To my knowledge there was no formal or informal arrangement between the Dutch and the US in the event of war.
I think you’re right. I’ve been delving into the cobwebbed recesses of my ancient mind and I think my post condensed a long process into a single agreement. What was probably at the back of my mind were informal strategic and tactical understandings reached between the US, British and Dutch commanders in NEI / Philippines / Malaya area at various conferences in 1941, which after Japan attacked led to ABDA, which in turn formally recognised the importance of defending the NEI.
I am very intrigued by your suggestion that perhaps the Japanese should not have attacked the British either, but confined their depredations to the Dutch. I had not considered that, though it would not have given them access to rubber.
I think Japan might have got away with it. America didn’t want war, for the reasons you gave, and neither did Britain because it had its hands full elsewhere.
The risk to Japan was that, given the British and American hostility and embargoes arising from its conduct in China, invading the NEI would only produce more of the same. This might lead to war in any event.
So why not get in first, with surprise attacks?
They’re just my thoughts. I don’t know if Japan ever gave serious consideration to the NEI alone option. Probably not for long.
Militarily, it was less attractive to steam down to the NEI and try to invade when, even if successful, Japan lacked the defence behind it in Malaya and the obvious leap-frogging advantages, especially with forward airfields, in Malaya then Sumatra then Java. If Britain and or the US decided to respond militarily to an NEI invasion, Japan was then at risk of being cut off in the NEI while the US and Britain could attack the sea lanes back to Japan, depriving Japan of its economic advantages in holding the NEI.
Considering the expansiveness of Winston Churchill, however, it is likely that he would have declared war on the Japanese anyway, especially since London was hosting the Dutch government in exile, but you never know.
I’m inclined to doubt it.
The instructions given to General Percival in Malaya were that he was in no circumstances to do anything to start a war with Japan, which hampered his ability to defend Malaya properly by taking the initiative in Thailand. Partly this instruction was because Britain was fully engaged elsewhere, and partly because Britain wanted Japan to start it to avoid Britain incurring negative opinion in America, which it wanted to come into the war. I think those considerations would still have held good if Japan attacked only the NEI.
At least it was consistent with their custom of ritual suicide.
Consider this: they could attack the Dutch who had only a few pathetic troops in the Dutch East Indies, poorly equipped and of dubious morale in spite of pre-attack propaganda to the contrary …
Also a problem with Indonesians in the service, many of whom promptly went over to the Japanese when they arrived.
One supposes that the strategic thinking of the Japanese must have been that America, especially in the Philippines, could menace their shipping bringing resources from captured oil fields in places such as Balikpapan. Reasonable enough, except that America wasn’t at war with Japan, and wouldn’t be even after Japan had attacked Singapore, British Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies, or even Australia.
We shouldn’t underestimate the significance of hostility towards America, and Britain and Australia, in forming Japanese attitudes on whether or not to attack them. The Japanese, inside and outside the military, were bitterly resentful about a number of issues which they perceived as slaps in the face from these countries, notably Australian (always) and American (circa 1924) exclusion of Japanese migrants and the British termination of its defence alliance with Japan in the early twenties, under US and Dominion pressure. Japan saw that alliance as confirming its status as an equal with Britain and other nations, and its termination as a relegation of Japan to a lower status. These and other events, including trade disadvantage, created and reinforced Japanese beliefs that they were regarded as second class people by those nations. Which they were. It’s hard to go to war with a nation you like, but it’s a lot easier with one that despises you, and which you despise in return…
Therefore, if the Japanese had not attacked Hawaii or, a few hours later, the Phillipines, or any other US possession in the Pacific, the US would NOT have gone to war against Japan.
I think that’s right. Unless America felt that the Philippines were threatened it was unlikely to risk war. Even then it might not. US strategy until about a year or so before the Pacific War started was based on letting the Philippines fall if it came to that. This approach was changed in the last year or so, partly because MacArthur reckoned he could hold the Philippines if he had sufficient air power but more so because Washington decided that it was better to hold the Philippines. Hence the fairly recently arrived flash new bombers that Mac managed to lose half of on the ground on the first day, by the simple expedient of doing nothing.
Another aspect is that America had no love for European colonial powers. That sentiment wasn’t uncommon at all levels of American society and government. This is reflected by Admiral King who was constantly suspicious of British motives during the Pacific War and expressed the view more than once that he wasn’t using American forces to help the Limeys recover their colonies.
Lastly, once having made this terrible error of attacking Hawaii, the Japanese would have been much better served by invading the islands rather than turning around and steaming back to their own home islands.
I think it was considered by Japan in the planning stages but rejected. I can’t recall why. Probably fear of over-extension. As if they worried about over-extension in the rest of their planning!
Japan took just about everything it wanted and needed, except the two things it needed most for its “plan” (some plan!) of ‘holding on’ to succeed: Hawaii and Australia. As long as one of them wasn’t held by Japan, America could base its forces close enough to Japanese occupied territories to advance on Japan.
Hawaii would have made a much better base than Rabaul. The anchorage at Pearl is much better, and, basing a fleet there, could have seriously impeded US progress in winning back its losses. B-17s from the mainland could reach the islands, but never make a roundtrip without refueling and not with a meaningful bomb load. One has the impression that, beyond a brilliant air strike at Hawaii, there simply was no real Japanese plan for dealing with the aftermath.
Agreed.
The Japanese ‘plan’ offends my basic principle of conflict initiation: Never light a fuse unless you know what it’s connected to, and what’s going to happen when it goes off.
Or, as a Japanese admiral whose name I forget wisely cautioned about Japan’s 1905 war with Russia: “If you light a fire, you must know how to put it out.” In 1941 Japan just lit the fire outside its borders, then stood back to see what would happen and, even now, seems surprised that it burned all the way back to the homeland.
Rabaul could bolster Hawaii, with or without Truk, to reinforce control of the central Pacific. But Hawaii could do it on its own without Rabaul, but not vice versa. Hawaii was the key base in the central Pacific.
Japan’s raid on Pearl doesn’t deserve the awe it commonly inspires as a master-stroke of destruction. They made two serious mistakes by not inflicting more destruction.
First, they failed to destroy the oil storages. This was particularly inept as they had air superiority and could have done what they liked. At the very least this would have seriously limited fleet action from Hawaii in the initial phase while Japan was extending southwards.
Second, Japan failed to concentrate submarine, and limited and expendable surface, forces around Hawaii to destroy tankers bringing in replacement oil.
These two steps, if largely successful, would have severely limited the range and mobility of the fleet based at Hawaii and forced longer transits for supplementary warships from the West Coast, again limiting their range and mobility. It wouldn’t have caused America the same problems as Japan invading and holding Hawaii, but it would have reduced Hawaii’s naval utility considerably.
Another aspect of Japanese error is their use of torpedoes in a shallow harbour. Yamamoto based his attack on Taranto where the British confounded the experts by using modified torpedoes in a shallow harbour. He should have realised from Taranto that all he would do is ground the ships, which could be repaired. He should have used bombs to penetrate the ships and destroy them.
There is no question that Pearl was a cleverly planned and very well-executed attack, but it wasn’t all that brilliant in the lasting damage it inflicted when it could have done a lot more with not much more effort. But it still would have done no more than delay the inevitable result for Japan.
Given the extent to which it outraged the American people as a whole, for little more than a short pause in American naval capability which brought Japan no lasting advantage, it was a stunningly stupid thing to do.
Which leads me into the question of Japanese military attitude. It relied too much on individual spirit and will and focused too much on military conflict, as exemplified by the failure to destroy the oil storages at Pearl and the failure to do much in the way of attacking merchant shipping during the whole war. Another aspect of the same flawed warrior thinking was the failure to provide their troops with proper medical care and to provide their valuable pilots with armour plate protection. In these respects they might have thought that they were tougher than the Allies, and they probably were, but they also inflicted serious cumulative disadvantages upon themselves that the Allies didn’t inflict upon themselves. In the long run those readily avoidable disadvantages had just as significant an effect on Japan as losing some major campaigns. .
Agreed. But first, I am stunned and gratified by the breadth and depth of your knowledge. Now, as to the KNIL (Koningklijke Nederlands Indische Leger), in spite of ridiculous screeds of propaganda published by Time Magazine and others, it was a hollow shell. Compare the tremendous service the Indians and the Gurkhas gave to the British and the shortfall is embarrassingly apparent.
We shouldn’t underestimate the significance of hostility towards America, and Britain and Australia, in forming Japanese attitudes on whether or not to attack them.
Agreed. We can’t be proud of (the West, that is) of having failed to understand the significance of slapping the Japanese in the face, or of having cared enough about the downstream implications.]
… fairly recently arrived flash new bombers that Mac managed to lose half of on the ground on the first day, by the simple expedient of doing nothing.
As you know, I am not a fan of MacArthur and think his behavior was very bad. Instead of making him an Imperial Pro-Consul, I think he should probably have been court-martialed, or at the very least, cashiered, but, sigh, Roosevelt needed a “hero” even if he despised him.
This is reflected by Admiral King who was constantly suspicious of British motives during the Pacific War and expressed the view more than once that he wasn’t using American forces to help the Limeys recover their colonies.
Yes. Admiral King was a caustic personality whose hatred for the British is thoroughly inexplicable, although his attitude towards recovering European colonies was widely held in American circles. King could merely have kept his mouth shut if he had been farsighted enough to know that Colonialism was tottering on its last legs in any event, but there’s that 20/20 hindsight thing again.
Japan took just about everything it wanted and needed, except the two things it needed most for its “plan” (some plan!) of ‘holding on’ to succeed: Hawaii and Australia. As long as one of them wasn’t held by Japan, America could base its forces close enough to Japanese occupied territories to advance on Japan.
Agreed. Both were, like Great Britain, “unsinkable aircraft carriers” and therefore lethal threats to Japan in both the short and long terms. Without Hawaii, the US might have made the investment in Australia instead. It would have taken longer, but the end result would have been the same.
Japan’s raid on Pearl doesn’t deserve the awe it commonly inspires as a master-stroke of destruction. They made two serious mistakes by not inflicting more destruction.
I completely agree. BUt let me add one single irony below.
First, they failed to destroy the oil storages.
Second, Japan failed to concentrate submarine, and limited and expendable surface, forces around Hawaii to destroy tankers bringing in replacement oil.
That the Japanese did not destroy the oil tanks, which were as plainly visible as the noses on our collective faces is puzzling and not a small failure of strategic thinking.
Another aspect of Japanese error is their use of torpedoes in a shallow harbour.
Some bombs were used to fairly devastating effect. Your reference to Taranto is exactly correct. The Japanese indeed watched that attack and drew their conclusions from it.
OK, here’s the irony: you already know what it is. The great weapon used by the Japanese against Hawaii was the aircraft carrier. At Pearl, they sank a bunch of battleships which in a previous life would have been considered to be THE top capital ships of any navy (and even then, many of the Admirals on both sides of the pond as well as the Atlantic still thought in those terms.) They didn’t sink a single carrier, because none were in harbor. The one type of weapon that could be used to effect against them was not hit. After this date, incidentally, the battleship never served as the lead force again, except, of course, for the Prince of Wales leading the Perth on what was essentially a suicide mission, and the Yamato which went on a similar mission near Leyte Gulf.
There is no question that Pearl was a cleverly planned and very well-executed attack, but it wasn’t all that brilliant in the lasting damage
Again, agreed. The lasting effect of Pearl Harbor was the destruction of Japan, not a good bargain on the part of the Japanese.
Given the extent to which it outraged the American people as a whole, for little more than a short pause in American naval capability which brought Japan no lasting advantage, it was a stunningly stupid thing to do.
In an odd sort of way, the Japanese did us a favor by re-aligning our naval ship building program to place much greater emphasis on the carrier task force, as opposed to the battlewagon task force. We still built battleships, but in actual practice, the carrier was placed out in front, and the battleships became huge, floating gun platforms very useful in assaulting islands.
Which leads me into the question of Japanese military attitude. It relied too much on individual spirit… Another aspect of the same flawed warrior thinking was the failure to provide their troops with proper medical care and to provide their valuable pilots with armour plate protection. … had just as significant an effect on Japan as losing some major campaigns. .
Amen to that! The Japanese built some terrifically effective and innovative submarines, and their ‘long lance’ torpedoes were the best of the war, but their submarine service, I have read, was schooled to believe that mercantile shipping was an unworthy target, unworthy of “warriors”.
It has been written about before, but is not often mentioned, that the US actually succeeded in doing to the Japanese home islands what the Germans failed to do to England! But then Japanese protection of their own shipping was pathetically bad - sort of like shooting fish in a barrel. Once the scandalous problem with deficient American torpedoes was solved, the silent service had a field day.
Very kind of you, but any appearance of depth is an illusion.
Now, as to the KNIL (Koningklijke Nederlands Indische Leger), in spite of ridiculous screeds of propaganda published by Time Magazine and others, it was a hollow shell.
Maybe, but the Dutch still gave a good account of themselves in the Pacific War, which is usually overlooked. Most people seem to think that the Dutch stopped fighting after the NEI fell. They did more than Britain in the Pacific (as distinct from CBI / Indian Ocean) between then and the end of the war. So I started this thread http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?p=103163&posted=1#post103163
Compare the tremendous service the Indians and the Gurkhas gave to the British and the shortfall is embarrassingly apparent.
My understanding is that the Dutch were regarded as harsher than the British in running their colonies, which might go some way to explaining the difference.
While about two million Indians volunteered for service in the British forces in WWII, the British also had to contend with Ghandi and strong anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments and actions during WWII, so they weren’t universally loved by the people they colonised. The Indian National Army also indicates opposition to Britain, although many of the recruits seem to have joined to avoid being POW’s and defected to the Allies when given the chance.
What about the thought that the Japanases Generals had taken the Hunters in the U.S into consideration and that most homes had at least one gun and marksman in them. This would equate to a very large homeland army.
