Messerschmitt Me 262.

Although Mr. David Smith was a steam turbine design engineer (sic!) within Metropolitan Vickers, he and other engeneers at the company were aware of the possibilities of the axial flow turbojet engine.

Originally, the first British axial-flow aircraft gas turbine B10 (known as Betty) was to have been built by the RAE (Royal Aircraft Establishment) the engines compressor was based on test data from experimental compressor “Anne” built to a design by A.A. Griffith of the RAE and manufactured by Fraser and Chalmers. A senior scientist within the RAE, A. A. Griffith had published paper on gas turbine development as early as 1926, and together with Hayne Constant, also of the RAE, considered that the compressors of future gas turbines should be of the axial type; However, the RAE did not have the manufacturing or research capability to make this aerodynamically complex compressor work on a scale sufficient to power an aircraft.

In 1937 discussions took place between the RAE and Metropolitan Vickers chief engineer Dr. Karl Baumann who in turn appointed Dr. David Smith to lead the design, development and manufacturing team. Work started at the company the following year under an Air Ministry Contract.

The experimental non-flight engine B10 had proved successful, with a compression ratio of 2:1. As war broke out and the Trafford Park Factory became committed to war work and space was at a premium, B10 had set fire to the research facility so it was decided to extend a small overspeed test cell which had been built in some secrecy on land off Barton Dock Road at Urmston, Manchester, with a view to relocate all gas turbine research and development. For a brief period the salt mines in Wincham had been used for engine testing, however pollution and fog from the nearby industrial town of Northwich caused contamination of the compressor blading which effected performance tests so all efforts were concentrated at “Barton Test’”.

The first flight engine F2 (“Freda”) ran in a test cell during December 1942, by June 1943 an F2 engine of 1800 lb static thrust was altitude tested in the tail of a Lancaster bomber. The Lancaster, which operated from the RAE Farnborough became the topic of much local discussion as it flew over the Manchester area. Interestingly, the aircraft allocated by the ministry was the Lancaster prototype which proved to be most unreliable, much to the frustration of Dr. Smith and the Metrovic team.

The first aircraft to be powered by and axial flow turbojet was a Gloster F/9 40 Meteor aircraft, the flight took place at the RAE on the 13th November 1943.

Metrovic continued turbojet development, the last flight engine being the F9 Sapphire, the design of which was handed to Armstong Siddley when Metropolitan Vickers decided to opt out of aircraft gas turbines and concentrate manufacturing and development on Industrial and Marine steam and gas turbines.

The test cells at Barton were turned over to steam turbine reseach and development in the early 1960’s. Dr. Smith returned to steam turbine design, although in great secrecy he was asked to assist Rolls-Royce’s Dr. Stanley Hooker when Rolls-Royce engineers ran into aerodynamic problems when developing the compressor for the famous Rolls-Royce Avon gas turbine engine.

It is worth noting that Whittle-type engines powered all the first generation of postwar jet aircraft…

Oh no, my dear Mr. Pdf 27. The MiG 9 “Fargo ” (first flight: April 24, 1946) was powered by two RD-20 jet engines (Soviet derivative of a BMW 003 A), and both Jak-15 and Jak 17 used a single RD 10 jet engine (Soviet version of a Jumo 004). You know… Just for the record.

RR Derwent instead is to me further evidence that your thesis that the Jumo-004 wasn’t too bad really does not hold water. It wasn’t until engines like the Armstrong-Siddely Sapphire and RR Avon became available in the 1950s that axial flow engines gained widespread acceptance.

Don’t be so sure, my dear Mr. Pdf 27. Those unknown masterpieces of engeneering produced back there in USSR are still widely unknown. Yes, you are right – they were not applied, more precisely not initially, but highly original constructive bureaus leaded by Stechkin and Mikulin actually have designed some very intriguing designs in early fifties. Yes, I know - this is not directly connected with WW2, but… Perhaps that will be a theme for another thread.:slight_smile:

…and the only reason that they are nowadays limited to a few applications like helicopter engines is simply due to ducting problems when stacking compressors, rather than issues of frontal area.

Really, my dear Mr. Pdf27? Excellent. Allow me than a tiny proposal: let’s make a tiny mathematical exercise deeply connected with some standard engineering tasks in aeronautic industry. Would you be so kind to make for me the Constant outer engine intake diameter calculation [Dmax] (given as the equivalent flat-plate area), separately for an axial-compressor equipped, as well as for centrifugal compressor equipped engine, outfitted with the following common parameters:
• Inlet Mach number: 0.70
• stagnation pressure: 101.4 kPA
• Inlet stagnation temperature: 300 K
• Pressure ratio: 21
• Isentropic efficiency of the compressor: 0.85
• Isentropic efficiency of the turbine: 0.85
• Mechanical transmission efficiency between the turbine and compressor: 0.97
• Combustion chamber pressure loss factor: 0.06
• Static thrust of the engine: 72 kN
• Engine airflow: 65 kg/s.

After that, please recalculate the parasite drag value of different engines, and compare gained numerical results. I am pretty sure right now that an axial compressor engine would allow higher drag-efficiency at lower frontal areas, so vital for a modern aircraft, of course, with some sacrifice to weight and length.

And don’t worry – some personal friends of mine will land you a hand in this lastly mentioned task. We will do that in complete congruence with the prescription and methodology prescribed in a Educational Manual EM 910 – “Elements of Aeronautics”, by Francis Pope and Arthur S. Otis, United States Armed Forces Institute, Washington.

I really can’t see how the degree of reaction would substantially affect the reheat stage. All it does is change the design of the final stator.

Indeed wery good and truly matter oriented observation, my dear Mr. Pdf 27. Well, I have to admit that I was able to find no more than one possibility. Accordingly to Dr. Fritz Dietzel (“Gasturbinen”, Vogel Verlag, 1974, p. 251), the degree of reaction, as the numerical ratio of the static pressure change in the rotor to the static pressure change through the whole stage, would substantially affect the turbine and compressor blades upstreaming and thus the flow simmetricity within the rotor and stator blades, and as a consequence the constructive possibility for the employment of the identical constructive parts for the rotor and stator blades network. For example, the compressor stage with a degree of reaction of 0.5 would share the pressure rise about equally between the rotor and stator, so the application of standardized components in that case will be possible.

“Degree of reaction”, Dietzel, p.251

Accordingly to Dietzel, the degree of reaction amounts constructive complexity, possibility for constructive parts standardization, and therefore the employment of strategically critical materials.

However, knowing intrinsic and constant German engineering tendency toward thermodynamic conversion effectivity, my personal conviction is that the German constructors actually have contemplated about one specific, truly brilliant and even today sadly neglected technological solution. Namely this one:

Now, look carefully, my dear Mr. Pdf 27. Do you see that pretty peculiar component marked with No. 10, and located within the rear part of the engine?

Mysterious Possibility

You do? Excellent. Can you guess the gadget? A little tip – in this case the degree of reaction is extremely important!

In the meantime, as always – all the best!

Well, in that case, my dear Mr. Pdf27 I think that we can pronounce the whole genuine early American jet-engine design activity as a completely erroneous waste of time and money, and also to enunciate that aforesaid crime was committed by a group of staggering engineering idiots misfortunately positioned in the high places.

He,he , that was a good one :smiley:

Goering under the instructions of the Fuhrer asked Messerschmitt on the 3rd November 1943 if the Me 262 could carry bombs.

Messerschmitt replied that the original plans envisaged the Me 262 could carry two 551lb or 1,102lb bombs. When questioned further by Goering about this Messerschmitt was forced to admit the design work for the bomb release mechanism and the bomb pylons had not even been started.

Under further pressure from Goering, M esserschmitt claimed the necessary work could be completed within two weeks, of course not mentioning to the Reichsmarschall there had never been any intention to build the Me 262 as a fighter bomber.

Another problem facing the entire programme at this time, was only one prototype(V4) was available for test flying.

On November 12 1943 Erhard Milch expressed his concerns. “The one thing that we are not yet entirely sure of the problem of whether the Me 262, with it’s jet engines, is so foolproof that we can go ahead with production next year. Are we ready-not only from the viewpoint of development, but also from the viewpoint of actual production?”

Major Knemeyer pointed out to Milch the Messerschmitt facilities engaged in work on the new fighter were in chaos and had run into a bottleneck. At this stage development work on two very critical items for the Me 262 had not been completed-the ejector seat and pressurized cockpit.

All this is a clear indication the Me 262 programme was encountering major difficulties outside of the continuing problems with the Jumo engines and at this stage the aircraft was not ready for production priority.

As can be seen all development work on the Me 262 had been with the view of producing it as a fighter, not a fighter bomber or a pure bomber. There was never any intention of Messerschmitt or his designers to produce the Me 262 as a fighter bomber or bomber and the first time this concept interrupted their thinking was during the conversation with Goering and then it was immediately forgotten. Equally at this stage even Erhard Milch operated under the belief the Me 262 was purely intended for fighter production and for good reason. The Arado Ar 234 light reconnaissance bomber was under development and as this aircraft was intended for purely this role any thought of the Me 262 filling the very same role had never been an option and was actually seen as a waste of resources.

This was the state of play in November 1943.

In the next post I will talk about the ‘Blitz Bomber.’

Regards digger.

Two Me 262 prototypes, the V4 and the V6 were presented to Hitler for demonstration at Insterburg on November 26 1943.

An engine of the V4 suffered a flame out and with test pilot Gerd Lindner at the controls the V6 was demonstrated to the Fuhrer. And it was a suitably impressive performance. It was at this demonstration it has been repeatedly claimed if the Me 262 could carry bombs and when informed it could Hitler decreed from this point the Me 262 would be produced as a Blitzbomber.

This version of the Me 262 development is an absolute fabrication. Firstly based on the erroneous information supplied to Goering by Messerschmitt himself, the Fuhrer already knew the Me 262 could carry bombs.

A telegram dictated by Hitler to a Luftwaffe aide was delivered to Goering 5th December 1943. It read: The Fuhrer has called our attention once more to the tremendous importance of the production of jet propelled aircraft for employment as fighter bombers It is imperative that the Luftwaffe has a number of jet fighter bombers[/COLOR] ready for front commitment by the Spring of 1944. Any difficulties occasioned by labour and raw material shortages will be resolved by the exploitation of Luftwaffe resources until auch time as existing shortages can be made up. The Fuhrer feels that a delay of our jet fighter programme would be tantamount to irresponsible negligence. the Fuhrer has directed that bimonthly written reports be made to him concerning the programme of the Me 262 and the Ar 234."

From this telegram it can be seen Hitler envisaged the Me 262 as a fighter bomber.

Although Speer shortly thereafter awarded the Me 262 top production priority, development problems still plagued the aircraft and the main production plant for the Me 262 at Kottern was not even complete and in fact it would never produce a single jet fighter.

Critically 23 Me 262A-0 airframes were available in February 1944, but there were no complete engines! It was to be April 1944 before 16 of these airframes received engines and were delivered to the Luftwaffe for evaluation. So we can see up to April 1944 no fighter bombers had been produced and all deliveries were in fact fighters. The major bottleneck in the programme to this point were the jumo engines.

It was at the notorious April 1944 conference with Milch, Goering and Saur that Hitler exploded and said,“Not a single one of my orders has been obeyed.”
Milch attempted to explain the Me 262 had been designed purely as a fighter. This was the beginning of the end for Milch.

The V10 prototype had been used in testing programmes to this stage, hardly an interference to the Me 262 fighter programme.

Into May and the Fuhrer was insistent the fighter bomber Me 262 take priority, but it was to be the June 7 conference between Hitler and Saur which would be claimed Hitler’s demands interfered with the introduction of the Me 262 as a fighter. This was the notorious ‘Fuhrer-Befhel’ which demanded intial production of the Me 262 be limited to bombers. Fighter development would be allowed to continue and not until these tests were concluded would production of the fighter version be permitted and once this point had been reached there would be no reason why production would not be shared between the bomber and fighter versions.

So did the Fuhrer-Befhel delay the inroduction of the Me 262 as a fighter? The answer is no as the detail modifications to adapt the Me 262 as a fighter bomber(bomb fusing equipment, design and testing of pylon designs, etc) had been completed before the announcement of the Fuhrer-Befhel and these modifications were relatively simple and could be carried out on the production line without any delay to deliveries. With these modifications the Me262 began to be delivered for service evaluation.

The problem of deliveries of the Me 262 still lay in engine problems and as we have seen with the freezing of engine development in early June 1944 led to the first deliveries, a mere 28 aircraft in June and 59 in July. the highest monthly production was 117 in October and as there were a surplus of airframes it can be seen delivery of the Me 262 was governed by the availability of the still less than satisfactory Jumo engines.

When the Fuhrer-Befhel was cancelled in early November 1944 a total of 315 Me 262’s had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, by December deliveries had reached 513 aircraft out of a planned total of 1,360 aircraft, a shortfall of 847 aircraft due to non delivery of Jumo 004 engines.

Regards digger.

I havent read any of the prior posts yet here on this thread but I found that the Messerschmitt 262 is being copied and replicas are built. Here is the web site if you are interested http://www.stormbirds.com/project/index.html
The Messerschmitt 262 jet fighter plane built late in World War II in Germany is back in production - at Seattle’s Paine Field. They use a modern jet engine instead of the flaky original and they’ve strengthened a few weak points, but other than that it’s a copy of the original. Price tag: $2 million a copy.

The Gloster Meteor evidently entered service at around the same time as the Me 262. Regardless, by 1944 the allies had jet fighters themselves.

If the British were so brilliant why didn’t they defeat Germany themselves? Doubtless, they had some advanced technology but as far as I can tell the UK did not win the war by itself. Why is this?

The German designs may have been flawed but the Germans had the satisfaction of knowing they were stronger than Britain and that surely counts for something.

Umm… What’s with the 3 posts?.. Pointless posts at that.

Post merged, Cojimar try to do not repeat that consecutive posting.

Into May and the Fuhrer was insistent the fighter bomber Me 262 take priority, but it was to be the June 7 conference between Hitler and Saur which would be claimed Hitler’s demands interfered with the introduction of the Me 262 as a fighter. This was the notorious ‘Fuhrer-Befhel’ which demanded intial production of the Me 262 be limited to bombers. Fighter development would be allowed to continue and not until these tests were concluded would production of the fighter version be permitted and once this point had been reached there would be no reason why production would not be shared between the bomber and fighter versions.

So did the Fuhrer-Befhel delay the inroduction of the Me 262 as a fighter? The answer is no as the detail modifications to adapt the Me 262 as a fighter bomber(bomb fusing equipment, design and testing of pylon designs, etc) had been completed before the announcement of the Fuhrer-Befhel and these modifications were relatively simple and could be carried out on the production line without any delay to deliveries. With these modifications the Me262 began to be delivered for service evaluation.

The 25th of May Hitler gave the more damaging ( in my opinion) order, this dviated resources for the develpment of variant like the Me 262A-2/U2 , is true that it was not the only cause some delay was caused also by allied bombing in the BMW motorplants.

I havent read any of the prior posts yet here on this thread

Well, you should ¡¡

As only one airframe, Werk number 110 484 was modified to serve as the prototype Me 262A-2a/U2, it could hardly be called a major diversion of resources.

The source of production problems suffered by the Me 262 through it’s entire service life was the slow delivery of engines. The fact the engines were still imperfect when all development was frozen did not help matters, nor did Allied bombing.

Considering the difficulties faced by the Germans, it is remarkable the manufacturers were able to deliver any completed aircraft. In retrospect the Fuhrer Befhel is used as a convenient way of explaining away the more complex issues which clouded the career of the Me 262.

Hitler’s demand for the Me 262 to be used as a fighter bomber was not as crazy as people believe. Quite simply existing Luftwaffe types were incapable of penetrating Allied defences and his belief a superfast bomber type was needed to reverse the situation was not wide of the mark. In the end the German aero industry for a variety of reasons was not able to comply with his demands.

Regards digger.

I make no claim to being either at this point in time.

The RR Welland was rated at 180 hours between overhauls in 1943. That’s a RATED value, i.e. one at which engine failure is highly unlikely before. See linky. I can’t however find the original source I was basing the 1,000 hours comment on.

Pretty much, and that’s what is so odd about it - the US organisation of industry in WW2 was nothing short of brilliant. However, when it came to jets they did very badly indeed. The US jet programme contributed precisely nothing to the allied war effort.

Precisely. Whittle got his engine to work in time for useful war service. The US concentration on axial flow engines produced nothing of value.
AA Griffith at the RAE was also trying to get British research to concentrate on axial flow designs for the same reason. He was wrong too.
Incidentally, I’ve spent a great deal of time at the Whittle Lab, and while I was there my supervisor was Professor John Denton, then head of the Lab. Nick Cumpsty was a Fellow at my college, but left to work at Rolls and became an Emeritus Fellow shortly before I matriculated.

So what? They were trying to get a working engine in wartime service. Who gives a stuff about isentropic efficiency so long as it works reliably and performs better than anything else you have? A bad jet engine is light years better than none at all, which is what the US ended up with.

Again, demonstration that he had something between his ears. There was a huge amount of radial compressor design detail available, from superchargers and the like. There was naff all about axial compressors in comparison. Remember, the overwhelming priority was to get an engine in service as fast as possible.

If not terribly bright. If they understand steam turbines, that means all they understand are axial turbines. A very different beast from axial compressors. It also means they will not use radial compressors, as they simply don’t understand them.

No, it didn’t - you’re making a massive logical error here. It confirmed that they were going to use an axial flow compressor, whether it was appropriate or not. An aero engine company would have compared the two - a steam turbine company would not.

Indeed. And as Whittle demonstrated, that would have been absolutely the right choice in wartime conditions.

Again, BS. Just because future engineering practice would be one thing, does not mean another was not the appropriate solution at the time. Centimetric wave radar is nowadays used for early warning, but during WW2 longwave radar was used instead despite the availability of centimetric radar. Not because the people during WW2 were stupid or made the wrong decision, but because they couldn’t yet build suitable centimetric sets. It was around 1950 before suitable axial flow compressors could be built.

Yeah, what were they playing at. So, given just how “pretty nice” these characteristics were, exactly how many US combat aircraft flew in WW2 service powered by this miraculous engine?

Again, how many aircraft powered by this engine served in combat in WW2? That is the only yardstick that matters here. We were fighting a total war, from which only one side would survive. Any industrial effort diverted from winning that war (before the very end when it was plain we couldn’t lose) was industrial effort working for the Axis.

Again, BS.

P-59:
Maximum speed: 413 mph (664 km/h)
Range: 240 mi (386 km)
Service ceiling: 46,200 ft (14,080 m)
Rate of climb: 3,200 ft/min (16,26 m/s)

Gloster Meteor F.8
Maximum speed: Mach 0.82, 600 mph at 10,000 ft (965 km/h at 3,050 m)
Range: 600 mi (965 km)
Service ceiling: 43,000 ft (13,100 m)
Rate of climb: 7,000 ft/min (35.6 m/s)

The F.8 is a postwar, cleaned-up version of the wartime Mark III, but finding plausible performance data for the Mark III is proving rather hard. The only valid data I can dig up and be confident in is the comparative evaluation that it was superior to the Tempest V in all departments except the heavy ailerons.

Trivially easy, and the two will be the same in any case. Incidentally, the only values you need in there are the inlet Mach number, inlet stagnation pressure & temperature and engine air flow. The rest is irrelevant, and looks suspiciously like you cut and pasted it out of a random textbook - it is not at all relevant to any part of your question, so it makes no sense to include it if you actually understood what you were talking about.
Neglecting edge effects, a diameter of 53.8cm should give you the required mass flux.

Can’t be done - you need detailed compressor design details to get the frontal area of a centrifugal compressor from that data. With the data there, you don’t have a chance. Parasitic drag will in any case be pretty low in either case - in a reasonably well streamlined nacelle, the only difference will be in the slightly increased wetted area. Wave drag is another matter however, and M=0.7 is fast enough you may have to worry about that. It is far more relevant to other parts of aerodynamics, however.

Which I suspect you are probably quoting here. Me, I personally prefer to go by what I was taught by lecturers like the aformentioned Prof. Cumpsty rather than the books they wrote. You tend to actually learn something that way.
Besides, why would I need help working out the air inlet area for something that simple? That’s a back of a fag packet calculation at worst.

All well and good (well, sort of - the fact that you can’t use common components anyway because the rotor and stator blades have to face in different directions seems to have passed you by!) but what’s that got to do with afterburner/reheat?

Last bit doesn’t follow - it will use less material if they aren’t standardised, as the stator blades can be made weaker and thus lighter, not having to withstand the rotational stresses imposed.

So far as I can tell from rather a bad drawing without accompanying text, that’s a reverse flow heat exchanger such as fitted to the WR-21 marine gas turbine. Certainly you have the gas prior to the combustion chamber going one way through it, and that after the final turbine stage going the other way through it. I will admit however to being stunned if that is what it is, as nobody in their right mind would think to put one on an aero engine - it will be massively too complex, heavy and expensive for any fuel savings you make.

As only one airframe, Werk number 110 484 was modified to serve as the prototype Me 262A-2a/U2, it could hardly be called a major diversion of resources.

The source of production problems suffered by the Me 262 through it’s entire service life was the slow delivery of engines. The fact the engines were still imperfect when all development was frozen did not help matters, nor did Allied bombing

I did not object that the engines had its troubles but the bombings on Regensburg did not help either.

More on the Hitler s order on May.

The bomber mania was so much that actually the first operative Me-262 were bombers ¡¡¡ and were used over France in July 1944 by the Kommando Schenk.

And yet another crazy experiment, towed glide bomb attached to a Me-262A-2 (v10)

The British flew some jets during the war but it appears they did little. Some V1’s were shot down by Meteors but I have never heard of any instances of them shooting down axis aircraft.

The axis were losing badly from late 1942 onwards. An allied victory would seem likely even earlier but certainly from late 1942 onwards the axis were losing badly. Why should Americans be so concerned about the war with their enemies in retreat by such an early date?

14 V-1s to be exact. After that they were mainly used to train USAAF crews in combating jet aircraft, since until spring 1945 they were absolutely forbidden from flying over German-held territory. By the time this restriction was relaxed and they went hunting for German jets, it was too late and the Luftwaffe had been pretty much totally destroyed.

Edit: They did destroy of the order of 40 German aircraft on the ground after this point however.

Can you tell me in what way Germany was stronger than the UK? And before you answer, consider than Panzer Divisions are not a sole indicator of power.

More powerful in terms of population and industrial capacity. The strange thing is that Germany did not utilize its massive production capacity for the war until late in the conflict.

REIMAHG Me 262 Production Site near Kahla (Codename “Lachs” - “Salmon”)

One of the most remarkable advancements made by the German military in World War II was the production of turbine-jet aircraft. The most famous of these was the Messerschmitt Me 262, developed beginning in 1938 and fielded in 1944. A special production facility was started in 1944, for quicker assembly line manufacture. Due to the setup at the main Messerschmitt factories, fast assembly line production was not possible, and these sites were vulnerable to Allied bombing. Accordingly, a company called Flugzeugwerke Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (REIMAHG for short) was formed as a subsidiary of the Gustloff Nazi industrial complex. REIMAHG eventually became concerned only with the Me 262, and its main production facility was located in an old porcelain sand mine in the Walpersberg Hill near Kahla (south of Jena) – Codename “Lachs” (“Salmon”).

The existing tunnels in the Walpersberg were enlarged and others were dug, and massive concrete bunkers were built outside these tunnels. Subparts were made and partially assembled in the tunnels, then moved outside to the concrete bunkers, where final assembly took place. The assembled jets were then moved to the top of the hill via a platform that moved along a railed ramp by a power winch. The top of the Walpersberg had been leveled off and concreted in a massive construction effort, to form a runway some 3300 feet long. This was not sufficient for an Me 262 to take off (even with the jet engines, take-off was actually fairly slow), so small rockets assisted take-off. The runway was also too short for the jets to land, so leaving the Walpersberg was an all-or-nothing proposition: there could be no emergency landings. The jets were flown from Kahla to a site some 130 kilometers away to be fitted with weapons and radios, and to undergo final testing.

REIMAHG only managed to produce some twenty-seven Me 262 jet fighters by the end of the war. The work was done mostly by foreign forced laborers, some 991 of whom died during their nine months at “Lachs.” The U.S. Army took the site on 12 April 1945, and before turning Thüringen over to the Soviets in July, they removed enough parts to finish five Me 262s that were found on the production line. Surprisingly, the Kahla area had not been bombed. British Intelligence had photographed Me 262s at the site in March 1945, so the Allies were well aware of “Lachs.” But Kahla was spared the fate of the V-2 works at Nordhausen, which suffered a devastating bombing attack only eight days before the American Army arrived. (In spite of this historical report, the REIMAHG-Kahla site today shows many depressions that look very much like bomb craters that can be seen at such sites as Normandy and the Obersalzberg, and many areas that appear to have undergone explosive upheaval, all in areas that were flat during the war. This situation is apparently the result of Soviet activity after the war.)

Beginning in 1947, the Soviets blew up the concrete bunkers and assembly buildings, and also the entrances to most of the tunnels, including destruction of the concrete runway on the hilltop. However, the concrete buildings had reinforced walls some 10 feet thick, so in many cases, the explosions only collapsed the roofs. REIMAHG-Kahla remains today one of the most extensive Third Reich ruins sites, with the walls and foundations of most of the concrete assembly and workshop buildings, some still supporting parts of their roofs. The site is not generallyopen to the public.

Picture caption:
Part of an aerial view of the site, taken by British photo-reconnaissance on 19 March 1945. The Walpersberg with its hilltop runway is at the top. A tiny Me 262 can be seen just at the top of the ramp, beside the runway. Various bunkers and assembly buildings can be seen along the cleared area at the bottom of the slope, to the right of the ramp bottom. The dark blotches on the runway, to the right of the ramp, were apparently an attempt at painted camouflage. (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-committee (CIOS) - Underground Factories in Central Germany, London, 1945)

Source: Thüringen

REIMAHGaerial1a.jpg

Walpersberg.gif

rampview.jpg

Very nice info.