Oh Bravo i didn’t know Gibson was the American emigrant. Thanks.
Well its seems his anti-british feeling has a religion reasons. I don’t see the Patriot - i have no any wishes to watch this propoganda.
Cheers.
If you have the opportunity to see The Patriot, Chevan, I would suggest that you do so. In the first instance, you will see where I am coming from. Secondly, it will help you gain a better ‘feel’ for how Hollywood tries influence public perspective. I am sure you have already witnessed this by viewing ‘Enemy at the Gates’. The Patriot, would help you to understand the nuances of the Anglo/American ‘Special Relationship’. 
Agree that Braveheart and The Patriot seemed to be expressions of Gibson’s anti-British passions.
Gallipoli was an earlier movie starring Mel Gibson which had a somewhat anti-British sentiment. (1981)
http://www.amazon.com/Gallipoli-Special-Mark-Lee/dp/B000BDGW0I/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/002-2828836-5154442?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1174073814&sr=1-1
In his Lethal Weapon 2 the main villains were white South Africans, no doubt capitalizing on the anti-South African sentiment of the time because of its policy of apartheid. (1989)
http://www.amazon.com/Lethal-Weapon-2-Mel-Gibson/dp/0790731924/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/002-2828836-5154442?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1174074876&sr=1-1
If I can pursue this topic drift for a bit.
In fairness to Gibson, he was just an actor and not responsible for the content. http://www10.pair.com/~crazydv/weir/articles/articlej.html
Any perceived anti-British sentiment reflects (correct) Australian perceptions that Gallipoli was a spectacular stuff-up, courtesy of First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill who was making the first of his several major and brilliant stuff-ups involving Australian (and British and other nations’) troops in both world wars. The other two are Greece / Crete and Malaya, in each of which he failed to appreciate a number of important factors, notably the importance of air power in land (Greece) and sea (Malaya - HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales) engagements.
Gallipoli holds a special place in Australia as it was, and still is, regarded as the blooding of the nation in war. It was a lousy campaign for a host of reasons, starting with landing in the wrong place and just getting progressively worse in the face of an outstanding defence by the Turks under Kemal Attaturk. http://www.dva.gov.au/commem/commac/studies/anzacsk/aday4.htm
There were actually more French and many more British casualties than Australian ones. At the time Australia was (and still is) unsure of its place in the world. Fighting with the big boys, and fighting well, became a focus for national pride and has remained so. It was the first big test of Australian, and New Zealand, troops which formed the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, hence the acronym ANZAC which has largely, in common Australian usage, dropped out the NZ recognition. Australia in fact did a lot better in France, for a lot longer and with a lot more casualties and managing to be the first Allied force to force the Germans into retreat, at Hamel in an original and exceptionally well planned and executed action http://www.macknortshs.qld.edu.au/ANZAC/battle_of_hamel.htm http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lehamel.htm This new Australian tactic became the basis for Allied successes later at Amiens and other major actions which brought Germany to defeat.
As an American, it may interest you that this was the first time some American troops went into action in Europe as a small element of the Australian force, being four companies of the 33rd Illinois National Guard Division attached to the Australians for training. The Americans acquitted themselves very well and received high praise from the experienced Australian commanders and troops. The only criticisms of them were that they were too green, too keen, and too brave, so that they advanced too close to the creeping barrage ahead of them.
Gibson apparently used to be an Australian until his infamous and drunken anti-Semitic escapade last year, then apparently we disowned him and made him an American again as our news media stopped calling him “the Australian actor” and started using terms like “the American born actor” and “the American actor who grew up in Australia”. We claim anybody famous as our own (e.g. the New Zealand born actor Russell Crowe who is always described as "the Australian actor) and ditch them if they don’t reflect credit on us (like “the New Zealand born actor Russell Crowe” after he threw the telephone at the hotel clerk). It seems to be one of our less endearing national characteristics.
Thanks for the information and links Rising Sun,
Yes, Churchill did have his bad moments, another example that comes to mind was the “soft underbelly of axis Europe that turned out to be a tough old gut”.
Quotes from one of your links:
http://www.dva.gov.au/commem/commac/studies/anzacsk/aday4.htm
On 19 May the Turkish forces attacked along the whole Anzac front. An estimated 3,000 Turks were killed in a virtually suicidal series of attacks on the Australian trenches. After five days an armistice was called to bury the rotting, swollen and maggot-infested dead bodies. This was the last time the Turks tried a frontal attack on the Anzac lines.
August offensives
In August an attempt was made to try and break the stalemate (see Source 6 on this page). They planned a major landing by British troops north of Anzac Cove, at Suvla Bay. This force would seize the area, which would then be used to land supplies for the Anzacs during the coming winter. These troops would then, if possible, be used to help the main attack, which was to gain the high ground between Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 (or Koja Chemen Tepe). The idea was that the troops at Suvla would quickly move inland and attack the defending Turkish troops from the rear while they were facing those attacking them from the front. A series of diversionary attacks by the Anzacs further south would stop the Turks from rushing reinforcements to the main attack area.
One of these diversionary attacks was at Lone Pine. The Australians rushed a heavily entrenched area, and in savage hand-to-hand fighting drove the Turkish defenders out.
Seven Victoria Crosses were awarded to Australians involved in this attack, and many Australians were killed. The following day, Australian troops attacked across the tiny area of flat land called the Nek. Four waves of Australian Light Horsemen were killed on the tiny area separating the Australian and Turkish trenches.
The Suvla and Anzac link-up was successfully made (see Source 7 ) but the main attack strategy failed. Only the New Zealanders and supporting British troops reached their objective of Chunuk Bair. They briefly gained the summit, but could not hold it. The force made little progress and was of no assistance to the men on Chunuk Bair.
This is the action shown in the 1981 film Gallipoli, which presents an inaccurate view of the strategic situation and distorts the role of the British (‘drinking tea on the beach while the Anzacs are being slaughtered at the Nek’).
In late August there was a major attempt to capture Hill 60 above Suvla Bay. Once again the Turkish defenders were able to maintain their position. Casualties, many of them newly arrived reinforcements who were poorly prepared for the attack, were very high.
Gallipoli Casualties:
Turkey 86,692
Britain 21,255
France 9,798
Australia 8,709
New Zealand 2,701
India 1,358
Newfoundland 49
Very interesting list of FIRSTS at the Battle of Hamel - thanks for the link.
He, he…I like your last two paragraphs about Mel Gibson and Russell Crow and the 33rd Illinois National Guard - pretty cute.
I believe that the Australians also did very well against the Turks in the Sinai under General Sir Archibald Murray and later in Palestine under General Sir Edmund Allenby. His forces captured Jerusalem 9 December 1917.
The Ottoman army had three active fronts at this time: Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the Gaza front. They also had substantial forces deployed around Constantinople and in the (now quiet) Caucasus front. Given all these demands, the army in Gaza was only about 35,000 strong, lead by the German General Falkenhayn and concentrated in three main defensive locations: Gaza, Tell Esh Sheria, and Beersheba. Allenby’s army was now much larger, some 88,000 troops in good condition and well equipped. Most of these British soldiers were from Australia and New Zealand.
A key feature to the British attack was to convince the Turks (and their German leaders) that once again, Gaza was to be attacked. This deception campaign was extremely thorough and convincing. When the British in fact launched their attack on Beersheba, the Turks were caught by surprise. The attack on Beersheba has been called the last successful cavalry charge in history. The victory on October 31, 1917 did not end the campaign because the Turks redeployed some forces and largely held their position.
The first British attack on Jerusalem failed but with a short rest and the gathering of more infantry divisions, Allenby tried again and on December 9, 1917 Jerusalem was captured. This was a major political event for the British government of David Lloyd George, one of the few real successes the British could point to after three long bloody years of war.
Australian Lighthorse troops marched unopposed into Damascus on September 30 1918. T.E. Lawrence and his Arab troops entered Damascus the next day to receive an “Official” surrender. The war in Palestine was over. The Turkish government signed an armistice on October 28, 1918 and outright surrendered two days later. 600 years of Ottoman rule over the Middle East had come to an end.
http://www.answers.com/topic/sinai-and-palestine-campaign
http://www.answers.com/topic/battle-of-beersheba
http://www.answers.com/topic/battle-of-megiddo-1918
http://www.uq.edu.au/~mlwham/banjo/happy_dispatches/lord_allenby_i.html
The British also waged a successful campaign against the Turks in Mesopotamia, capturing Bagdad on 11 March 1917. (The vast majority of the British empire forces in this campaign were recruited from India.)
http://www.answers.com/topic/mesopotamian-campaign-1
http://www.answers.com/topic/fall-of-baghdad-1917
I have several movies on the Australian and ANZAC involvement in WWI.
[i]Forty Thousand Horsemen[/i] (1941)
http://www.amazon.com/Forty-Thousand-Horsemen-1941-Australia-Emmett/dp/B0001NJ5XE
http://www.moviegoods.com/movie_product.asp?master_movie_id=15015
http://blog.awm.gov.au/lawrence/?p=86
http://movies2.nytimes.com/gst/movies/movie.html?v_id=18287
[i]The Lighthorsemen[/i] (Import) (1985)
Australian Light Horse fighting the Turks in Palestine 1917.
Features the attack on Beersheba which has been called the last successful cavalry charge in history.
http://www.amazon.com/Lighthorsemen-Simon-Wincer/dp/B000CJ2E5I/sr=11-1/qid=1165112687/ref=sr_11_1/102-3240256-7489714
[i]Gallipoli[/i] (1981)
http://www.amazon.com/Gallipoli-Mark-Lee/dp/B00000J11Z/sr=1-3/qid=1165106535/ref=pd_bbs_sr_3/102-3240256-7489714?ie=UTF8&s=dvd
[i]Anzacs[/i] (1985)
http://www.amazon.com/Anzacs-George-Miller/dp/B00000F25O/sr=11-1/qid=1165107054/ref=sr_11_1/102-3240256-7489714
George
Glad you enjoyed the links.
A few titbits.
Technically, the claim that the Beersheba charge was a cavalry charge is wrong. The Light Horse by definition were mounted infantry who fought dismounted, unlike cavalry who fought mounted. Still, at Beersheba they fought mounted for the most part, charging over the Turkish trenches. They generally weren’t armed with sabres or other swords (although swords can be seen in the picture here http://www.lancers.org.au/site/1st_Gaza-Beersheba.asp ), but only the long British pattern bayonet which qualifies as a short sword.
The 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments drew up behind a ridge. From the crest, Beerhseba was in full view. The course lay down a long, slight slope which was bare of cover. Between them and the town lay the enemy defences. The 4th was on the right; the 12th was on the left. They rode with bayonets in hand. Each drew up on a squadron frontage. Every man knew that only a wild, desperate charge could seize Beerhseba before dark. They moved off at the trot, deploying at once into artillery formation, with 5 metres between horsemen. Almost at once the pace quickened to a gallop. Once direction was given, the lead squadrons pressed forward. The 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment and the Yeomanry followed at the trot in reserve. The Turks opened fire with shrapnel. Machine guns fired against the lead squadrons. The Royal Horse Artillery got their range and soon had them out of action. The Turkish riflemen fired, horses were hit, but the charge was not checked. The Lighthorsemen drove in their spurs; they rode for victory and they rode for Australia. The bewildered enemy failed to adjust their sights and soon their fire was passing harmlessly overhead. The 4th took the trenches; the enemy soon surrendered. The 12th rode through a gap and on into the town. Their was a bitter fight. Some enemy surrendered; others fled and were pursued into the Judean Hills. In less than an hour it was over; the enemy was finally beaten.
http://www.lighthorse.org.au/histbatt/beersheba.htm
Note that the British Yeomanry, also mounted infantry, also participated.
I’ve always been a bit sceptical about that oft-repeated claim that the Turks missed the charging men and horses because they didn’t adjust their sights. A horse with a crouching man aboard is a big vertical target and very wide in the horse’s chest. I would have thought that a sight adjusted even for for, say, 400 yards and aimed accurately at the centre of the horse’s chest is still going to hit something important between there and the top of the man even at 50 to 100 yards. At 25 yards or less I would expect that the sight setting is irrelevant, unless Turkish rifles had a trajectory like a mortar. I’m more inclined to think that there was either or both panic or poor marksmanship by the Turks, who would have found aiming at a galloping horse rather different to aiming at even a running man. More likely the latter as they were generally brave and fierce fighters.
The famous scene in Forty Thousand Horsemen of the line of troops going across the sand dunes, which is in the background of the film poster you posted, was actually filmed on a suburban Sydney beach at Bondi. The Australian film industry, such as it was, ran on a shoestring and couldn’t afford to travel too far.
There are supposedly pictures of the charge at Beersheba but there is a debate about whether they were staged after the event, like the immortal image of the raising of the second flag at Iwo Jima. http://www.lighthorse.org.au/histbatt/photo.htm
Apologies to all for drifting this topic.
You are correct concerning the Lighthorse being mounted infantry.
This was a point brought out in the movie which I have -
[i]The Lighthorsemen[/i] (Import) (1985)
Australian Light Horse fighting the Turks in Palestine 1917.
Features the attack on Beersheba which has been called the last successful cavalry charge in history.
I recommend the movie if you haven’t already seen it.
http://www.amazon.com/Lighthorsemen-Simon-Wincer/dp/B000CJ2E5I/sr=11-1/qid=1165112687/ref=sr_11_1/102-3240256-7489714
This was also a practice used during the American Civil War as by the Federal cavalry under
General John Buford on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg.
The horse provided mobility, but once at their objective they fought on foot.
The British pattern 1907 bayonet (17" blade) as used at Beersheba can be seen in the pics below.
(photo taken: 12 / 10 / 2005)
My Lee-Enfield rifles. Top is a SMLE No. 1 Mk. III* made at a BSA (Birmingham Small Arms, Co.) controlled company near Birmingham in Shirley, England in 1940, with 1907 bayonet (17 in blade). Bottom is No 4 Mk I* made at the Long Branch Arsenal near Toronto, Canada in 1942, with spike bayonet.
Well, I think that the Australians made a good effort on [i]Forty Thousand Horsemen[/i] considering their budgetary constraints at the time.
I remember passing a British/Commonwealth military cemetery containing graves from the First World War while in Haifa, Israel in early 1980.
Interesting posts.
Winston had a fixation with the soft-underbelly in both wars. As a strategy, would you say it was generally flawed, or was it purely down to British incompetence.
As an aside: I was at a luncheon with a group of friends a few years ago. One of them was speaking rather disparagingly of General Sir Ian Hamilton, the leader of the Eastern Mediteranian Expeditionary Force. After a while one of the others spoke up and said “Would you please refrain from speaking in such sentiments about my Godfather, old boy?”
“Although the allied fleet suffered heavily (the Royal Navy lost five battleships) the new submarine arm excelled, their adventures worthy of an Homeric epic.”
ANZACs was a good series, and as I recall, didn’t really have much of agenda other than portraying the ANZACs at war.
The Royal Australian Navy got half its submarine fleet through the Narrows and attacked shipping in the Sea of Marmora at the time of the Gallipoli landing. (This sounds less impressive when it is admitted that we had only two submarines in our sub fleet. :)) Two RN sub captains won VC’s for their actions in the same area around the same time. http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/ae2/index.htm
A couple of other titbits about the Australians at Gallipoli.
Australians invented and used the periscope rifle to fire at the Turks without exposing themselves.
http://anzac.homestead.com/prifle.html
http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/gallipoli/periscope_rifle.htm
Australians also made improvised hand grenades from jam tins and invented the drip rifle. The drip rifle was important in enabling the evacuation of Gallipoli as it deceived the Turks into thinking that the Australian trenches were still manned when in fact the troops had left the trenches.
http://anzac.homestead.com/rifle.html
Drip (or “pop off”) rifles were self-firing rifles used at Gallipoli to deceive the Turks during the evacuation of December 1915.
Fire was maintained from the trenches after the withdrawal of the last men, by rifles arranged to fire automatically. This was done by a weight being released which pulled the trigger. In this case by means of weights operated by water escaping from one tin to another. A rifle could be left to operate at various times up to twenty minutes after the automatic firing device was set.
http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/gallipoli/drip_rifle.htm
Thousands of Australians, most of whom weren’t even born when WWII, or even the Vietnam War ended, let alone during WWI, visit Gallipoli each year. A huge contingent goes there each year for a commemoration ceremony on the anniversary of the landing, 25 April, which is Anzac Day in Australia and the day we remember our war dead and those who served the nation in war. Click on the trumpeter picture to get an idea of the size of part of the crowd.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200604/s1623517.htm
Also http://www.fleetonmorgan.com.au/images/service.gif
The Turks maintain the war graves and honour the Australian dead. In 1934 Kemal Attaturk, the Turkish commander at Gallipoli and father of modern Turkey and an extraordinary man, made what I think is the most moving and generous statement anyone has ever made about their dead enemies. It is engraved on the memorial at Gallipoli.
Those heroes that shed their blood And lost their lives…
You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country.
Therefore, rest in peace.
There is no difference between the Johnnies
And the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side,
Here in this country of ours.
You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries…
Wipe away your tears.
Your sons are now lying in our bosom And are in peace.
After having lost their lives on this land, they have
Become our sons as well.
I think British incompetence is vasty overrated. It’s a clever ploy by the crafty Poms to create the impression that they are bumbling amateurs to lull their enemies into a false sense of security so the Poms can unexpectedly cut their throats while the enemy is feeling superior. There was nothing incompetent or amateurish about the Spitfire, the Hurricane, the Lancaster, the Rolls Royce Merlin that turned the American P-51 from a slug into one of the best fighters of WWII, the Commandos, the Guards regiments and a host of other famous and not so famous British regiments, D-Day and the planning for it, beating the U-Boats, and many other aspects of British military endeavours. Sure, there were plenty of stuff ups and errors, but every nation made just as many and just as bad.
As for Churchill, I think the reasons for getting into the underbelly of Europe were very different in each war, assuming that we regard Turkey as part of Europe.
My understanding is that the Gallipoli campaign was primarily to enable the Allies to control the Dardanelles, in part so that Russian ships could get out and Turkish ships couldn’t.
The WWII invasion of Italy was very much a sop to the Americans and Russians so that Churchill could delay opening the second front but be seen to be doing something under pressure from the other two major Allies. Given the generally poor Italian performance against the British in North Africa, although some Italian units fought as well as any in any army, and waning domestic Italian enthusiasm for the war, it probably seemed like a good idea at the time.
I’ve never been too clear on exactly what the Italian campaign was supposed to achieve in the total war picture apart from reducing Italian naval influence in the Med and diverting some German forces from the proposed Normandy invasion. I’m not sure that the latter idea makes much sense as the lines of communication to Italy were longer for the Allies and, if they were going to fight the same Germans after an amphibious landing, why not do it in Normandy instead of Italy?
I don’t know what was supposed to happen when the Allies got to the Alps, which had been fairly easily defended by the Austrians in WWI. I suppose they turned left and went into France by the back door, thereby committing the grave error of splitting their forces against the Germans in France and fighting on two widely separated fronts without having an anvil to hammer the enemy on.
Italy is not a campaign I’ve paid much attention to. Maybe it would make more sense if I knew more about it.
I have to agree the Italian company was just the wast of time. In the strategical perspective it was ubsolitly sensless for the allies ( excet the some politic reasons). Furthermore the German’s could able to save its troops and power to contionie to lead the war.
The practice meaning the Italy as the "second front " was zero. If the Churchill choosed the Normandy in 1943 i/m sure this war has end whole year early i.e. in 1944.
Cheers.
http://www.radiodeejay.hr/forum/lang/inexed.htm çäåñü ìîÿ êèñêà %))
Well i’ll wath this specially to see the place where you comming from 
And do you think a/m don’t know how the Holliwood “washs the brains”?This not just “Enemy at the gates” 
Well i’ll wath this specially to see the place where you comming from
And do you think a/m don’t know how the Holliwood “washs the brains”?This not just “Enemy at the gates”
Even had the entire set of forces used to invade Italy been transferred to the UK in time for an invasion in 1943, the forces available would have been substantially smaller than those used in 1944. Furthermore, the available German forces were substantially larger in 1943, and had far better mobility.
Furthermore, the campaign in North Africa itself wasn’t finished until May 1943. Given how critically important Suez was to the UK war effort, there is no way forces could have been withdrawn until North Africa was secure. Thus it would be around August at the earliest that any of the forces from the Med would have been available in Northern France - realistically too late to make any difference to an invasion. The only difference was the availability of landing craft being affected by the Italian campaign, and in reality Overlord took everything it needed from Italy and thus was unaffected by it. The Italian campaign was crippled by the lack of landing craft, but that’s real life for you. Industrial capacity dictates strategy, rather than the other way around.
I doubt it. The Allied strength in 1944 and the extra year for planning and marshalling forces and supplies and other materiel gave the invasion a much better chance of success.
For example, if they had invaded in 1943 and everything had gone as it did in 1944, they wouldn’t have had the Mulberry harbour as it didn’t even start construction until the summer of 1943. This would have had a significant effect on the ability to get supplies ashore to sustain the landing. http://www.combinedops.com/Mulberry%20Harbours.htm#The%20Construction
I think it is more likely that a 1943 landing could have stalled or failed, which would have lengthened the war rather than shortening it. Churchill was probably right to wait until 1944.
I would never underestimate the intelligence someone who speaks my language better than I am able to speak theirs. 
I am not particuarly well informed on the overall strategy of the Italian campaign. At first glance it seems rather odd to invade from the tip of a long thin peninsula with a range of high ridged mountains stretched along the length of it. I suppose that if the intention was to go directly for the south of France, then it would have left enemy to the rear. As others have mentioned, the reason is probably caught up in the mire which was the politics of the time?
Well … back to the future pdf;)
I/m actually don’t see what relation the “industrial capacity” of Britain has to the landing compains of 1943-44.
Was it problem to order in USA instead 1000 of sure-expensive strategical bombers B-17 the enought transport aircrafts and ships for the landing operations?
I doubt it was a real problem. The mean reason of why the Churchill shoosed the Italy was his political ambitions ( he hoped to involve into the war the Turkey under british “flag” and liberated Balcans for itself by them). But as we know this plan was failured.
The capitulation of Rommel was in may of 1943, but if the Britains really wish to land in the France in 1943 they could find the time for this( not later jule of 1943).
But as we know this wasn’t planned by the Churchill from the beginning. He has own plans ( to captured the Balcans for Britain) but unfortinatelly uncle Jo Stalin didn’t let him to realise his dreams and Balcans were libareted by the Red Army together with ugoslavian partisans. This was the one of greatest mistake of Churchill but not first.
If he really wish to win the Germany as soon as it was possible he could fing the political willing to prepeare the invasion into the France in 1943 ( instead of waiting while the Red Army crashed the Germans troops and take the Eastern Europe for itself).
Sorry again.
Cheers.
Right strategy if you have enough time while the Germans armades were crashed in the East. But this is wrong way if you try to fight enemy and you know that time plaing AGAINST YOU. In this perspective the short and quick way to finish the war was the assault to the Heart of fascism - Germany. When you wish to win - the direct and shortest way just attack to the heart.
For Britain it was only one way to attack via the France- any other way could just slow the process and forces the more casulates. (Don’t need to repeat you that the last year of war -1944-45 was the MOST blood : just one example - the 60% of Holocaust victims was in this period. )
The inevitable resault of strategy of Britain was the practically full lost of political influence after the war. Becouse Churchill prefered to wait 1944 while the USA and Red army made whole work for him.