WW2 myths

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#101

Hi Lancer.
I nothing heared about the joint Jupan-Germany “atomic research” but certainly some technological interaction had the place. As i know in the end of WW2 germans sent the documentation of some perspective wearpons (jet fighter and the homing acoustic torpedoes).
New germans acoustic torpedoes could be unpleasant surprise for allies. I read that Winston Churchill ask Stalin to transmit one of cuptured of Red Army acoustic torpedoes to London for the study. He feared that Germans could transmit the technology of its production into Japan.

Cheers

#102

Hello Lancer and Cheven:

There is some cooperation on weapons research, and it is believed that the Japanese received plans for a version of the ME262, which may have been superior! It was enough to cause the Allies to make jet technology a priority in the far east and led to a few interesting Allied projects that can be discussed elsewhere in this forum.

][8] NAKAJIMA J8N1 KIKKA / SUKHOI SU-9, SU-11 / REPLICAS

  • Late in the war, the Japanese were shipped a complete Me-262 by submarine. They began work on a copy of the fighter, designated the “Ki-201 Karyu (Fire Dragon)”, but it was never completed.

They did build and fly a smaller derivative, the “Nakajima J8N1 Kikka (Orange Blossom)”, as an attack aircraft for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The Kikka looked enough like an Me-262 to be mistaken for it, though its rear fuselage was distinctively different, not tapering towards the tail, and its empty weight was about half that of the Me-262.

The Kikka had folding wings, apparently to permit concealment in caves and the like, as whatever carriers the IJN had were quickly finding their way to the bottom of the Pacific. It was not fitted with guns, armament consisting of a single 500 kilogram (1,100 pound) or 800 kilogram (1,760 pound) bomb.

From: http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avme262.html

There were also some aircraft in which the Japanese ‘reverse-engineered’ such as the ME-109 in order to produce better piston engined fighters. They also shared some tactical doctrine and lessons learned regarding the countering of Allied amphibious landings (bot learned it was better not to resist the initial landing, but far more painful to the attacker to keep forces inland and beyond the range/accuracy of Naval artillery).

#103

One great myth that persists here in the states is that Hitler was obliged to declare War on the US after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor according to the terms of their mutual defense pact. The pact actually stipulated that Germany was only to aid Japan defending itself against foreign aggression, not the conduct of offensive military actions.

As to Japan’s failure to aggressively confront the Soviet Union, there is the fact that the Japanese Imperial Army did not perform well in sustained offensive operations over large areas against industrialized enemies. The Imperial High Command knew this, I think this is why the Japanese never attacked the USSR along her far east frontiers. They were already tied down against the Chinese and soon to face the American Navy. They simply did not want a two-front War, and felt they would be assisting the Germans by tying down most, if not ALL, of the US military.

Despite Japan’s much ballyhooed suicidal fanaticism of her soldiers which made them fierce foes when on heavily fortified Pacific atolls, which effectively negated any American advantage in armor and mobility, they were often unable to confront a superior armored forces in open terrain, especially when they took the offensive. This was demonstrated in the British experience of Burma, where the Army was able to rely of significant artillery support and even then-second rate M3 Grant tanks to stave off and slaughter attacking Japanese IA soldiers, who were often poor with tactics, which often made their courage futile or even counter-productive. In addition, the Japanese had few anti-tank weapons, and her armor fleet was feeble in both numbers and quality on the whole when compared to any full strength Western army. This would culminate into the shock of the USSR’s invasion of Manchuria, in which the often ‘fanatically-suicidal’ Japanese soldier surrendered in droves in a state of near catatonic shock when confronted with massed armor moving fast.

#104

Hitler promised to japane embassador in 1941 than if they will attack in THE USA , Germany will declare the war to USA. Hitler want to push Japanese to the more active aggression.

As to Japan’s failure to aggressively confront the Soviet Union, there is the fact that the Japanese Imperial Army did not perform well in sustained offensive operations over large areas against industrialized enemies. The Imperial High Command knew this,

it’s not correct. Japanes tried “to the tooth” the Red Army into 1938-39.
In 1938, 38 000 troops of Kvantun Army attacked USSR . After two weeks they was destroed and were ejected out. This importaint lesson was good learned by Japenese. In contrast to Hitler they were not understated the possibility of the Red Army.

#105

That may well be, however, he was not bound to do this stupity under any treaty obligation. And the Japanese could be pretty aggressive on their own, just ask the Chinese.

it’s not correct. Japanes tried “to the tooth” the Red Army into 1938-39.
In 1938, 38 000 troops of Kvantun Army attacked USSR . After two weeks they was destroed and were ejected out. This importaint lesson was good learned by Japenese. In contrast to Hitler they were not understated the possibility of the Red Army.

Then how is what I stated “not-correct?” I was vaguely aware of this fact. This is one of the ways that the Japanese learned that their Imperial Army was sorely lacking in firepower and mobility. It was a run of the mill border war," not a full fledged invasion.

And Hitler’s initial experience with the Red Army was vastly different than Japans.’

#106

Hitler need on japan blow to USA. This coul be distract US forces from european theater.

Then how is what I stated “not-correct?” I was vaguely aware of this fact. This is one of the ways that the Japanese learned that their Imperial Army was sorely lacking in firepower and mobility. It was a run of the mill border war," not a full fledged invasion.

Nick , Japanes had sufficiently supplies and mobility for the crushing defeat British and American forces in 1941-42.
In 1938 Japanes also had the great plans of invasion to the Far-East terriories of USSR in perspectives.

#107

But I think there is little evidence of any coordination. Both Japan and Germany shared imperial aspirations, but little on the ground military coordination. Certainly America goaded both the Japanese and Germans to an extent and was looking for a reckoning before Britain or the USSR could fall, but in fact I believe the Germans were almost as surprised as the Americans by Pearl Harbor.

Nick , Japanes had sufficiently supplies and mobility for the crushing defeat British and American forces in 1941-42.
In 1938 Japanes also had the great plans of invasion to the Far-East terriories of USSR in perspectives.

The Japanese were conducting amphibious operations with air superiority against distant garrison forces re. Singapore and the Philippines, two islands that were cut off, with garrisons that lacked their own armor and mobility and proper air cover. Were the Soviet frontier forces in Mongolia cut off, or didn’t they get ample resupply? Japan was also still fighting a large Chinese Army and guerrillas. There’s a difference. And what are you basing the “great plans” for a Far Eastern invasion on? Japan was clearly focused on the Pacific rim and needed oil and raw materials, not Siberia.

#108

True, it was the Japanese Army’s plan to invade Russia and expand the operations in China, while the Navy proposed an alternative plan to go southward instead. Imperial General Headquarters knew they could only pick one, and as we see today, they picked the Navy proposal. Both plans simply could not exist at the same time for Japan did not have the resources to do so.

#109

Do you guys actually have any documentary support for this?

#110

I think this is another myth. Maybe you can show in this Wilki article where the Japanese wish to unambiguously invade the Soviet Union in an all or nothing invasion? In fact, the Japanese preparations were largely defensive and they only pondered an invasion if the Germans had largely finished off the Soviets.:rolleyes:

#111

Is this the battle you speak of? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Halhin_Gol

A border dispute that began over Mongolian horses grazing in Manchuria?

#112

Hi Temujin.
I see you know the theme.
Yes, japan generals of Kvantun Army has its own plan to offence into USSR . But naval generals in Tokio had own plans to attact the Sout-Eastern Asia. Both plan was actual till end 1941. As reported soviet spy R. Sorge ( he work in germans ambassadors in Japan) japanes could realised this plan if Germans took the Moscow in october-november 1941.
Japanes finally picked the naval proposal when saw that germans was stoped in the end of 1941. They wanted not to be late to the “being left train”.

#113

Yes , Nick .
Yourself find it.
Thanks.

Some sources have suggested that Stalin had been informed by Germans that Germany had no hostile intentions against the USSR at the time. This allowed for the temporary redeployment of some elite units of the Red Army to the east. Stalin took the chance and relocated all the few already existing fully mechanized units to the eastern theatre for deployment against the Japanese whose forces of tanks and armored cars were considerably weaker. The Japanese were surprised by the highly mechanized status of what they believed to be “local command troops”, and some even took these just emerging mechanized units as an already generally existing standard of the Red Army. The devastating outcome of this “testing of Red Army strength” in the end convinced the Japanese Army to choose the “southern strike” (attacking the more promising and comparatively more weakly defended South East Asian areas), and to dismiss the “northern strike” option. As known, Soviet spy Richard Sorge informed his superiors of the Japanese decision to “go south”. As he had already correctly predicted the German attack of June 22, Stalin could redeploy his Siberian elites and throw them into the battle for Moscow in December, 1941

This what i told about.

#114

Some sources have suggested that Stalin had been informed by Germans that Germany had no hostile intentions against the USSR at the time. This allowed for the temporary redeployment of some elite units of the Red Army to the east. Stalin took the chance and relocated all the few already existing fully mechanized units to the eastern theatre for deployment against the Japanese whose forces of tanks and armored cars were considerably weaker. The Japanese were surprised by the highly mechanized status of what they believed to be “local command troops”, and some even took these just emerging mechanized units as an already generally existing standard of the Red Army. The devastating outcome of this “testing of Red Army strength” in the end convinced the Japanese Army to choose the “southern strike” (attacking the more promising and comparatively more weakly defended South East Asian areas), and to dismiss the “northern strike” option. As known, Soviet spy Richard Sorge informed his superiors of the Japanese decision to “go south”. As he had already correctly predicted the German attack of June 22, Stalin could redeploy his Siberian elites and throw them into the battle for Moscow in December, 1941

Isn’t this pretty much what I had said? There was no serious planning of a Japanese invasion of the USSR.

#115

Nick, you wonder me
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Halhin_Gol

…since the defeat convinced the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo that the policy of the North Strike Group, favored by the army, which wanted to seize Siberia as far as Lake Baikal for its resources, was untenable…

to seize the territory of USSR from Kamchatka to Baikal( half of all territory) - was it not seriouse plan?

#116

No it wasn’t, it was dreamy war-plan that was never to come to fruition:

Did you selectively ignore this? Yes Japanese troops were deployed along the border, but it was contingency planning, not a serious strategic plan simply because the Japanese knew their limitations:

In devising operational plans against the USSR, the hypothetical movements of the Soviet Far Eastern Army were a major consideration. The Japanese Army General Staff made the following estimate of the situation: the Soviets could be expect to commit 55-60 divisions to the Far Eastern Operations. They would launch simultaneous, converging offensives from the east, north and west of Manchuria. The enemy would strive to cut off communications between the Japanese homeland and the Asiatic continent. If war broke out with the Soviet Union, the most important problem would arise: how to terminate the hostilities? The Army General Staff feared that the Russian territory was so boundless that Japan would be unable to deal a finishing blow to the enemy…

After this secret conference, Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the “Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun” or KANTOKUEN for short. The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. [b]These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.

The Imperial Army anticipated the German offensive, to commence in 1941-42. The Russians had to transfer several divisions from the Far East to European sectors, but the USSR would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and United States, of her own accord, thereby having to wage two-front operations. Certain reports mentioned the sending of 20 or 30 divisions to the European battlefront.

Although the Kantogun had been reinforced, the Russo-German War for which the Japanese Army had held such great expectations might not turn out favorably for Germany, despite Hitler’s boasts. A serious problem consequently demanded response: how could the expanded Kantogun pull through the rigorous cold of a Manchurian or Siberian winter? Military materiel was geared to hypothetical mobile operations against the Soviet Union, characterized by light weapons, large scale logistical systems, light armored groups and many horses. If after the southern operations are underway, the Soviet Army appeared to be mounting an invasion of Manchuria, requisite forces could be diverted there in ample time…

That Japanese were not going to attack the Soviet Union based on her bad experiences with the border conflicts, all else was typical ambitious war planning and speculation, but nothing was concrete. The Japanese Imperial Army was never serious about a conquest of the Soviet Union because they knew their limitations when facing armored forces on a broad front of an open plane, at least not without the Red Army being seriously disrupted by a German invasion that was sure to defeat them.

#117

dreamy war-plan ?!!
Name this the children’s fantasies of the emperor of Japan, if you wish.
According reports of soviet reconnaissance in Japan:
http://rus-lib.ru/book/35/17/039-071.html

In the 30’s Japanese General Staff of ground forces with the participation of the staff of the Kwantung army placed in Manchuria actively developed the concrete plans of military intrusion.
Thus, in the plan in 1933 were determined three basic directions of the impacts(to the USSR):
east - seaside, northern - Amur and western - Khinganskoye, in this case the main thing was considered eastern. According to the precomputations of Japanese General Staff, against Soviet 4–5 divisions in the littoral at the beginning of war Japanese army it had to have 3 divisions in Manchuria and 2 in the Korea . Furthermore, one division was separated for the debarkation from the sea in Vladivostok region. Was posed the problem already in the initial stage of war applying to Soviet troops in the littoral “smashing attack”. It was assumed that when THE USSR will be able to move from the interior of the country to the Far East two more divisions, battle in the littoral will be completed, soviet air forces are destroyed, Vladivostok is seized.
3 were separated for the actions in the northern direction on the basis of the plan, and on west - 4 divisions. By the forces of one division it was planned to accomplish seizure of North Sakhalin and Kamchatka. Two divisions had to ensure from the south the rear of group. In the reserve of rate were separated 10 divisions

end of senseless discussion of japanes plans

#118

The end? Why is it senseless? If the Japanese had such elaborate war plans, then why did they not carry them out?

And if Stalin feared intervention from Japan, why did he pull forces from the Far East military district to fight the Germans?