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Ceylon huh?
never heard of this major operation before!
picked from: http://www.century-of-flight.freeola.com/Aviation%20history/WW2/involved.htm
Ceylon
The island of Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, as it was then called, was used as a naval base for allied operations. On 5 April 1942 over 300 aircraft from Japanese carriers bombed the island. Winston Churchill called it “the most dangerous moment” of World War II, as the Japanese fleet wished to have a surprise attack on the British fleet. They did not see a repeat of the attack at Pearl Harbor as the British ships were moved to Addu Atoll, 600 miles south-west of Ceylon. Nevertheless, the British Eastern Fleet lost an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and two destroyers, while the RAF saw its squadrons massacred. The British fleet retreated to East Africa until 1944.
The Ceylon Garrison Artillery on Horsburgh Island in the Cocos Islands mutinied on the night of 8/9 May, intending to hand the islands over to the Japanese. The mutiny took place partly because of the agitation by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. The mutiny was suppressed and three of the mutineers were the only British Commonwealth troops to be executed for mutiny during the Second World War. Bombadier Gratien Fernando, the leader of the mutiny, was defiant to the end, confident of his place in the annals of history as a fighter for freedom.
No Sri Lankan combat regiment was deployed by the British in a combat situation after the Cocos Islands Mutiny, although Supply & Transport Corps troops were used in rear areas in the Middle East. The defences of Sri Lanka were beefed up to three British army divisions because the island was strategically important, holding almost all the British Empire’s resources of rubber. Rationing was instituted so that Sri Lankans were comparatively better fed than their Indian neighbours, in order to prevent disaffection among the natives.
Sri Lankans in Malaya and Singapore enlisted in the Lanka Regiment of the Indian National Army to fight on the side of the Japanese. While there was a plan to land them in Sri Lanka to start a guerrilla war, they never actually saw action.
I knew this thread would lead to some surprising, lesser-known facts about ww2…
That is exactly what I was hoping for…
Sorry Quentin for re-posting the picture without asking first.
I reduced it and considered it was public, so good for this thread.
Tell us when you have news on your publishing date, I’ll be the first to order it!
This is like beeing a kid in a candy store, but with a bullet-proof glass instead of a door…
hi
ok about pic
i had to be very choosy with which one i used.
i did laugh when you put…
This is like beeing a kid in a candy store, but with a bullet-proof glass instead of a door…
now you know how i feel.
i want the info out there it will create a great stir.
the bit re ceylon you posted does not relate to the canoe tack…
i will explain oh the hours i am going to be here!
Small Operations Group formed by S.E.A.C.
Officially formed on the 12th June 1944 it was commanded by Colonel H.T.Tollemache R.M. The group included four sections of the S.R.U., three groups of S.B.S., four units of C.O.P.P.S. and three troops of Detachment 385. These were based at Hammenheil Camp, Ceylon.
These units played a great part in the crossing of the Irrawaddy, as well as the Chindwin, by the 14th Army.
The different teams within S.O.G. could only be used in the roles specifically tuned to their type of training. All the men were operational.
The functions of the group were to…
‘‘… Operate against enemy coastal, river or lake areas using as their final means of approach various types of small craft …. ’’
The Small Operations Group carried out 174 operations. It was disbanded following the cessation of hostilities in the Eastern Theatre in 1945.
Although there was a mix of various formations at Hammenhiel Camp very little was known about the purposes of the other, friends often did not know they were in the same area - there was ‘no careless talk’.
The smaller specialised units as is mentioned did most of their training which evolved around their equipment; within these units came additional specialisations.
Many operations by the COPP’s, SBS, and Detachment 385 were made in support of local forces throughout the areas mentioned.
if you can imagine these elite of the elite forces. the COPP’s themselves were not even known about until in the 50’s ithink, the U.S. media found out about them and their activities were gradually known of. i will not go on about them cos there is so very much info to get through. these guys basically were the people who planned the approach attack.
detach 385 was a unit with other specialities. some info is available on 385 but much has not even to this day.
i had to cut a lot out of the manuscript.
the amount of documentation and info i found that still has not seen light of day is incredible.
you really dont want me to start here.
i would get death threats from peeps who wanted me to stop.
i found stuff that has been unseen since it was archived and totally forgotten about.
in the uk recently there was a docu by a presenter jeremy clarkson who co -presents a uk car prog. he highlighted the raid on st nazaire. this was a largish scale suicide mission which involved a converted U.S. ship made to look like a german ship. ( it was called ‘campbeltown’ it was filled to the gunwhales with tnt and rammed the drydock. i wont go on but this docu had difficulty getting info on the 'campbeltown’s ’ design etc.
during my research a few years ago i had found the original blueprints of this converted vesssel in a place they shouldnt have been. the archivist was very pleased i found them.
the docu should have asked me! i would have told em where to find them!
stop i hear you shout
ok
snooze
Q
hi not thai exactly, see my other posts to windrider.
Q
the reason no-one has much info is because it was so hush hush
Q
Are you taking the proverbial?
Even if it was hush, hush at the time it is fast becoming less and less hush hush.
You can buy this book if you want…
BEHIND JAPANESE LINES (The untold story Royal Marines Detachment 385) by Captain Derek Oakley MBE RM £6.50
from http://www.royalmarinesregimental.co.uk/histsociety.html
Detachment 385 was Royal Marine Assault Force, which operated Phuket Island, Thailand amongst other places.
It was part of the Special Operations Group (there have been many SOGs, this one was British). I don’t think it was called the “Small” Operations Group, the term “Special” during WW2 denoted a specific meaning, this was that the unit was dedicated to working in a particular theatre. Hence Special Air Service was a Specialied (dedicted) Air (Parachute) unit that operated in the desert.
Once the Second World War ended, the Special Operations Group, who operated in the Far East returned, to the UK, many of its men stayed on in the East and moved to non-specialised units. This was because conventional commanders and politicians saw little use for Special Forces in the post-war, Atomic Age, and started to disband the various Special Units.
The War Office Tactical Investigation Committee decided to raise and train short term shallow penetration Special Forces under the Royal Marines, while the other Special Forces’ units were disbanded altogether.
Those sections of SOG which remained intact were transferred to the Royal Marines, and the men who formed the new sections were from the SOG (including the Special Boat Section, RM Detachment 385, Sea Reconnaissance Unit, Combined Operation Pilotage Parties and Boom Patrol detachments).
The small number of men stayed on reported to the Westward Ho! Hotel, which had been the wartime headquarters of Combined Operations Experimental Establishment. There were fewer than 60, under the command of Blondie Hasler. Westward Ho! has special meaning within this community because of this.
In early 1946, the Admiralty gave approval for the opening of the School of Combined Operations, Beach and Boat Section, (SCOBBS) at Fremington, Devon. Hasler produced a paper outlining his vision of the future, defining the role of modern amphibious Special Forces.
The SCOBBS would train a core group of men for beach surveying, intelligence gathering and sabotage, within a year it was placed under the command of the Royal Marines and merged with RMBPD and renamed the COBBS (Combined Operations Beach and Boats Section).
At the end of August the two units of 39 men and their stores moved to the RM base at Eastney, Portsmouth. By the summer of 1948 COBS had been renamed the Small Raids Wing of the Royal Marines Amphibious School at Eastney. Their first mission being ordnance removal in Palestine and removing limpet mines from ships in Haifa harbour.
At this point the guidelines for the SAS and SBS were laid down, a row ensued about the title of SBS. The RM won and was able to use SBS as a functional title.
The SAS were responsible for recce at division level, deep penetration raids, behind-the-lines harassment and training partisans. The SBS were responsible for operations against ships and coastal installations, shallow waterborne penetration raids, beach recon, landing preparation and ferrying agents.
Either could carry harassment of coastal targets, landward recon, capture of prisoners and eliminating undesirable people. However, at this time, the SBS were regulars and the SAS remained part of the Territorial Army. Specifically 21 Special Air Service (Artists)(Volunteers) (the Artists Rifles were a unit, first in the Rifle Brigade then in the Army Air Corps that allowed the Army to retain some SF personel. 21 SAS were originally the Malayan Scouts.
Suggested reading for all
Ladd, James. SBS: The Invisible Raiders ( Arms & Armour Press, 1983)
Lodwick, John. Raiders from the Sea ( Lionel Leventhal, 1990) (originally published as The Filibusters:The Story of the Special Boat Service by Methuen, 1947.)
Macksey, Kenneth. Commando: Hit-and-Run Combat in World War II (Jove, 1991)
Parker, John. SBS: The Inside Story of the Special Boat Service
( Headline, 1997)
Seymour, William. British Special Forces ( Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985)
Welham, Michael. Combat Frogmen ( Patrick Stephenson, 1989)
Are you sure about that bit?
Did not the Malayan Scouts become 22SAS, once they had got their lack of self-discipline sorted out?
21 SAS (Artist Rifles) were, and remain, Teritorial Army (TA), they were formed from the Artists Rifles, about 1947, after the SAS Regiment had been disbanded, to keep the SAS alive. That is why they have a more senior number than 22. If I remember correctly, the Malayan Scouts were formed from volunteers during the Malayan campaign, they became known as 22 SAS as the campaign progressed. They were a pretty undisciplined bunch in the beginning, and 21 were not much pleased with what the Malayan Scouts were doing with their name.
Would be interested to know the Malayan Scouts angle, I could be mistaken.
As Ar
It is a bit of a grey area and it will very much depend on your view point. My time line goes like this…
30th November 1946 - The SAS officially disbanded. (This would be the WW2 SAS, ie Stirlings).
1st May 1947 - the SAS is revived from whatever ex members and others with needed skills that can be found. 21st Battalion, Army Air Corps SAS, a Territorial Army Unit (The Army Air Corps at this time consitsted of the Paras, SAS, Glider pilots, RA Observers and some heli pilots).
1950 - 21 SAS deploy to the Korean War.
1950 - 1955 Malaya
21 SAS deployed to Malaya as the ‘Malayan Scouts’, in response to the ‘Malayan Emergency’ insurrection.
1952
The SAS is reorganised into:
22nd Special Air Service Regiment (formed from the Malyan Scouts).
21st Special Air Service Regiment (Artists Rifles)
1959 - The 23rd Special Air Service Regiment, a territorial army unit, is created.
Thus in fact, 22 SAS was formed from the Malayan Scouts, which in turn had been created from 21 SAS.
It is worth noting that 21 SAS was a Territorial unit in name only, it was not a regular regiment in name only. It was the last place various forward thinking brass could hide their less conventional soldiers. (Let’s face it, the Guards were never going to take them!!!)
Those of the 21 SAS that didn’t go to Malaya, would form the cadre of the Artists, those who did go, formed the Scouts who were later formed in to 22.
I beleive other units followed similar forming, ie, from one to another, to roughtly back to what they were.
Also many Special units were formed, complete, from existing units.
Similar to the current change of role for 5 Rifles (is it?) moving to Commando, I think the Somerset LI (and others) were re-roled as Paras in exactly the same way, “Oi, you lot, anyone who doesn’t want to be Para one step forward, and bugger off, the remainder… Stand by.”
In order to better understand the elite forces of British military within S.E.A.C. it would be necessary to give some background.#
This background leads into my world of research namely… Military canoes of WW2.
This sector of history within the development of canoes for clandestine operations melds into the aluminium constructed canoe asked about by windrider.
A synopsis of the manuscript from my research is available by searching on this site.
It occurred to me that many had not heard about the pacific clandestine forces and as a prelude to further discussions i offer this diatribe.
COPYRIGHT Quentin Rees (c) 2007 [all info in brackets]
[FONT=“Arial Black”][Small Operations Group formed by S.E.A.C.
Officially formed on the 12th June 1944 it was commanded by Colonel H.T.Tollemache R.M. The group included four sections of the S.R.U., three groups of S.B.S., four units of C.O.P.P.S. and three troops of Detachment 385. These were based at Hammenheil Camp, Ceylon.
These units played a great part in the crossing of the Irrawaddy, as well as the Chindwin, by the 14th Army.
The different teams within S.O.G. could only be used in the roles specifically tuned to their type of training. All the men were operational.
The functions of the group were to…
‘‘… Operate against enemy coastal, river or lake areas using as their final means of approach various types of small craft …. ’’
The Small Operations Group carried out 174 operations. It was disbanded following the cessation of hostilities in the Eastern Theatre in 1945.
Although there was a mix of various formations at Hammenhiel Camp very little was known about the purposes of the other, friends often did not know they were in the same area - there was ‘no careless talk’.
The smaller specialised units as is mentioned did most of their training which evolved around their equipment; within these units came additional specialisations.
Many operations by the COPP’s ( Combined Operations Pilotage Parties) SBS (special boat section) RMBPD (Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment) or Halser’s Party as they liked to be known as, and DETACHMENT 385 (The ‘Bootnecks’), were made in support of local forces throughout the areas mentioned.
these were the elite of the elite forces.
the COPP’s themselves were not even known about until in the 50’s ithink, the U.S. media found out about them and their activities were gradually known of. i will not go on about them cos there is so very much info to get through. these guys basically were the people who planned the approach attack.
a little of the vast amount of info on these chaps…
based on haylaing island nr portsmouth england.
C.O.P.P.S
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties
The first C.O.P.P was formed in the U.K. in 1942 and in the words of Commander Clogstoun-Willmott they were to become ‘Rolls Royce equipped commandos’.
The actual cover title for C.O.P.P was Combined Operations Police Patrol as many of the cover activities of the unit such as canoeing in the dark near booms and gangways could be explained in this way. The Combined Operations Pilotage Party was the approved title for Combined Operations Beach and Pilotage Reconnaissance Party. Perhaps the greatest users of canoes were the C.O.P.P’s.
The party was never referred to by the word ‘reconnaissance’, but by Combined Operations Police Patrol Units or if essentially required C.O. Police Patrols, Naval Commandos or Commandos to the local populace around Hayling Island where they had their base of operation.
A subsidiary role was for Pilotage and/or canoe marking duties on any given assault and subsequent rough surveys, mine detection, guide and Pilotage duties.
The origins and value of reconnaissance work can be traced back to April 1941 when two officers, Commander Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott DSO DSC RN and Major Roger. J. Courtney MC KRRC, launched from a submarine in a two-man canoe and paddled themselves to within half mile of the shoreline of the Island of Rhodes.
For various reasons the value of such work was not realised until late 1942 when it was decided by the Chiefs of Staff that beach reconnaissance was to become an integral part of future amphibious assaults and to that end ten units were formed, trained and equipped so this work could be accomplished.
Commander Willmott was then attached to Combined Operations and along with two officers was instructed to build up the new organisation with a COPP depot.
By the end of February 1943 the sailing club at Hayling Island had been requisitioned.
Primarily Naval Parties, each team was commanded by either a Lt. Commander or Lieutenants rank with the appropriate Hydrographic or Navigation qualification and experience.
Transported to an area concerned via H.D.M.L, minor landing craft or submarine the final approach and task was carried out by canoes or with swimmers from canoes.
The very nature of COPP work called for a high degree of navigational skill. They were specially trained for detailed reconnaissance and surveys of enemy held beaches as well as the seaward approaches, land exits, provision for markers and guides for subsequent assault. A minimum of five hours of darkness was required for a successful beach reconnaissance, as well as fine weather (F2 wind) despite the workhorse , the Mark 1** being seaworthy up to F4 wind.
They had trained almost entirely with submarines; they also had trained to act as markers and pilots for the D-Day landings.
A typical operation with a submarine would consist of a party of four,
It took six months to train the Commanding Officer of a COPP unit (S/Copp) from scratch. The training syllabus for the ranks was between 13-15 weeks at the Hayling Island depot, and one week with a submarine.
The size of the unit on operations was governed by the capacity of the parent craft, usually submarine and the ‘offspring’ – the canoe.
At that time a ‘U’ class submarine could carry two teams consisting of two canoes and crew with enough room for a maintenance man or spare operational crew; the provision of four two man teams in each unit being the original intention.
At any one time there were rarely any more than 150 on active duty; during 1943-1945 the total number serving in COPP was a maximum of 250. They served in all theatres with the exception of the American and Australian Pacific.
The Officer-in-Charge during May-August 1943 was Lieutenant-Commander Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott R.N., D.S.O. D.S.C.; COPP 1 was the original team formed by Willmott which became the Training and Development Unit at Hayling Island.
During this time Willmott was concentrating on the preparations for the Normandy landings in which the COPP’s played an extremely valuable role, without which it is doubted it would have been a success.
In the Far East it was believed that reconnaissance was very important; the knowledge of the beaches in that theatre was inadequate at that time (1944) and as a large proportion of the operations were to be amphibious a considerable amount of beach reconnaissance would be required.
In early 1944 General MacLeod on behalf of S.A.C.S.E.A. had asked for as many teams as possible, but at that time the number of parties that could operate in the theatre was determined to the availability of carriers such as submarines, hence the introduction of Flying Boats.
In mid-May 1944 two COPP teams were in the Far East,
Fortunately a record of photographs showing various COPP’s parties on completion of training at the depot still exists.
Of the COPP’s time in the Far East, Willmott compared the foray in Burma with the Japanese ‘as not unlike those of crews in bomber command’. with the unhealthy water of Akakan, as well as the disease, many individuals succumbed.
Night reconnaissance was the only possible way to proceed as it was too easy for a canoe to be ambushed during daylight hours. Thus in these difficult conditions the intelligence was gathered and used for the 14th Army’s advancement south and east through Burma. ]
this is continued on an additional thread … found it to be too long for posting
Q
Continued fron canoe related info post new thread…
A large proportion of the COPP equipment was that of Special Stores.
As with the evolved stores canoe use also changed, becoming more specialised as the need arose, especially in tropical climes.
The weapons included a silent pistol ‘The Welrod ’, Grenades 36M & 82 type, beach gradient gear and reels, special sounding reels, waterproof protection covering for various items such as watches and compasses, type 31CM RG beacons with batteries, type ‘C’ Mine detectors, underwater writing equipment, type ‘U’ RG Receiver.
The pre-depot training for Officers consisted of; three weeks Beach Pilotage at H.M.S. James Cook; 10-14 days RE beach reconnaissance at CTC Dundonald; 7-10 days of Naval beach organisation at H.M.S. Armadillo; 7 days of Navigational aids at H.M.S. Northney I; Three days with major landing craft at Troon; two days of photographic reconnaissance interpretation at Dundonald Aerodrome. H.M.S Armadillo hosted four weeks of naval beach organisation for the other ranks.
The depot training for all ranks comprised of lectures, endurance tests, demonstrations, exercises and practical canoe training. After four or five months the officers were required to be proficient in canoe work which included Pilotage, sounding methods and homing techniques, launching and recovery; planning of a reconnaissance; close combat, evasion and escape; COPP maintenance; reproduction of information by graphs and sounding data; observation through submarine periscope, sketching and photography; reconnaissance methods in surface parent craft - LCP(H), disguised fishing craft, including knowledge of beaching capabilities of various craft and capabilities and limitations of different types of vehicles and the role of the naval beach commando.
The training of the unit continued right up to the actual operation with increasing application of the task in hand anywhere in the world. Whilst in the U.K. each COPP, post training, was given further training practice in launching and recovery of canoes from submarines of five or six day’s duration.
Midget submarines or X craft were used in the technique of beach reconnaissance. The surface craft used were only suitable for specific tasks of short duration and were either LCN, LCP, disguised Prau, Caique, Dhow, and this also depended on the locality of the operation and availability of the craft. All of these craft could carry canoes for marking and swimmer carrying. There were distinct Naval and Army responsibilities.
The COPP organisation was quietly disbanded post hostilities, with the R.M.Commandos taking over the reconnaissance and special boat work. In 1945 those parties in NW Europe were regrouped and lettered A, S, M and E.
The name COPP became COBBS (Combined Operations Boat and Beach Section) and then S.C.O.B.B.S. and was based at Westward Ho! – Instow & Fremington in North Devon.
It should be noted that the COPP 7 Commander subsequently became Admiral Geoff Hall DSC.
Hall’s COPP 7 arrived in India in the autumn of 1943 and during the following twelve months was joined by other reconnaissance units eventually forming the S.O.G. team on 12th June 1944.
Hall nearly lost his life through becoming tangled in his own measuring line on one operation, when being used for a beach survey, due to heavy waves. The semi-conscious Hall was saved by his number one, Ruari Mclean. Both men were awarded the DSC for their part in the reconnaissance in Burma that later paved the way for Commando raids.
The COPP organisation remained secret until the American Press featured their work in 1954.
detach 385 was a unit with other specialities. some info is available on 385 but much has not been known of even to this day.[/FONT]
so chaps after all of this meaty feast this is a VERY small snippit of the INTRODUCTION of the manuscript. it has also been edited.
this info is not as important to me as most of the other stuff and as you cahps are interested in men/units etc it will give you a taster to the information contained within my manuscript.
believe you mee there is lots lots more. most of which has never been known of. hard to believe? i thought so when i failed to find out about canoes etc on the web!
this was hard graft for me so allow me a little secrecy on my subject matter.
interested in canoes WW2? think you know info on same try WW2 british military canoes on GOOGLE GROUPS. POST some messages and tell all!
if you have or know of a military looking canoe post info
ok?
snooze
Q
I thought as a tribute to this group of chaps i would post the detachment song
We’re happy,were happy, were glad to be alive,
for we are the boys of old 385
we’ll fight and we’ll fight,we’ll fight any foe,
we are the ‘bootnecks’ who never say no!
we live on what we can borrow,
we dont give a damn for tomorrow,
all we want is beer, baccy and wait for it - wait for it.
down in our camp there are sergeants in rows,
where they get stripes from Lord only knows.
they stand on the square and they bawl and they shout,
all about things thay know nothing about.
sing high! sing low! wherever you go
we are the ‘bootnecks’ who never say no.
ops undertaken by the 385…
(all operations 1945 and burma except were indicated.)
feb
‘attempt’ in chaungtha, ngayokkaung and sinma
march
‘copyright’ (siam); chaungtha 2; bruteforce 1; noah 2 (off Malaya); bruteforce 2; pagoda point; meridian & cattle (Sumatra); clearance baker (Saim); defraud (Nicobar Isalnds); fairy; carpenter 3 (malaya); graph (Siam); slumber (off Sumatra); subtract (Siam); subtract (Siam)
aug/sept 1945 - occupation of penang malaya
these guys were based off the jaffna pennisula of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) at hammenheil camp (old dutch fort hammenheil nearby camp).
please realise the distances travelled and realise also that all these chaps had a great realisation that they might well not return from an operation. due to their M.O. very few perished.
operation Copyright
two members Major J Maxwell and Ex 682 C/Sgt E C Smith were executed ( 20th July 1945) by the japs by the sword ( beheading ) firstly buried at johore bahru there bodies now rest at Kranji war cemetery in singapore plot 23 row a 12-14 also beheaded at the same time was F/O Tomlinson.
the two japanese offices who carried out this execution werte found out and after confessing and to save the honour of their superior officers they made the ’ amend honorable’ ( hari )
details of this can be found from the hq malaya command intelligence summary no 10, which was based on information recieved up to 5th jan 46
a happy note is that by some quirk the relative of the F/O tomlinson had no thought he had been lost at sea. it was many years later that the true fate was revealed.
Q
Very nice Q.
How about posting it all on one thread though?
Start the thread, and then put the rest ina reply. Starting multiple threads just muddies the waters.
Can a mod merge these two threads please?
So far, all related threads have been merged.
forgive me but the machine would let me post all the words written and as i am so stupid i took the road most travelled for once ie the easy routee!
Q
i reather think your mistaken.
it was hush hush at the time. obviously not now.
most of canoe info in these books is inaccurate. end of.
IT WAS called Small ops group… so when you say ‘i dont think’ please do b4 posting.
i have done an aweful lot of homework and when pro’s or amatuers think they are right it often means they have read it and not researched it.
there is many an author who instead of going to source material has taken what has been written in other publication as correct. mistakes are therefore made.
i have already listed the ops of 385 FROM Ceylon to various areas concerned, your mail does not state that they operated from ceylon but i understand what you mean. others may not.
i am aware of the oakley book. i ahve it! i am also aware that most of the info is not written but lifted almost entirely from org archive material. i have seen it. in fact oakley has made certain mistake.
these above points were confirmed when i talk to the RM archivists who also came to the same conclusions i reached.
the oakley book is not so much a book but a small notebook.
ladds invisible raiders is most amusing when it comes to getting accurate info on canoes!
i could waste my time telling you but i cannot be bothered.
it REALLY irritates me when someone puports the know yet makes so many basic mistakes… i think its called lazyness.
ladd only deals with men and ops the other info on canoes is a sideshow full of inaccurate info.
regards
I have some other information on this, but I want to check it with a couple of chums. I’ll post it later on a different thread.
By the way. The British SAS in WW2 were 1SAS and 2SAS When the TA regiment was formed through the Artists, it was those past numbers which gave it its identification. There was already some unit or other designated ‘12’ (Para, I think) so, they reversed the numbers and it became designated 21SAS (just in case you didn’t know that 
) There were others in WW2, by the way, 3, 4 etc…French, Belgian etc.
When ‘G’ Squadron, 22 SAS was first formed, its members were selected from the Guards Division, hence: ‘G’ Squadron.
Aye
Thanks for the great info Quentin.
I’ll “see ya” on your google group in the future
hi given my limited field of interest i rather think its best
regards
ps when anything ww2 comes up ask me please.
Q