Um, no. You yourself posted that there were 20 divisions of the regular Wehrmacht in the sector, though admittedly ones that were of lessor quality. The “reserve” divisions were a further 11 quickly raised. Granted, they were of dubious quality. But they still ere defensively fighting for their homeland, then there were the six-divisions worth of border guards men that would have retreated to the Siegfried line…
[i]from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_betrayal[i]
Both the pre-war reports of the Polish intelligence and the post-war testimonies of German generals (most notably of Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl) reported that there was an equivalent of less than 20 divisions facing France in 1939, as compared to roughly 90 French divisions. On the other hand, German orders of battle show 33 infantry divisions, plus eleven newly raised infantry divisions, plus the equivalent of six border guard divisions, all under command of Army Group C. Similarly, most of the Luftwaffe and all armoured units were then in Poland while the Siegfried Line was severely under-manned and far from completed. Knowing all of the above, the Polish commanders expected that the French offensive would quickly break the German lines and force the OKW to withdraw a large part of its forces fighting on Polish soil back to German western frontier. This would force Germany to fight a costly two-front war.
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The French assault was to be carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one armoured division, three mechanized divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions. All the necessary forces were mobilised in the first week of September. On September 12, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then, the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop not closer than 1 kilometre from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony war started. The French remained in control of a pocket in the Saarland. As a symbolic gesture, the 1st Polish Grenadier Division later raised in the French Army was stationed to occupy this German territory.
The Allied attitude towards Poland in 1939 has been a subject of an ongoing dispute among historians ever since. Some historians argue that if only France had pursued the offensive agreed on in the treaties, it would have definitely been able to break through the unfinished Siegfried Line and force Germany to fight a costly two-front war that it was in no position to win. At the same time, others argue that France and Britain had promised more than they would deliver — especially when confronted with the option to declare war on the Soviet Union for violating Poland’s territory on September 17, 1939 the way they had on Germany on September 3, 1939 (though in fact the pledge would not have obliged France and Great Britain to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor) — and that the French army was superior to the Wehrmacht in numbers only. It lacked the offensive doctrines, mobilization schemes, and offensive spirit necessary to attack Germany. Also, while the bulk of Luftwaffe was engaged in Poland, neither the French airforce nor the British Royal Air Force engaged in any operations against Germany beyond leaflet droppings and the bombing of German naval bases.
It is unlikely, given Soviet strategic doctrine of opportunistic war that they would have carried on with invasion of Poland fulfilling their promises given to Germans.[citation needed] Though Germans asked Russians to invade Poland on September 3 no such action took place till September 17, 1939. This is partly because the Soviet Union waited for a proof of Poland’s collapse as well as lack of military involvement on the part of the Allies[citation needed].
So, in effect, it would have been 40 divisions against almost 40 divisions or so…
What would be the value of the offensive ? An instant and immidiate conquest of Germany with no opposition offered, no russian offensive meant that Poland could actually receive the british arms which were en route and mobilize the rest of its divisions in the romanian triangle.
Completely and utterly impossible according to any historians I have read and again you deny basic facts. Namely nobody believes a French Army of largely mobilized reservists, which out any sort of real offensive plan, were going to “conquer Germany.” A most was the speculation of a “two front war” would wear down the Third Reich and perhaps have put France in a better position for its own battle with Germany.
But the French were thinking of WWI and their lower birth rate (half of Germany’s). The French Army almost broke in 1914 because it had launched a premature offensive into the Saar region and had to retreat wholesale to avoid annihilation after suffering heavy casualties. They were also thinking in terms of winning in 1918 with a slow, steady combined arms approach that helped to break the back of the depleted German Army. The French armies dispersed most of their armor, and moved in terms of calculated infantry foot speeds…
The French doctrine of “Methodical Battle” moved very slowly in a localized action that prevented them from exploiting any large opportunities of a battle of maneuver or breakthrough. By the time the got anywhere, and I am not arguing they wouldn’t have nor that they shouldn’t have tried, it wouldn’t have been far enough and the Germans would have counterattacked…
Also you forget a crucial and common fact, Germans did not have winter equipment nor ammunition for more than three more weeks of warfare by 17 september which means that come winter german resistance would crumple.
Winter equipment? Please! And the French really were not prepared to fight a long war either, as they had been caught off guard by the attack on Poland. They also didn’t have a huge stockpile and were not even fully mobilized by the middle of September.
And the French offensive would have more likely run out of steam, and they would have been just as hypothetically vulnerable to massed panzers and combined arm Blitz warfare as they were in the Spring of 1940…
We could argue that they may have come out better ultimately as they might have had more time to adapt to the vastly quicker pace of German warfare, but then, that would mean the French screwed themselves as much as they did Poland ultimately. wouldn’t it?
By 17 of September Poland retained fighting capability and majority of its army and equipment which coincidentally became compressed enough to offer stiff resistance, read up on german advances around Warsaw, they were all repelled with heavy german casualities, unlike French or Czech Poles were also resolute to fight to the last man if there was a possibility of victory so there was no risk of French losing their allies.
No they didn’t! the Polish army was fragmenting and was in a full headlong retreat to a final defense line, and even that was ruined by the speed of the panzers…
Yes, they inflicted casualties on the Germans, but they were fighting a final stand at that point with no air force, armor, and little way of stopping German tanks…
And there were French that were also “resolute” to fighting to the last in the Norman hedgerows much as the Germans would against the Allies four years later, ironically after Paris had fallen and it was know that saving continental France was impossible…
The Polish courage was even more in vain as France’s was, as the French could have fought from their colonies after the downfall. They didn’t…
Then again the offensive would give time for brits to deploy in France and/or in Poland and provide air/navy support which would further tip the scales in the allied favour.
There is no end to the gains that could be had if the allies did assault Germany,
Complete hindsight and a big bag of hypothetical…
The French armies only hope was to fight a battle of defensive attrition, then to move over to the mobile offensive. Gamelin, for all his faults, knew that the French army could not fight a mobile battle with the Wehrmacht. That’s why they waited until they were to have overwhelming advantage by mid-1941 against a blockaded Germany, and even then, the French and BEF would have suffered at least a few defeats until the adjusted their tactical war-fighting doctrines on armor and combined arms warfare…
in fact thanks to polish stiff resistance this was the only time during entire WW2 when Germany could be defeated with ease and within a few months, the conformism and cowardice of the western allies blew it.
