I agree that there is a pretty big mug filled with “hindsight” in the ex-German generals epilogues on the battles…
But the Wehrmacht would have had an urban winter quarters had they seized Moscow. One that would have reduced the deprivation of their under-equipped army that had too endure winter in bunkers --and dwellings that they confiscated from the unlucky Russian citizens that were thrown out into the winter subzero temperatures, often robbed of their boots and jackets. And the readiness of the Heer panzers and vehicles also suffered in the open steppes, as mice got in them and chewed through the electrical wiring. The city may well have been a lightening rod in which to inflict heavy casualties on what would have been no doubt desperate Soviet efforts to retake the capital…
With the Market Garden failure , it comes from Army Intel . not paying closer attention to the reports of 2x SS panzer Divs in the area for rest and refit. The drop zones were a tad distance away and they could have reached the bridge if the Germans on the ground waited to re-act, but after walking from the DZ’s to the Bridge with a few friends just to see how long it would take, witha few refreshment breaks,…yup a long way… It was a bold plan , and the intell was good from the Dutch underground , but was pushed aside. The radios all worked well in line of sight, but dropped with the wrong components for long range comms.
I believe I’ve read that the British strongly (correctly) suspected that the Dutch resistance had a traitorous double agent feeding intell to the Abwehr and disinformation to MI6 and the OSS. However, I think the said German mole had no access to, nor knowledge of, the operation…
But that’s just the point, in the initial important frontier battles, the Wehrmacht had the superior manpower, had the advantage of surprise attack, plus knowing the the weakest places to strike with the strongest force, having recon flights detailing every Russian forward position and airfields for weeks leading up to the attack.
Because of Stalin’s insistence that there was no German attack coming, the Red Army formations were not properly organised for defense and not even on heightened alert until a few hours before the Germans struck.
But it’s amazing what a surprise preemptive attack can do to even the odds.The surprise attack destroyed a huge number of Soviet aircraft, many caught on the ground [over 2,000 on the first day alone, mainly fighters] Soviet aircraft were not properly dispersed and protected, making them easy targets for the Luftwaffe. As for the tank park, according to Erickson, almost one third needed major overhaul and almost a half required sizable refit.
But there were no reserve of spare parts or concentration of repair facilities, and except for a relatively few T-34’s and K-1’s, they were obsolete, and more importantly, badly used, the Red Army was just as inferior to the Wehrmacht in tank tactics as the Allies were in France.[as Nick pointed out]
There were many causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was just one.
It amazes me that Hitlers mistakes are always trotted out as the excuse for the German defeat and Stalin’s equally massive blunders are rarely mentioned.
On German mistakes a noted author wrote this…
''It is often asked could the Germans have won the war if they had not made certain mistakes.
The general answer I believe is that the Russians also made huge mistakes.
Which is the more absurd…to allow, with the wisdom of hindsight, an immaculate German campaign against a Russian resistance still plagued by those blunders and follies that arose in the heat and urgency of battle, or to correct both and to reset the board in an atmosphere of complete fantasy, of each side making the correct move like a chess text, when " white must win "? "
In the beginning, yes, but importantly, in the end, the most powerful army in the world.
Yep, it’s certainly something to ponder isn’t it, ‘‘if’’ Guderian had got the green light from Hitler and made a bee line for Moscow and if he managed to take it, what would the outcome be when a highly centralised society losses it’s centre?
Glantz suggests that the Russians would raise another army of 4 million men and take Moscow back again.
The whole SOE agent network in the Netherlands had been taken over by the Abwehr from the very beginning, they called it the “England Spiel”, the “English Game”.
The disaster had only recently been discovered, so any intel coming from the Dutch resistance was subsequently mistrusted.
Thats quite wrong, what i have given were the initial numbers, by week 2 russians had five milion troops in the general area, add to this the fact that Wehrmacht stretched itself and you get spearhead units fighting well prepared positions, Germans virtually always faced 2;1 or greater odds.
The Red Army was not properly organised for any sort of action whether defensive or offensive.
Thats true for Poland and France, not for Russia, there was ample time to organize defence after the attack, Wehrmacht had quite some ground to cover to get to the Stalins line, the problem was not in the airforce losses or the suprise but the lack of military organization whatsoever, russian army did not posses any procedures for rapid redeployments hence my earlier statement that it was an armed mob rather than an actuall army.
Russians had more T-34s and KVs than Germans all medium tanks together, while the Red Army was inferior in tactics it had massively more adequate machines, in Poland and in France during the battle with the british it was demonstrated that even inferior tactics can be effective when utilizing fine machines, what bites the russians in the arse is the complete lack of any organisation both in terms of logistics and deployments.
As for the rest of the thread, taking Moscow would further destroy what administration remained, Russia’s problem was not the inferior tactics but the generally pitifull level of its army and lack of organisational skills and systems of the military administration.
American soldiers were down to almost NO FOOD, low on ammunition, pretty much anything you can think of, they were low on it.
-The worst operation in World War II hands down because there was no real way to get the wounded out and to the field hospitals. No way for fresh supplies to be brought in, and/or fresh troops to help aide.
Had not Patton’s divison stepped in, this could have been the worst DISASTER in World War II (although take into account the feelings of the troops inside the operation – feelings that Patton’s troops were not needed.) However, there is clear evidence that if patton hadn’t helped out, it would have been bad. Cause I mean c’mon, can you really kill platoons of Germans by launching your helmets in the air? :mrgreen:
Source: “The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich” by Richard Overy, and figures by David Glantz.
22 June 1941
Soviet: 3,680,000 on the front.
Axis: 3,117,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (in fact around 350,000) so a total of 3,867,000. To these forces the Hungarian and Slovak troops added after 26 June 1941.
11 September 1941
Soviet: 3,463,000 on the front.
Axis: 3,382,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (in fact around 306,000) so a total of 4,088,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.
1 November 1941
Soviet: 2,200,000 on the front.
Axis: 2,867,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (finally a closer figure to the real one: 62,000 on the front+103,000 as occupation forces in Trans-Dnestra) so a total of 3,432,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.
1 December 1941*
Soviet: 4,197,000 on the front.
Axis: 2,767,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+140,000 Romanians (60,000 on the front+112,000 as occupation forces in Trans-Dnestra) so a total of 3,339,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.
*From here on, the Red Army had a continuous numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht and its allies.
Red Army had 800,000 plus on the far Eastern front and about 250,000 facing the Finns.
From John Erickson in ‘‘The Road to Stalingrad’’
By November '41, the Red army was at its lowest ever ebb, 2.3 million, from the 4.7 mill who could be fielded in June 41.
At the beginning of Nov.'42 the Red Army numbered 6,124,000, with 5 million Axis forces deployed against them.
The Red Army, like the Wehrmacht, suffered from personnel shortages. German accounts frequently refer to the supposedly inexhaustible flood of Soviet troops and equipment, but Glantz and House reveal that this actually reflects the Soviets’ ability to strip troops and equipment from other sectors of the front in order to achieve crushing superiority at breakthrough sectors. Time after time the Russians deceived the Germans regarding the site of upcoming Soviet offensives. http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=19656850796725
Even if that’s true, which Ashes’ post shows it’s not, whose fault was it that the Germans attacked when they were outnumbered?
The attacker assesses the enemy; attacks; and bears the consequences of success or failure.
Being outnumbered in attack, even a beachhead attack which generally is the most difficult and the one where defender:attacker ratios usually matter most, didn’t stop the Japanese winning in Malaya.
If the Germans had to stretch themselves by week 2, whose fault was that?
So the German spearhead units were fighting well prepared positions? WTF do you expect the defender to prepare? Papier mache castles?
Whose planning and / or execution was deficient if the Germans had to stretch themselves to fight exactly what even any military moron expects in an anticipated attack: well prepared defensive positions.
But earlier you said ‘Germany and friends had approximately 4 milion 300 thousand troops against russsian force of about 3 and a quarter milion’. I gather from your latest post that this refers to the first week.
So?
WTF do you expect the defender to do but bring up more troops?
However, unless, on your earlier figures, the Soviets knocked off about 1,800,000 (40%) Germans and friends in the first week (which might have been expected to blunt the German advance), there was nothing like a 2:1 Russian:German advantage.
Doesn’t that demonstrate even more the failure of German arms in attack or the success of Soviet arms in defence?
I agree with Warpig. I add also that the Germans were well suuperior in strategic combat abilities than the Russians. It was the logistics of sending supplies so far into Russia that caused the German downfall. If the supplies were available, Germany could of captured Russia. Germany moved faster than their supplies.
Stretching their forces was unavoidable, the distances involved and the fact that only a fifth of the German army was motorized or partly motorized means that you leave infantry and heavier artillery behind.
This refers to the outset of the campaign yes, approximately 3 weeks into the offensive Russia brought in the reserves which is portrayed in 5 milion dead/wounded/captured by winter 1941, note these figures as usually with soviet tabs of the time are severely downplayed, i will not attempt an actuall number but it was likely a lot bigger.
I forwarded this to prove that ultimately Russia had a lot more troops despite the initial numerical disadvantage, the numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht and CO had a lot less troops as early as the first weeks.
That is such an extreme rubbish … do you even learn history ? The total combat fatalities of the entire Axis during the entire war in the east were 900,000.
The losses of the initial offensive were less than 200000 men and that includes wounded, dead and missing from the entire Axis, these losses were minuscule when compared to what the Russians lost.
Uh no ? Because the German arms overrun pretty much every defensive position with inferior numbers and usually inferior equipment all the way untill they hit Moscow ?
Every history book. every publication about eastern front and i believe even rubbishpedia.
The total of captured men was over 4 milion of course but the dead were around 900 thousands, soviets give a much number but given that the romanian hungarian and italian tabs are consistent with the german body count i see no reason not to believe the german records.
Really? Are you absolutely positive?
Could you reffer to couple of them?
The total of captured men was over 4 milion of course but the dead were around 900 thousands, soviets give a much number but given that the romanian hungarian and italian tabs are consistent with the german body count i see no reason not to believe the german records.
Remarks: red - Soviet blue - German
[ul]
[li]The data is only for Werhmaht and SS, i.e. land forces, which were 90% of total losses. [/li][li]The Eastern front gave about 95% losses until June 1944.[/li][li]The number of German POW in Soviet captivity was very low before Stalingrad. The number of ALL POWs in Soviet hands was only 19.782 on 19/Nov/1942.[/li][/ul]
So, are you positive it was 900.000 dead Axis (That is Germans + all their allies, right?) on the Eastern front for the whole war?
On the other hand you have “every history book” on your side… It is a tough one…
So… according to you they were not killed and they were not taken prisoners… So why did they die? Malaria? [i]Fell down the stairs?[/i]
So you’re saying the Germans were incompetent? Much like their Red Army adversaries? But perhaps on a different level (of hubris)…
Not too mention that even the motorized contingent of Ostheer forces were relying on a large percentage (if not a majority) of French made trucks for their transport. :lol:
Sort of a Franco-equivalent of “Montezuma’s Revenge!”
I have to add General Macarthur’s incredibly stupid decision to keep the US Army Air Force in the Philippines on the ground after her knew Pearl Harbor had been attacked and that he was within striking distance of Formosa. Naturally, the air force was destroyed on the ground.
:mrgreen:
