeat on ALL fronts.
But then, the Japanese had no real plan of action beyond the brilliantly executed but fundamentally stupid plan to attack Pearl Harbor.
I think we could start a few threads out of those observations.
Taking a wider view of all the factors which led Japan to attack, I don’t agree that oil was quite as much at the heart of things as you say.
Oil was unquestionably the trigger for war once oil embargoes were imposed on Japan when it had only a year’s reserves for military action, and the militarists had been moving towards war. It was a case of strike now, or forever be doomed. In that sense, I agree that the drive for oil was the cause and the whole basis of Japan’s war.
However, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the achievement of which was specifically mentioned as the first item in Japan’s decision for war in mid-1941 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/IR-410702.html , deserves more serious consideration than it is usually given in popular and even serious Western histories. It is usually written off as a quaint Japanese notion or a smokescreen for its brutal imperialistic ambitions. This reflects the Western interpretation of Japan’s actions, with hindsight, rather than viewing them through contemporary Japanese eyes leading to the war.
The GEACPS was the result of several threads in Japanese history and thinking, the essence being the usual colonial era manifest destiny of a nation to dominate others for the good of all. Conveniently, this invariably produced massive benefits for the imperial power and few for the colonised people.
Factors peculiar to Japan which drove its extra-territorial imperial thinking were rapid population increase after it was forced to engage with the West; a severe deficiency in natural resources in Japan; expanding industrial capacity reliant largely upon external sources controlled by the major powers; and unfavourable terms of trade for its industrial and other production with the major powers. All these factors crystallised into economic crisis in the Great Depression, when Japan’s position was made worse by the protectionist measures employed by the great powers in their efforts to deal with an unprecedented economic disaster. Japan got screwed over mightily, albeit unintentionally.
The solution to these trade problems was, for Japan, a pan-Asian trade bloc centred on Japan.
It was in part the need for a large trading bloc which drove Japan’s militarily ambitious and unsustainable expansion, first into China in the early 1930‘s and later into the southward drive.
Lots of countries with lots of people (which rather contradicts the Japanese penchant in practice for reducing populations arbitrarily) meant lots of markets. Conveniently, those countries also had lots of things that Japan needed as natural resources etc, the sale of which (in practice often on at best the same terms as the major powers imposed on Japan which led it to war) would supposedly generate a vibrant trading bloc for the benefit of all in Greater Asia. And, conveniently, Japan most of all.
If Japan had had more brains, in the sense of a better understanding of so many things about the nations it attacked, and had had its ambitions been infected less by its arrogant and corrupted martial spirit, it might have chosen to take just the NEI. It would have got one third of the world’s oil production, and better still high quality crude that could be put straight into naval fuel tanks in emergencies. Ten per cent of the world’s tin just from Banka Island. Great trade items in various resources and produce from the NEI.
All without attacking Britain or America. Whether an attack on the NEI would have provoked war with America and Britain will never be known. My recollection is that there was some informal or formal pre-war agreement which might have brought America and Britain in on the Netherlands’ side if Japan attacked it, but I’m not sure just how tight it was (I had the details at one stage, but as usual I can‘t find them when I need them.). Or how likely it was to be implemented, given that Britain had a much stronger and longer arrangement with Australia that turned to dust when Japan attacked.
Speculation is always a lot of fun. So many possibilities. And you know hindsight and all that. I believe the Japanese made a tremendous and huge error in attacking the US. By attacking us, they guaranteed their own defeat. Consider this: they could attack the Dutch who had only a few pathetic troops in the Dutch East Indies, poorly equipped and of dubious morale in spite of pre-attack propaganda to the contrary, and whose own central government was in exile in London; they could attack the English, who were much better equipped but who were stretched to the point of elastic failure, especially in North Africa. The Japanese, from a strategic point of view, sensibly did both and defeated both. We won’t go into Japanese barbarity here.
But when they attacked the US, they attacked a country whose warmaking potential had not been tapped at all, so in effect they attacked a country with, by comparison to Japan, limitless resources, as opposed to two European powers who were at the limit of their resources and who could do no more. Huge mistake.
One supposes that the strategic thinking of the Japanese must have been that America, especially in the Philippines, could menace their shipping bringing resources from captured oil fields in places such as Balikpapan. Reasonable enough, except that America wasn’t at war with Japan, and wouldn’t be even after Japan had attacked Singapore, British Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies, or even Australia.
To understand this, consider that the US Congress was fundamentally isolationist in mentality. The reason Roosevelt was so limited in his options, other than Lend-Lease, which was a pretty clever subterfuge on his part, is that short of being attacked, Congress - which has the power to declare war - would not have authorized Roosevelt to go to war. We forget how powerful the isolationist sentiment in this country was at the time and it is easy to look back and see the “inevitability” of it all, but this was not so.
Therefore, if the Japanese had not attacked Hawaii or, a few hours later, the Phillipines, or any other US possession in the Pacific, the US would NOT have gone to war against Japan. Instead they would have left us in a state of tremendous ambiguity, but very much unable to act. That they did was either an act of incredible arrogance and hubris, or of stupidity, which may be the same thing. It showed an utter lack of understanding of US internal politics at the time, so one would have to surmise that their diplomatic corps didn’t do a very good job or the Japanese government didn’t want to know or wouldn’t listen.
Lastly, once having made this terrible error of attacking Hawaii, the Japanese would have been much better served by invading the islands rather than turning around and steaming back to their own home islands. Hawaii would have made a much better base than Rabaul. The anchorage at Pearl is much better, and, basing a fleet there, could have seriously impeded US progress in winning back its losses. B-17s from the mainland could reach the islands, but never make a roundtrip without refueling and not with a meaningful bomb load. One has the impression that, beyond a brilliant air strike at Hawaii, there simply was no real Japanese plan for dealing with the aftermath.
The point and purpose of the Japanese advance into the Pacific was singular - resources. Read: oil and rubber. They might have held on to it much longer if they had never attacked America, and, once having attacked it, would have held on to it longer if it had occupied the Hawaiian islands. Inevitably, it would have lost it all in the long run, but it might have gone on until 1950.
Finally, in spite of reasonable fears on the West Coast, the true risk of invasion from Japan - cooler heads knew it - was nil.
It would be interesting to read commentary from Japanese contributors but I have not seen any.
That’s my take.
QUOTE=Rising Sun*;102948]All without attacking Britain or America. Whether an attack on the NEI would have provoked war with America and Britain will never be known. My recollection is that there was some informal or formal pre-war agreement which might have brought America and Britain in on the Netherlands’ side if Japan attacked it, but I’m not sure just how tight it was (I had the details at one stage, but as usual I can‘t find them when I need them.). Or how likely it was to be implemented, given that Britain had a much stronger and longer arrangement with Australia that turned to dust when Japan attacked.[/QUOTE]
As usual, RS, well-written and thought out.
To my knowledge there was no formal or informal arrangement between the Dutch and the US in the event of war. This would have been known and the Isolationists in Congress would have howled if Roosevelt had proposed such a treaty, which, in any event, would have had to be ratified by Congress which I am quite certain in the climate of the late thirties and prior to Dec 7, 1941, it would not have done. It was literally everything Roosevelt could do to send the British 50 obsolete three-stacker destroyers in exchange for long term bases on British controlled islands. The opposition to this rather lame deal was great.
I am very intrigued by your suggestion that perhaps the Japanese should not have attacked the British either, but confined their depredations to the Dutch. I had not considered that, though it would not have given them access to rubber.
Considering the expansiveness of Winston Churchill, however, it is likely that he would have declared war on the Japanese anyway, especially since London was hosting the Dutch government in exile, but you never know.
Frankly, although I concede that there was a body of intellectual thought in Japan that believed in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, I continue to believe that in practice its main purpose was simply to gull domestic independence movements into not opposing Japanese invasions in their infamous “smash and grab” operation in the Pacific. There is simply nothing in the evidence post occupation of these countries that would lead me to believe otherwise. Japanese behavior towards natives in these countries was bad, though not as bad as towards European colonials.
A small part of the Japanese thinking was centered around Colonialism and racism. Their belief Japan was the ‘master race’ of the Asian region was deeply rooted and it was therefore their ‘right’ to carve out a new colonial empire.
Of course what they did not realize was the very people they were intent on liberating from the old colonial powers did not share this view. This situation was created by their own blind arrogance. The swift victories of the early Pacific/South East Asion blitzkreig only served to heighten this blindness and ultimately they would pay the price.
They seriously underestimated, partly due to their arrogance/racism they could hold at bay the western nations, not for one minute believing these nations would combine to carry the war to Japan.
The whole adventure was a giant gamble and not a very well planned one at that. Could the Japanese have invaded the US? No. They just did not have the forces or the resources to carry out such a venture.
To take it further, the Japanese estimated if they were to conquer Australia, one million men would be reqired for the task. One million men they did not have. How many men would have been required to invade the US?
Digger.
I’ll use Digger’s quotes but some of my comments cover aspects raised by royal744.
Agreed.
It was also consistent with German thinking in WWI and WWII and, more importantly, with the long-standing colonial practices and possessions of the major powers. And with Japan’s existing colonial possessions in Korea and the Pacific. There was nothing remarkable in that era about having colonies. Japan, and Germany, just left their run too late and had to try to expand into areas already controlled by other powers.
The question is whether Japan had a sincere belief in liberating colonial peoples or whether it was just a rationalisation for what it wanted to do. I think it was both. High minded intellectuals and others probably believed it sincerely. Militarists and economic or territorial expansionists probably used it as a rationalization for what they wanted to do anyway. The latter group was the one that had its hands on the levers of power, not the intellectuals etc. So, as I think is implicit in royal744’s comments, the colonial liberation idea should be viewed cynically so far as it was a motive or justification for the decision makers who took Japan into war, although probably there were some with a sincere belief in it. Just as there are probably some people in the current US Administration who had, and still have, a sincere belief that they were doing the Iraqis a favour by getting rid of Saddam and bringing democracy to Iraq(although it was heavily advertised before the event as nothing to do with regime change but only WMD’s), which so far has worked out about as well as Japan liberating colonial peoples.
Of course what they did not realize was the very people they were intent on liberating from the old colonial powers did not share this view. This situation was created by their own blind arrogance. The swift victories of the early Pacific/South East Asion blitzkreig only served to heighten this blindness and ultimately they would pay the price.
Agreed.
There was a noticeable change in behaviour after the war started. For example, before the war Japan courted Thailand with gifts of territory and other things, in part to get tactical advantage for the assault on Malaya. Once Japan was in the ascendant, it just took what it wanted when it felt like it from whomever happened to have it.
One thing that is routinely ignored in many of the countless books and documentaries on the Burma Railway is that many, many more impressed Asian labourers worked and died on it than Allied POW’s. Japan was an equal opportunity oppressor throughout its conquered territories.
They seriously underestimated, partly due to their arrogance/racism they could hold at bay the western nations, not for one minute believing these nations would combine to carry the war to Japan.
Agreed.
But some didn’t.
Admiral Yamamoto was the most notable. His experience in the West and in America gave him a better understanding of America, its people and its capacity than many of his contemporaries. He was reluctant to attack America but carried out his orders to the best of his considerable ability once the decision was made. His prediction that Japan would have free rein for the first six to twelve months and after that it would be on the back foot was right on the money.
The whole adventure was a giant gamble and not a very well planned one at that. Could the Japanese have invaded the US? No. They just did not have the forces or the resources to carry out such a venture.
Agreed. I am uncommonly agreeable today. It can’t last.
To take it further, the Japanese estimated if they were to conquer Australia, one million men would be reqired for the task. One million men they did not have. How many men would have been required to invade the US?
Add to that the other main reason they didn’t try to invade Australia was that they couldn’t find the shipping, or the oil, to launch and sustain an invasion. What hope did they have of finding an awful lot more shipping and oil to invade the US?
I’ve seen the reference to a million men before, but in rejecting the IJN’s bid for invading Australia in March 1942 the IJA’s realistic assessment was that it needed 12 to 15 divisions. It used only 12 in its initial assaults southwards and eastwards in 1941-42. Fifteen infantry divisions would have been about 300,000 men. When we add the support services and naval and merchant navy men, it might well have approached a million men. Which meant pretty much that Japan had to abandon or at the very least risk losing China, which was a lot more important to it than either Australia or the US, at least in economic strategy. Or try to invade America with largely green troops, which was just a path to earlier destruction on the US mainland.